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By Salvador de MADARIAGA



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FOREWORD

To most Englishmen Spain is a land of mystery. Here is a volume written by an eminent Spanish scholar and man of affairs which seeks to lift the veil. Only a Spaniard habited in the rich fancy of his race can do this. Don Salvador de Madariaga, who sees so sharply, feels so deeply and uses our English language with such brilliant precision, does not allow us to forget that he is a Spaniard with the artistic temperament of that distinguished people. A little paradox does not alarm him, nor does he shrink from stating views upon contemporary affairs from which many of his compatriots would dissent. For him an ounce of keen perception is worth a pound of magisterial equanimity. Yet though he has the convictions of a Spanish Constitutionalist, he is no narrow partisan, but, having a wide knowledge of international affairs, and some experience, from his work in the Secretariat at Geneva, in the handling of them, he presents the history of Spain in that larger context. To his English readers much of the information contained in this volume will be new, and many of the reflections arresting, and at variance with preconceptions inherited from Elizabethan times.

H. A. L. Fisher.

5744

PREFACE

THE author is indebted to a number of friends for advice, books and documents. He wishes to express his thanks to Professor Don Fernando de los Rios for most valuable notes, as well as for his works *Religión y Estado en La España del Siglo XVI.* and *The Religious Character of Colonial Law in Sixteenth-Century Spain*; also to Don Joaquin Pellicena, editor of *La Veu de Catalunya,* and Professor F. Valls-Taberner for their cordial contributions to his study of the Catalan question; and to Don J. Dantín Cereceda and Don Luis de Hoyos Sáinz for books and notes on several points. He is especially indebted to Don Francisco Cambó for the manuscript of an unpublished book which is a masterly survey of the Catalan question and to Don Leopoldo Palacios for the manuscript of his forthcoming book on Freedom of Labour Association in Spain.

Acknowledgments are also due to *The Times* and to *The Yale Review* for permission to reproduce material which was published in their columns. More detailed acknowledgments will be found in the notes on sources and bibliography appended at the end of the volume.

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PART ONE

LAND, PEOPLE AND HISTORY

CHAPTER I

THE LAND

THE main fact about the land is its inaccessibility. Spain is a castle. The Iberian Peninsula stands at a higher mean altitude than any other European nation save Switzerland, and, if it be borne in mind that Switzerland rises on a pedestal of high lands while Spain rises from the sea, the average altitude of Spain (2,000 feet approximately) will appear as more impressive than the average altitude of Switzerland (3,600 feet). Mont Blanc is in the centre of Europe far from the sea; the Iberian Peninsula can show peaks comparable with, though not as high as, Mont Blanc on its four coasts: north, the Cantabric range; west, the Sierra de la Estrella; south, the range of the Andalusian coast; and east, the knot of mountains behind Valencia. Save for the valley of the Guadalquivir, which penetrates in a gradual ascent to the very heart of the peninsular labyrinth, the whole territory is thus surrounded by high walls, leaving between them and the ocean but narrow strips of land intersected by torrents, short valleys soon abruptly walled by rising lands (as the Tagus valley) or narrow passages through which the river winds its way from its inner valley to the sea (as in the case of the Ebro). Thus

closed in behind the high walls of its several coastal cordilleras and the towering Pyrenees, the Peninsula stretches as a vast tableland, broken up, however, into several compartments both by ranges of mountains and by deep depressions.

The citadel of this castle is the Central Tableland or Meseta Central, an archaic formation stretching over two-thirds of the territory at an average altitude of about 2,000 feet, and generally considered as the geological nucleus and the oldest constituent of the Peninsula. This Tableland gives the country its most typical features : loftiness, bareness, space. It lies, slightly tilted in a south-westerly direction, leaning on the Cantabric range to the north, and on the Iberian cordillera to the north-east. It is limited on the west by the depression which separates it from the Atlantic plain on which Portugal lies ; to the south-west by a sheer drop forming a wall at the foot of which falls the Guadalquivir. The Meseta is thus a true citadel surrounded by walls and waters. The valley of the Guadalquivir, which limits it on the south, explains Andalusia. Beyond the western edge the Tagus spreads out in a low-lying plain which accounts for Portugal. North of the Cantabric range, Galicia, Asturias and Santander lie and thrive on the sea-shore with their backs leaning on the borders of the Central Tableland. From the Basque depression to the Catalan coastal chain, the Ebro flows in a deep ditch wedged in between the Pyrenees and the Iberian range, in a kind of triangle which contains the lands of the old crown of Aragon ; Valencia is wedged in between the sea and the formidable walls which limit the Tableland on the east ; while Murcia, on the north-eastern slope of the Andalusian range, communicates with Castile through the steppes of La Mancha immortalised by Don Quixote. Nor

is the Meseta itself a mere flat tableland. A range of high mountains, perpendicular to the Iberian range, cuts it from north-east to south-west into two portions : Old Castile, the land of the Duero, known in English-speaking countries under its Portuguese name of Douro ; and New Castile (with La Mancha), the land of the Tagus or Tajo, which the Toledo range separates in its turn from the Guadiana valley. It is nowadays maintained that the Central Tableland has (in relatively recent times) undergone an upward movement which contributes to increase its isolation from the surrounding parts of the peninsular territory.

A geographical survey reveals, therefore, the centrifugal character of the peninsula. Madrid, the capital of the kingdom, communicates with the north through three mountain passes, the lowest of which rises to 4,700 feet. The two main railways connecting Madrid with the north have to ascend about 1,500 to 1,600 feet in their first 60 miles. The towns on the northern coast, Bilbao, Santander, Gijón, Coruña, are reached by railway from the Central Tableland through regular strings of tunnels coiled in inextricable knots in and around the high valleys of the north and north-west. The railway to Málaga crosses the Andalusian range very much as an alpine climber ventures on unexplored ground, always on the edge of precipices, and to this day Madrid remains unconnected directly with Valencia, its nearest seaport (as the crow flies), through the sheer power of natural obstacles. The north-western territory, the four Atlantic valleys, the Ebro valley and the south-eastern territories are mutually inaccessible and point in different directions; moreover, the Tableland is also separated from the Portuguese plains by a sudden drop in altitude. The general inaccessibility of the Peninsula is thus prolonged

inwards, and walls and battlements divide within itself the territory which walls and battlements separate from other countries.

From such a relief considerable variety is to be anticipated. In point of climate, however, the Peninsula may be classified into two main regions: wet and dry. The frontier between these two regions is fairly accurately known to-day. It starts on the Catalan coast, on the northern side of the Ebro, running westward past the point where the Iberian and the Catalonian ranges meet, then, circling round south of the Cantabric range, it turns southward, following the Portuguese frontier though advancing into Spanish territory on the high lands stretching north and south of the Tagus, and leaving on dry territory the whole of southern Portugal. This line divides the Peninsula into two parts: north and west of it lies a country of soft, temperate, and rainy climate; south and east of it a country with a hard, extreme, and dry climate. Of the 226,590 square miles of the Peninsula, 101,790 belong to the northern and western temperate and wet region, while 124,800 belong to the extreme dry south-east. Portugal partakes of both, though in unequal proportions, most of it belonging to the temperate wet zone. If Portuguese territory be excluded, the representative figures are 69,420 for the rainy north-west and 122,460 for the dry south-east. Temperate and rainy Spain represents, therefore, about 36 per cent., or slightly over one-third of the Peninsula. Yet these figures must be carefully interpreted. A large proportion of the temperate part of Spain is made up of high, uninhabitable regions, and, though the valleys which they hide away in their inextricable labyrinths are generally rich and thickly populated,

there is in their very isolation an inherent element of weakness when they are considered from the point of view of their contribution to the spirit and character of the country as a whole. Both Spains make Spain : the temperate and the extreme ; but there is little doubt that the extreme is the more important of the two. Lofty, bare, and spacious, this Spain impresses the mind with a sense of primitive strength. Whether in summer, when it receives on its " monk-coloured " mantle the fierce caress of an overpowering sun ; or in autumn, when deep purple clouds drag their mysterious shadows across its unlimited plains in silence ; or in the thin, clear winter, when the sunlight seems to lend its cold gleams to the sharp knives of the Sierra winds ; or in its fleeting spring, the Castilian Tableland is a country with a grandeur and a majesty which make it the worthy companion of the great scenes of Nature—seas and skies—and of the great moods of the spirit—poetry and contemplation.

North, south, east and west of the Central Tableland, and in deep contrast with its vast monotony, Spain presents to the traveller every possible landscape. Portugal is a sunnier Normandy. Norway has no more picturesque fjords than Galicia, nor Switzerland more impressive peaks than the snowy mountains of Asturias and Santander ; the Scot, winding his way up the industrial valley of the Nervion, may well imagine himself travelling towards Glasgow along his busy Clyde ; the wooded slopes of Navarre are a match to those of the Black Forest ; the Ebro valley, with its alternation of dry, broken, reddish cliffs and fertile oases is, perhaps, purely Spanish ; but lower Catalonia is a Mediterranean country, and could be either Italian or Greek ;

Valencia and Murcia, whose rivers run dry so that their chequered plains may flourish, are still Moorish, with now and then a Palestinian touch in the landscape—the palm-tree and the biblical well. Andalusia, again, is purely Spanish, though it might be dreamed of in Persia or in the pages of the *Thousand and One Nights*. And yet all this variety is, so to speak, shrouded in the atmosphere of unity. From soft, moody Galicia to parched, clear Murcia, glowing under its hot sun, from the snowy pines of Asturias to the dusty palm-trees of Alicante, from the puritanical narrow valleys of grey Guipuzcoa to the blossoming *vegas* of western Andalusia, the same air, the same mood seems to be suggested by Nature. Spain is one under all her Spains, and this is the first mystery which has to be solved. What is this one quality which unifies the several qualities; this deeper impression which covers and colours all other impressions? A kind of primitive strength, static, unexpressed. A kind of passive vigour. It is best understood, perhaps, in the wild vegetation of its dry, uncultivated lands, particularly those broken territories which the more enterprising traveller is apt to discover for his gratification in the higher recesses of its mountainous knots. The earth is often but that rough sand which results from decomposing granite. For the greater part of the year it is dry, now baked by a merciless sun, now contracted by the severe frosts of a luminous winter. Yet this rough earth clings to its mountain-side and brings forth sturdy, vigorous plants, small wiry twigs covered with tiny flowers which no dew ever comes to refresh—little flowers of infinite variety and so strong in aroma that, once it has been scented, all other country walks seem flat to the most imaginative of senses. Botanists say that of the ten

thousand flowers known in Europe more than half are to be found only in Spain ; navigators, that the scent of Spain is perceptible from the seas before her coasts are in sight. Such is the primitive fertility of the Peninsula, a fertility which is but a sign, a symbol of that quality which makes it one in its variety. Its quiet strength, its permanent vitality, is the source of that impression which the traveller finds everywhere as the Spanish essence under the Catalonian, Aragonese, Castilian and Andalusian forms. Rough, primitive, dry, but rich in spontaneous scent, in wild vegetation, in uncultivated grace, the Peninsula is, in itself, apart from the people who inhabit it, a great power and a great presence.

CHAPTER II

THE PEOPLE

VARIED but one is the land; varied but one the people. Recent anthropological studies show the complex mixture of physical types which can be found in Spain. A centre of round-headed types seems well established on the Cantabric coast, stretching from Santander to Coruña, while a similar centre of long-headed races would appear to exist on the south-eastern coast, between Alicante and Almeria. Yet long-headed types are also the rule in Castile, Teruel, Alava, and even Orense and Portugal, while round-headed ones are to be found in Cáceres and in the southernmost part of the Peninsula, i.e., the district of Málaga, as well as amongst the women of the Guadalquivir valley. This blend of types becomes still more apparent when types are defined, not merely by the usual proportion between the two diameters generally adopted to discriminate between so-called long-headed and so-called short-headed races, but by a higher number of cranial indexes. By adopting a three-dimensional method a contemporary Spanish anthropologist has outlined a map of racial regions which illustrates the intimate blending of the purely racial elements in the Peninsula. An endeavour to establish a certain amount of order in this chaos of data would lead to dividing the Peninsula into the following regions:

1*st Region.*—Inhabited by a long-headed type. Can be subdivided into two zones :

(*a*) The Aragonese Iberian zone, with a long, high, narrow skull and a fairly high proportion of light-coloured eyes and fair or red hair (about 35 per cent.).

(*b*) The Valencian zone, which occupies the eastern coast from the Ebro mouth to the Cape of Gata. Here the face is even narrower than in the preceding zone and the proportion of blue and grey-eyed and fair and red-headed types is much smaller.

These two types have been related to an African-Iberian or Berber race.

2*nd Region.*—Inhabited by a round-headed type. May be subdivided as follows :

(*a*) Cantabrian zone (Santander to Coruña). The skull is wide, short and somewhat low, yet the face is apt to be narrow ; the nose sharp and the eye-orbits low but wide; a lively complexion, frequently red or fair hair, clear hazel eyes.

(*b*) The Estremadura zone. A less robust race with more angular features and darker eyes, though blue eyes are not rare.

These two zones have been traced to Celtic origins, though the second is sometimes considered as Ligurian.

3*rd Region.*—A middle type, also subdivided into two zones, closely related, however.

(*a*) The Basque zone. The skull has a shape intermediate between the two extreme types mentioned in Regions 1 and 2 ; the face is long and narrow, the nose sharp and aquiline, the orbit low. Light-coloured eyes are found in a proportion of about 40 per cent.

(*b*) The Castilian zone. Still within the middle group, yet with a tendency towards the long-headed type. The name Castilian should not be taken literally here, as this region includes provinces which are not politically Castilian (such as Leon), while it leaves out Santander (politically Castilian, but belonging to the 2nd or round-headed region) and Soria and Logroño (belonging to the 1st region, Aragonese variety). Its most constant feature is the absence of fair hair and light-coloured eyes.

Other less marked types are :

4th Region.—The Manchegan type, with a high and narrow skull, often short, a low forehead, a heavy jaw, long nose and wide orbits. It is believed to represent an old prehistoric Peninsular stock.

5th Region.—The round-headed Andalusian. A dark-coloured type inhabiting the provinces of western Andalusia.

Finally, there are two considerable regions, namely, eastern Andalusia and Catalonia, the study of which has led to no further conclusion than the extreme complexity of their physical characteristics and, therefore, the probable mixed character of their inhabitants. Such a conclusion can evidently be generalised to cover the whole Peninsula. A physical study of the Spanish race confirms the view that the Spaniard results from a mixture of several races, the clearest types of which would appear to be a long-headed "Iberian," settled, roughly, along the Ebro valley and the eastern coast, and a round-headed "Celt" occupying the north coast from Santander to Cape Finisterre.

Opinions as to the origins of the Spanish people are as varied as opinions in such matters are apt to

be. Humboldt held the Peninsula to have been inhabited by the Basques. For such a view the eminent German is now held in derision. On the authority of the Romans, Spain is said to have been populated by three peoples: Iberians, Celts, and Celt-Iberians. On equally sound Roman authority we are told that the Spanish Peninsula was peopled by four races: Tartessians, Kampses, Saephs, and Cantabrians. A similar wealth of historical opinion is at our disposal as to the actual realities behind all these names. Do we want to know what the Iberians were like? Tacitus will tell us that they were "swarthy-skinned and curly-haired men"; Sylvius Italicus, that their hair was of a glowing gold and their skin white as snow; while Calpurnius Flaccus will assure us that they were tall and fair-haired. If we enquire as to their origin, we are confronted with four theories: the Iberians are an African type closely akin to the Berber and Tuareg peoples, and they came to Spain from the south; they are Indo-Europeans and they came to Spain from the east; they are Indo-Europeans and they came to Spain from the north; and they are Atlantians, and therefore they came to Spain from the west. In the circumstances, we may safely conclude that the matter of who the old Spaniards were and where they came from is at present in a state of well-ascertained and scientific ignorance. We may be allowed to leave it there.

Two things, however, seem certain. The first is that from a very early time, perhaps as far back as the twelfth century B.C., there was a wealthy, active and enlightened civilisation in the south and south-east of Spain, a civilisation which has left such traces as the Cáceres rings to be seen in the Louvre, and which, long before the Greeks had ventured to dis-

cover it, had itself struck an acquaintance with the British Isles and traded with its inhabitants. The second, that the Iberians, whoever they were and wherever they came from, were already known in the past for most of the characteristics which are attributed to Spaniards of all times. A French historian has pointed out that while ten years sufficed for Cæsar to conquer Gaul, Carthage and Rome, with such leaders of men as Hannibal and the two Scipios, had to fight for two centuries before they reduced Spain to subjection. The best known Spaniard of that period, Viriatus, was a typical specimen of the race: a self-made man, noble by nature though not by birth, a born leader though far from a born organiser, despising luxury and wealth, a fanatical lover of freedom, the slave of his word, tenacious rather than persevering.

Over this first layer, itself certainly mixed, a series of waves of civilisation and immigration were spread, covering a greater or lesser period of time and space and leaving a greater or lesser mark upon the character of the Spanish people. The Phœnicians and the Greeks were the first. They had settlements on the south-eastern and eastern coasts, and were isolated factors with but a small connection with the hinterland. Carthage had a deeper influence. Two great towns were founded by the Carthaginians: Cartagena and Barcelona. But the hold of Carthage lasted but a third of a century, and it was succeeded by the sway of Rome, which was to leave on Spain the deepest racial and social influence before that of the "Arabs." The Romanisation of the country was extremely quick once the military resistance was broken. By the end of the Augustan period Rome had conquered Spain with her arms, and Spain Rome with her letters. The literature of the Silver Age is

Spanish. The Antonine Emperors, from Trajan to Marcus Aurelius, were Spanish. Such a swift adaptation suggests not so much an educational as a colonising effort on the part of Rome. Roman soldiers, ex-soldiers, civil servants, mixed with the aboriginal population and contributed to Romanise it.

The several hordes of barbarians which overran the country from the first half of the fifth century cannot be said to have left in Spain either a racial or a social influence comparable with that of the Romans. They disrupted Roman civilisation and plunged the country into anarchy, out of which in the course of time the Visigothic Kingdom was gradually evolved. It cannot be said that the Visigothic period contributed much to the social and racial characteristics of the Spaniards. Most of what was institutional in it had been left over from the Roman period, whether it was actually Roman or Iberian. The only important event which occurred during the Visigothic era was the adoption of the Christian religion as the religion of the State, first in its Arian form, then in the orthodox Catholic form, thanks to King Reccared (586–601). But the very inadequacy of the Visigothic military State enabled the south of Spain to settle down to its usual task of evolving a culture and a civilisation. During this period St. Isidore shines in Seville, a beacon not only for Spain, but for the whole of Christendom.

The Visigothic sway fell at the hands of the people who, with the Romans, were to exert the deepest influence over the Spaniards. The "Arabs," or the "Moors" as they are called, with a truly impartial inaccuracy, invaded Spain in 711. Almost instantly they covered the whole Peninsula, with the exception of the inaccessible valleys of the high Cantabric and Pyrenean ranges. From 711 till the fall of

Granada in 1492, they lived on the most intimate terms with the people they found in the Peninsula, both in peace and in war—two forms of intimacy. The Reconquista is not so much a war as a historical period, the true meaning of which can only be grasped when mediæval Spain is seen as the frontier between the Islamic and the European civilisations of the time.[1] From the ninth to the eleventh century the civilisation of our world is Islamic. Christendom is in the dark while Islam shines in Baghdad and in Córdoba with all the lights of science, art, politics, culture and refinement. Northern Spain is divided up into petty barbarian kingdoms on whom the mighty and refined Khalif of Córdoba looks down very much as the President of the French Republic looks down upon Moroccan tribes. Islamic Spain gives the world her philosophers, astronomers, mathematicians, mystics, poets, historians. In one of the smallest courts of "El Andalus," in Almería, there were five thousand looms weaving all kinds of cloth from brocade and silk to wool and cotton, and the Prime Minister of a small State (a kind of Islamic Goethe in his Spanish Weimar) had four hundred thousand books in his library, while the "great" and famous library of the monastery of Ripoll in Christian Catalonia boasted of its paltry 192 volumes. During this period the Christian kingdoms of northern Spain were the tributaries of the Khalif of Córdoba, i.e., of the monarch of "Spain," in financial, political and cultural matters, and it was to Córdoba that they sent their ministers, or that they repaired themselves, to seek the help of the Khalif, to ask for his protection, to beg him to arbitrate between their rival

[1] *See* on this point the scholarly book of Don Ramón Menéndez Pidal, *La España del Cid*, 1929.

claims. Towards the end of the tenth century Almanzor, a Napoleonic dictator, arose in the Khalifate and in a series of fifty campaigns he reduced the Christian kingdoms to complete subjection, from Catalonia to Galicia, carrying numberless trophies to Córdoba, in the mosque of which he hung as lamps the bells of Saint James of Compostela.

But the Islamic civilisation entered a period of decadence. The Khalifate of Córdoba fell into weak hands, and disintegrated into smaller kingdoms, while Christian civilisation was rising in Europe under the leadership of high-principled kings (Robert the Pious of France, St. Henry of Germany, St. Stephen of Hungary and, later, Ferdinand I of Castile-León). Seven years after Almanzor's death (1009) Sancho García, Count of Castile, entered Córdoba at the head of his knights. The wheel had turned full circle. El Andalus was going to break up and its petty kingdoms were to fall vassals to the northern king —to "Spain." The body, "Spain," was the same, but the spirit which it was to house was going to change, within the eleventh century, from the spirit of Islam to that of Christianity. The north produced its representative hero in El Cid, just as the south had produced Almanzor, and almost exactly one hundred years later. But just as Almanzor was no longer exactly the Khalifate, but in reality the beginning of its disintegration, so El Cid was not yet exactly the king of Spain, but the herald, the precursor of the king. He is a free lance. He symbolises that period when the Northern States are not yet strong or united enough, while the Southern States are still capable of some resistance. In this transitional situation the Christians adopt a complex policy comprising protection, exploitation, vassalage, and, now and then, actual wars with the Moorish kings.

The struggle, however, is much less one of nations and peoples than of religions and civilisations. Señor Menéndez Pidal has shown that the north was more Christian than the south was Islamic. El Andalus contained :—

(*a*) Moslems of Eastern origin, many of whom had married Christian women.

(*b*) Moslems of Spanish origin (Gothic or Hispano Roman)—numerically far stronger than the first group—who had been converted to Islam in the course of time, and who also had often married Northern women;

(*c*) A considerable Christian population (Mozárabes) who lived amidst the Moors, under their Christian faith and Visigothic laws, ruled by Christian bishops and counts;

(*d*) Isolated Christian lords who had succeeded in retaining a kind of independence in the midst of Islam.

El Andalus was bilingual. Both Arabic and *Romance* were spoken, and the line between the two languages was not one of religion, but one of culture. Arabic was spoken in the higher ranks of society, *Romance* by the popular classes. It is known that there were Moslems in Spain who knew no other language than *Romance*.

This picturesque constitution of El Andalus explains the progress of the Reconquista after the second half of the eleventh century. Beneath the religious difference the people were very much the same, north and south. The drive southwards was led less by a feeling of " foreign-ness " towards the inhabitants of El Andalus than by a tradition which felt Spain as one, and which, therefore, led the most powerful of the Spanish States to reconstitute the unity of Spain. This tradition was handed down

from the Roman and Visigothic periods through the kingdom of Leon to the king of Castile. By 1276, the date of James of Aragon's death, the whole Peninsula was under Christian control. James's States bordered on the south those of Alfonso the Sage. Ferdinand III (St. Ferdinand), Alfonso's father, had reduced the Moorish possessions to the kingdom of Granada, which had become one of his tributaries.

Much as the temper of the Spanish people towards the Moors and Jews changed after the eleventh century, until it led them to the wholesale expulsions of a later date, there is no doubt that in their four hundred years of cordial intimacy in peace and war the racial intermixture must have been deep. Not only the Moor but the Jew was bound to become an important element in the Spanish people as at present constituted. The typically Oriental characteristics of the Spaniard, though they may have pre-existed, must have been reinforced by these four centuries of familiarity with two typically Oriental races.

This is, perhaps, the best moment for remarking that the Spanish Peninsula, considered as a place or as an environment, seems to have an Oriental value of its own. If it be admitted that environment has a definite modelling effect on races and peoples, it follows that there may be places particularly attuned to definite people. Spain would appear to be an environment especially favourable to Oriental peoples. The Peninsula acts as a sounding-board for Oriental races, who usually give their richest sounds in it. Thus Spain brought to a high degree of excellence no less than three Oriental races: the Arab, the Jew, and the Gipsy. It was in Spain that Arab civilisation rose to its highest brilliancy;

Spanish Jews were the greatest luminaries of Hebrew civilisation since Biblical times; and as for the Gipsy, the superiority of the Spanish type over any other is not to be proved by books, but by the observation of the living specimens which may be found in Andalusia.

Such are the influences, racial, historical and local, which, in the course of ages, have fashioned the Spanish people, as we find it, on the threshold of modern history at the beginning of the sixteenth century.

A direct observation of this people leads to the same conclusion to which we were led by the survey of the land it inhabits; outward variety and inward unity. There are in Spain several well-defined types:

The Gallegan, in the north-western corner of the Peninsula, shrewd, intelligent, hard-working, thrifty, physically strong, provides Spain with lawyers, politicians, stevedores, policemen and the famous gangs of mowers who, in the early summer, travel southwards and return home, scythe in hand, harvesting the whole peninsular crop. The inhabitant of a soft, grey land, the Gallegan is of a dreamy disposition, poetical and imaginative, superstitious, apt to believe in apparitions and to feel the presence of the supernatural world. His mind and life have been admirably rendered by the most distinguished of living Gallegan men of letters, Don Ramón María del Valle-Inclán, in such works as the *Sonatas*, fortunately available in English.

The Asturian, a close neighbour of the Gallegan, is credited by tradition with a kinship more intimate even than mere neighbourhood: "Gallegans and Asturians are cousins german," as the popular dictum

has it. Yet they differ in many ways. (The Asturian is less reserved and more consciously intelligent, less cautious and more vivacious. He is still deeply poetical, but the faith, at times naïve, of the Gallegan, is here undermined by a quiet yet keen sense of humour.) These natural gifts are expressed in a popular poetry which ranks with the best to be found in a country so rich in popular poetry as Spain. Asturias has given Spain several of her enlightened statesmen. Its spirit is fitly represented in contemporary literature by Ramon Pérez de Ayala, a poet and a novelist, some of whose works, such as *Prometheus*, are available in English.

If, following the northern coast eastwards, we skip the province of Santander, a purely Castilian province in spirit, we come next to the Basque country, a labyrinth of narrow valleys, green as befits a land generously watered by skies too often grey. (The Basques are forest-men, fishermen, peasants; they are strong, healthy and simple. In recent years their inherent spirit of enterprise has blossomed out to such an extent that the Basque has become the chief capitalist of modern Spain. The Basque is apt to hold fast to his opinion, as people who have not many opinions to spare are wont to do. He is stern, loyal, uncompromising and narrow.) It is in the Basque valleys that the narrow-minded clerical Catholic movement finds its mainspring and its fastest strongholds. Loyola was a Basque. There are Basques of a different school of thought, more amenable to compromise, as the great name of Unamuno suffices to prove. The works of Don Miguel de Unamuno are the best guide for the understanding of the Basque spirit.[1]

[1] His masterpiece, *The Tragic Sense of Life in Men and Peoples*, has been admirably translated by Mr. Crawford Flitch.

At the other, the Mediterranean, end of the Pyrenees, the Catalans occupy a symmetrical position.[1] Aslant south of Basques and Catalans, the valley of the Ebro may be considered as the geographic definition of the kingdom of Aragon. The Aragonese is the most primitive, perhaps the most genuine representative of the distinctively Spanish features. Spontaneous, frank, he is apt to form extreme opinions; he is uncompromising, stubborn, richer in intuition than in conscious intellect, independent, proud and individualistic. Goya was an Aragonese, and his genius conveys the genius of Aragon better than any works of literature.

South of the Ebro the kingdom of Valencia, linguistically connected with Catalonia, might be interpreted as a combination of the Catalan and Aragonese spirit. It is mediterranean and expressive like Catalonia, but spontaneous and primitive like Aragon; more peasant than *bourgeois*. The passions of the Valencian are stronger and more easily aroused than is the case with his northern cousin. His love of pleasure is not so keen, nor is he so fond of thrift and comfort. Though as gifted as Catalonia in artistic tendencies, Valencia manifests herself in colour rather than in eloquence. The best exponents of her spirit are the two well-known artists recently lost by her: Blasco Ibañez the novelist, and Sorolla the painter. *The Cabin* of Blasco Ibañez is an admirable description of Valencian life and character.

If the Basques bring to the Spanish character force rather than grace, the Andalusians provide it with grace rather than force. The Andalusian is richer, no doubt, in æsthetic gifts, which he manifests freely in his daily life. Flowers and songs are his constant companions and an innate wisdom his principal

[1] For Catalan psychology, *see* Chapter XVI.

virtue.) The genius of Andalusia has been most felicitously expressed by two Sevillian authors, the brothers Serafin, and Joaquin Alvarez Quintero, some of whose plays have been published and staged in English, both in England and in America. /In the midst of all these varieties of Spain stands the central and normal type of the country, Castile. The Castilian spirit has been best expressed, and for all time, by the greatest of Castilians and of Spaniards—Cervantes. Don Quixote and Sancho are, strictly speaking, Manchegan, but the differences between La Mancha and Castile are not easily discernible, particularly at the psychological depth to which the great Castilian takes us. (Castile, moreover, provides the best specific example of Spanish character in general, i.e., that character which constitutes the unity under their variety and binds together the several types of Spaniards by means of an inner link.

[As with the land, so with the men. The sense of unity under the variety comes from an impression of primitive strength, of permanent vitality, of all-round synthetic vigour.) It may be first observed when dealing with the people. It will be noticed that the people, i.e., the popular classes, north or south, east or west, possess qualities of wisdom, of heart, of manners, which the visitor is used to connect with the cultured or well-to-do levels of society. The usual test—illiteracy—breaks down in Spain. Illiterates speak like Seneca, sing like Blake, and behave like Louis XIV. A composure, a quiet assurance, covered with respect but not oiled with subservience, a genuine fellow-feeling, a quick sense of dignity yet free from susceptibility, suggest that the Spanish people are endowed with a natural notion of equality springing from a deep sense of fraternity. A sense rather than a feeling, for rather

than a definite movement, or manifestation, or even mood, it is an atmosphere in which moods and movements manifest themselves.

Such a sense of the inherent equality of all men springs from a religious substratum which may or may not take a definite dogmatic form. Indeed, it is often strongest in men and women who are not conscious of its religious character. Yet it is religious in that it contemplates not the welter of social, political and economic orders, but the universal and permanent life order. Whether consciously or not, the Spaniard lives against a background of eternity, and his outlook is more religious than philosophic. Hence it is that the two poles of his psychology should be the individual and the universe; the subject and the Whole; and that life for him should consist in the absorbing of the universe by the individual, the *assimilation* of the Whole by the subject.

The individual thus becomes the standard of all life—an individual voluntarily stripped of all but essential tendencies. Instinctively at home in essential things, the Spaniard is therefore apt to evade the grasp of things which are less high up in the scale —things merely necessary or useful or advisable. The Spaniard is therefore unfettered by any sense of social pressure or intellectual standard. He is spontaneous, "all-round," always entirely present and wholly engaged wherever he happens to be. He shuns abstractions as much as any Englishman and is as free from inhibitions as any Frenchman can be. He is neither a citizen of an equalitarian State, nor a partner in a national society, nor a subject in an empire. He is a man.

This individualist is an egotist. His person is the channel through which the life-stream is made to pass, thus acquiring a personality polarised along a

definite individual direction. The Spaniard therefore feels patriotism as he feels love—in the form of a passion whereby he absorbs the object of his love and assimilates it, that is to say, makes it his own. He does not belong to his country so much as his country belongs to him, and as his perspective is concrete and individualistic it follows that he is apt to feel his patriotism with an intensity in inverse proportion to the area of the regions which surround him.

Moreover, the instinct for preserving his own liberty makes him eschew all forms of social co-operation, since all collective work tends to enslave the individual and to reduce him to the status of a piece of machinery. His anti-co-operative instinct comes to reinforce his tendency to dwell on the two poles of his psychology—man and the universe—leaving uncultivated the middle stretches in which social and political communities lie.

These middle stretches are precisely those which can be best governed by ethical and political principles. But the Spaniard, however interested he may be in such principles, governs his life by an individual "sense of direction" which works in him precisely in virtue of the passive character of his inward attitude towards life. In what concerns collective, and particularly political, life, the Spaniard is apt to judge events according to a dramatic criterion, singularly free from any practical considerations or intellectual prepossessions. It follows that in Spain, liberty, justice or free trade matter less than the particular Smith or Jones who is to incarnate them for the time being. Nor, be it said in passing, is such a point of view quite at variance with the experience of countries more politically-minded than Spain. In this dramatic criterion of the Spaniard,

his sense of man may be observed. His sense of the universe manifests itself in his tendency to found his political institutions on the widest and most universal basis, i.e., the religious basis. Thus his patriotism, considered as a mere manifestation of group-consciousness, is weakened both ways: at the individual end, because the individual tends to absorb the nation rather than allow himself to be absorbed by it; at the universal end, because the Spaniard who widens his outlook does not stop at the borders of the nation, and seeks to embrace the whole world.

This oscillation between the two extremes, man and the universe, is the rhythm that underlies the history of Spain.

CHAPTER III

THE SPANISH EMPIRE

THE modern history of Spain may be divided into the following periods of approximately the same duration :—

1. Rise and fall of the Spanish Empire (1492-1700).
2. (*a*) Restoration, new rise and new fall of Spain, as a world power under the Bourbon dynasty (1701-1800).
   (*b*) Rise of modern Spain as a self-contained nation (1800 to the present date).

In 1479, Isabel becomes queen of Castile, and Ferdinand king of Aragon. In 1492, they conquer Granada from the last of the Moorish kings in Spain and Christopher Columbus discovers America. Spain's career as a world power begins.

Spain is thus the first great nation to attain to full stature. The reign of Ferdinand and Isabel may be considered as symbolical of the forces which we are to observe at work in Spanish history. These forces may be reduced to three : the two extreme tendencies, individualism and universalism, both typical of the Spanish character; and a middle force then strongly active everywhere in Europe : State consciousness. Anarchy, religion, politics. The individual, the Church, the State. The first of these three forces is at play throughout the Middle Ages both in Castile and in Aragon. Isabel owes her crown at least in part to the disorders which the turbulent

Castilian nobility maintained against her predecessor and brother, the wretched Henry IV. Religion and politics may be seen incarnated respectively in Isabel and Ferdinand. It is not through sheer accident that Isabel is the queen of the Central Tableland, slanting away from the Mediterranean, rising above the Atlantic coast, isolated in its austere and primitive simplicity; while Ferdinand is the king of the Ebro valley, sloping towards the Mediterranean, open to the winds of Italy and to the temptations of wealth and conquest.

Isabel, daughter of a mad princess and mother of a mad queen, is herself a highly-strung woman, earnest, firm, conscientious, deeply possessed by the sense of her responsibility as the minister of God on earth. Every one of her actions is taken on this background of Eternity. She may err; she often does. But she means the best and the purest at every step. Her reign was inspired by the necessity of making Spain one in spirit. Her mind was religious and her vision essentially universal.

Ferdinand is a politician. He is the Politician: the model on which Machiavelli outlined his ideal *Prince*. Astuteness was his method as much as or more than force. On being told that the king of France complained that Ferdinand had deceived him twice, he commented: "The king of France lies. I have deceived him ten times." His aim is not spiritual, but political. He wants a State. His mind is positive and his vision national. Isabel and Ferdinand reigned on a footing of equality. Thus the religious and the political forces acted together, the more harmoniously in that they were led to solve similar problems in similar ways. Under their common rule the Spanish anarchy became a State and the Spanish State became a Church.

Not, be it understood, The Church; least of all, the Roman Church. Ferdinand and Isabel had definite ideas on this question. The expulsion of the Jews was not a Roman but a Spanish idea. The Inquisition was conceived and founded as a department of State, outside the jurisdiction of the Church and its bishops; and though in later years Rome sought to regain control over it, and did in part, the royal tendency to yield as little as possible to Papal pressure remained as active as ever.

Nor was Queen Isabel less firm in handling the Church at home. She resisted with great energy all attempts made by the ecclesiastical jurisdiction to encroach on the State jurisdiction. With the help of her confessor, Ximénez de Cisneros, Archbishop of Toledo, she undertook a strict reform of the Spanish Church. The Crown claimed the right to suggest names for the Spanish sees, and strongly protested in one or two cases when the Pope made appointments without consultation. Finally, the Crown secured from Rome considerable control over the Church in America. Thus the Spanish State, while identifying itself with the spiritual interests of the Catholic faith, did not submit to the Roman Church. It was itself a Church in that for it nationality and religion became one and its official interests were religious, i.e., the spiritual welfare of its subjects.

Of the two forces combining to establish an absolute Church-State in Spain, the political, represented by Ferdinand, was circumstantial and transitory, since it concerned the ways and means only; while the religious, incarnated in Isabel, was essentially permanent, for it aimed at the end. Both were transmitted to their successors by them, and both determine the policy of Spain in the Peninsula, in Europe and in America.

As was to be expected, the essential and permanent element of this policy, i.e., its religious character, is the stronger of the two. It explains why the standard by which the State is unified should be not political nor linguistic, but religious. Thus this royal couple, who insist on the conversion of all their new subjects to the Catholic faith, maintain a strict separation between the political institutions of their two kingdoms, with the significant exception of the Inquisition, which, with a perseverance akin to obstinacy, they impose on an unwilling Catalonia under Castilian forms and men. The Catalans, subjects of the Crown of Aragon, maintain their consuls in Castilian ports as in other foreign ports after the union of the two crowns. The Cortes, the judiciary, remain distinct. As to the language, the kingdom of Aragon was bi-lingual, for Aragon proper spoke Castilian, while the Catalans, who began then to speak Castilian through mere social causes such as the natural prestige of the language spoken at Court, were the object of no official action to stimulate this evolution. Political and cultural unity was not found essential. What was essential was a unity of faith. Hence the expulsion of the Jews. Ferdinand and Isabel have been severely criticised by learned economists and historians for having overlooked the disastrous economic consequences of such a measure. We might as well criticise Mahatma Gandhi for disregarding the political philosophy of Henry Ford. The Decree was sanctioned on March 31st, 1492. Mark the date: Granada had been taken from the last Moor on January 2nd. The expulsion was justified on the ground of the "great damage which has been and is being caused to Christians through the intercourse, conversation and communication which they have held and hold with

Jews who, as is proven, continuously try, by all ways and means at their disposal, to divert and turn faithful Christians from our holy Catholic faith, taking them away from it and drawing them towards their own diseased belief and opinion." All royal work is not, of course, so directly inspired by religious zeal. Both tendencies, political and religious, combine in a series of measures tending to strengthen the State. Unruly nobles are reduced to obedience with an iron hand, legislation is unified, municipal liberties, while respected in outward forms, are gradually brought under royal supervision and authority; the value of money is accurately defined and maintained uniformly throughout the kingdom; a protectionist policy, often misguided and generally inspired by an excessive confidence in State regulation of and intervention in economic matters, is pursued with remarkable perseverance and, in fine, the royal hand and mind are felt everywhere.

Thus strengthened at home, the now united kingdom sallies forth. If the religious inspiration of the Castilian queen prevails in home affairs, Ferdinand's political genius and the Mediterranean traditions of Aragon gain the upper hand in foreign policy. The Ebro valley looks towards the south-east. Catalonia is the natural rival of the king of France in a common claim over the Roussillon—Catalan by race and language, French by geographical necessity. The duel is thus against the French king and the battlefield Italy. Through many an episode the rivalry ended in the victory of the Spanish king, who, at his death in 1516, left to his heir the islands of Sardinia and Sicily, more than half the Italian Peninsula and the Roussillon.

Nor was war his only method for securing Spanish supremacy. He had woven a net of princely

marriages which, even after it had been torn by the ruthless hand of death, caught untold political wealth in its remaining meshes for the house of Spain. All his daughters were politically married; Isabel with the duke of Beja, heir to the Portuguese throne; Katherine with Henry VIII of England; Joan with Philip the Handsome, head of the house of Burgundy. Thus on the death of Ferdinand, who survived Isabel by twelve years, Charles, Joan's son, found himself king of Spain, of half the Italian Peninsula, the Low Countries and a fair portion of the north-east and south-east of what is now known as France.

Such was the political basis which Ferdinand prepared for the spirit of Isabel to rise above national limitations towards universal aims. The man who was destined to inaugurate a universal policy in Europe was half-Spanish, half-Flemish by birth and wholly Flemish by education. Distant and contemptuous at first towards his mother's country, he became the instrument of her historical destiny and, when exhausted by the struggle he sought relief from the burden of his crown, he chose a Spanish monastery for his retreat.

Three historical lines intertwine in the history of the Spanish Empire under the Austrian dynasty: the natural evolution of Spain herself; the evolution of Spain as the leading factor in European politics; the history of the discovery and colonisation of America. During this period Spain is the foremost power in the world. Her territories comprise the south of Italy, Holland, Belgium, Spain, Portugal and considerable parts of France; the whole of South and Central America with most of the western and southern portions of the United States, the Philippine Islands, Madeira, Azores and Cape Verde Islands,

Guinea, Congo, Angola, Ceylon, Borneo, Sumatra, the Moluccas and a number of settlements in other Asiatic lands. During the reign of Charles I Portugal was a separate nation, but the Central European territories under the Imperial Crown were also to all intents and purposes a part of the Spanish Empire.

Nor was this Empire great in size only. It was great also in the prestige gained both by the adventurous and romantic character of its discoveries and by the varied emotions which the stores of precious metal Spain was supposed to obtain from her El Dorados awoke in other lands. For two centuries, therefore, Spain was the natural enemy of all the world, since all the world endeavoured to secure some, if not all, of the advantages which her marvellous destinies had let fall into her lap. Other causes of enmity came to add their effect to this natural cause of a somewhat material character. Spain was thrust on the world stage by an impulse directed towards religious unity. Such an impulse was to dominate all her policy, at home, in Europe and overseas. At home, it explains the Inquisition, the decay of the university, the drying up of the sources of intellectual leadership in her middle classes, the impoverishment of her Civil Service, and, in the end, the lamentable weakness of the State at the death of Charles II, the incapable king. In Europe it accounts for the tragic efforts which Charles V (Charles I of Spain) made to heal the wound of the Reformation and to save the unity of Europe; his decision to leave the Low Countries to the Crown of Spain (Philip II) and not to the German Imperial Crown (his brother Ferdinand); the struggles between Philip II and the Netherlands, and the final exhaustion of the Spanish Monarchy in the hopeless task of retaining the Low Countries within

the fold of the Church. In America, the impulse of the Spanish people towards religious unity accounts for the proselytising ardour of many a conquistador, whose zeal had to be tempered by the wiser friar at his elbow; and it explains the basis of racial equality which distinguishes Spanish colonisation and the prodigious effort for the religious and general education of the Indians which make it an exceptional enterprise in those times and a worthy model even in our own.

The net result of these efforts was that Spain became at that time the enemy, though for different reasons, of practically every nation that counted in the world. Two centuries of struggle cannot be easily lived down. The world is still living on the set of ideas and opinions which those hot feelings and emotions of old helped to foster. We are just beginning to emerge from the long after-effects of the Reformation. The wound which Charles V tried to heal is perhaps closed, but the scar still disfigures the European soul. If we want to bring about a better understanding of history, we must endeavour to write under the steady light of this principle—that Europe is fundamentally one and that her wars were civil wars. This light must light up all facts unfavourable as well as favourable to our convictions, but light everything fairly and in its right proportions. This, the key period of Spanish history, cannot be understood unless the spring motive which animates it is appraised at its true value. No apology is therefore needed for endeavouring to bring out its true meaning at the outset. And, to begin with, the Austrian dynasty, worthy heirs of Ferdinand and Isabel, were always alive to the capital distinction between purity of faith and dogma and submission to Rome. The Spanish State was a Church, but it

was not The Church. Spain was the soldier of God, but she did not allow the Pope to define her duties. Far from it. As the history of the Counter-Reformation shows, Spain was the chief factor in the reformation and purification of the Church from within. From the early days when Cisneros applied his stern personality to the task of reforming the Spanish Church to the days of St. Teresa and St. John of the Cross, this work, carried out under the severest standards, never lacked leaders or workers. Charles and Philip, moreover, were the moving forces which led to the Council of Trent, the intellectual and moral leadership of which was also, to a considerable extent, Spanish.

Knowing her mind, Spain was then little disposed to let the Pope, whoever he happened to be, tamper with the great work she had at heart. Both Charles and Philip had to fight the "king of Rome." Charles' (Spanish) ambassador in Rome advised him to profit by his troubles with Clement VII in order to abolish the Pope's temporal power. Philip II set up a council presided over by the archbishop of Toledo to act in lieu of the Pope at the time when the king of Spain was not on speaking terms with him. The brilliant school of theologians and lawyers which Spain produced in this period, practically all churchmen, sided with the king in these matters. Their stand was firmly religious, and they were therefore the more disposed to argue down the merely ecclesiastical point of view of Rome. The same reason, i.e., a profound freedom of mind within the bounds of dogma, explains why, although they were with the king against the Pope, they were with the people against the king. The king is "God's minister on earth"; therefore he must behave or bear the penalty of misbehaviour. Father Mariana,

the Jesuit historian, justifies regicide against a king who betrays God's trust. He was not the only jurist to think so boldly in those days of absolute monarchy. Fox Morcillo, whom Philip II esteemed so much that he made him the tutor of his son and heir, was of opinion that no obedience was due to the king who transgressed the laws and declared that the form of government—Monarchy or Republic—mattered little. The greatest of Spanish jurists, Father Vitoria, one of the precursors of the League of Nations, in a discussion on war limits the power of the king to what is right and the duty of his subjects to what they think is right. The matter is too important to be left at that. Father Vitoria was no irresponsible intellectual. He was the chief authority of the land in matters of law and theology; his advice was sought by the king on questions of moment. It was a time when kings had a conscience because they had a responsibility as God's ministers on earth; when Charles V had scruples as to his right to reign over Navarre; when political decisions were taken, so to speak, in the awful presence of the Lord. Now, in those times, speaking *ex cathedra*, in words which his students took down and one of his great successors published, Father Vitoria laid down the theory of the conscientious objector in unmistakable terms: "if a subject is convinced of the injustice of a war, he ought not to serve in it, even on the command of his prince . . . hence follows the corollary that subjects whose conscience is against the justice of a war may not engage in it whether they be right or wrong. This is clear for *whatever is not of faith is sin.*" Nor is this an isolated case. A position equally individualistic, over and above the duty owed to the king, appears in the *Mayor of Zalamea*, the best perhaps, certainly the most

popular, of the plays of Calderón. The mayor, a wealthy peasant, has had a daughter dishonoured by the captain of the king's infantry billeted in his house. He has the captain hanged. The king in person (Philip II) upbraids him for his high-handed behaviour, and the mayor answers in four lines which have won deserved fame in Spain: "To the king we owe our life and fortune, but honour is the patrimony of the soul, and the soul belongs to God."

We are now in a position to understand what was the spirit which animated the Spanish nation. It was no Romish bigotry, no abject submission to a tyrannical king, but a subtler, nobler and higher spirit. Uncompromising in matters of religious unity, stern in matters of duty and conscience, yet sufficiently free to stand up with the king against the Pope and with the people against the king. As Father Vitoria puts it, "the prince derives his authority from the republic": "[Princeps] habet auctoritatem a republica." Such a spirit, it will be seen, combines the tendency to religious unity which several centuries of religious preaching and crusading had at last kindled in the Spanish breast with the individualistic turn of character of the race; the synthesis of these tendencies intensified by the discovery of America and by the dramatic events of the Reformation—such is the force which drove Spain during two centuries from glory to ruin.

CHAPTER IV

THE SPANISH EMPIRE (*continued*)

THE whole trend of internal history is an illustration of what precedes. The kings of the Austrian dynasty are, above all, in the pregnant image of Oliveira Martins, Pharaohs. Their main idea is the religious unity of the country. After the revolt of the Comuneros (1519–20), caused by the inexperience of Charles V, who tried to govern Spain through his Flemish favourites, the power of the monarchy was well established. The king of Spain reigned over not one but many kingdoms, each with its administration, its Cortes, its laws and *fueros*, or local rights. Had the Austrian dynasty been a tyrannical institution, it would have undertaken the political unification of the Peninsula. The spirit of the time, however, did not aim at political but at religious unity, and thus it is that while the Austrian kings closely watch the Inquisition and expel the unconverted Moors from Spain, they allow every part of their dominions to maintain its local liberties. Nor was the task as easy as might be imagined. Erasmus was in great favour in Spain. Most of the brilliant legal and theological minds of the country were on his side, and when directly attacked in the rest of Europe, he sought the help of his Spanish friends—perhaps in the hope of "turning" what for him would have been the formidable opposition of Charles V. Vitoria was on the side of Erasmus, and it is a curious sign of the times that the anti-Erasmus campaign made

but little headway in Spain until the death of the Inquisitor-General Manrique (1538), who, interpreting a Papal bull in an unwarranted and exceedingly liberal fashion, had forbidden all attacks on Erasmus's works. Not the least piquant detail of this story is that while Erasmus's Dutch friends suggested that the right to criticise him should be restricted to the Pope and to the Spanish Inquisitor-General, and a Spanish canon of Salamanca coined the witticism: "He who doth Erasmus harass is a friar or an ass," the campaign against Erasmus was actively stimulated in Spain by no less a bigot of the Catholic cause than the English ambassador, Edward Lee. The Erasmian current prepared the way for the Lutheran movement, led in Spain by a chaplain of Charles and Philip, and in Naples, then Spanish, by Juan de Valdés, brother of Charles's private secretary and one of the masters, indeed founders, of modern Spanish prose. The movement cost his See to the Archbishop of Toledo, Carranza, who, despite his record as Mary Tudor's adviser in England, was suspected of Lutheran leanings, and despite his austere life, was prosecuted. The Inquisition dealt with this "pest," applying its powerful prophylactic methods to it, and Charles was not remiss in urging severity on the Inquisitor-General.

Purged from the foreign danger, the monarchy turned to its own home ills. The Jews had already been dealt with by Ferdinand and Isabel. There remained the Moors, two classes of them: the Moriscos, converted to the Christian religion, and the Mudéjares, who had remained faithful to Islam. The clergy and the king entertained grave misgivings as to the existence of so strong a mass of religious aliens in the nation, and more than once precautionary measures were taken to guard against the evils

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which were feared from such an anomalous state of affairs. The idea of their forced conversion was bound to come to the fore. It is useless to condemn a sixteenth-century idea with our twentieth-century minds. That subjects should follow the religion of their sovereign was then an accepted proposition in practically the whole of Europe, Protestant as well as Catholic. It found its staunchest opponents . . . in Spain. Yet they were overruled. Charles had the matter so much at heart that he asked the Pope to release him from the oath which he had given to the Cortes of Aragon (in the territory of which most of the Mudéjares lived), pledging himself not to convert the Mudéjar population by force, and this done, despite the opposition of the Cortes and nobility of Aragon (less bent on religious unity than Castile), the decree of forced conversion was promulgated (September, 1525). As a measure of relief, the Valencian converted Mudéjares (who thus became Moriscos) were granted exemption from all interference by the Inquisition for forty years.

But the Morisco was not very much safer than the Mudéjar for a nation determined to achieve religious unity. The forced conversion of the latter added a considerable contingent of Christians of doubtful loyalty to a mass which, at best, was but lukewarm in its Christian faith. During the whole century this situation was actively, at times anxiously, watched by clergy, prelates, generals and kings. Philip II had to listen to all kinds of advice on the matter. Military chiefs, such as Mondéjar, captain-general of Granada, were for leniency. Ecclesiastics, such as Inquisitor Deza, were for ruthlessness. The king gave way to Deza, whom he even (logically) made both cardinal and captain-general, and thereby got what Mondéjar had prophesied—a rebellion. The

rebellion was crushed by Don Juan of Austria, and his cardinal-general finally got rid of the leader of the rebels by having him quietly murdered, whether with or without confession and the sacraments the story does not reveal, but allows us to guess. The end came during the first years of Philip III's reign, when the Moriscos were expelled. Readers of Don Quixote may remember the scenes in which Cervantes makes us live the expulsion, bringing into his narrative a Morisco family dispersed by it. It was Cervantes's quiet way of registering his protest. The Valencian nobility protested more forcibly, and when they found themselves powerless in the face of the king's determination, backed by the clergy and by public opinion, they took upon themselves to protect the exodus of the men who had lived and worked in their lands. Such is the power of attraction of the Peninsula that, despite the inhumanity of the measure, numerous Moriscos stole back into Spain.

While the monarchy endeavoured thus to ensure the religious unity of the country, the several regions continued to live an autonomous life. Despite the obvious advantages of centralisation for a monarchy continuously engaged in war, the old division into separate kingdoms, which had been inherited from Ferdinand and Isabel, was maintained. The kingdoms other than Castile had their own viceroys, Cortes, troops, Civil Services, taxes. The difficulties which this autonomy entailed fell ultimately on long-suffering Castile, whose Cortes were more easily convened and convinced (not always by means as pure as the end). Portugal, which belonged to the Crown of Spain during the better part of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, was left in complete possession of its local liberties—a fact which would have been unthinkable in a centralistic country such

as France. Aragon gave a splendid opportunity to Philip II in connection with the flight of Antonio Pérez. The story deserves to be told at some length as a sidelight on the relations between the king and his several kingdoms. Antonio Pérez, an Aragonese, was one of the king's secretaries, whose influence at court came partly from his talents, partly from his friendship with Ruy Gómez, Philip's Minister, an advocate of conciliatory policy in the Netherlands and an enemy of the Duke of Alba. Pérez had acted in Madrid in support of Don Juan of Austria's policy in the Netherlands, and this activity had brought him into close touch with one of Don Juan's secretaries, Escobedo. In March 1578 Escobedo, who had come to Madrid on a mission, was found dead in the street. It was known by then that Pérez and the princess of Eboli (Ruy Gomez's widow), who had become his mistress, were on bad terms with Escobedo, and Pérez was accused by Escobedo's family and friends. The king acted with his usual hesitation and remissness, but in the end had Pérez arrested. After many vicissitudes Pérez fled to Aragon. There existed in Aragon a dignitary, the Justice, whose powers included the custody and protection of all alleged criminals until their guilt had been proved. This protection the Justice extended by locking up the men concerned in a special prison, the Carcel de Manifestados. Pérez put himself under the custody of his country's Justice. Philip II was wroth, yet could do nothing directly against the authority and dignity of the Justice. In this quandary the pious king bethought himself of the Inquisition and had Pérez accused of heresy. Now heresy was a privileged crime and the Inquisition a privileged tribunal, so that Pérez was transferred from the prison for manifestados to the prison for heretics, for such was the

wealth and variety of prisons which Spain enjoyed in those times. Meanwhile, Pérez had rashly countered the king's attack with a "memorial," in which he asserted that the death of Escobedo had been decided upon by His Majesty in person. The people of Aragon rose as one man against the violation of their *fueros* or liberties implied in Pérez's transfer from the Justice's hands to those of the Inquisition, an institution more revered yet less trusted and, moreover, Castilian, i.e., foreign. Pérez was returned to the Justice's prison. Once again the Inquisition tried to secure its prey, and once again the populace of Saragossa rose and delivered him. Pérez profited by the disturbance to escape, and fled from a land so rich in prisons to live an adventurous life in every possible country in which Philip's enemies were not unwelcome. But Philip's attitude towards Aragon was curious. He was ruthless with the rebels and unnecessarily cruel with the Justice, who was beheaded. But he did not profit by the circumstances, as a French king would certainly have done, to reduce Aragon to the common law of Castile. All he did was to obtain from the Cortes of Aragon (1592) that the Justice should no longer be irrevocable by the king. The case of Catalonia is still more striking. When Catalonia was beaten back to submission after a rebellion which lasted twelve years (1640-52), the king did not abolish the *fueros*. On the contrary, he deliberately confirmed them in 1653.[1]

The tendency of the age is therefore clear. Religious unity yes, but no excessive political unity. Absolutism, yes, but no despotism. Similarly, in matters of the mind, a severe discipline of books and teachings in all that concerned dogma, but the most liberal help granted to education and the arts. Spain

[1] *See* Chapter XVII.

was already famous for her universities. Along with Salamanca, specialised in law and theology, Alcalá, founded by Cisneros, became the centre of learning and the seat of the highest authorities on Chaldean, Hebrew and Greek. During this period, no less than thirty-four universities flourished in Spain, most of them in lands of the Crown of Castile and most of them founded by private initiative.

The rhythm of culture and the arts follows the political rhythm. Thus, if the period of greatest power corresponds to the end of the reign of Charles V and the beginning of that of Philip II, the period of greatest intellectual splendour comes a little later, covering almost exactly the reigns of Philip III and Philip IV. Spain, who under Ferdinand and Isabel had already produced a work of truly Shakespearian greatness in *La Celestina*, gave then to the world a literary wealth which only England could rival though not surpass. From the theatre to lyrical poetry, from mystical experience to applied psychology, from education to the novel, from wit and criticism to pamphleteering and satire, Spain invades and explores every area of the creative mind with admirable vigour, everywhere a pioneer. This was the period, to quote but the very greatest, of Cervantes, Lope de Vega, Calderón and St. John of the Cross.

A similar activity is at work in the Arts. This is the period when Spain absorbed the Flemish Charles V, of whom she made a Spaniard, and the Greek Theotocopulos, who became, also, a Spaniard known as El Greco. This is the time of Ribera, Zurbarán and Velázquez, the time of the great Spanish musicians, Morales, Guerrero, Cabezón and Victoria. In all the fields of culture and polite society Spain was then the leader and model, and Spanish

was a language which no man or woman of good birth could afford to disregard. Spanish was, in fact, the language spoken at the Imperial Court for at least a century. The printing-presses of Spain, Italy, France, the Netherlands and Germany turned out Spanish books to satisfy a world demand, and Spanish intellectuals spread over all Europe, partly through the natural expansive force of the race at that time, partly through the powerful stimulus which impelled towards emigration many free minds who had felt at too close a distance from the Inquisition.

It has become customary to sum up the history of Spanish creative effort in America in three hasty generalisations: cupidity, cruelty and ignorance. Were they justified, the picture would still have to be completed with the astounding fact of the discovery itself. By this we do not mean the actual discovery by Christopher Columbus, which, though not to be minimised as the first impulse and an act of faith, was but one chapter of a legendary epic, but the long list of almost incredible feats of imagination and endurance which gradually revealed to the world the extent, the wealth and splendour of its new acquisition. By the side of this immense achievement, the "cruelty," the "cupidity," and the "ignorance" which are the features generally mentioned would, even if admitted at the value generally attached to them, sink into relative insignificance. But the facts when examined impartially show that the accusation of ignorance recoils on those who make it, while the cruelty and the cupidity appear in their true proportions as features of an age in which the Spaniards can claim perhaps a better record than the average of their coevals.

The four voyages of Columbus took place in 1492,

1493, 1498 and 1502. On the first and second of these voyages he discovered lands which, under threat of severe punishment, he made his companions accept as Japan, but which we nowadays believe to be Cuba and the other Antilles; on the third voyage he discovered one of the rivers of the Garden of Eden, which we now believe to be the Orinoco, the main river of a country which Spaniards in later years renamed Little Venice or Venezuela. On his last voyage Columbus discovered the country now known as Honduras. In 1506 he died, still full of fantastic delusions as to the lands he had discovered, his last days overcast by difficulties which arose partly from the cumbrousness and niggardliness of the Spanish State, partly from the action of envious rivals, partly from his own difficult nature.

Simultaneously, Pinzón, one of the two brothers who had accompanied Christopher Columbus on his first voyage, and a host of other navigators and explorers sallied forth from Spain and took up the new sport. Their expeditions must be considered very much as those of contemporary airmen who try to conquer the air. They were individual enterprises. If they lost limb, health or wealth or even life, theirs was the loss. If they discovered or conquered territories, the gain was the Crown's. A curious fact, and one which shows the strength which the Crown had acquired, even in so individualistic a country as Spain, is that, while all these conquerors conquered by themselves, none conquered for himself. The land was no sooner trodden than they planted the Cross on it, and took possession of it in the name of the Queen of Castile.

The discovery was made by Castile and not by Aragon. We are again confronted with the consequences of the peculiar shape of the Peninsula.

The Crown of Aragon is the valley of the Ebro, falling towards Italy ; the Crown of Castile seeks the sea through the valley of the Guadalquivir, which flows south-west and through the northern and north-western ports. Thus, while Ferdinand, and later, Charles V, are busy in Europe, their Castilian, Andalusian and northern subjects swarm over the ocean and, turning their backs on Europe, open out a new world.

There was another kingdom equally well placed for exploring the world. The Portuguese were early in the field. Many, some of the best of them, worked under the Spanish Crown. Magellan left the Spanish shores on September 20th, 1519, and, after marvellous adventures, discovered the Straits, to which he left his name, and was killed in an obscure fight with the natives near the Philippines ; his second in command, Del Cano, a Basque, arrived in Sanlúcar, on the Guadalquivir (September 6th, 1522), the first captain to circumnavigate the earth, in a ship which deserved her name of Victoria.

By this time the Spaniards, with some Portuguese and Italians, had discovered every island in the Caribbean Sea and the Mexican Gulf, Florida, most of Central America on both sides of the Isthmus ; the Pacific Sea, first seen from the Isthmus by Balboa, whom Keats immortalised in a sonnet under the name of Cortez ; and the whole of South America. Panama was founded in 1519 ; Nicaragua discovered in 1521. In 1517 Hernán Cortés, at the head of 11 ships, 400 soldiers, 200 Indians, 32 horsemen and 11 pieces of artillery, conquered New Spain (Mexico). In 1523 he began to look for the channel between the two seas, the existence of which Charles V had assumed on the assumption that good strategic principles were part and parcel of the Creator's plan.

Cortés and his successor devoted infinite patience, endurance and resources to the search for this channel. Meanwhile Florida was explored, and Pineda discovered the Mississippi. In 1521 Narváez ventured inland. The four survivors of his expedition walked through the territories which separate New Orleans from San Francisco. Nothing daunted by this disastrous attempt, other Spaniards followed in the quest northwards, and discovered Georgia, Colorado with its Grand Cañon, Arkansas and Missouri. One of these explorers made bold to assert that California, which he had crossed and explored, was *not* an island. But he was not believed by sober-minded people.

In 1524, Pizarro, financed by a priest who lived in Panama, tried his hand at the conquest of Peru. He tried again in 1526. Finding it too hard a nut to crack, he sailed for Spain and sought the help of the king, with whom he signed a treaty, which enabled him to leave Panama for Peru, in 1531, at the head of no less than 227 men. Such were the armies which conquered empires in those days. Pizarro fought in Peru. Mendoza, at the head of 14 ships sailed for the Plata in 1534, and founded Our Lady of the Good Winds, now shortened to Buenos Aires. Ayolas, whom he left in charge on his return to Spain, thought he might as well do a bit of exploring meanwhile, and, having discovered Paraguay, founded its present capital Asunción, In 1541, Cabeza de Vaca sent an expedition which, through Brazil, arrived in Asunción. By the middle of the century the whole of the territory irrigated by the Paraguay and Parana Rivers was in Spanish hands. The activity of sailors and explorers passed then to the Pacific Ocean. The Philippine Islands were explored, and Manila founded in 1570.

The centres of this expansive effort were two: Spain and the Antilles. The islands in the Caribbean Sea had been promptly colonised by the Spaniards. The first elements were brought from Spain. Horses, oxen, sheep, pigs, hens, dogs, unknown in America before the discovery, were abundant a few years later to the point that in many cases cattle were killed merely for the hides. The Spaniards introduced sugar mills. Cortés, having pacified Mexico in 1521, introduced the cultivation of sugar, silk and the vine in his new country. In a few years the Spaniards had tried to acclimatise most of the home plants and animals, succeeding in most cases, failing in some. It is said that wheat was first sowed on American soil by Inés Muñoz, Pizarro's sister-in-law, who, as she was sorting a barrel of rice from Spain, came upon a few grains of wheat which she carefully put aside and tried in a flower-pot. Others attribute the same providential rôle to Cortés' negro servant. The story shows that the mass of the Spaniards who went over were not preoccupied with mines and metals, but with the treasures which every hard-working man can get out of the soil. Not that mining was neglected. Far from it. The attention bestowed on the methods for extracting metals from their ore, and the numerous treatises and inventions published both in the metropolis and overseas at the time, show that this branch of economic development had not been overlooked. In every economic direction the Spaniards set their new possessions in motion with remarkable celerity.

But their main effort was in the realm of enlightenment. The Church, which from the first had taken a leading part in the colonisation and government of the New World, as it did in the government of the metropolis, was deeply imbued with the idea that

the basis of the right of the Spaniards to be in America was their capacity to bring the Indian within the fold of the Faith. Sinned against—as what principle is not—forgotten, at times prostituted, the principle remains in force and consciously or unconsciously governs the actions of responsible Spaniards in America for three centuries to come. It explains the absence of all colour bar in Spanish America. The first Bishop of Mexico, Juan de Zumárraga, founded a college for Indian noblemen, in order that they should be in a position to teach the native language and ways to Spanish monks and priests come over to catechise the New World—an example of the spirit in which the immense civilising work of the Spaniards in America was carried out. When the University of Mexico was founded (1553), there were already several colleges standing in New Spain. The Spaniards founded and maintained universities in Mexico, Mérida, Chiapas and Guadalaxara (New Spain), Santo Domingo (in the island of that name), Habana (Cuba), Sante Fé (at present, Colombia. There were two universities in Santa Fé), Lima (Peru), Santiago (Chile), Córdoba, Charcas (Argentine). It must be noticed that these universities organised the study of the native languages. Numerous colleges, generally founded by religious orders, contributed to this educational work. Finally more attention was paid to elementary schools than was the case in the metropolis (a clear case in which religious zeal had happy effects). The missions, still a familiar sight in California, testify to this special creative power of the Spanish Church in America.

Much of this civilising effort was made in the language of the Indians themselves, which shows both its eagerness and its disinterestedness from the

national point of view. Compared with present-day colonisation, generally understood from the point of view of the coloniser, who brings (and generally imposes) his language, Spanish colonisation was singularly free from self-seeking. The friars preached in Aztec, Quechua and the other languages of the land; they wrote grammars, vocabularies, catechisms, in these languages: works which they considered mere tools in their catechising mission. Later they turned to the study of the history and customs of the Indians. A long and honourable list of historians and specialists of the American pre-Columbian world devoted themselves to this work. They were all eclipsed by the name of Father Sahagún, whose whole existence was consecrated to the study of Mexican life, art and society, and who may be considered not merely as the greatest authority on Mexican history, but as the founder of the modern school of history, with its wide curiosity open to all the ways of private and collective life. It is curious to note that Father Sahagún wrote his monumental work in the Mexican language. Efforts of a similar nature were made in other parts of the Spanish domains, and particularly in Peru, Central America, the Plata and Chile.

This attitude of the monks and clergy on the spot had its parallel in the Peninsula, and owing to the strong clerical influence on the Government, it reflected itself in the general attitude of the Crown. Much bitter ink has been spent in denouncing Spanish conduct towards the Indians. In actual fact, both in theory and in practice, Spain was in advance of the times. Had the Spanish monarchy conformed to the ideas prevailing at the time, the whole Indian population would have been reduced to both legal and practical slavery and the cruellest

methods—current even in Europe—would have been used towards them. As it was, the Crown established legal freedom for all Indians, and allowed slavery only in the case of cannibals and natives who resisted evangelisation. The position gradually became worse for several reasons : first, much cruelty and barbarity was caused by wars, then barbarous and cruel everywhere; secondly, the cupidity and callousness of many a settler often made miserable the lot of Indian workers, both free and slave; thirdly, the reluctance of the Indians to perform any work whatsoever produced difficulties similar to those which are being met with in our own times by twentieth-century colonisers. In 1503 orders were given that free Indians should be obliged to work for a salary, though stress was laid that their status remained that of free men—a decision which, though perhaps inevitable at the time, was bound to open the way to practical slavery. Before the death of Ferdinand, the pressure of economic conditions and of the ideas prevailing at the time had overruled the generous innovations of Queen Isabel. Her spirit, however, lived again in the famous bishop of Chiapa, Father Las Casas, whose admirable life was spent in unremitting endeavour to put the case of the persecuted Indians before the emperor. Nor was he alone in such a task. Many an eminent man—Zumárraga, Palafox, Ruiz Montoya—took up the cudgels for the native race, and this must be said for their efforts, that though they were unable to stop the evil in the Antilles, where the Indian population rapidly dwindled down and disappeared, the Indian population of all continental Spanish America, far from diminishing, increased and prospered, and to this day constitutes the most important stock in a

number of Spanish American countries (Mexico, Peru, Bolivia and others).[1]

In Europe the policy of Spain was inspired with the same religious principle which animated her home and her colonial life. Under Charles V such a policy was conditioned by the all-important fact of his being emperor of Germany as well as king of Spain. He had to engage in a long struggle with Francis I, which was partly a chapter in the long-drawn duel between Austria and Spain on the one hand and France on the other, partly a consequence of the fact that the domains of Austria-Spain, situated as they were in the string of territories from Italy to the Netherlands, barred every possibility of French expansion, itself a threat to the vital communications between the southern and the northern possessions of the emperor. Francis I was defeated and taken prisoner (1526); but the Peace of Madrid, which he signed then, was not and could not be final. The duel was, in a sense, a permanent historical necessity; yet, as we shall see anon, it was in Charles's own mind less a political struggle for supremacy than an

[1] "Unfortunately, the exceptional opportunities for study which had been offered by surviving primitive people had been largely neglected. Civilisation had been more concerned with exterminating these than with collecting information from their manners and customs. The native Tasmanians might have thrown a flood of light upon the problems of the Middle and Late Palæolithic culture phases, but seventy years from the date of the first European settlement they had been wiped out."

Thus, Mr. Henry Balfour, curator of the Pitt Rivers Museum at Oxford, speaking—as reported in *The Times*—to the British Association in Johannesburg (Aug. 1st, 1929), condemns a colonising enterprise neither Spanish nor old. The reader may compare these remarks with the admirable work of Father Sahagun in Mexico in the sixteenth century.

indispensable preliminary to the work of unity which he had planned. A similar necessity explained his expedition to Tunis (1535) against Barbarossa, the pirate whom the Turkish Sultan had put at the head of his fleet. Charles, the conqueror of Tunis, and the deliverer of twenty thousand Christians enslaved by the pirates, appeared then before the whole Christian world as its true leader, worthy of the Imperial Crown, the only sovereign Crown of Christendom.

Nor was the Christian emperor to be mistaken for a mere instrument of Rome. The league which Clement VII organised against him, with the help of Henry VIII of England and of several Italian States, would suffice to prove his independence of Rome, and though, on the news that his troops (which comprised both Catholic Spaniards and Lutheran Germans) had taken Rome and plundered it, forcing the Pope to capitulate, he ordered prayers for the safety of the Holy Father and postponed the festivities which were being prepared to celebrate the birth of his son Philip, his ability to discriminate between the purity of the Faith and the tyranny of the Vatican was always alive.

Charles V was the greatest monarch of the Austrian dynasty. His very hesitations towards the Reformation should be read in relation to the high and noble dream which animated him. He heard on the one hand the Duke of Brunswick, in the name of the Catholic princes, and the prelates at Mainz, urging him to take strong action; on the other the wise and generous advice of his Spanish secretary, Valdés, whose leanings were not unfavourable to the Reformation. His policy was not definite, but it was clear. He wished to save the unity of Chris-

tendom while remaining faithful to the purity of his faith, hence, while uncompromising as to dogma, he tried to compromise as much as he could in every other way.

His mind is nowhere more clearly expressed than in the admirable speech which he delivered on Easter Monday, 1536, before the Pope Paul I, his cardinals and ambassadors. This document should be read in full. It is one of the great pages of European history. It is in the form of an accusation against the king of France (Francis I) for having been the main obstacle in the way of the fulfilment of the emperor's dearest wish, in his own words, "the peace and calm of Christendom" and the use of "all the power and greatness" which God had granted him "against the heathen and the infidels, the enemies of our holy Catholic faith." The emperor offers to submit all his differences with Francis to arbitration, declaring beforehand his readiness to obey the findings of the "*concilio* so that the king of France may have no occasion to enter into agreements and leagues with the Turk and the infidel against us." Having reminded his hearers of the several occasions on which he had found Francis I in agreement with the infidels, and having offered to give Milan to one of Francis's sons, Charles ends up in truly knightly fashion by proposing to the king of France to settle the matter between them in what Don Quixote would have called a singular fight:

> "Therefore, I promise your Holiness, in the presence of this sacred college and of all these knights here present, if the king of France wishes to meet me in arms, man to man, I promise to meet him armed or unarmed, in my

shirt, with sword and dagger, on land or sea, on a bridge or an island, in a closed field, or in front of our armies or wherever and however he may wish and it be fair."

The man who in 1536 spoke thus in Spanish knew hardly any Spanish and cared little for Spain in 1519. But it is obvious that the country had already conquered him. In thus transforming the issue into a magnificent but personal duel, Charles showed his Spanish nature . . . and a little more, the touch of madness which the dynasty owed as much, perhaps, to the strain of Queen Isabel, daughter of a mad princess, mother of a mad queen, as to the House of Burgundy which had produced Charles the Bold.

In this speech he is a worthy grandson of the great queen. He reveals himself full of his dream of peace and unity. "I say it once and three times: I want peace; I want peace; I want peace." Such are the last words of his address. And more than once in the text he refers to the peace and unity of Christendom, but does not say one single word as to the Reformation. The enemy he wants to fight is the infidel, the Turk. In his mind, the unity of Christendom comprises the whole of Europe. He is a truly great emperor and perhaps the first great European.

His successors mark with the descending curve of their capacities the slope of Spain's downfall. None was as great as the Empire which they had inherited necessitated. Philip II, the most intelligent, was hampered by a mistrustful nature which prevented him from delegating the smallest portion of his enormous powers. From the Escorial, the cell which he had built for himself in the palace which he had built for God, he tried to govern his immense dominions down to the minutest details. His policy was essentially religious unity and war on the infidel;

but he lacked his father's political vision, and the religious ideal of Isabel and Charles V degenerated into bigotry. He continued his father's policy in the Mediterranean by entering into an alliance with Venice and with the Pope against the Turk, who was beaten at Lepanto (1572) by an allied fleet commanded by his brother, Don Juan of Austria, but his mistrustful and vacillating policy prevented him from reaping the fruits of victory. In the Netherlands the king's policy was even less fortunate. Though his methods varied—first ruthlessness with the Duke of Alba (1567–73), then moderation with Requesens (1573–75), then half-and-half mixtures with his brother Don Juan and with Alexander Farnese, his principle remained the same : no compromise on dogma. He lost the Northern Netherlands, which he handed over to his daughter and to her husband, the Archduke Albert. But the crucial moment in this reign, and indeed in the history of Spain, came when the Armada sent by Philip II against England was defeated in 1588. One hundred and sixty vessels, two thousand six hundred guns, eight thousand sailors and twenty-two thousand men —such was the force which was at last to avenge the insults received by the Lord, as understood by Philip, at the hands of the Lord, as understood by Queen Elizabeth. The man who had organised and armed this formidable fleet was, perhaps, the greatest sailor of the time—Don Alvaro de Bazán, Marqués of Santa Cruz. He died shortly before the date appointed for the departure of the fleet. In his stead Philip chose the Duke of Medina Sidonia, who entreated the king to relieve him of the post, for, he said, he knew nothing of the things of the sea and was, moreover, what is known as a bad sailor. Philip explained that the true admiral was the Lord, a

statement which deprived him of a scapegoat in case of disaster. Disaster came, and after unheard-of adventures, storms, hunger, disease, rather less than half of the vessels and of the men returned to Spain. One of the hardiest admirals, Oquendo, who after an admirable odyssey arrived in San Sebastian with the few vessels he had been able to save from the disaster, refused to speak to his wife and children and, without even looking at them, died of grief, his face turned to the wall. The year 1588 is the date which marks the turning-point in the history of the sea. From that date the Spanish command of the sea begins to weaken and that of England to rise.

Philip III, a man of honest mediocrity sunk in unintelligent bigotry, and Philip IV, a selfish, brilliant man of the world, were mere figure-heads. The Spanish Empire under their rule continued an evolution already determined by a century of masterful errors. The wars in the Netherlands flared up again now and then; France, under the strong hand of Richelieu, became the protagonist of the enemies of Spain—mostly the Protestant nations of the north. Though at first victorious on land and sea, Spain was finally beaten in the battle of Rocroy (1643). The treaty of Westphalia put an end to the European war, but not to the Franco-Spanish war. Spain had still ten years of hard fighting to live through in Flanders, Italy and Portugal.

When Philip IV died, in 1765, he had lost Portugal, many of the territories of present-day France which he had inherited, and Naples. He left a son feeble of mind and will and aged four. Charles II's reign was all chaos and disorder at home, wars and disasters abroad. The dismemberment of the vast, but now almost inert, body of the Hispano-Austrian dominions continued, actively aided by the king of

France, Louis XIV. In actual fact, the foreign adventures (rather than policy) of this reign were the last act in the century-long duel between the French monarchy and the House of Austria. The *dénouement* of this duel came as a triumph for France when Charles, who died in 1700, left his throne to Philip of Anjou, grandson of Louis XIV. A war ensued in which Austria, England and Holland upheld the rights of the Austrian archduke to the throne of Spain. Philip remained king, but of a kingdom which in 1714 had lost Flanders, Minorca and Gibraltar.

The rôle of Spain as a leading Great Power may be said to end here. Leaving aside for the present other reasons of a more matter-of-fact character, the main cause of Spain's failure lay in the very task which she had dreamed of achieving. Universality was then impossible, even within the restricted limits of Christendom. The faith which Spain wanted pure and intact was not susceptible of a universal appeal. Her policy cost her untold sacrifices of money abroad, and of liberty, particularly liberty of thought, at home. In 1700 the century began which was to burn much that Spain had worshipped and to worship much that Spain had burned.

CHAPTER V

A NEW CENTURY, A NEW DYNASTY AND A NEW SPAIN

THE nation has lost her own call or vocation. The religious atmosphere in which such a vocation manifested itself has vanished. The century is called an intellectual one, and the court, once frequented by ardent monks and bishops, is now in the hands of intelligent Frenchmen.

If the spirit of old Spain has vanished, the cumbrous machinery which it had gradually evolved is either rusty or altogether paralysed. The Frenchmen are bewildered by the multitude of councils and boards, *fueros* and local liberties. They miss the unity of the French monarchy and the clarity of French administration. The century dominated by French thought shifts the stress from the religious to the political, and the Spanish Crown ceases to worry about religious unity, but seeks to reduce Catalonia to the laws of Castile. Gradually the Inquisition relaxes its hold over the people. Catalonia lost her liberties in 1714. As a compensation, and in consonance with this policy of centralisation, commerce with the New World, reserved till then to the subjects of the Crown of Castile, and to the two ports of Seville (and later Cadiz) and Coruña, was opened to all Spaniards. Several hindrances to internal trade, such as customs barriers, were also removed. These modest measures, with now and then a short period of peace, sufficed to bring about

a recovery. Commerce, both internal and foreign, flourished once again, and under the able leadership of an efficient minister, Ensenada, the navy was resuscitated. The monarchy was happy in its ministers, at least in those in charge of home affairs. The chaotic finances left by the disastrous régime of the Austrian dynasty were put on a sound basis. Municipal, sanitary, transport reforms were introduced; a new impulse was given to manufacturers; technical education was fostered; plans for internal colonisation were prepared and even carried out; and the Bank of San Carlos, forerunner of the Bank of Spain, was founded by Charles III.

Spain had thus turned to her civil and commercial progress. Disenchanted with other-world business, she tried to get on with the business of this world. Her relations with Rome reflected this change. Even in the height of its religious phase, the Spanish monarchy had never, as we know, abdicated its religious rights. Charles V's relations with some of the Popes had been cold and Philip II's frigid. Philip V actually broke with Rome, which had backed his rival in the War of Succession, and the negotiations for an agreement, though begun in 1714, dragged on till 1754, when a concordat was signed which, in fact, put the Church of Spain under the authority of the king. As the ideas of the century penetrated in Spain, more and more drastic measures were adopted to curtail the power of the Church to amass wealth, and the privileges of the Inquisition were severely regulated. This evolution culminated in the expulsion of the Jesuits (1767).

The age was particularly favourable to culture, and both official and private initiative stimulated the creation of all kinds of institutions for the fostering of education, art, science and letters. A

typical Spanish entity should be mentioned: the Economic Societies of Friends of the Country, free associations formed by well-to-do persons in various provinces, and having for their object the education of the people in all matters connected with agriculture, industry and commerce. But the tone of the century is not typically Spanish. It is, therefore, a period during which Spain produces many men of first-rate talent but no real genius. The best men of the period are critics like Father Feijóo or statesmen such as Jovellanos. Art, like letters, though estimable, is pale after the glories of the seventeenth century—until, towards the end of the eighteenth, Goya enters the stage, not only of Spanish, but of universal art. Goya, however, lived beyond this period, and some of his best works are like flames surging above the fire which consumed old Spain and from which new Spain arose like a phœnix.

The foreign affairs of the House of Bourbon were no more typically Spanish than their home policy, and were, moreover, less successful. The War of the Spanish Succession had pretty well achieved the ruin which the later Austrias had prepared and, though all the allies on either side were supposed to have fought for the good of Spain, the Peace of Utrecht resembled very much the sale by auction of a grandee's house. England kept Gibraltar and Minorca, which she had occupied in the name of the archduke, presumably for Spain. Italy and Flanders went the way of nature. England gained also the right of *asiento*, equivalent to a monopoly of the negro slave trade with Spanish America and the right to keep a 500-ton ship filled with merchandise off New Cartagena.

But as a set-off against so many losses, Spain had

got rid of her religious preoccupation. Leaving the Lord to take care of Himself, she was now free to devote a little attention to her own affairs. Philip V's first administration understood this and acted, in consequence, by abstaining from adventures and giving the country a much needed rest. Unfortunately, the queen died and Philip married Elisabeth Farnese, a lady whose passionate maternal love proved nearly as devastating for Spain as Philip II's religious dreams, for it would not be satisfied with anything short of a throne for each of her children. The remainder of the king's reign was devoted to the throne-hunting expeditions of this maternal lady, at times indistinguishable from the incidents of the semi-chronic war with England and from other events of European life such as the War of Austrian Succession. In 1746 the king died, when negotiations were beginning towards the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle (1748).

Ferdinand VI, his successor, was a peace-loving man. In his reign, Spain made a significant decision which she was to repeat often in later years, indeed to establish as one of the cardinal principles of her foreign policy: solicited as a prospective ally by both France and England, about to engage in a war (which was to be known as the Seven Years' War), Spain decided to remain neutral. When in agreement with both, when in disagreement with neither, was to be for a long time and still is Spain's policy towards the two great western nations. Ferdinand's decision, taken in the face of such tempting offers as the restitution of Gibraltar, shows both the wisdom of the monarch and the love of political passivity to which Spain had by now resigned herself.

But Spain is unfortunate in her monarchs. The bad ones last too long; the good ones die early.

Ferdinand VI died at the age of forty-six, and Charles III, his half-brother, who succeeded him, though a most enterprising and enlightened despot in home politics, proved a worthy heir of his loving mother, Elisabeth Farnese, in his somewhat unwise conduct of foreign affairs. England, it must be owned, was not helpful. When Charles III, in the Family Pact which he signed with France (1761) claimed that England sought the control of the sea, he was levelling an accusation which events were by no means to belie. The Family Pact opened a period of wars between England and Portugal on the one hand and Spain and France on the other, the main episode of which was the co-operation of French and Spanish troops in the War of American Independence —a fact generally unknown and mentioned here with no intention of belittling the glory of Lafayette. The Treaty of Versailles (1783) gave back Minorca and Florida to Spain. But Florida went the way of nature in later years, when the infant, god-mothered by France and Spain, had grown his teeth.

There seems to be a kind of law that Spain devours the wit of dynasties. After the shining lights of Ferdinand, Isabel, Charles V, and even Philip II, the intellect of the Austrian dynasty degenerated rapidly down to the paltry level of Charles II. After Philip V, Ferdinand VI and Charles III, none of them a genius, yet still acceptable kings, the Bourbon dynasty gave Spain Charles IV, whose mental powers were of the most touching modesty. He reigned, at first, with the ministers whom he had inherited from his father—Floridablanca, Campomanes, Aranda, the instruments of enlightened despotism—then with the minister whom his wife had chosen for him, on grounds best known to herself and to everybody else but her husband. Godoy, whom the queen made

Duke of Alcudia, and whom, later, the king made Prince of Peace, sent a popular expedition against the French Revolutionary Government, which had just beheaded Louis XVI. But again England was not helpful and carried on, meanwhile, her lonely and profitable game—colony-hunting. Spain fell into the hands of France, and with France suffered the defeat of St. Vincent. Napoleon made her a tool in his policy, through Godoy, who conquered Portugal for the emperor. As a reward, Napoleon gave over to Great Britain the Spanish colony of Trinidad. Further co-operation with Napoleon brought about the destruction of the Spanish fleet at Trafalgar. Napoleon rewarded Spain with a regular invasion, begun under the guise of an expedition against Portugal. Charles IV went to see Napoleon at Bayonne, and abdicated.

The fool was succeeded by the knave. Ferdinand VII is easily the most contemptible king that Spain has had to put up with. He also went to Bayonne, was forced to abdicate, and was kept under strict watch in a French château while Napoleon gave the crown of Spain to his brother Joseph. The Spanish people called Joseph Bonaparte by the picturesque—if unmerited—name of *Pepe Botellas*, which amounts to Joe Bottles. Here the Spanish people entered the political stage. A new period of Spanish life had begun.

Faithful to its guiding principle—the fraternity of all men—the Spanish monarchy organised the "kingdoms" overseas as images of its European kingdoms. But fraternity does not mean equality, and the Crown was aware that, left to themselves, their European brothers might be dangerous to the less developed natives. The aim of the Spanish

monarchy was, therefore, to seek the welfare of the two commonwealths (*las dos repúblicas*), namely, that of the Spaniards and that of the Indians. This welfare comprised, for the Whites, a "clean" faith and sound prosperity; for the Indians, conversion, *policía*, i.e., civilisation, fair treatment and the preservation of their rights. The towns, or *pueblos*, were conceived as either Spanish or native, and though the natives were allowed to settle in Spanish towns no Spaniard, except the priest, was allowed to settle in Indian *pueblos*. The colonisation began, of necessity, by a kind of trust system: each of the first settlers received an *encomienda* or trust whereby he was to protect, civilise and convert a certain number of Indians, while the Indians were to work for him for a remuneration. Municipal institutions, analogous to those of Spain, completed the local arrangements. To preside over all, the dominions were divided into viceroyalties, the number and importance of which varied considerably with the time, while two remained constant in their wealth, power and majesty: that of New Spain in Mexico and that of Peru in Lima. The viceroys were images of the king, save that they were limited both by frequent instructions and by the encroaching power of more unwieldy bodies, the *audiencias*.

The streams of commerce all converged upon the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean Sea. The goods and precious metals thus gathered at regular intervals were conveyed to Spain in "fleets" or convoys owing to the insecure state of the seas; for even when Spain was not actually at war (which was rare) piracy was not then as disreputable a profession as it became when England sided with the police. In spite of commercial legislation singularly rich in economic mistakes, the colonies made fair pro-

gress, mostly through breaches of the law on the part of nationals and foreigners, and sometimes through unexpected help from Heaven. Thus when Seville, with an eye on its trade monopoly, protested against the rich trade which had developed between Peru and China through the Philippine Islands, the Crown refused to intervene, on the ground that the suppression of such trade relations across the Pacific would ruin any chances of evangelising the Chinese. The argument has since been reversed—the missionary having been sent to open up the country for the business man—with equally good results in the field of economics—which shows that, provided an argument be good, it does not much matter which way it is used to beat error with.

In 1762 the English occupied Havana, one of the great commercial, and the most important military, port of the Spanish dominions. They remained till 1763. During this short interval, the Havana merchants tasted the honey of commercial liberty. The event coincided with a period of exceptionally reasonable government in Spain; it led to a gradual change in commercial methods and to an enormous increase in revenue, which, though coming from liberty, was most gratifying to the absolute King of Spain.

The development—commercial, political and intellectual—of the Spanish dominions was as quick and successful as might be expected in the circumstances. Account should be taken of the fact that the initial generation of settlers were after all soldiers and adventurers, a type nowhere particularly gifted in the virtues of peace, precisely because they are gifted in the virtues of war. The immense courage, endurance, hardiness and imagination which went to the discovery and to the

conquest could not but start the work of settlement rather tumultuously. And yet, this work was achieved quickly and well. It often called forth criticism and even eloquent condemnation in the sixteenth century from exalted and idealistic Spaniards such as Las Casas, and, two centuries later, from intelligent and efficient Spaniards such as Ulloa and Jorge Juan. But foreign critics, provided they were well-informed, and not merely copying Spanish denunciations, have always been free in appraising and even admiring the work of Spain in America. The subject has suffered from its vastness. Thus, in the criticism of Spain's treatment of the Indians, little account has been taken of the fact that the Empire lasted three centuries and occupied a whole continent. Las Casas is thus generalised both in time and in space. A closer study shows, however, that while great hardship was the rule in the Caribbean region at the beginning of the conquest and in certain Peruvian districts, and in occasional and more or less isolated places at nearly all times, the system as a whole worked well and humanely. From the economic point of view, Humboldt found the Indian worker in Mexico better off than the European peasant. Biologically, the Indian has survived and even thriven in the greater part of the Spanish possessions; nor does this mean that where he has disappeared the fault is necessarily on the conqueror's shoulders, for epidemics and warfare were, unfortunately, no more uncommon then in America than in Europe; even from the religious point of view, the Spanish sway over the Indian was milder than might have been expected, for, considering them as minors, the Crown had them exempted from the Inquisition.

No better illustration could be found of the spirit which animated the Spanish Empire than the way it solved the problem of its frontiers. Its settlements had frontiers practically everywhere with savage tribes; it had to ensure its peace and security; it had to convert the heathen. This second task was no empty word, no hypocritical screen. It was a duty, and Father Vitoria had based on it the right of the Spaniards to occupy the New World in that monument of generous thought: "De Indis." The eminent master had pointed out that force should not be used except in the face of deliberate and armed resistance to the efforts of the catechisers. Philip III embodied these principles in his instructions to his viceroys. The result was the truly Christian system of the missions, by which the catechiser took over most of the dangers and most of the work. The work of the missions cannot be described or judged by generalisation. The Jesuit establishments in Paraguay bear little resemblance to the missions in California or to those in the Orinoco valley. In many cases, reality forced the priests, the monks and the State to strike a compromise between sword and Cross. But, on the whole, it is fair to say with an English historian that "it may safely be alleged that so vast a region of savagery has never elsewhere been pacified with so much patience and so little violence, and that an immense, indefensible frontier has never won comparative security at so little cost of life and treasure."

But what about the other *República*, the Commonwealth of the Whites? There is no question but that their happiness was mixed. Spain was not a single-minded coloniser-State, but almost a single-minded Christianiser-State. Her insistence on the welfare of the two commonwealths implied severe

limitations on the liberty of her White subjects. Emigration was restricted and controlled, settlement carefully watched. So much for the principle. Then came the defects inherent in Spanish rule at the time, whether at home or overseas. Crushing taxation, cumbrous and slow administration; fitful justice, at times severe and just, at times corrupt and lax; over-regulation of life and movements even to trifling details; meddlesomeness of the Inquisition; prohibition of foreign books—in fine, all the ills of a priestly and paternal administration which takes itself seriously, multiplied and at times alleviated by all the exceptions, loopholes and irregularities to be expected from a people of individualists.

The Spanish Empire lasted three centuries. During this time it held a whole continent and many nations beyond it in the longest period of peace which they, or indeed any region of their size, has known. It introduced Christendom and civilisation, the sciences and the arts. It explored the possibilities of building canals through Panama, Nicaragua and the Patagonian States. As Humboldt handsomely acknowledges, it spent more money than any government of its time for the advancement of knowledge. And this mighty effort was carried out under continuous attacks both by war and by piracy on the part of numerous and strong enemies. Yet the Spanish Empire held on and finally gave rise to a number of nations which keep its language and its traditions. In short, so far as America is concerned, the Spanish Empire presents a normal three-century evolution ending, in true biological fashion, in the creation of new and independent offshoots.

In its wider aspect, the Spanish Empire embodies the idea of religious unity predominant in the six-

teenth century. Though the effect of the political shortcomings of the Spanish people should not be overlooked, there is no doubt that the very greatness of the cause which they espoused contributed not a little to Spain's ultimate downfall. Such a cause demanded great sacrifices both at home and abroad. The loss of liberty of thought and a disastrous financial burden were the two prominent ones. But it would be unfair to forget that the cause exacted and obtained a higher level of international behaviour, particularly in naval warfare, than was then the rule amongst the enemies of Spain.

The greatest loss, perhaps, was the unavoidable break in national tradition which Spain had to undergo when the world outstripped its views of universal unity. The defeat of the Armada was a mortal blow. Death was slow and took more than a century. The French dynasty brought the eighteenth century into Spain. While the old tendencies still lived deep in the national consciousness, the statesmen of the Bourbon period endeavoured to rationalise Spain. The aim was new, but the methods remained the same, for reason and efficiency were enforced on authority and from above. Thus, of the two characteristics of the Austrian Empire, religious unity and absolutism, both consubstantial with Spain in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the eighteenth century eliminates the first, while the second, absolutism, remained alive until the nineteenth century. Spain worked hard during this century to outlive it, i.e., to evolve something else in its place. She is still trying.

CHAPTER VI

THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

The nineteenth century in Spain can only appear as a turbulent and chaotic period without any meaning whatever unless it be realised that, in the history of Spain, it stands as an era of reconstruction *from the very ground upwards*. The collapse of the Bourbon dynasty under Napoleon's combined strength and perfidy meant more than a mere change in regime for Spain. It meant a revolution in her outlook, in her understanding of collective life, in her political philosophy. Spain had always been a deeply monarchical country, in which the king was the incarnation of the State and the minister of God on earth. The treatises—theological, political and critical—of the period, extending from 1500 to 1700, are most emphatic as to these two rôles of the monarch; the drama still more so. The king is the fountain of honour and authority, as the incarnation of the State; but he is the first servant of the community, the first slave of duty as the minister of God. Hence that definite shade between the Spanish monarchy, in which the king's liberty is hedged in with scruples and overloaded with advice, and the French monarchy, in which the ultimate criterion is *Car tel est nostre bon plaisir*. When the Bourbon dynasty comes to occupy the Spanish throne, the religious absolutism of the Spanish monarchy takes on a strong dose of French despotism. Charles III, with all his good intentions, governed more despotic-

ally than Charles V or Philip II. There is in the Bourbon kings more of the personal master, less of the symbolical institution, than there was in the Austrian dynasty. It follows that the absolutism of the Bourbons was at bottom less in harmony with the natural tendencies of the Spanish people than the Austrian rule. After all, the political turn of mind of a people is rooted in the subsoil of its psychology, and no history which fails to penetrate thither can ever convey the true sense of its life. The strong "sense of man" which animates the Spanish character leads the Spaniard to incarnate abstract political ideas as well as institutions. Not Liberty, Equality and Fraternity, but the particular Tom, Dick or Harry who is to pull the strings of these three inert deities. Not Judiciary, Executive and Deliberative, but the Harry, Dick or Tom who is to act for them. This is one of the dominant factors in Spanish political life. The other is the individual's resistance to all social pressure, a resistance which acts in two ways: by preventing the Spaniard from taking full advantage of co-operation, and by making him particularly sensitive to all superiority assumed by any man not hallowed by an authority either inherent or symbolical. It is easy to see how, from such psychological premises, a type of absolute monarchy like that of the Austrian dynasty would be evolved. On the one hand, the tendency to incarnate political ideas and institutions was to lead to the concept of the monarch as the symbol of the nation; on the other, the refusal to recognise the superiority of any man *qua* man was to lead to conferring on the monarch certain quasi-religious attributes, while, at the same time, insisting on the fact that such authority and such attributes were not granted to the man but to the king. The king,

that is, would be the object of reverence and obedience so long as he did his duty, i.e., so long as he was a Christian king. Nor was this a mere doctrine to be stowed away in books. It was taught in theological schools which, in their turn, controlled the opinion of confessors every one of whom held in his hand the key to the eternal salvation of a number of Spaniards. It was again formulated in unmistakable terms in one of the most famous plays of Calderón, a typical production of the period and heard with pleasure, approval and admiration by people, court and university : Segismundo in *Life is a Dream* wants to punish Clotaldo, the king's agent, who, by order of the king, has kept him in prison since he was born : one of the attendants admonishes the rash prince : " Mind that he did but obey the king," and Segismundo answers :

> " En lo que no es justa ley
> No ha de obedecer al Rey."

He should not obey the king in commands against the law. *Nostre bon plaisir* is not, therefore, the ultimate fount of law. The king's commands may run counter to the *justa ley*. There is, in other words, a natural or just law which is dictated by his reason to every good and true man, what Father Vitoria calls the wise man's judgment (*judicium sapientis*).

Such is the point on which the Bourbon dynasty failed to understand the Spanish genius. Philip V imported the solar system of his grandfather, Louis XIV, *le roy soleil*. Had Ferdinand VI left direct descendants it is just possible that the dynasty would have found its roots in the national psychology. But his successor was Charles III, who came from Italy at an age when men's ideas are set. He was one of the prototypes of the enlightened despot

which the century produced. A fairly intelligent and very "progressive" monarch such as he was could not see much to learn in the people whom he came to govern. His reign, fruitful as it was in "reforms," may be considered as the period during which the winds were sown which brought about the harvest of storms of the nineteenth century. The main features of the inner conflict of the nineteenth century are prepared during this reign.

Firstly, the ruin of the monarchical sense of the Spanish people. This all-important change in the history of Spain begins when the dynasty finally adopts the tone of personal power and the man-king asserts himself through the kingly symbol. Charles III could afford the risk. His half-witted son Charles IV and his treacherous and cruel grandson Ferdinand VII, dishonoured the crown by identifying it with their own unworthy heads. Much blood was to flow in Spain as a consequence of this deep-lying transformation of Peninsular life.

Then Charles III's reign sees the invasion of Spain by French eighteenth-century ideas. Spanish intellectual leadership, which had been homogeneous under the Austrian dynasty—whatever the methods used for obtaining such a result—splits into two parties: one faithful to an ideal which, though rooted in the Spanish people, had become obsolete; the other committed to a view which, though in the full glory of its new-born light, is strangely out of harmony with the Spanish genius. Spain, who for centuries had fiercely fought for her own unity at the cost of heavy sacrifices, was rent by two beliefs, one out of touch with the world, the other out of touch with the national soul. The first belief was the old ideal of the symbolical monarchy, inherited from the Austrian days. The men who remained

faithful to it failed to realise that such an ideal, even if workable under the Austrian dynasty, was utterly unworkable under the Bourbons, whose Religion was either an affair of State (as with Charles III) or a benighted superstition (as with Charles IV and some of his successors), but no longer a leading beacon. The second school were too fascinated by the new philosophy to realise that under the phrase " sovereignty of the people " they had swallowed the principle of *nostre bon plaisir* dressed in a new garb which was no more acceptable to the Spanish people than the old. French centralisation, French State despotism, was in reality the only alternative which the new men opposed to the obsolete Spanish absolutism of the Austrian theocratic brand.

Finally, this reign removes all obstacles to the unrestricted liberty of the sovereign. By establishing the king as the fountain of law, this reign prepares the downfall of such later monarchs as were unable to bear the weight of so much liberty.

The history of the nineteenth century—and of what is past of the twentieth—is the history of the endeavour of the Spanish people to erect new institutions on the ruins of the old. This endeavour is thwarted by a succession of monarchs singularly unfitted for the discharge of their high responsibilities or singularly unfortunate in their preparation therefor; by the division of the intellectual classes into two irreconcilable camps, neither of which advances a practical solution consonant with the people's character; by the dispersive tendencies inherent in the character of the people and even in the soil of the country. It has gradually been helped by the growing prosperity which the country owes to its inherent virtues and particularly to the sobriety and a capacity for hard work of its inhabitants;

and by the steady growth of culture and wisdom which the country owes chiefly to the devotion and genius of a handful of men working with little or no help from the State and at times under its inimical threats or actions.

The people begin the century by rising against the French. It is characteristic of this rising that it should have taken place as a spontaneous movement of loyalty and affection towards the Royal House. In 1808 the people are still profoundly imbued with the monarchist ideal. But that king whom the people acclaimed was grovelling before Napoleon, in Bayonne, and the crown of Ferdinand and Isabel, of Charles V and Philip II, was being put by him at the feet of a Corsican upstart. The people of Spain created *Juntas* or committees, which took upon themselves the defence and government of the country abandoned by the king. The " monarchy " had fallen and broken itself to pieces, and in Madrid and Coruña, Asturias and Valencia, these broken pieces of the monarchy were taking in hand the affairs of the nation. Such an experience was to have far-reaching effects.

In 1812 the Cortes met in Cadiz, convened not by the king but by the people. They were controlled by the Liberals. Spain was given a constitution. It was the first round of the long match between the two beliefs. The Liberal victory was not to be long-lived. The people had to turn against the invader. Much obloquy has been cast on the *Juntas* and on their armies for not showing as much effective discipline and organisation as Wellington's redcoats. Wellington was England, a prosperous and organised country. The *Juntas* were the Spanish people. And yet it was an army of this people which inflicted the first defeat on the dreaded troops of the invincible

Napoleon, at Bailen, when Dupont capitulated, with twenty thousand Frenchmen before General Castaños. England came to the rescue, though the beginning of her intervention was not conspicuous for its efficiency. Three generals, Wellington, Burrard and Dalrymple, succeeded each other at the head of the English army in Portugal in less than forty-eight hours, all duly accredited. The result was that Wellington's first successes against the French were nullified by the Convention of Cintra. The combined efforts of the English force and of the Spanish guerrillas succeeded in driving Napoleon out of Spain. Ferdinand, till then a prisoner in France, came back to occupy the throne which his people had reconquered for him.

He had forgotten nothing and learnt nothing. He flouted the Cortes, and started to govern in the worst possible taste as a personal despot, surrounded by a camarilla of worthless and low individuals. Yet the reaction was, on the whole, well received by the Church, most of whose members were inclined to the old view of the monarchy (though there were many enlightened priests amongst the Liberal framers of the 1812 constitution), while the people were still too closely connected with the absolutist tradition to object to the exercise of personal power on the part of the king.

This circumstance explains the rôle which the army began to play in politics. The Liberal leaders, unable to count on popular support, sought the help of a few army officers who, holding Liberal views, could be expected to bring about a system of reason and liberty through methods of force and coercion. It is necessary to pause here, for the question raised by the first military pronunciamento of the century goes to the core of Spanish public life in modern

times. The main point is that, on the collapse of the old system, Spain found herself with practically no political institutions of any kind. The old municipal institutions which the nation had spontaneously created *pari passu* with the Reconquest, had gradually been absorbed by the Crown. Through the process of religious unity the country had conceived herself as the emanation of the monarch who, Buddha-like, animated all institutions. Thus, when the Crown fell to the gutter through the quarrelling hands of Charles IV and Ferdinand VII, all Spanish institutions fell with it. There was no basis on which to build up a political opinion. We note, moreover, that, for psychological reasons, the people of Spain, even when ripe for political life, are not prone to take kindly to political dogmas. Of the two, into which the Spanish leading classes had then split, one, the traditional school, was well content with this state of affairs. It was indeed a confirmation of the theories which the traditional school maintained; the other school was bound to take the historical or evolutionistic attitude: "the people are indifferent because they are unenlightened; they have been left in the dark by centuries of obscurantism; but wait and see what happens when we enlighten them."

Had Ferdinand VII been a wise king, of the quiet temper of Ferdinand VI, the work of adaptation would have proceeded satisfactorily, and, though it would have led to other results than those which the hot-headed Liberal enthusiasts anticipated, it would almost certainly have launched Spain into a constructive evolution towards such results. As it was, Ferdinand VII behaved with all the base stupidity which is his only claim to an unwelcome corner in the memory of men. What was then to be done?

The Liberal hotheads lacked the wisdom to wait. They were impatient. They wished to see a Liberal Spain during their lifetime, even at the risk of their life. They called on the soldiers. Honour to their memory, but we are still suffering the consequences of their intemperate action. And nowadays, moreover, the soldiers are on the other side of the barricade.

Riego, the military leader whose forces brought back the Constitution—how strange the word becomes when tossed about to and fro amidst cannon and bayonets—has left a name in the history of Spain, for, till recent years, in fact, till the urban masses went practically over to socialism and changed their music accordingly, the *Himno de Riego*, written in his honour, has rung in Spanish cities wherever there was Liberal blood to spill. From 1820 till 1823 the Liberals tried to govern constitutionally. King Ferdinand made famous a phrase often recurring in the memory of Spaniards: "Let us all walk, and I the first, on the constitutional path." Apart from the difficulties inherent in the fact that their views were foreign to the people, and at least one century in advance of the times, the Liberals had to contend with internecine struggles within the party, due mostly to the rivalry between the military and the civilians in it; with the lack of loyalty of the king, who hated the constitution and was an artist in matters of perjury; and, finally, with the enmity of the foreign powers which, alarmed at the success of the Liberal revolution in Spain, sent a hundred thousand Frenchmen to quell it. They were known as the hundred thousand sons of St. Louis. The powerful impulse of this holy army sent the pendulum swinging to the traditional end of its course, and King Ferdinand was able to indulge in

his favourite pastime—man-hunting. Though he did his very best, he did not satisfy the right wing of his absolutist supporters, who, under the name of *apostólicos*, gathered round Ferdinand's younger brother, Carlos. Thus began the evolution whereby the division between two political tendencies became a dynastic division and then a civil war.

Ferdinand had no sons. He left two daughters by his fourth wife, Maria Cristina of Naples. Spanish law permitted women to be heirs to the throne. Salic law, which the Bourbon dynasty had brought over from France, debarred them from such a right. The last years of King Ferdinand, while worse than sterile for the nation, were seething with intrigues, whereby Don Carlos on the one hand and the Queen on the other endeavoured to secure the throne. As the *apostólicos* had chosen Don Carlos for their leader, Doña Maria Cristina smiled her best Neapolitan brands on the good-natured Liberals who, moreover, found a mother and a little girl an appropriate idyllic combination to crown their Liberal arcadia. The Queen won the last round, and her daughter, Isabel, was crowned on her father's death.

Following a precedent which her deceased husband had established, and which her daughter was to raise to the status of a dynastic tradition, the Queen Regent immediately proceeded to betray the party which had given her support in time of need. She had, however, to compromise at first with Liberal ideas, for Don Carlos had taken the field in the north, and the times were not propitious for throwing away any support which might be forthcoming. In 1834 a mild constitution was enacted under the ægis of Martínez de la Rosa, a minor poet and a minor statesman. The "progressive" Liberals found it inadequate, and, in 1836, a military revolt forced the

Queen Regent to enact a more liberal charter which was promulgated in 1837. Everybody but the progressives could see that a Liberal constitution granted at the point of the bayonet was bound to perish by the bayonet. But at the time most of the bayonets of Spain were engaged in the only sport which Spaniards seem to prefer to constitution making and unmaking—civil war. Given this attachment of the Spanish people to civil war, there seems no reason why the Carlist struggle should have ended. A Liberal leader, Mendizábal, who owed perhaps to his Jewish blood a measure of practical shrewdness uncommon in Spain, succeeded in forcing the bigoted Queen to adopt the measure which was to deprive the war of much of its popularity with the pious upper middle classes: he secularised the immense lands of the Church and put them on sale at prices so tempting that the well-to-do had to choose between the two worlds: they took the lands and became Liberals. The State took their good money, and the Carlist war ended in reconciliation on the field of Vergara (1839). But the struggle in the field was but a symptom. The real struggle was—and still is—inherent in the body politic of the country. Maria Cristina, who had by then married morganatically, though she kept the fact officially secret in order to retain the regency, was expelled in circumstances typical of the paradoxical and unaccountable ways through which new Spain was acquiring her political experience. With the cooperation of the "Moderate" section of the Liberals she had contrived a law restricting the municipal liberties of the towns (a regular mania with Spanish monarchs, but of course with much Machiavellian method in its madness). The advanced Liberals objected in the name of Liberty, and manifested their

opposition in a pronunciamento which forced the Queen to revoke the law on her own authority—surely a step not to be expected from such staunch enemies of absolutism. The head of the rising, Espartero, became regent in 1841, and had to leave office in 1843, a victim of the same method which had enabled him to attain it—another pronunciamento also made in the name of Liberal principles. Queen Isabel, then thirteen years old, was declared of age.

This was, of course, a pure constitutional fiction. Queen Isabel was never of age, though she died a grandmother. The best that can be said on her behalf is that she could plead effective extenuating circumstances. Her father was a contemptible person and her mother a mediocre and sensuous woman; she herself was put in charge of one of the most exacting tasks in Europe at the tender age of thirteen. Her mother was by then discredited and remarried; she was surrounded by men of all kinds, every one of them superlatively full of his own particular self. Institutions and traditions were weak, and as a result of protracted intrigues between Paris and London, she was deliberately married to her cousin, Don Francisco, who was notoriously unable to gain any ascendancy whatsoever over his wife and queen.

These were the circumstances which in part, at any rate—for the Queen embroidered on their canvas with a genuine zest for which credit must be given her—explain the scandalous reign of Isabel II. In private life she created her own standards of queenly behaviour. In public life she conformed to the traditions of her worthy parents. She betrayed her first Prime Minister, Ólózaga—though, considering the Queen was then but thirteen and Olózaga had

been her tutor, this first act may be pardoned her on the ground of post-scholar vindictiveness. She then gave power to Gonzalez Bravo, a converted radical, who tried to convince his new friends that a mere civilian could gag the nation as effectively as any general. His friends were not convinced, and though Gonzalez Bravo governed without the Cortes, disbanded the national militia, a citizen force of pronounced Liberal tendencies, and applied a strict censorship, the Camarilla were not impressed and General Narváez took office in 1844.

The new prime minister was a perfect example of the military politician, a type which has been the curse of Spain in modern times. It is a type not altogether devoid of genuine national precedents in the history of old Spain, and some of its features recall well-known figures of the Spanish past, not excluding the Cid himself. But in the nineteenth century the type takes on new forms. We find it now on the Liberal side (Riego), now on the reactionary side (Narváez), now in a dubious zone hesitating between Liberal leanings and friendships and a reactionary temperament (O'Donnell); but in every case the soldier politician is built on a pattern which it may be useful to outline here.

To begin with, he is a patriot. He does not come to politics through the intellectual roads of the university and in his tender years. He arrives late, when he has already made his mark in the army, when, both from the material and from the social point of view, his position is sure and his situation is made. His first attitude, therefore, is apt to be that of a natural observer who finds fault with "the whole lot of talkers" and feels sure that he can put everything right if he is only left to apply decent military methods.

In this attitude he is strengthened by his ignorance and by the tendency to think in simple categories, which is one of the features of the mere soldier. His idea of law is less an idea than a feeling of irritation akin to that which arises in a determined walker trying to beat his steady record across a field netted with barbed wire. He knows what is good. He sees what is good. He wants to go there direct. An argument is an obstacle.

Whether liberal or reactionary in his ideas, the Spanish military politician is a reactionary by temperament. He wants to have his way, not to pool his ideas or wishes. At his best he belongs to the category of the benevolent despot of the eighteenth century. At his worst, to that of the Oriental despot when honourable. For it is a characteristic of this interesting genus that their sense of honour is strong—a fact not always recognised by their adversaries, mainly because honour is a subjective criterion which may counsel different and even opposite actions to different men. For the military politician is, of course, a strong individualist. The native individualism which every Spaniard brings to the world is made more acute in him by his ambition—since, *ex hypothesi*, he is ambitious—and by the military temperament. This last element of his individualistic nature explains why the soldier-politician contributes so much to developing the worst feature of Spanish political life : the excessive influence of personal ambitions. Moreover, military education has disastrous effects on Spanish psychology. The Spanish character has an innate tendency to become overbearing. The military law of obedience from below and orders from above encourages such a tendency. What the Spanish character needs is the education and the strengthen-

ing of the tendency to give and take and to co-operate. Now, given the pride and stiffness of the Spaniard, such an education can only be attempted by appealing to objective tasks in view, and not by exacting submission to a chief. The military politician is unable to realise this fact, as he is to realise most of the essential facts of Spanish life, concerned as he is with externals.

And of such externals the first which strikes him is order. The military idea of order is purely mechanical. When men are arranged as pawns in threes or fours, that is order. If they could be ranged in order of sizes, that would be heavenly order. All the military "leaders" Spain has had were obsessed by this idea of external order—oblivious of the fact that the most shocking example of disorder a nation can give the world is to keep a general at the head of its civil Government. And as their idea of order is purely material, so are their methods to obtain it. *Palo y tente tieso*, which means "a blow with my stick and keep erect."[1]

Naturally, the military politician objects to freedom of the press. Free discussion is the true way towards true order. But the military politician does not know what true order is. All military politicians, even those who entered politics through the Liberal gates, have revealed themselves unable to govern without the censor. Instinctively, they limit the political field to the arena of material forces, in which they feel stronger. Over this purely instinctive and temperamental cause of their dislike for the freedom of the press, the usual crop of reasons is allowed to grow in order to explain it. The intellectual weak-

[1] The English language needs five words to the Spanish single and eloquent *palo*, because, in Spain, the mere mention of the weapon suggests not merely the use but the action.

ness of such reasons in its turn becomes a further incentive to keeping airtight the hothouse atmosphere of censorship.

In the history of modern Spain the military politician, however, incarnates a tendency which is not without both theoretical justification and practical importance. For reasons which must now be apparent to the reader, the Spanish people cannot acquire political experience without considerable disorder and unrest. This disorder and this unrest are detrimental to the growth of both wealth and institutions, which in their turn are indispensable for political experience. Thus the country finds itself now and then in a mood of political weariness ready to sacrifice many of its political ideals for a crust of bread eaten in peace. Such are the moods in which the military politician can hope, not merely to be obeyed, but to be heard. Peace and prosperity are not inherently ideals wherewith to appeal to the Spanish nation; but they may become so through force of circumstances. The trouble comes when the military politician, having secured peace and prosperity by exceptional methods, fails to realise that such methods are detrimental to the higher aims which every country must set before herself. That man shall not live by bread alone is a Gospel truth which military politicians do not often appraise in its true import.

For, as a matter of fact, Spanish military politicians are not particularly rich in religious gifts. Most of them, if not all, have been matter-of-course Catholics without concerning themselves much about it, except on great occasions. There is a deathbed story of Narváez which, true or not, is significant in this connection. "Does Your Excellency forgive all your enemies?" the priest asked him. And the dying

man, in a determined voice: "I have no enemies. I have had them all shot." Discount Narváez's particular "resoluteness" (a refined English name for that kind of statesmanship) and what remains is common to all Spanish military politicians. They are believers because they "don't bother their heads about that kind of stuff," but they are not bigoted clericals. They are, in fact, generally well-disposed towards education and towards a reasonable policy of religious liberty—only . . .

In actual fact, whatever their personal attitude may have been, Spanish military politicians have always ended in countenancing, tolerating, or even fostering clerical reaction. There are several reasons for this constant fact of modern Spanish history. Like seeks like and clerical reaction is too closely akin to political reaction not to benefit by it. Moreover, the administrations (in the American sense of the word) led by military politicians, erect a wall of censorship between them and the public so that the clerical pressure over the Civil Service can increase in a thousand little ways without fear of protest from the intellectual leaders of opinion; finally, in such periods the Crown, though less influential than under civilian administration, is generally given a freer hand in purely religious questions, and the Crown in Spain—nowadays—is always clerical.

Thus, on the whole, it will be found that, when military politicians appear on the Spanish stage, the permanent difficulties which beset political life are increased by their rivalries and ambitions, though simplified at times if there happens to be amongst them an outstanding personality with sufficient power to oust all others; that even then, though the country is able to benefit from a period of peace and prosperity, the political education of the people

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suffers from the methods of force adopted; and, finally, that a clerical reaction usually sets in, with disastrous effects in all walks of life, politics and education.

Queen Isabel's reign had to suffer, not one, but five military politicians: Espartero, Narváez, O'Donnell, Serrano and Prim. Its history is but a succession of periods of resolute government (Narváez) with the acquiescence and help of the queen and her clericals cut short by "Liberal" pronunciamentos (Espartero, O'Donnell), which brought in Cabinets of a mild democratic tendency working under an inimical and intriguing Court. Incidentally, the country was involved in two external adventures—a war in Morocco (1859), in which O'Donnell's victories remained sterile, owing mostly to British intervention, and the ill-fated expedition in Mexico in collaboration with France and England. Gradually, however, the absolutist tendencies of the queen had taken on the worst features of her father's reign, and the popularity of the once beloved child-monarch had vanished. Her repeated disloyalties towards some of her advisers led many of them to the conclusion that the root of the evil was in the queen herself. Liberals decided that the next pronunciamento should aim at a change in the occupant of the throne. In the autumn of 1868 the army and the navy revolted. Queen Isabel crossed the frontier and her reign was over.

Now or never. Did we not say that the root of the evil was in the Crown? Was not the queen expelled under posters bearing the inscription: "Down with the spurious Bourbon race. A condign punishment of their perversity"? The Spaniards were free and

left to themselves. Now they would show what they could do.

What could they do? They had lost half a century fighting: fighting against the French; fighting amongst themselves; fighting the hostility of a despicable Court; fighting—the hardest fight, perhaps, of all—against their own political shortcomings. And so, when the time came to act, they found the masses either wrong-headed or indifferent and the leaders both inexperienced and intransigent.

This experimental period opens and closes with two names: Serrano and Prim. Both generals, of course. Serrano, the head of the Provisional Government, and Prim, his right-hand man, more popular and more intelligent than his chief, were unable to bring the remaining political leaders to agree as to the form of government to be adopted, and left the matter to the Cortes, in which a majority declared for a monarchy. This vote brought about a Republican revolt in Aragon which Serrano had to quell. A monarch was sought in Europe—incidentally providing the reason or the pretext for the Franco-Prussian War—and was finally found in the person of Amadeo of Savoy. Prim, who had negotiated his election, was murdered on the very day the king landed in Cartagena. The disappearance of his magnetic personality precipitated a political confusion which the king would have been unable to master even if he had known the Spanish language, but which, through his ignorance of Spanish, became a nightmare. The gentleman-king, as he was called by the Spaniards—whom adversity had led to think such a conjunction rare enough to be emphasised—abdicated in 1872. The Cortes voted a republic in February, 1873, but split hopelessly as to procedure and were dissolved by a *coup d'état*. The new Cortes,

convened in May, voted a federal system, but split again as to the particular unit to be adopted as the basis of the federation (old kingdoms, new provinces, small cantons). In less than one year the republic knew four presidents. The last of them, Castelar, allowed himself to be ousted by a military pronunciamento. Serrano took power again, but this time not as the godfather of a new era of liberty, but as the military dictator who came to relieve the country of the weight of liberty which it was unable to carry. On December 29th, 1874, Isabel's son was proclaimed, by a brigade of soldiers, king of Spain.

The main fact about Alfonso XII is that he had known adversity, and, therefore, his education was less incomplete than had been the rule with Spanish kings. He was a man who knew his mind, and he seems to have had a true sense of the responsibilities of his position. He had also a good minister; but, unfortunately, not a great one. Cánovas consolidated the monarchy for a generation, but he was not the man to provide it with a basis solid enough to last for a century. He relied on force and fiction. A constitution was voted with the clear intention of governing under, over, around, and even through it, but never honestly with it. And so this man, personally honest and honourable, even devoted, was the greatest corrupter of political life which modern Spain has known.

He was effectively helped by his compeer, Sagasta, an ex-radical ex-revolutionist, who took the leadership of the Liberal party. "Time and I against everybody" was his motto, and he lived up to it. What in Cánovas was, at bottom, pessimism over his countrymen, in Sagasta was pessimism over things. The Restoration rests thus on two symmetrical figures, the stern pessimist and the smiling pessimist.

And yet, they found a nation ready to build up a normal and healthy political life, a king of free and independent mind, for once unfettered by a camarilla, and not in the least disposed to allow one to gather round him. A Carlist outburst disposed of, Cánovas and Sagasta carried on a policy of make-believe. Instead of developing political habits in the people by enforcing a clean electoral law and seeking the opinion of the electorate (however restricted it might be), Cánovas and Sagasta chose to invert in practice the system which had been outlined theoretically in the constitution. The consequences of such a step were bound to be disastrous, and Spain is still suffering from them.

The system evolved may be summed up as follows. A general election was "managed" from Madrid. The Director of Politics of the Home Office, which by an irony of fate is known in Spain as *Ministerio de la Gobernación*, was the expert who saw to it that in each district the Government candidate was returned. To secure this end all methods were good. Municipal authorities were first thoroughly prepared. If the local elections to which they owed their existence had not been particularly favourable to the Government, the Civil Governor (head of the province) and a Government "Delegate" suddenly discovered an irregularity in the accounts of the Council, and suspended the Councillors, replacing them with trusted men. Faked lists, the resurrection of the dead (always safe Government voters), pressure on officials and other persons directly or indirectly dependent on Government offices; and finally, if necessary, a descent of ruffians on the poll or expert manipulation of certified documents did the rest. The Government had its majority. The Opposition was granted an adequate

number of votes to keep it well disposed to carry on the game. Naturally enough, political life, thus deprived of its healthy source of power, sought to obtain it where it could be found. The obvious alternative was the King. It is a deplorable yet a transparent paradox that these two men who were obsessed with the idea of the Crown, possessed of the desire to save and protect it from the dangers which were supposed to beset it—and, for these two pessimists, no greater danger to the Crown than political activity in the people—should have evolved a system which, through sheer mistrust of the people, ended in exposing the Crown to the odium of party politics. Cánovas, at the beginning of the Restoration, had genuine power. Had he chosen the right path, i.e., the creation of a restricted but effective electorate in which to deposit it, he would have put the Bourbon monarchy on an unassailable basis, and we should see in him the greatest Spanish statesman. As it is, he advised the King to play a constitutional game, and whilst he corrupted the electorate from the Home Office, he corrupted the Crown from the premiership. The Crown learned from its Prime Minister to consider itself as the true source of power. The seed fell on ground which had been prepared of old. But the source of power is not in kings. It is in God. What of Spanish generals?

The lines of the system began to suggest themselves under Alfonso XII, and were to become apparent under the regency of his widow, Maria Cristina. The Cortes lived an agitated life, the prey of rival ambitions of leaders who knew that any man could form a government, and, therefore, a Cortes, if the King wished him to do so. The King grew to know that any politician would be ready to

acquiesce in anything he demanded in exchange for the proof of royal favour—the decree of dissolution, i.e., not so much the right to dismiss the Cortes as, what was far more important, the right to "make" the general election.

Life, however, went on around all these pretences, and the people were apt to find that the Government had little to show for all the trouble and expense which it brought into everybody's life. Industrial progress, education, communications, greater intimacy with foreign movements, the advent of Socialism; in short, all the several aspects which in Spain, as everywhere, modern life was taking on, brought about not so much unrest as activity in the people. Had Spain been led by great statesmen, such activity would have been canalised and absorbed by the nation in healthy forms. As it was, popular life of any kind was bound to be disturbing. Gradually the system was led to enlarge the basis on which it rested: a few politicians and the King could not suffice. New sources of power had to be called into play. The Restoration developed two allies: the Church and the Army.

Strictly speaking, the allies were not new. The Army had impatiently proclaimed King Alfonso without waiting for the Cortes to do it. The Church had been won over by Cánovas during the first years of Alfonso's reign. But the Restoration came gradually to feel the power that the two institutions wielded in Spain, as the deplorable policy of its two protagonists gradually elbowed the people out of the constitution through the dismal door of disillusionment, and as all other institutions in the country, notably Parliament and the Judiciary, lost authority and prestige in the process. This evolution was favoured by the Queen

Regent. Alfonso XII unfortunately died young. His wife, Maria Cristina of Hapsburg, a lady of the highest moral standing, took over the regency with remarkable dignity and devotion. In true quixotic fashion, Castelar, the Republican leader, refused to rise against a "lady and a cradle." He had seen a Spanish republic, and perhaps he thought, as some bitter Frenchmen did under the Third Republic, that the Spanish republic is always at its best under the monarchy. At any rate the Queen was left unmolested by both Republicans and Carlists. But the dynastic question was beginning to wane in Spain, and other more substantial causes of trouble were threatening to replace it. The Queen showed pronounced clerical leanings and a disposition to listen willingly to the swarm of generals who fluttered about the plums of office. One of the least prominent of these generals bore a name which his nephew was to make famous in later years—Primo de Rivera.

Spain could still offer its soldiers of fortune enviable posts overseas. Cuba, Puerto Rico and the Philippine Islands had to be governed. The army had practically monopolised the three governor-generalships and, so far as Cuba and the Philippines were concerned, at any rate, it had misgoverned them effectively enough to make a military governor indispensable. Just as nations take a good deal of ruining, colonies take a good deal of misgovernment. But in Cuba there was a third party. The United States of America is known to be particularly anxious to ensure a high level of peace, happiness and good government in every nation whose territory happens to be strategically placed from the point of view of the Panama Canal. The peace and happiness of the Cubans became thus a matter of

great concern for statesmen in Washington, and interference, both official and unofficial, in Cuban matters gradually became the rule. The Spanish Government, for whom the government of the island was not a serious problem, were, of course, unable to cope with the difficulty of dealing with a country such as the United States of America, whose excess of power over that of Spain was overwhelming. Negotiations went from bad to worse, partly because the Spanish Government was afraid of putting the gravity of the situation before public opinion and was racially inclined to be unyielding; partly because, as events were to prove, there were strong forces in America working for war. Fate was on the side of the Yellow Press, and an American cruiser, the *Maine*, was blown into Havana harbour when the two Governments were still pursuing conversations.

Despite the efforts of the American ambassador in Spain and of many truly peace-loving Americans, the American warlike party, ably helped by one or two Napoleons of the Press, won the day, and Spain had to embark on the last of her imperial wars. The methods of the Regency system were never more conspicuous than in this grave crisis. Resistance to the obvious course was maintained at every step till it was too late, and the course was adopted when a more radical one had become imperative. The people were left in the dark as to the most important events, misled as to the true power of the potential enemy, sacrificed to the fetish of the period—the dynasty. A fleet of disciplined sailors sacrificed itself twice to this senseless policy. Admiral Cervera agreed to sail for America knowing that he had at his disposal none of the elementary conditions for holding the seas, and having succeeded in reaching

Santiago, thus immobilising the American fleet there, he again agreed to come out and fight, obeying superior orders because it was decided that for the good of the dynasty there was to be a sea-fight. The American army off Santiago, on the brink of withdrawing before the spirited resistance of the Spaniards, was relieved to find that the Spanish commander in Havana thus came to their rescue by ordering the fleet out to sea. Indeed in this picturesque war it looked much as if the chiefs on either side were, of course unwittingly, the best allies of their adversaries. But the United States had a greater margin to spare, and the war soon came to an end. By the treaty of Paris, 1898, Spain wound up her colonial empire: Cuba was made nominally independent, while Puerto Rico and the Philippine Islands passed over to the United States.

Four years later, on May 17th, King Alfonso was declared of age, and took charge of the destinies of the country as constitutional king. These two events contribute to give the end of the century a particular significance in the history of Spain. The loss of the last remnants of her Empire forced Spain to recoil on herself and to find herself. The reign of Alfonso XIII must be understood in this light. Spain has behind her a closed imperial cycle, a closed world mission and a century of political turmoil. The twentieth century must show the new Spain emerging from the ruins of the past. How far is this Spain new? How far is she the old Spain under new forms? What are her hopes, what her possibilities, what her message?

PART TWO

"SCHOOL AND LARDER"

CHAPTER VII

"SCHOOL"

REDUCED to its essentials, the problem for Spain consisted in adapting her national psychology to the conditions prevailing in the modern world. The law of the modern world is solidarity within the framework of national unity.[1] Now, the most striking characteristic of the Spaniard is an individualism rebellious to solidarity. There are two ways whereby such a tendency can be curbed: one, through an evolution in men determined by education; the other, through an evolution in things determined by economic development.

The history of contemporary Spain can therefore be best explained in terms of these two evolutions, both of which set in—or at any rate become more manifest—as soon as Spain finds a period of relative peace through the treaty of Paris and the advent of Alfonso XIII.

Yet, though the importance of material factors should not be overlooked, the true source of the Spanish renascence is of a spiritual character. The

[1] The national framework is beginning to prove too narrow—hence, in its essence, the international problem of our day. But I am referring above to the end of the nineteenth century.

most pressing need was, of course, a new spirit in education. But foreign observers have often gone astray owing to the ready-made idea that a nation's education must be measured solely by the index of illiteracy. The question is one of the most enigmatic with which we are confronted by this cruel sphinx we call, God knows why, civilisation. There was once a Scotch university professor who, while staying in a boarding-house in Seville, observed how rudely a Spanish commercial traveller was behaving towards an Englishman with whom he had entered into an argument. The maid in attendance was also shocked at the behaviour of her countryman. She was a peasant girl from one of the valleys round Seville, and could neither read nor write. When at last, to everybody's relief, the commercial traveller left the room with a bang, the maid turned to the Englishman and, with that respectful familiarity which is the gift of the Spanish popular classes, said soothingly: "Never mind him, sir, he is a man without education." "What an admirable thing to say," added the Scotch professor, out to discover Spain. A Spaniard would not have found it admirable at all, but merely matter-of-course. Instinctively he knows that education and letters do not go more necessarily together than holiness and prayers. During the War, an Englishwoman was crossing a small sea loch in Galicia in a boat manned by an old sailor who may, or may not, have been illiterate, but who certainly did not make much use of whatever powers he had for deciphering print. There were three students on board who, by way of conversation, commented on the War with pronounced anti-German views. The old sailor cautiously and quietly said: "Gentlemen, we are not all Spaniards here." The point is not the theoretical one whether that maid and that old

sailor would have been improved by knowing how to read and write, but a more practical and definite question: in both these cases the illiterate person proved the better type, and in the first of them, at any rate, obviously the more "advanced." Whether, other things being equal, education is or is not an advantage is another matter, but this other matter is confused and befogged by the conscious or subconscious insincerity with which it is generally discussed. The argument based on education in all its theoretical perfection is, of course, unanswerable. Take any human being, act on him in such a way as to draw out (educate) his inherent powers, and you must perforce enrich his personality. This is not an argument, it is a truism. But when, the point being granted on the assumption of an education theoretically perfect, we are asked to agree to an education reduced to a grotesque makeshift consisting mostly in communicating ability to read ready-made trash, we grow cold and cautious.

That this caution is justified no one can deny who has glanced at nine-tenths of the printed material which circulates in countries proud of their high level of literacy. Books and newspapers are very largely goods belonging to the stimulant or stupefying group, such as alcohol, tobacco or even opium and cocaine, and it is doubtful whether, in at least 50 per cent. of the cases the schoolmaster does more than enable human beings to have access to a kind of mental drug. But in a country like Spain the question takes on an even greater complexity. If our reading is correct, the Spanish nation is, above all, a nation of men of passion whose main characteristic is spontaneity. The people being everywhere the most spontaneous part of the nation, we may expect the people of Spain to be particularly gifted. And that

is what experience shows. All observers of Spain, national or foreign, witness to the innate distinction, dignity, originality and creative power of the people of Spain. When Borrow noted that the Spanish language is superior to Spanish literature he expressed a mere corollary of the prominence of the people in the life of Spain, for the language is the raw material of literature, or, in other words, the language is spontaneous literature. The observation is confirmed by the fact that Spanish popular poetry is, in its simplicity, one of the finest known to man, worthy to be quoted along with the most beautiful creations of individual poets. A nation whose untutored people can manifest itself with so much beauty and power may well pause before deciding whether so-called education is, or is not, an unmixed blessing. Not that Spain has ever hesitated. No one but benighted clericals has ever suggested that elementary schools should be curtailed. Two conclusions might be retained from this brief glance at a subject which in itself deserves a whole treatise: first, that the problem of education in Spain is not most urgent at the base but at the top, for the people are better qualified to fulfil their functions than the leaders to fulfil theirs; secondly, that, in order to educate such a people without spoiling its wonderful gifts, the education of the teachers must be particularly careful and exacting—which in its turn implies that education must be taken in hand first at the top.

Our two conclusions are thus reduced to one. On the threshold of our age Spain found herself confronted with the necessity to restock her culture, most of the wealth of which had been dilapidated or badly depreciated by a shift in world values. Despite the brilliance of individuals, the atmosphere of collective ideas was thin. The middle classes had

turned away from the Catholic religious culture which had animated them and given them character and personality. Part of them had fallen into devout Philistinism of the kind fostered by the Jesuits, particularly amongst the well-to-do classes; others lived on ready-made ideas imported from France. The Restoration saw a few more venturesome minds take a bolder flight and feed on Herbert Spencer's thin pastures. There were even cabinet ministers known to have quoted Gustave le Bon in order to gain a reputation for studiousness—and who achieved their aims. A story is told of an ex-minister who, after a visit to the palace of the popes in Avignon remarked to his secretary: "An interesting place, but as to that story of the guide that the popes lived here for so many years, I can hardly believe it. If it were true it would be known." The story is probably an invention, but it is symbolic as an invention, particularly as it is attributed to a successful lawyer. Culture at the top is what Spain had to evolve, and of course she had to evolve it out of her own substance, for she is far too original to borrow or even to adapt.

Fortunately, she found at hand the men—a small group of men who, just at the moment when the Liberals thought their millennium had set in in the revolution of 1868, gathered the harvest of experience which the century had yielded and, turning away from politics, decided to start on the long path of education. The leader of this band of pioneers was perhaps the noblest figure of the nineteenth century in Spain: Don Francisco Giner de los Ríos.

In order to understand such a man one must go back to that fleeting period in the sixteenth century when Spain falls in love with Erasmus and produces Vives, when Juan de Valdés in Naples attains so

fascinating a combination of true saintliness, intellectual distinction and worldly grace. The inherent humanity of the Spanish race is later made to serve a stern and narrow idea. But, as the nineteenth century lives down both the religious dreams of the sixteenth and seventeenth and the Gallic conceptions of the eighteenth, Spain begins to produce again the men who had incarnated her best spirit. Don Francisco Giner was one of them.

He was born in 1839 in Ronda, that most picturesque of Andalusian towns, and early migrated to Madrid, where his uncle, Don Antonio de los Ríos Rosas, was a prominent politician. In 1866 he won the Chair of Jurisprudence and International Law in the University of Madrid. The University was then intellectually led by Sanz del Río, a follower of the new educational and philosophical opinions preached at the time in Germany by Krause. In 1867 the Minister of Education, Orovio, tried to force Professor Sanz del Río to sign a profession of fidelity to the Crown, to the Dynasty and to the Catholic religion. He refused and was deprived of his Chair. Don Francisco Giner resigned his own Chair as a protest, though the deprivation of his salary implied then a serious sacrifice to him. The Revolution of 1868 reinstated all the persecuted professors in their Chairs. During this period, Giner contributed to the most important reforms introduced by the Revolution, particularly in matters of education and of prison law. But the Restoration brought back Orovio to the Ministry of Education and the same oppressive measure was enacted against the liberty of the Chair. Giner who, since Sanz del Río's death, was the recognised leader of the group, led the protest, but the Government, determined to please the clericals, had him and his colleagues prosecuted,

exiled and deprived of their Chairs. There is in this story a significant episode which typifies the methods of Cánovas, then Prime Minister. He sent Giner a message begging him to withdraw his protest and giving him every assurance that the decree, though officially promulgated, would remain unapplied. Giner refused to compromise on so dubious a basis and Cánovas had him removed at four in the morning from his sick-bed and sent under custody to a fortress in Cadiz. English public opinion—more sensitive, it would appear, in those days than now—was deeply stirred. The English consul visited the prisoner and offered to enlist English sympathy on his behalf, but Giner politely declined. His dignified attitude did but increase English sympathy. Offers were made to him amounting to the creation of a free Spanish university in Gibraltar. But of all this English episode Giner retained nothing but the friendship of a few English families who were to remain attached to him for life, as well as an inclination to observe and study English educational ways, which explains the strong English element to be found in his later work. Don Francisco and his friends were soon after set at liberty, but deprived of their Chairs. This, let it be noticed, was the first important act of the Restoration.

Fortunately, this time, the men who were persecuted had a leader worthy of the attentions of adversity. Don Francisco realised that the time had come for carrying the fight into its true field. Instead of pitting liberal against reactionary in the often bloody and always sterile game of politics, the time had come for directing the energies of enlightened leaders towards action and private initiative. The State, rescued from the Carlists for the Alfonsos by the Liberals, was delivered

back to the Carlists by the Alfonsos: the Liberals should then leave the State alone and work not against it, but outside it. Don Francisco preached by example. There they were, a handful of professors without a University: let them found a School. And thus was born the true nursery of contemporary Spain: the *Institución Libre de Enseñanza.*

If, for some of them, this change in their activity was a kind of exile from the romantic lands of politics, for Don Francisco it was a return to the fatherland. He was first and foremost a born teacher. His spirit was not so much in his books as in his living and personal communication, in the indefinable charm and quiet authority of his nature, his sweet persuasiveness, his endless patience, enlivened here and there by a subtle vein of irony, his sure taste, his genuine friendliness, his unfailing loyalty and his total lack of self-seeking. Naturally, while realising that a thoroughgoing evolution in educational methods was indispensable as a preliminary to any political progress in the country, he took up the task for its own sake, seeing in education a self-contained art the aim of which is to create men. This is the true link between the *Institución*—as it came to be known—and the doctrines of Krause which Sanz del Río had introduced in Spain.

The success of Krause in Spain can only be explained in this way. He was not a first-rate philosopher, but he happened to express an instinctive tendency of the Spanish mind, giving it the intellectual dignity of a philosophical system. The stress which he lays on the all-round human—not merely mental—character which education must have, won him his title to Spanish admiration.

He stated in nineteenth-century German what Vives had written in sixteenth-century Latin, and what every self-thinking Spaniard has always found for himself. The "Krausista" movement in Spain was therefore one of the cases, frequent in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, in which Spaniards discover Spain on their return home from abroad.

The *Institución* was born as a kind of private university. But Don Francisco Giner had other ideas. He was bent on education, not on mere instruction. He knew that the work had to be begun at the beginning. Gradually, he made the *Institución* concentrate on the young until it became an elementary and a secondary school. In those early days Giner proved a wonderful inventive genius and his school was inspired by principles which later years were brilliantly to vindicate. First and foremost, he understood the school not as a teaching factory, but as an environment. His keen sensibility—both ethical and aesthetical—seemed to emanate an atmosphere of good will, good manners and good humour which permeated the house. The school conceived of as life on the threshold of life was not only his doctrine, but his instinct and his behaviour. This carried with it a considerable widening of the field of school activities. Tuition was made to cover the Arts and the knowledge of civilisations. Games, excursions, seashore holidays were organised as developments of school life. And when, in 1884, Giner and Cossío came to the London International Conference on Education, in which they paid a high tribute to the educational value of English games in the formation of character, they were able to show the world a flourishing example of a school founded and maintained by

private initiative, "the first institution in Spain that has introduced manual work throughout the whole course of elementary education, perhaps the first in Europe to have made it compulsory in the secondary course, on the ground of its being an absolutely indispensable element not only of technical education but, within certain limits, of all education that is rational and human." The *Institución* had also adopted co-education, though in this it followed a practice traditional in Spain.

It may be wondered why so much importance should be granted to what after all was no more than a highly successful experiment in elementary and secondary education. The answer is that time has shown the incalculable effects of Don Francisco's creative work. He had the courage to take a long view and to prepare future generations from their very first years. He had the vision to undertake the work in original fashion and in alliance with Nature and with Truth; he was intensely national in spirit, yet open to foreign influences which he was, however, able to sift with taste and sense; and he acted on a fairly large group of families which had traditions of public life and of social leadership. Furthermore, the *Institución* stimulated other educational establishments, both friendly and unfriendly. Its influence began to make itself felt on official centres. Most of the staff of the *Institución* belonged also to the University of Madrid, or to other State educational establishments. The phase of persecution had passed and the sacrifice of Giner and of his friends had at least secured for the Spanish Chair a freedom equal to that which university professors enjoy in the freest nation.[1] Giner had been reinstated in 1881 and he spread

[1] Until General Primo de Rivera's policy.

his quiet but penetrating light into the darkest recesses of the old-fashioned University. The wide humanism and the alert curiosity of his mind were stimulating; all branches of knowledge seemed to blossom and to bear fruit wherever he passed, and in many a place in which he was nothing but a name —maybe not even a name—his influence subtly penetrated and manifested itself in a new curiosity, activity, efficiency, movement towards a purpose.

The *Institución* acted thus as a leaven in the educational and general life of the country. The universities had fallen from the days of their splendour. In the old days they had lived a life of their own, each according to its traditions. Salamanca, the most famous of them, had seen times when more than six thousand students congregated from all parts of the world attracted by the learning of its sixty professors. The university comprised a number of colleges (four major, 19 minor and four military colleges, i.e., maintained by the four great Military Orders of Spain). It was a democratic institution, the professors being elected by the students, while the Rector was not only elected by the students but was a student himself. The famous University of Alcalá, though under an entirely different statute whereby the students took a lesser, but still important, rôle, was also wholly academic in its government. The University of Valladolid, which attained a distinguished position in matters of law, was a transition between this academic type of Salamanca and Alcalá and the municipal type of university prevailing in the lands of the Crown of Aragon. In Valencia, for instance, professors were appointed by the Municipal Council. In Saragossa they were elected by the students. This variety and complexity of university life suggests a close relationship between the university and the nation. The universities were, in fact,

institutions evolved by the nation and not set up by the State. Professors were not officials, but workers whom their co-workers in other walks of life trusted to perform their job properly. The State, of course, absorbed this spontaneous national life as it was to absorb all national life, particularly when, with the Bourbon dynasty, the State ceased to be the spontaneous manifestation of the national purpose. The evolution of the university presents very much the same features as may be observed in the evolution of the nation at large. The universities rapidly decay while simultaneously the State increases its hold over them. The two evolutions are parallel, and it would be a mistake to interpret the first as the cause of the second. A glimpse at Salamanca in the first half of the eighteenth century—such as we are fortunate to enjoy through the entertaining and outspoken *Life* of Diego de Torres Villarroel—shows in fact that the process of internal disintegration had been much quicker than that of statification. It was but an outward sign of the isolation imposed on Spain by the policy of religious safety. The brief period of enlightened despotism of the eighteenth century had done much to start university life in the direction required by the times. When Torres Villarroel applied for the Chair of "Mathematics and Astrology" in Salamanca it had been vacant for thirty years. By the end of the eighteenth century there was good scientific work being done in a few of the universities, but, though Charles IV and Godoy endeavoured to stimulate their life, the general policy of the king and of his minister was bound to be fatal to Spanish culture as it was to every other form of Spanish life; as for Ferdinand VII, he was definitely hostile. The Carlist influence which controlled the actual springs of power during most of the years of the nineteenth century did its best to thwart the

progress of universities along lines of free evolution. Nowhere was the struggle between Reactionaries and Liberals keener than in the field of education. "Was," indeed, is hardly justified, for, as we shall see, the year 1928 has witnessed the most cynical, or the most ignorant, attack on the university from its reactionary and clerical enemies.

Giner found the universities mere Government establishments for the granting of official diplomas. In a sense all universities tend fatally to become degree factories. But in Spain, when Giner first began to observe them, they were nothing else. Here and there an outstanding personality was actually engaged in true research, true education and the cultivation of the mind; but he was isolated and looked upon as a crank. The rule was to consider the Chair as a routine job, examinations as irksome tasks to be got through, and students as junior officials who, after the required number of years and examinations, were promoted to the seniority of a diploma irrespective of the knowledge and understanding which they might have acquired.

Such were the universities which the youth formed by Giner had at their disposal after the *Institución* had prepared them for higher studies. In a sense the evil was less than might appear on the surface since the very soullessness of the university made it innocuous to the young men and women who came to it with souls of their own. Self-reliance, the help provided by the *Institución* and the presence of some trusted and loved masters (Giner himself one of them) did much to ease matters. Giner, moreover, stimulated studies abroad by all the means in his power.

At this juncture the effects of Spain's return on herself as a consequence of the Spanish-American War began to be felt. What Don Francisco Giner had realised in 1876 was rapidly sinking into the

consciousness of the nation, home from her last adventure with the seed of wisdom in her heart like Don Quixote after his defeat at the hands of the Knight of the Mirrors. Abroad—abroad. Spontaneously, parents began to send their boys and girls to be educated in France, in England, in Switzerland, in Belgium, in Germany. The feeling was in the air and the men were at hand who could capture it and turn it to account. The *Junta para Ampliación de Estudios* was created in 1907.

The new organisation was a significant proof of the far-reaching effects of Giner's creative genius, not only in its aims, but in its inception and methods. The State had come to realise that it was incompetent to deal directly with the most delicate national problems—a triumph this of the subtly penetrating atmosphere, the tacit criticism, the quiet work of Giner and his followers, along with a general rise in the level of public opinion. Yet it was obvious that the authority and the funds for any educational work of national scope had to come from the State. A formula was found which met these two apparently conflicting requirements most felicitously: the Government handed over a grant and certain powers to an autonomous body, a committee of prominent scholars. As if clearly to signify that the new institution was to be run under strict scientific inspiration untainted by politics, the committee was presided over by Dr. Ramon y Cajal, the great physiologist to whom Neurology owes its main inspiration. As for the actual work of the committee, by one of those generosities of Fate which nations cannot expect very often, Spain, who had produced a Giner at the time of inspiration, found a Castillejo at the time of execution.

He is a man with a lofty brow which (as Rostand remarked of his own) stretches from the eyebrows

to the back of the head, a bald head of strict dolichocephalus type, a face of inconspicuous features, a cropped, fair moustache and a complexion burnt by frequent exposure to the cold and hot winds of the Sierra; the mouth of a shrewd peasant and eyes like gimlets—but gimlets alive. The Spanish language, in spite of its rich vocabulary, having broken down under the strain of his requirements, Señor Castillejo draws on several other languages as well, all of which he speaks with a fluency, a rapidity and a frequency which remind the listener of one of those smoke screens which modern men-of-war emit in order to move at ease behind their dense atmosphere. The suggestion is haunting, for Señor Castillejo obviously combines the purity of the dove with the guile of the serpent. Many an entertaining tale might be told—were it wise to do so—of the ways whereby he succeeded now and then in making a Cabinet Minister sign the right decree when his natural inclination would have led him to sign the wrong one. Señor Castillejo, who knows English well and who is the author of an admirable treatise on English education, has taken a few leaves from the English book of wisdom for his own *Gramática Parda*, or Dusky Grammar, as practical shrewdness is called in Spain. Amongst these imported secrets, perhaps the most efficient and one here made public (with singular candour) for the first time, is that of never calling a thing by its own name. Señor Castillejo's genius was revealed to the wary when the new institution, which was to revolutionise Spanish education in a few years, appeared before the world under an unassuming name truly English in its vagueness and inaccuracy: *Junta para Ampliación de Estudios; Committee for the Development of Studies*. Great things could be expected from a man with such a gift for misnomers.

The expectations thus raised have been honoured.

A regular crop of students and graduates has been sent every year, properly chosen and prepared for their stay abroad, properly advised and recommended both as to the technical and the social aspects of their intended residence; and stimulated with the certainty that the result of their work will, if found worthy of it, be published in its adequate setting. Laboratories and centres of research have been organised and kept going with both technical ability and admirable devotion; a model secondary school has been set up in Madrid, an establishment which vies with the best and most up-to-date to be found in any country; finally residential colleges for men and women have been founded in Madrid with conspicuous success.

But here, as in the case of the inspiring work performed by Giner, the imponderable results are even more important and profound than the tangible yields in educational establishments. The tone of the *Junta* and of all its creations is distinctly Ginerian. The *Junta* endeavours to maintain the strictest impartiality in confessional matters. sometimes in most trying circumstances. This is one of the factors in the situation which its enemies find most embarrassing. Thus, when the bigoted clerical enemies who, more or less shamefacedly, try to represent the *Junta* as an element of denationalisation, directed an attack on the secondary school which it had created in Madrid, the *Junta* was able to show that the (Catholic) religious tuition provided in the school to all but those who did not desire it was more complete than that available in any ordinary Government establishment. The *Junta's* success, moreover, depends to a great extent on the exceptional powers of self-denial of those whom it employs. Like Cæsar's wife, the *Junta* must not only be honest but look it as well, and, as it is closely scrutinised, many

are the cases in which the workers who have devoted their lives to it have to deprive themselves of salaries or emoluments not only allowed in law, but legitimate in equity. Challenged as to the cost of the secondary school, the *Junta* was able to show that the State paid less per hour of teaching in the secondary school than in the average of the *institutos* dotted all over the country, the efficiency of which is known to be lower.

The effects of this activity began soon to be felt. Gradually, the young men sent abroad returned home ripened by their experience and settled either in business, in Government departments, or in the universities. The gain was always certain. But the greatest gain came from those who took up educational work. The leaven of the *Junta*, and therefore of the *Institución*, began to act in the universities. Twenty years ago it was safe to say that all the universities in the country were bad, though there were here and there isolated men of great value. Gradually, the number of such men increased. Ten years ago it was sufficient to bring distinction on every university in some way or other. To-day every university can count on a substantial minority of well-trained men having a good, and in some cases an admirable grasp of their speciality, and an excellent idea of what Spanish education should be. There is nothing more striking than the change in tone to be observed in every Spanish university during these last twenty years: the vitality, the eagerness, the organising ability, the sense of solidarity which has been developed in all of them in a varying degree. This movement owes much to the *Junta*. Directly or indirectly it may be traced back to Giner.

CHAPTER VIII

GALDÓS AND THE 1898 GENERATION

While, to indulge for once in contemporary jargon, Giner built up the *ethos* of the nation, Galdós was vigorously rebuilding its *epos*. Why Europe and America should remain ignorant of one of the greatest creative artists the white race has produced is a mystery which, of course, like all mysteries outside of theology, admits the curious and inquisitive into its secluded privacy. Spain has not produced a greater novelist since Cervantes. Born in the Canary Islands in 1839, he soon evinced an artistic turn of mind in music and in drawing, then, following one of the hardest and most rigid laws which governed the destiny of young nineteenth-century Spaniards, he was made to study law. There is something appalling to the mind in the thought of the number of people who studied law in Spain during the second half of the nineteenth century. So universal a knowledge of law augurs no better for justice than a universal knowledge of medicine for health. No more welcome sign of the Spanish Renascence could be found than the relative fall in law students compared with students of other faculties which has been observed in Spanish universities of recent years. When Galdós was a young man, however, the study of law was still in the ascendant, and his family, conforming to the general rule, sent him to the law faculty, while his brother was sent to a military school. (Experience shows that, in the nineteenth century, these two

professions could to some extent be described as the art of turning the law and the art of cutting a way through it.) The young student arrived in Madrid when the storm of 1868 was brewing. The unpopularity of Isabel II was reaching its apex; political clubs were boiling over with enthusiasm for freedom and eloquence, and the barracks were hearing the call. His eyes, though inexperienced, began to see through and below this political activity, perceiving the genuine movements of national psychology on both sides of the barricades already discernible to the imagination. When these barricades actually took shape in substance, cutting the nation into two camps, Galdós we may presume threw in his lot with the revolutionaries, for, though at heart impartial and neutral, his neutrality and impartiality presupposed liberty, and he was bound to be for the time being on the side of light. In those early days he wrote his first work : *La Fontana de Oro* —a novel in which, under a title suggestive of the age (a name of one of the political clubs in which he saw the ferment of the revolution gradually rise), the type of his later productions was already emerging; for this novel may be considered as belonging to both the great series of works which he was to create : his *Episodios Nacionales* and his Contemporary Novels. The former are in themselves a true history of nineteenth-century Spain seen, not from the scholar's window, but from the street kerb, and at times from the top of a tree, the exposed street corner just fought over by rival factions, the private house of a politician, the darkest recess of a café seething with conspirators, the country orchard turned into a battlefield by a skirmish between Liberals and Carlists. Characteristically enough, the *Episodios Nacionales* begin with Trafalgar—the title

of the first of them—and constitute an imposing collection of five series (the last unfinished) of ten novels each, in which the Spanish nineteenth century is felt alive. In a sense the contemporary novels show an equal attention to the actual life of Spain as it flowed under his eyes. But here his creative imagination was freer, and he was soon able to show the breadth and depth of his conception of life. His main theme is, of course, that of the greatest artists : the relations between man and the forces of the universe, Life, Death, Love. He is fascinated by the problem of Christianity and of the possibility of absorbing its ideals in our Western societies. Such is the theme of *Nazarín*, and particularly of his masterpiece, *Angel Guerra*. He shows Love at work under all its complex aspects. His marvellous impartiality—only temporarily veiled during an anti-clerical phase covering but three or four of his works—his intellectual honesty and the truly magnificent gift for conveying a sense of vigorous optimism even when relating stories of death and despair are some of the more relevant features which make him, while an unmistakable Spaniard, a novelist with a universal appeal.

Hence the all-important rôle which must be assigned to Galdós as one of the spirits who moulded contemporary Spain. He brought out the true nineteenth century from a truly national, i.e., non-party, point of view, dwelling on its history as a Spaniard without bias ; then he let fall on the Spanish character a flood of universal light, achieving a work which remains inherently as one of the treasures of European literature while incidentally fortifying and clarifying the Spanish consciousness of Spain.

Despite its inherent virtues and its vitality, the

movement initiated by Don Francisco Giner and continued by his disciples would probably have petered out in an empty atmosphere of indifference had it been an isolated manifestation of private activity. As for Galdós, his influence would perhaps also have vanished with time. But both Giner and Galdós were more than mere isolated men. They were the signs of a general renascence, so that when their influence began to gather momentum it merged with other movements of an altogether different origin and character, yet springing from the same wave of new power. The most important of these movements was that known by the rather inaccurate name of *the Generation of* 1898.

The date, of course, refers to the Spanish-American War. The men then young were able to observe at close quarters the hollow insincerity, the incompetence and the pompous frivolity of most of the figure-heads of the Restoration. The nation had been kept in the dark and deceived; she knew neither the gravity of the Cuban revolt nor the strength of the powerful country which had come to the rescue of the insurgents; she had not been informed of the most important steps in the negotiations which led to the rupture; she knew nothing, of course, of the state of blissful unreadiness in which both Army and Navy had been allowed to stand by while the conversations with the United States went from bad to worse; she was ignorant of the conditions under which Admiral Cervera had sailed to his doom knowing that he would have neither base, nor coaling station, nor transport ships, nor any of the most elementary requisites for a fleet to exist, let alone fight. The nation had received from the Government nothing but stimulants. When the repatriation of the Army began and the Spanish towns saw the processions

of yellow ghosts landing from the ships, the Islands gone, the warships lost, the men given over to yellow fever, there was a healthy reaction, the healthier for its quiet intensity. This was the mood of the nation when the generation of 1898 wrote.

Four men stand out as the leaders of this movement: Joaquín Costa; Angel Ganivet; Miguel de Unamuno and José Ortega y Gasset. There were others. Moreover, the movement had nothing of an organised drive. It was a spontaneous and natural mood which manifested itself in seemingly independent activities, just as a natural season, though an unmistakable fact of nature, can only be deduced from a number of separate events. It was not considered as a definite historical unit at the time, but only later, when a new generation began to look at their elders with some perspective and realised the striking unity of the spirit which animated them. The very character of the movement was complex, extending from politics to literature, so that amongst the men who were later seen as within the group there were some who distinguished themselves in the field of pure letters —such as Azorín; some even who never wrote a line in a political mood, being artists and nothing else—such as Valle-Inclán.

Joaquín Costa was one of those many-sided minds which are typical of a country so rebellious to specialisation as Spain. A notary by profession, he was a scholar by vocation and had studied with equal industry the laws, customs and religion of the early inhabitants of the Peninsula, the political and social ideas underlying Spanish popular poetry and folklore, the methods whereby his own legal profession could be made more useful and effective. the features of agrarian collectivism in Spain and

many more non-descript problems of a political, social, technical and even philological character. He was not a popular, not even indeed a well-known, man beyond a circle of friends and admirers, when, in the critical years at the beginning of the century, he challenged Spain to a new life in his famous polemical works: *Reconstitución y Europeización de España* (1900), *Crisis Política de España* (1901), and particularly his contribution to the enquiry organised by the *Ateneo de Madrid* on the evils of Spanish public life under the significant title of *Oligarquía y Caciquismo como la forma actual de Gobierno de España.* Don Joaquín Costa was an Aragonese with a strong individualistic temperament, which not infrequently showed itself in the form of strong temper, a fierce and fiery patriotism, and all the impatience and the intolerance of a man whose whole life had been spent in pure and disinterested service for his country and for knowledge. His outburst, for it was somewhat in the manner of an outburst, aimed at raising the people from their lethargy and bidding them shake off the artificial system which the Restoration had evolved in lieu of government. He was loud in his denunciation of the rhetorical appeals to the past made by men unable to deal with the present. His message was to look things sternly in the face, to cease gilding the bare present with the glories borrowed from a bygone past. "Lock up the Cid's sepulchre under a treble key," he advised Spain, and attend to the needs of the day. What were those needs? He defined them with his usual thoroughness and precision, but also with his power for striking formulas which circulated afterwards like coins: "School and Larder" was the slogan which he invented. It will be seen that Costa saw the primary needs of the day. An educational

and an economic evolution were necessary before the Spanish people could develop the virtue without which all political communities are bound to live a precarious life—solidarity.

In deep contrast with this powerful voice resounding in the political arena, Angel Ganivet's quiet disquisitions might sound almost detached, yet the impression would be erroneous. Ganivet was a man of deep feeling, as shown by his suicide, which deprived Spain of one of her most brilliant hopes at a relatively early age. But he was a philosopher by vocation and a Granadino by birth, and a mind formed by Granada is bound to learn serenity from the alleys of cypress trees which make her a favourite haunt for poets. His first grown-up years were spent in the company of a small group of men of his meditative turn of mind, discussing philosophical problems in one or other of the gardens of Granada, eminently fitted for so noble a purpose. An ornamental fountain with his effigy in a pleasant corner of the Alhambra Park still groups in welcome harmony his pensive features, the quiet leafy shadows of the Park and the ever-present murmur of running water which keeps company with the mind and tunes it to hear the permanent in the fleeting. In 1896, Ganivet published his *Idearium Español*, a classic of restricted utterance, originality, ponderation, a searching and penetrating analysis of the Spanish soul and of the permanent features which have resisted all the changes brought about by influences and events even as deep as the advent of Christianity and the discovery of America. There was between Costa and Ganivet a contrast of matter as well as of manner. While Costa insisted mostly on the negative characteristics of the Spaniards and with the voice and gesture of a Bible prophet urged them to mend their ways and to

"Europeanise themselves," Ganivet laid stress on the positive features of Spain, on the qualities and ways whereby she brings an original contribution to civilisation; his message, suggested rather than actually expressed, is that such positive qualities must be cultivated and refined. And, as if to illustrate the paradoxical turn which things are wont to take in Spain, it happened that while Costa shouted forth "Europe, Europe," with the unsociable and ultra-individualistic way of an uncompromising Iberian, Ganivet wrote his Iberian Essays with the polish of a true European.

A similar contrast, though with an altogether different grouping of qualities, will be found by comparing the other two leaders of the generation of 1898 : Miguel de Unamuno and José Ortega y Gasset. The one a Basque, the other born in Madrid, these two men were destined to take over the dialogue initiated by Costa and Ganivet, and to drive it into the Spanish conscience.

English-speaking people interested in Spain have no excuse for wondering what sort of a man and mind Unamuno may be, for his best and most typical work has been translated in so admirable a fashion as to justify the view that great translators, like great poets, are born. *The Tragic Sense of Life in Men and Peoples*[1] is a discussion on the relations between the immortality of the soul, the existence of God, and man's own views and wishes, conscious and unconscious, on these all-important matters. From the outset Unamuno boldly puts man, man concrete and complete, "the man of flesh and bones," at the centre of his enquiry. He does not neglect philosophy, indeed there is no philosophy that he has not read, but behind it he goes in search of the philosopher

[1] Translated by Mr. Crawford Flitch. Macmillan, London.

whose " flesh and bones " we get in his books devitalised into syllogisms. The man Kant, the man Spinoza, are for Unamuno the true key to their systems. Instead of a search into older books he seeks the sources of books in the secret places of the author's heart. He is, of course, fully aware of the fact that in thus searching the vital sources of thought he destroys its objectivity, or, as he would put it, he forces thought to drop the mask of objectivity which it is wont to wear. But he is not equally ready to grant that we are the worse for it. Truth, for him, is in the struggle ever alive in men's hearts. Truth, in fact, is that struggle. And, possessed by this idea, Unamuno endeavours to free man from all intellectual veils and trappings, to accustom him to the contemplation of his own naked self standing before the Lord. Such was the message which Unamuno brought with burning conviction to the Spanish nation at the beginning of the nineteenth century. A universal message, essentially of a religious character, it was, of course, neither national nor political. Yet, precisely because of its inherent universality and also because it lays so much stress on the individual and on his relation to God, Unamuno's message was bound to appeal deeply to Spain. Virtually, it amounted to a restatement of the theme of Christian unity in a modern and a liberal setting. It implied also an affirmation of Spanish values as, not antagonistic to, but certainly independent of, European values in their originality.

The opposite view was taken by Ortega y Gasset, who, though strictly speaking, can hardly be counted as one of the " Generation " in point of age, reached fame and leadership early enough to be considered as one of its undisputed prophets. Ortega was frankly on the side of Europe. His antagonism

to Unamuno—a purely intellectual antagonism of course—springs from natural causes and may be explained by circumstances of race, education and personality. Unamuno is a pure Basque, in so far as racial purity is attainable even by Basques. He is, therefore, more inclined to grow in depth than in width and more gifted in force than in grace. He is apt to be a man of one idea. A professor of Greek in the University of Salamanca, of which he was Rector until a petty political intrigue deprived him of his post, he formed his mind in Spain and rarely came to Madrid, which he found too poor in Spanish character for his taste. Though not a nationalist—in fact, rather an anti-nationalist—he is intensely national. His strong temper, moreover, leads him to express his views in a forcible manner. His headstrong, independent personality is admirably expressed in his face and figure—a healthy complexion and a vigorously structured head in which every bone demands and obtains its full share of attention despite the attraction of two aggressive eyes and the poise of the whole face challenging all comers. Unamuno is essentially unsocial. Nature, interminable walks alone or with a friend readier to listen than to speak, are his main pleasures, and his themes are primitive and essential. In society he is apt to wield a heavy hammer. The stories attributed to him, even if inaccurate in fact, are significant. In a circle of friends he has just explained how he needs a considerable amount of sleep every twenty-four hours; an unfortunate mortal, who does not know his ways, ventures to doubt the necessity of such a waste of time. "Five hours a day are all I need." "Ah"—comes the hammer—"but when I am awake I am far more awake than you."

Ortega is a Castilian. He was born in Madrid and,

as he himself has pleasantly said, on a newspaper-printing machine. "*Yo que nací sobre una rotativa . . .*" He refers to *El Imparcial*, the (then) leading newspaper in the country, owned by his mother's family (Gasset) and edited by his father (Ortega Munilla). Ortega was thus born a journalist, and from his early days acquired the instinct to look at things *sub specie publicitatis*. Hence, perhaps, one of the strongest influences in the shaping of his political and even philosophical personality, for there is *public* in *publicity* and every force of a kind to strengthen the none too keen collective tendency of the Spaniard should be welcome whatever its origin. Ortega matured this predisposition to think collectively by his education in Germany. He was sent (a sign of the times) to study philosophy with Cohen in Marburg. We may well imagine the effect of the neat, quiet, German little town on the youthful sensibility of our Spanish student; the revelation of its order, cleanliness, method, social discipline, on this Iberian born in the bustle of the newspaper office of the most individualistic capital in the world, a city of absolute kings. Then in the town of order and method, the sanctuary of thought: the Jewish spirit clarified and intellectualised by German *kultur:* the Oriental yearning purified into Western research. No. The Iberian must not be allowed to go to seed in his unruly anarchy; he must learn to curb his instincts and impulses to the civic order, his inspiration and imagination to the order of science which is method. And so Ortega, who, had Giner and his "abroad" movement never existed, might have become a mere brilliant journalist, developed into a philosopher and Europe was the richer by one of her most original minds.

But though by natural genius and training Ortega

became a stimulating philosopher and interpreter of life, he kept a connection with the newspaper world in that his main interest is in the events of the day—the intellectual events, of course, that is, the latest ideas. A further contrast with Unamuno. While the Basque prophet is always unactual, even when dealing with the latest murder case or *coup d'état*, Ortega is always "in the news," even when dealing with eternal things. The very question which burns constantly in Unamuno's heart—Does God exist? Has He made us? Must we make Him?—a question to which he leads, whatever may be the starting-point of his writing or conversation, is turned by Ortega into a piece of sensational news: one morning he casts a glance over the horizon, strains his eyes for a while, then, advancing to the forefront of his newspaper he announces the tidings to all whom it may concern in big block capitals: "GOD IS IN SIGHT." The voice is eminently social.

Thus taste and conviction determined in Ortega a European attitude, for is not Europe the incarnation of the social model which the traditional individualism of Spain has forever before it in the generation of 1898? Ortega represents the voice of European Spain. His tendency is critical of pure Spanish values. He advocates science, philosophy, method, technique, the study of foreign books, first-hand knowledge of foreign universities. He preaches with deeds. He becomes a professor of philosophy in the University of Madrid and devotes his time to the study of contemporary currents of German philosophy; he endeavours to evolve his own doctrines, particularly with regard to Spain and her character (*Meditaciones del Quijote. España Invertebrada*), or, to present-day ways of thinking, such as relativity (*El Tema de Nuestro Tiempo*).

Ortega and Unamuno, then, even more definitely than Costa and Ganivet, are the protagonists of the two trends of thought which the generation of 1898 brings to light: one stands for the salvation of Spain within her own substance; the other for her renovation by European influence and example. In a sense, Spain, which, like England and Russia, is a country on the borders of Europe and therefore not purely European, has in these two men a pair similar to that which Russia evolved in Dostoievsky and Turgeniev, the one intensely Russian and indifferent, if not hostile, to Europe, the other a convinced European and critical of Russia as such; but the case of the two Spaniards is even more complicated. Unamuno, in his unchecked spontaneity, is a voracious consumer of European values and shows readiness to assume every kind of tendency, save, perhaps, the fastidious æstheticism of a D'Annunzio, or the smiling Parisian indifference of Anatole France; this ever-ready curiosity for things human, combined with the permanent appeal of his main theme, make him, while intensely Spanish, a universal author. Ortega, on the other hand, more exacting and intellectualised, shows a far less hospitable mind; there is, moreover, in his temperament a curious imperviousness to the Anglo-Saxon world; and these limitations, combined with his tendency to ride on the top of the wave of fashion, make him less universal though more abstract and general in his thought than Unamuno.

These four men lead the generation of 1898. The message of this generation springs from a critical mood prepared by a long century of trial and error (with a stress on error), and determined by the defeat of 1898. What are we? What have we done? What are the Spanish values which circulate in the world? What is the trace which Spain has left in

history, in thought, in European civilisation? Why all this disorder at home? why this sham and pretence? A constitution flouted, a Parliament which is a comedy, general elections which are but markets for votes or else free fights, corruption and incompetence. Where are we to turn? Such is the tone of the generation. At its lowest, doubt, and in many cases, negation. To the president of an *audiencia* (provincial law-court) who ranted against the incompetence of the navy, Costa retorted with his usual directness: "If *audiencias* had to navigate!" The first mood of the generation is, therefore, fiercely negative and critical. Nothing. There is nothing but sham and hollowness. We must begin afresh. And then, as soon as the new men turn their faces towards the morrow, the split occurs. Though all belong inherently to free Spain, that Spain in which the old religious earnestness had been delivered from its dogmatic shackles by the same Europe which she had fought in bygone days, the New Spaniards broke asunder as to their estimate of what New Spain was to be. Some of them, with Costa and with Ortega, carried forward their European position; we must, they said, make Spain a European people; others, with Ganivet and Unamuno, hesitated to accept all that Europe means: sons of Europe, no doubt, but all the sons of Europe are not identical. We have our message for the world. Europe is economic, scientific and mechanistic. We are . . . what we are. Our main concern still is the salvation of our soul. And to a reproach that Spain has brought but little to European civilisation (in its mechanistic sense) Unamuno will answer: "Let them invent." Not in vain did Ortega describe him as "the brother and the enemy."

But this very duel within the new generation was

salutary and stimulating. A touch of civil war is always necessary in order to catch the eye and ear of the self-absorbed Spaniard, whose interest in his neighbour is aroused if and when there is a reasonable prospect of breaking his head (of course to help him save his soul). Civil war, moreover, as Unamuno has pointed out, is the cleanest and purest of wars, for it is less likely to be infected by sordid and material motives than a war against strangers, and is generally waged for spiritual reasons. The split in the generation of 1898 led to no spilling of blood, though ink did run freely, but in so far as different voices argued the points at issue the Spaniard's attention was caught and held and the voices were heard.

A further fact which contributed to the success of the generation was the character of the Spanish Press. This is hardly the place for a technical history of the Press in Spain, and for our purpose it will suffice to draw attention to the peculiar conditions under which papers had to live and prosper in a century in which dictators, under several names of a more or less constitutional character, were always ready to ride roughshod over whatever liberties were granted, on paper, for the circulation of opinions. There is still a newspaper in Barcelona whose title bears witness to the difficulties with which the Press had to contend in the nineteenth century, and to its vitality to resist them. This paper was suspended and it reappeared the next day under a new name. Suspended again, it again reappeared under a third name. And the game went on, the editor inventing every night the name under which it was to appear the next morning, till one day, his imagination exhausted, he christened his paper *The Deluge.* The name remained, for it so happened that the paper was no longer suspended,

and Barcelona is, perhaps, the only town which rejoices in a deluge a day. On the whole, however, the Restoration was favourable to the growth of a fairly prosperous and free Press, and, save in exceptional circumstances such as general strikes and revolutionary risings, its liberty to print whatever came into its hands was not curtailed. Gradually, the period of relative peace and prosperity which Cánovas and Sagasta secured for the country allowed the Press to develop and to evolve a definite national type. Even the most prosperous newspapers have a relatively moderate circulation. This is due partly to the individualism of the Spaniard, which, by preventing amalgamation and stimulating individual initiative, leads to a large number of small newspapers; Madrid has a considerably larger number of newspapers than London; partly also the fact is due to the lack of those enormous centres of population which powerful industries tend to create. Another feature of the Spanish Press is that it is practically always under the direct inspiration and control of one leading personality, generally the founder and owner. This remains the case even after the appearance of newspapers owned by limited liability companies, or what is known in Spain as "Periódicos de Empresa." It follows, of course, that the Spanish newspaper is apt to reflect the personality of its leading spirit and that the qualities and defects of Spanish newspapers differ profoundly from those of Press organisations understood as commercial firms. Spanish newspapers are far more independent of business than is the case in other countries. Moreover, the national proclivity to put the stress on man rather than on things carries, as its corollary, that the newspaper reader in Spain is more interested in views than in news. His

stand is, that since there is no getting away from man, at bottom all news is views, and therefore views pure and simple is better than views parading as news. Moreover, news is ephemeral and its bloom goes with the day; views have a more permanent value and allow the reader to scent the fragrance of a human mind. This simplifies journalism, and eases the budget of many a newspaper. The saving in telegrams permits of a generous list of contributors, who sign, of course, for the reader wants to know with whom he is conversing.

Newspapers act, in Spain, not only as newspapers, but also as weeklies and monthlies, and even as books. They are the main organs of intellectual distribution and exchange, by far the most important link between the nation and its intellectual leaders. In this capacity the Spanish Press has shown its originality and a deep insight into the nation's peculiarities. The old newspapers carried, perhaps, somewhat too far the individualistic liberty which they granted their contributors. Nowadays a better balance is generally reached between the claims of the contributor and the claims of the newspaper as a whole. Such papers as *La Vanguardia* (Barcelona), *A.B.C.* and *El Debate* (Madrid) are definite in their views and in their general policy, while granting to their prominent contributors free scope, not merely for their ideas, but even for their peculiar way of looking at life.

A Press thus understood was bound to be of great assistance at a time when Spain began to feel herself again. The themes raised by the generation of 1898 were all in that zone extending over literature, politics and history, which has always interested Spanish readers. The columns of the daily Press were gradually opened to the new men, most of

whom had acquired celebrity in a shortlived " daily " which, characteristically enough, had chosen for its name the word *España*. The preoccupation with the fact, the historical phenomenon " Spain," was apparent in the name of this original newspaper, as it was to be in later years in the weekly founded by Ortega y Gasset, with the same name.

Some of the new-comers worked almost exclusively in the literary field. Azorin, for instance, though later he dabbled in politics, was then a pure word-artist applying his wonderful gifts for vivid description to the discovery of out-of-the-way Spain for the Spaniards. He revealed an admirable faculty for rendering Spanish scenes which no Spaniard had ever observed before precisely because they were sights to be enjoyed every day. He made Castile live for the Castilians. Valle-Inclán brought to Spanish letters the poetical gifts of the North-west so closely allied to the lyrical vein of Portugal. Benavente began to write his plays of Spanish bourgeois life. And, along with the men of letters, the generation evolved its own political philosopher in Don Ramiro de Maeztu. An Anglo-Basque, born in Biscay, Maeztu won distinction in the Press from an early age. His success may be traced to a fund of experience due to an adventurous youth which led him amongst other occupations to work as a labourer in Cuba; a gift for expressing general things in striking terms of a noble simplicity; and an exceptional sensibility towards new ideas which made him adopt with equal intensity and sincerity the latest view which happened to impress him. A man of strong convictions withal, whose mind moved along a steady line of evolution, beginning in intellectual anarchism and passing through liberalism, Nietzschian ideas and Guild Socialism, ended in Roman Catholic orthodoxy,

intellectual absolutism, and the acceptance of the post of Spanish Ambassador in Buenos Aires, under General Primo de Rivera's dictatorship. Maeztu was, in the 1898 group, the representative of Anglo-Saxon ideas. Whether he owed this rôle to his English blood or not, the fact is that, from the first years of the century, he settled in London and began to provide the Spanish papers with a running commentary on English manners of thinking and living, which he maintained at the same high level of intellectual distinction for a considerable number of years.

He was the first prominent Spaniard to settle in England for that purpose. Till then the Spanish Press had relied on their Paris correspondents for news and views of the outside world. The result was obvious. The vision of the world which the average newspaper reader obtained had to undergo the simplifying processes by which complex and irrational things become clear, simple, rational and universal through the filter of the French mind. The importance of this fact on the life of Spain could hardly be exaggerated. French ways of living and thinking have a fascination which conquers at once. France wears all her charms on her neat face. The Spanish nation, in her nineteenth-century re-birth, was but too prone to take her cue from her perfect neighbour. But we know that the genius of France differs profoundly from the genius of Spain. This apparently simple model was singularly difficult to emulate. The feeling that Spain was but a France which had missed fire was the natural outcome of such a state of affairs.

With the arrival of Maeztu, the attention of Spain was turned towards England. The field of influence and observation suddenly widened out, and Spanish public opinion began to absorb new ideas, new

standards and a new outlook on the world, and therefore on Spain herself. This transformation may be compared to that of the scientific opinion of Europe when Copernicus put forward his views and made men realise that the centre of the heavens was not the earth, but the sun. Such a change prepared the ground for the dethronement of the sun itself and for the ultimate disappearance of any centre of the heavens whatsoever. Similarly, by transferring the centre of attention from Paris to London, Maeztu prepared the Spanish mind for a truer understanding of the world and of Spain herself by objective standards independent of both French and English points of view. There is an ingrained tendency in France to consider Paris as the centre of the world. London is too wide in its world interests and perspective ever to make that mistake, and, moreover, the English mind is not geometrical and abstract like the French, but empirical and organic; so that while France sees the world as a geometric figure, a kind of *Place de l'Etoile*, with Paris in the middle, England sees it like a forest in which each tree stands on its own stem.

Ramiro de Maeztu was well prepared to realise all these facts and to convey their import to his readers. He had the merit of converting public opinion to the importance of Anglo-Saxon civilisation, the first of a series of men of letters who devoted their youth to an interpretation of Anglo-Saxon values in terms of Spanish civilisation. It became necessary for a respectable newspaper to have a London correspondent, by which, of course, was meant not a mere telegraphic correspondent in charge of a news service, but a racy writer and thinker in charge of a *views* service, a mind alert enough to catch the light of English life and ways and

to cast it in vivid colours over Spanish public opinion. This was the period which saw the rise of Ramón Pérez de Ayala and of Luis Araquistáin, both men formed in London in the school of English life.

Nor was the change welcome merely because it brought English views and ways to bear on the development of modern Spain. The main point was that the educational effect of the daily press had been strengthened by the access of a new civilisation to be observed and criticised, and that, therefore, further acquisitions were bound to be sought in similar fields. By a natural process of development the newspapers established touch with German public life. Some of the men who had lived in London, and had realised there the value of their experience, went to Germany and learned the language. Maeztu and Araquistáin settled in Berlin. Ortega had, from the very beginning of his intellectual life, shown a strong attachment to German ways of thinking. Though less widely felt than the Anglo-Saxon influence, the German influence was, perhaps, deeper owing to the growing number of students who, through the *Junta Para Ampliación de Estudios*, were constantly flowing into the German universities and returning to Spain enriched with a new mental discipline.

Thus the period that stretches between the end of the Spanish-American War and the beginning of the World War is one of intense intellectual activity during which Spain develops her university life and educates her public opinion. In the first case the main instrument in the change is the *Junta*; in the second, the *Press*. In both cases the method is the same: an increasingly intimate contact with the outside world.

CHAPTER IX

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT.—AGRICULTURE

The spiritual and intellectual awakening outlined in the preceding pages was, of course, the continuation of a movement begun in the nineteenth century, yet its quickening at the beginning of the twentieth must undoubtedly be interpreted as one of the effects of the pruning of the old Iberian oak, the last branches of which had just been somewhat ruthlessly plucked by the United States. No better proof could be found than the sudden rise in economic vitality which Spain experienced simultaneously. Whether we turn our attention to agriculture or industry, to commerce or to banking, to mining or to the harnessing of electric power, to railways or roads, or to any other manifestation of what is pleasantly described as material progress, we are to find the period 1898-1914 an exceptional, and at times even an epoch-making period, in Spanish economic history.

It is a clear case in which the economic interpretation of history is, if not belied, at any rate considerably sobered by events. The economic factors were not the cause but rather the effect of the moral and spiritual adaptations which the loss of the colonies made necessary. By no stretch of the imagination can it be said that the stimulus then felt in Spain was due to the fact that the capital which Spain used to place in her colonies was repatriated—for it was not; nor that capital ceased to go to the lost colonies —for it did not; nor that men of ability and enter-

prise formerly lost by the metropolis remained at home, for the loss of Cuba and the Philippines brought no other change in the distribution of Spanish manhood than the re-absorption by the metropolis of the host of officials, good and bad, which she had sent overseas. The true import of what then happened was far deeper, far more fraught with enduring consequences than any such outward material event. Spain felt then that the era of overseas adventures had gone, and that henceforth her future was at home. Her eyes, which for centuries had wandered to the ends of the world, were at last turned on her own home estate. The first thing to do was to take stock of her situation. What were her assets?

Spain is fundamentally an agricultural country. Opinions as to her soil and climate have fluctuated, as opinions about Spain are apt to do, between extremes of extravagant optimism and of exaggerated pessimism. For a time it was customary to initiate any discussion of Spanish soil by quoting Lucas de Mallada's famous dictum on the distribution of Spanish lands from the point of view of their fertility:

"(1) Lands totally bare, 10 per cent.

"(2) Lands with but a small capacity for producing, either because of excessive altitude or owing to a bad constitution or to drought, 35 per cent.

"(3) Lands moderately productive, lacking in water or unfavourably placed or with a defective constitution, 45 per cent.

"(4) Lands which make us think that we were born in a privileged country, 10 per cent."

The authority of the writer contributed not a little to the prevailing pessimism on the subject of the

Spanish soil. Contemporary writers take a somewhat soberer view of the matter and, while refusing to see Spain as a Garden of Eden, tend to react from Mallada's pessimism, and to provide fairly acceptable reasons for their opinion. The latest calculations, based on official figures, duly corrected to take account of the excessive discretion which taxpayers are apt to evince in matters of land statistics, would put the proportion of cultivated lands at rather less than half the area of the national territory, i.e., somewhere between 50 and 60 million acres (Spain's total area approximates 125 million acres). This does not include, of course, land used as pasture and underwood, which amounts to a figure between 60 and 50 million acres, leaving rather less than 15 million acres for totally sterile lands and urban or industrial areas.

The unusually high proportion of pasture and wood is explained, for the most part, by the broken nature of the country, which does not allow normal methods of cultivation to be used. Visitors to some particularly well cultivated parts of Spain, such as Majorca, may recall that even particularly unpromising lands placed on steep hillsides are, by dint of ingenuity and labour, transformed into fertile gardens by the inhabitants. But such a work can only be undertaken in exceptional circumstances, and for the most part the high lands of Spain are bound to remain fallow. If it be added that the centuries-long wars which the country has undergone have thoroughly depopulated her forests, thereby denuding the hills of their earth and depriving the lands of water, further reasons may be found for the unusually high proportion of low-producing districts in Spain. Moreover, in the dry part of the country which covers nearly two-thirds of the Peninsula,

water is extremely scarce, and in certain regions almost entirely lacking. The productivity of the regions known as the *Huertas* of Valencia and Murcia is entirely due to the ingenuity of its inhabitants. who have succeeded in husbanding their scanty resources of water with admirable skill and perseverance.[1] The agricultural production of Spain increased in value from 81⅓ million pounds (2,440 million

[1] The usual comment here on the part of unfriendly observers is that the irrigation system of these regions was due to the Moors, and that the Spaniards have no merit in it. But even if we admit that the irrigation system originated with the Moors, a debatable point which the greatest Spanish expert on Arabic culture and civilisation, Professor Rivera, answers in the negative, the present-day inhabitants of these regions *are* "Moors," as anyone who cares to look at them may find out for himself. Moreover, the Moors were officially expelled under Philip III. Are we to count for nothing the skill and perseverance wherewith the system has been preserved and considerably developed since? Nor is the system a mere feat of rural engineering. The important point is its social and traditional aspect. Without the vigorous tradition behind the irrigation system of Valencia and Murcia, such an institution as the *Tribunal de las Aguas* would not have resisted the wear and tear of centuries. Whatever the actual origin of this original institution, it has succeeded in perpetuating itself entirely on tradition, and its vitality is rooted in the people who compose it and live it. The Tribunal is a judiciary and administrative body on which the whole irrigation system rests. Every Thursday, under the porch of the Apostles of the Cathedral, the Tribunal sits in the open, on a level with the street. It is composed of seven syndics, representing the water users of the seven main canals of the *Huerta*, water users themselves, belonging to the hard-working peasantry which elects them and maybe to-morrow will pass judgment on them. The Tribunal, despite this democratic origin and composition, this modest and simple make-up, seems shrouded in a strange majesty and never sees its authority challenged or flouted by any of the men on whose interests it has so considerable a power. The *Tribunal de las Aguas* is a most eloquent proof of the capacity of the Spaniard for evolving and vitalising institutions when the necessary basis exists, *i.e.* the complete recognition of the individual as an autonomous unit.

pesetas) [1] between 1897-1901 to 127⅓ million pounds (3,824 million pesetas) between 1903-1907, which, even if due allowance is made for the decrease in the purchasing capacity of the peseta, shows a considerable advance. This advance has been not merely maintained but considerably improved upon, since the latest figures at hand value the yearly production of Spanish agriculture as high as 306⅔ million pounds (9,201 million pesetas), an average of rather more than £6 per acre of national territory (cultivated or not) and of about £15 per head of the population.

The main item in this agricultural production is that of cereals and associated plants, which accounts for nearly one-half of the value of the whole. This item illustrates the importance which the problem of water assumes in Spain, for, while the 33 million acres of non-irrigated lands (*secano*) yield an average of 13 to 14 bushels per acre, the million and a half irrigated acres yield an average of 24 to 25 bushels, which compares fairly with the average yield of European lands of rainier climates.

The second item is fruit and kitchen-garden produce, estimated at about 35 million pounds. This group is composed almost entirely of intensively cultivated lands, which explains why, despite its financial importance, it covers no more than 1,150,000 acres. It follows that the group yields a handsome return per acre (about £30). It covers mostly the irrigated lands of Valencia, Andalusia, Aragón and Rioja, though produce of this kind is found in practically every region of the country.

The third item—roots, tubers and bulbs—amounts to 28⅔ million pounds (860 million pesetas) and

[1] At par, £1 = 25 pesetas 22. The exchange has fluctuated during the period discussed. Figures in the text are calculated at the rate of 30 pesetas to the £.

accounts, therefore, for rather less than 10 per cent. of the whole agricultural wealth. Being also raised mostly on irrigated lands, it occupies a relatively small area—about the same as the preceding group—and gives a yield of about £25 per acre.

The vine, which occupies so large a place in Spanish economic life, comes fourth in this list of agricultural items of wealth. Despite the prestige of such wonderful things as sherry—the creation of which should suffice to justify a civilisation—it is but doubtful whether the vine is as good a business for Spain as it may seem at first sight. It contributes 8¼ per cent. of Spain's agricultural income and has the further advantage of utilising lands which are hardly ever fertile and which, in many cases, would be altogether useless for any other purpose. Its 3·2 million acres yield an income of £26·4 million (792 million pesetas), with an average yield of about £8 per acre. But the marketing of this product is an ever-recurring problem for Spain, and of late a policy tending to limit the area planted with the vine has been wisely inaugurated.

After the vine the olive tree is the most important of Spanish agricultural products. It comes fifth in the categories of the *Junta Consultiva Agronómica*, and is continually rising. It contributes rather more than 7 per cent. of the total agricultural production, i.e., about £21·7 million (650 million pesetas), and it occupies an area of just over 4 million acres with an average yield of £5 per acre.

A group may be classed here composed of pasture and other lands, excluding forests. It accounts for about £21·3 million of income (644 million pesetas), or roughly 7 per cent. of the total yield. The next group is that of tilled pasture lands responsible for about £15·2 million (456 million pesetas), but, unlike

the preceding one, obtained on a relatively small area, i.e., 683,000 acres. This amounts to an average yield of about £22 per acre. Finally, the last group is made up of industrial and special crops. It produces £8 million (240 million pesetas). It is one of the categories in which agricultural progress has been quickest in the twentieth century, owing particularly to the remarkable development of beetroot-growing due to a protected sugar industry which was fostered in the country as a result of the loss of Cuba. This category will, no doubt, increase in at least two directions: textile plants and tobacco. Cotton, hemp, flax, are receiving a growing attention; tobacco is being planted, unfortunately under the strict supervision of the Tobacco Monopoly Trust (*Compañía Arrendataria de Tabacos*), a powerful organisation which justifies itself by relieving the Government of much taxation machinery, but which in many ways counts as an obstacle to the development of both agriculture and trade.

Such is, briefly told, the tale of Spanish agricultural wealth. But from our point of view, i.e. that of the relations between economic growth and the growth of political experience, the rate of increase is even more important than the absolute figures of yield and wealth.

According to the best available data the figures for the production of corn between 1891 and 1925 show the following results :—

Years	Acres (thousands)	Bushels (thousands)	Value (millions of £s.)	Yield (bushels per acre)
1891	6,130	72,394	16	12
1900	8,920	100,727	27·6	11·2
1910	8,983	137,283	32·6	15·2
1920	10,323	138,440	88	13·4
1925	10,797	161,065	70	15

The olive tree bids fair to become the most important item of agricultural production in Spain after cereals. Progress here is stimulated by a practically unlimited demand as well as by exceptionally favourable local conditions of soil and climate, which explain why, of the 49 provinces, 36 produce olive oil. The growth in acreage has been considerable since the beginning of the century. Olive plantations covered 2,807,500 acres in 1891. In 1925, the area covered was 4,137,500, i.e. there was an average increase of 39,118 acres per year. Progress in area is accompanied by progress in yield. This can be shown in spite of the statistical difficulty caused by the peculiar behaviour of the olive tree, a plant which is wont to produce in biennial fits a year of high efficiency followed by a year of quiescence and poor yield. The data must therefore be reported in averages. The average crop in 1891–1900 was 211,400 metric tons, with a yearly average increase of 2,400 tons. The average crop between 1900 and 1920 was 251,100 tons, with an average yearly increase of 4,385 tons. Average yearly production between 1920 and 1925 was 303,400 tons, with an average yearly increase of 10,400 tons. The average yearly increase in yield during the whole of the period under review was 4,700 tons. This figure amounts to 2·6 per cent. of the initial crop (179,800 tons), while the yearly increase in acreage amounts only to 1·39 per cent. of the initial acreage; the net result is therefore a net increase in yield. As for value, the average crop was estimated at £6⅓ million (190 million pesetas) during the period 1891–1900, while it is nowadays considered worth £21⅔ million (650 million pesetas).

The vine, though holding its own, is not encouraged. But practically every other line of agricultural development shows progress similar to that already

observed in cereals and olive trees. For instance, the production of potatoes rose from 607,500 acres and 2,300,000 tons worth about £6⅔ million in 1902 to 1,060,000 acres with 4,600,000 tons worth about £16⅔ million in recent years, and it will be noticed that the increase in the amount of the crop is again higher than the increase in the acreage, showing therefore a net increase in yield.

From these examples it may be fairly concluded that the progress of Spanish agriculture during the present century is a well-established fact due to progress in a number of the factors which bear upon agricultural production.

The most important of these factors is water. Practically the whole of the area of arid Spain would, of course, benefit by irrigation. A fair proportion of it has been cultivated under an irrigation system dating from at least Moorish days. In the nineteenth century there were sporadic attempts to develop the irrigated area. But the movement did not acquire true impetus till the beginning of the nineteenth century. Two men must be mentioned in this connection : Joaquín Costa, who made irrigation one of the constantly recurring themes in his " School and Larder " campaign, and Rafael Gasset, one of the typical politicians of the Alfonsine period who, though indistinguishable in many ways from the other political figures of his time, devoted most of his public life to the study and execution of irrigation schemes.

The first attempts were perhaps inspired by an excessive optimism. It was calculated that about 10,000,000 acres could be reached by irrigation. Present-day experts do not care to go beyond more modest figures ranging from 6,000,000 to 7,000,000.

Of this area of what might be described as potential irrigation, 3,385,000 was already being irrigated in 1918, according to the estimates of the *Junta Consultiva Agronómica*. The efforts made by the Government comprise :—

(*a*) Construction. A general plan of canals and reservoirs was approved in 1902. It included new reservoirs, such as the Pantano de la Peña in North Aragon, which completely transformed about 40,000 acres of land; the development of existing works; the building of new canals and the adaptation of certain navigable waterways, such as the *Canal de Castilla*, to irrigation purposes.

(*b*) Legislation granting special subsidies to irrigation enterprises in order that landowners should be able to face the cost of transforming the land from dry to irrigated culture. Long term loans at low rates of interest have been granted, but here the question borders on political problems. Broadly speaking, it may be said that the economic efficiency of irrigation schemes is in inverse proportion to the size of the holdings. The intensive culture to which irrigated lands can be put in a country where sunlight is plentiful, thrives best with a system of small holdings. More often than not the areas benefited by public works are to be found in provinces in which enormous *latifundia* are the rule. The Government here made perhaps the gravest error of the last twenty-five years—the failure to tackle and solve the problem of land ownership.

Next to irrigation, progress in dry farming must be considered as one of the typical features of the modernising tendency observable in Spanish agriculture. Under the old system, applied nearly everywhere in dry Spain, only one-third of the land was tilled every year, leaving two-thirds fallow in

order to re-stock the soil and to retain the scanty water which Heaven granted from year to year. This system is gradually disappearing everywhere except in the large *cortijos* of Andalusia, in which irrigation is somewhat hindered by difficulties connected with the capital outlay which the change of cultivation would require in tenures of this vast size. Everywhere else the land is put to a better use. Several causes are contributing to this development. First, the increase in the use of fertilisers, considerable quantities of which are being manufactured in the country, and a growing amount also imported from abroad. Secondly, the increasing use of agricultural machinery. For years the taunt that the Spanish peasant still scratched his arid soil with the Roman plough was sure to be found in every book of travel. In 1898 there was only one firm of agricultural machine manufacturers in Spain; there are numbers of them nowadays and at least nine important ones, while agricultural machinery of all kinds is imported in growing quantities. A third cause of agricultural progress is to be found in an increasing solicitude on the part of the State. Here, again, the origin of the present-day activity must be traced to Rafael Gasset, and the date (1903) must be noted, as it corresponds with that period of Spanish introspection which has been analysed in previous pages. *Granjas* (experimental farms) managed by Government experts have been set up in the thirteen agricultural regions into which the country was divided at the time, and a number of specialised institutions have been organised with a view to educating both peasants and experts in the agricultural art, such as the *Instituto Agronómico de Alfonso XII*, a kind of agricultural college housed in Madrid, and schools for agricultural workers specialised in vine, olive, silk

and other agricultural produce. The *Granjas*, moreover, carry on "agricultural missions," i.e., circuits of lectures on such things as the use of agricultural machinery, of fertilisers, of irrigation, choice of seeds and particular points arising out of local conditions.[1] Experiments made in cotton and tobacco, the introduction of hops, the fostering of the silkworm and a number of other developments tend to show that the reawakening of Spanish agriculture has reached even the generally unpromising regions of officialdom.

A survey of Spanish agriculture would be incomplete without some mention of live stock. Spain was always famous for the quality of her domestic animals. The Andalusian horse, the *Merino* sheep, the Pyrenean ass and mule, to mention only the most notable amongst them, could boast of a great reputation were animals afflicted with the exclusively human capacity for boasting. Here, as in practically every other field, the curve of Spanish development shows a change for the better at approximately the same period—the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries. By 1891 the drop in the figures of live stock, which, from 22½ millions in 1749 had fallen to 16 millions in 1865, and to 8½ millions in 1879, seems pretty well arrested, a change no doubt due, for the most part, to the closing of the protracted period of civil wars which afflicted the Peninsula in the nineteenth century. A movement upwards sets in which raises the figure to 11,796,000 in 1904 and 13,765,000 in 1908. Progress

[1] The director of one of these *Granjas*, Señor Arana (*Granja* of Zamora) is the originator of the new dry farming method which is reclaiming vast areas of fallow land. Señor Arana claims that the fallow system can be avoided altogether by a judicious use of agricultural machinery, whereby the moisture usually lost by evaporation when the surface of the soil is allowed to crack, as the effect of drought, can be retained.

takes place simultaneously in practically every region and in practically every type of animal—sometimes, as in the case of horses and cows, by the introduction of foreign breeds, sometimes by the development of the native types. Thus the Spanish goat proved superior to any of its foreign rivals, as indeed it was bound to, for the Spanish goat is, by tradition and by natural selection, an adept in the art of thriving on scanty and unpromising food. The writer saw an enterprising representative of the race devour, one by one, all the labels on a 24-truck goods train waiting in a railway siding—a fact which, besides illustrating the peculiar difficulties with which railway men have to contend in Spain, shows the admirable variety of the components which go to the making of goats' milk. Goats contribute about $3\frac{1}{2}$ million units to the figures of live stock for 1918. As to sheep, special attention is paid to the *Merino* and to the *Churro*, with a view to restoring the old prestige and value of Spanish wool-producing animals. Horse-breeding is active, though suffering from a somewhat bewildering mixture of stocks, save in the south, where a few breeding establishments maintain the pure types to which Andalusia owes its high reputation for horses. A similar observation applies to cows and bulls, of which Spain always had excellent breeds, particularly in the northern coast districts for milk cows, and in the rich Andalusian pastures for her famous bulls for sport—animals to be highly praised for their beauty whatever opinion may be entertained as to the sport itself. Pig-breeding is general in the Peninsula, Majorca, particularly, producing a highly prized type. The total live stock of the country was estimated at 26 million in 1912 and 31 million in 1918. The income obtained from it was estimated, in 1924, at 40 to 46 million pounds.

A Note on Fisheries.—The considerable length of coast-line and the wealth of most territorial waters explain the importance of sea-fishing, while the irregular character of rivers prevent a vigorous development of inland fishing. Sea-fishing is a flourishing industry, producing about 12·3 million yearly (figures for 1920). In spite of the obstacles with which river fishing has to contend, the restocking of rivers is carefully organised from five different breeding centres, four of which belong to the State and one to the town of Barcelona. There are about 15,000 fish-preserving plants, employing 35,000 workers, who produce 73,000 tons of preserved fish valued at over two million pounds (figures for 1917).

CHAPTER X

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT—*continued.*

INDUSTRY AND COMMERCE

MINERAL INDUSTRIES.—Though much less important than its agricultural wealth, the richness of the Spanish subsoil has, perhaps, attracted more attention. Practically every invasion in the history of Spain—with the exception of the Moorish—was determined by the lure of the mineral treasures which the Peninsula concealed. Spain possesses almost every mineral, some in exceptional abundance, so that, until the arrival of the United States on the field, Spain was the most important producer in the world of many precious ores, and particularly of copper, lead and mercury. Finally, though not in such liberal quantities, Spain owns important coal deposits. And yet it can hardly be said that the development of all this mineral wealth had come up to what might be expected, given the generosity of Nature. Several factors account for this.

The first is the tendency to consider mines as adventures rather than business enterprises. The law itself (December 29th, 1868), which, until 1900, regulated the ownership of the subsoil, seemed to have been drafted by and for mine speculators. It provided that the ownership of a deposit should be vested in the person who should have officially discovered it, *denunciado*. A *denuncia* became thus a kind of letter patent with which quickwitted penni-

less amateur geologists stood at the gates of the future, claiming toll money for the right to develop the land. This law no doubt helped to discover the wealth of the country, but not to develop it.

Then, the country does not lend itself easily to the development of its ore and coal deposits, owing to the obstacles with which the road and rail engineer has to contend. Many a seam of excellent coal, many a mount of sterling hematite, awaits in idleness the railway or the road which will actualise its potential wealth. Though slackness has, no doubt, its part of responsibility, most of the stones thrown at Spain by irate or supercilious strangers come from citizens of countries admirably fitted for inland transport.

Finally, Spain lacked the capital and the political stability for sinking considerable sums in enterprises which live and thrive in continuity, while, though possessing a considerable number of distinguished engineers, she had not applied her mind to the building of great technical and business enterprises.

Here, again, the beginning of the twentieth century is the crucial date. The law amending the more objectionable aspects of concession-hunting dates from 1900; and another law, amending the first, was enacted in 1910. Under the new system, the concessionaire must pay a tax per unit of surface, whether he works the mine or not. A commission was set up to study an adequate mining code, and although the draft had not passed through the slow mills of Parliament before General Primo de Rivera stopped them working with his sword, much of what it contained has passed into actual official practice by way of decrees and regulations. The whole trend of the new spirit is frankly nationalistic. The nineteenth century had, in fact, allowed foreign holdings of mines to a somewhat dangerous extent—dangerous

not so much from the point of view of defence and economic independence as from that of the relative power of big foreign business and of the national Government. The royal decree of June 14th, 1921, actually limits mining concessions or transfers to Spaniards and Spanish-controlled firms.

That some such measure had become necessary may be gathered by comparing the figures of foreign and national capital invested in mining enterprises. Spanish capital amounted to 543,944,815 pesetas in shares and 61,190,000 pesetas in bonds, a total of 605,134,815 pesetas (£20,170,447), while foreign capital amounted to 662,214,301 pesetas or £22,073,810, most of it (£18,348,132) British. It will be seen that the total capital thus invested in Spanish mining amounted to over £42,000,000 in 1912.

Progress in legislation and organisation in a period of relative stability, and when a new spirit of application and study was abroad, culminated in a general rise in mining production. Thus the figures for the two branches of the mining industry in which Spanish mining statistics are always couched, i.e., extraction and transformation, are the following :—

	Average value in £s.	
	Extraction.	Transformation.
1901–1905	5,960,000	7,083,333
1906–1910	7,333,333	8,700,000
1911–1915	8,360,000	10,260,000
1916–1920	16,116,000	22,546,666

The figures for the period 1916-1920 should be read, of course, in connection with the abnormal stimulus which the War produced in mining and metallurgy. A reaction sets in from 1921, considerably aggravated by other circumstances such as a coal crisis. In the two years 1921 and 1922, the respective values fall to 13·4 and 9·7 millions for extraction and 23 and

15·4 millions for transformation. Yet the rate of progress has been restored since, and statistics calculate present values at 16⅔ and 30 millions respectively.

One of the most remarkable features in the mining position is that the rate of progress has been quicker in transformation than in extraction. The point deserves to be noticed, for it evidently shows that Spain is deliberately aiming at the industrialisation of her mineral resources. It is significant that, while practically the whole of the foreign capital invested in Spanish mining is devoted to the extraction and export of mineral wealth, the capital invested in the transformation of minerals—amounting to 398 million pesetas (£13·2 million)—is practically all in Spanish hands. Progress in this field began with the century. In 1901 there were 138 factories working coal and minerals; in 1909 they had increased to 189. As for the particular materials produced, it may be said that Spanish metallurgy is one of the most varied, for, though not in the front rank as to quantity, Spain produces practically every metal and important chemical raw material.

The most important of Spain's metallurgical industries is the production of steel and iron. It is an industry with deep historical roots in the country, since the mediæval *forja catalana* provided the world model for pig-iron production until the discovery of modern methods. Iron and steel production is nowadays centred in three main districts :—

Bilbao, the centre of the world-famous iron ores, in which the *Altos Hornos de Vizcaya* have developed a flourishing industry based on local ore and on coal brought from Asturias or imported;

Asturias, which, being the most important coal centre in the country, and placed, moreover, close to

the sea, has developed a certain number of metallurgical enterprises, the most important of which is the *Compañía Duro-Felguera*;

Valencia, or more exactly Sagunto, in which the firm *Sota y Aznar* has set up a new and up-to-date establishment for the production of pig-iron on the basis of rich iron ores exploited on the border of the provinces of Guadalajara and Teruel, in Sierra Menera;

Ponferrada, in the kingdom of León, in which both coal and iron are abundant, and though suffering from an unfavourable geographical position, has nevertheless developed a metallurgical industry of its own.

The progress in Spanish metallurgy since the beginning of the century, both in quantity and in quality, is evident, though the position of the country does not yet correspond to her natural wealth in ore and fuel. Yet, despite the moral handicap of protection, and possibly helped by its material advantages, Spanish manufacturers are growing alive to the possibility of conquering foreign markets for their iron and steel, notably in the Mediterranean, while national markets have been steadily expanding since 1898.

Similar progress is shown by the industries based on other metallic ores, in which Spain is singularly rich. Copper is exploited in the district of Huelva, mostly by British capital; lead in the provinces of Jaen in Northern Andalusia, and also in Murcia. The first of these two districts, in particular, is one of the most important lead-producing regions in the world. Zinc is extracted in both Murcia and Santander. The famous Almadén mines and works are still one of the chief sources of world supply for mercury. Tin, tungsten, silver and gold are also extracted in smaller quantities as well as bismuth, antimony, sulphur and

practically every other mineral. A relatively recent discovery has revealed the existence of considerable deposits of potash in Suria (Catalonia), but the corresponding industrial development has not yet been organised.

The manufacture of machines of all kinds is perhaps one of the industrial activities for which Spain was traditionally and psychologically least prepared. Yet this branch of industry shows unprecedented progress during our period. It is true that some of the bigger firms, such as *La Maquinista Terrestre y Marítima* (founded 1855 in Barcelona), date from the nineteenth century, but a remarkable revival is manifest in recent years; the *Sociedad Española de Construcciones Metálicas* (Bilbao), is of 1901; the *Unión Cerrajera* is of 1906; the *Fábrica de Vagones de Beasain* was considerably developed in 1921; *Ajuria y Aranzábal,* specialised in agricultural implements, date from 1914; *Echevarria's* electrical furnaces from 1920; the *Hispano-Suiza* (motor cars) was founded in Barcelona in 1904; the *Constructora Naval* dates from 1909, and it comprises: shipyards in El Ferrol, Cartagena, Matagorda, Sestao, Nervión (Bilbao); ordnance works in La Carraca, and an establishment for the production of special steel in Reinosa.

Chemical Industries.—The mineral wealth of the country, and particularly the existence within the territory of abundant pyrites, rich potash deposits and excellent sources (both sea and mineral) of common salt, with, moreover, easily available electrical power, should have enabled Spain to build up a powerful chemical industry. Here again, though the position is by no means what might be expected in view of the natural resources of the country, the keynote of the present century is rapid progress, hampered perhaps by an insufficient co-ordination of

efforts. There were no less than 3,466 firms on the books of the tax authorities in 1917. The industry has not attained yet the degree of concentration which would enable it to compete with the highly organised industries of Germany and Great Britain. The most important firms are specialised either in the distillation of wood or in fertilisers, pharmaceutical products, or perfumes—this last an industry which is particularly favoured by an almost unlimited supply of excellent olive oil on the spot.

The Textile Industry is also of very old standing in Spain. Wool was, of course, a famous Spanish product from the early days of Spanish history; the silk industry, notably during the Moorish period, reached a degree of exceptional splendour, and cotton was grown and manufactured in Andalusia long before the modern age. These industries, particularly cotton-weaving, suffered a severe set-back after the Spanish-American War, which cut off a safe market. Yet the recovery that ensued, due almost entirely to the expansion of the home market, was relatively swift, and had a steady and permanent effect. As a typical example of the growth of this industry during the present century we may quote the cotton figures for 1903, 1912, and 1920, which are respectively 1·7, 2·2, and 2·5 million spindles. By far the most important centre for textile industries is to be found in the region which forms the hinterland of Barcelona—this choice being determined partly by a local proclivity to this kind of industry, partly by the commercial advantages of a great port, partly by the possibility of hydro-electrical development afforded by the Pyrenean valleys. Cotton, in its turn, contributed to the development of wool, though this industry is also flourishing in places so far apart as Béjar (in the province of Salamanca), and Alcoy

(in the kingdom of Valencia). Silk is manufactured in the south-east and south, notably in Valencia and Murcia. A number of other textiles are also produced, and in particular the excellent esparto grass for which Spain is famous. Of late, signs are not lacking of a tendency to develop the cotton industry in Seville, a region in which certain types of cotton may be grown under good conditions, and which, moreover, abounds in electrical power. This development need not be considered as a threat to Catalonia, for the cotton industry of Spain, though prosperous and growing, is far from having attained the development required to satisfy the national demand.

A detailed survey of all the other industries would be out of place here. The general tone of development is obvious. A further proof of it may be gathered by consulting statistics of taxation. The yield of the tax known as *Industrial Contribution*, paid by firms engaged in industries, passed from 46⅓ million pesetas in 1916 to 101·6 in 1922. It is true that the rate of the tax was raised in 1919, but no industry had it raised by more than 75 per cent., and only a very few by as much, while the rise shown in the above figures is of course much higher. A similar rise is observable in the *Impuesto de Utilidades*, a tax on returns. This remarkable industrial development of the country is paralleled in the growth of its thermal and hydro-electric power and in its means of transport.

Power.—Spain can draw on two abundant supplies of power : her coal and lignite mines, and her waterfalls. Both have been considerably developed since the beginning of the present century.

Coal and Lignites.—Though not one of the great world coal centres, Spain has enough coal deposits to meet her own requirements, at least, if the matter

be considered on a merely statistical basis. In actual fact, a variety of reasons, the three most important of which are quality, price and communications, force her to import about one-third of her normal consumption. Coal districts are to be found in practically every region. The most important of them are :—

Asturias, a region in which no less than 45 seams have been studied, some of which attain a width of 7 feet, though the average size varies between $1\frac{1}{2}$ and 3 feet. The area of this coal basin is estimated at about 800 square miles, one-quarter of which contains good deposits. The Asturian basin is the most important in the country. It extends beyond the Asturian border over the northern regions of the kingdom of León.

The basin of León proper, however, occupies the west of the province of this name. This district had not been worked commercially until the exceptional conditions brought about by the War more than counterbalanced the natural obstacles which the broken character of the district opposed to the marketing of its excellent coal. After the War, difficulties were again felt on this score; but a few railways and roads had been built in the brief spell of prosperity, and the district has not been allowed to fall back into complete inactivity.

The basin of Palencia may also be said to belong to León, at least in part. It contains four groups of seams, the most important of which, the Sabero basin, has been considerably developed of late. North of this basin there extends what is, perhaps, one of the most promising coal centres of Spain, the almost untapped district of Burgos, well provided with good steam coal. Its admirable central situation is being further improved by the construction of the

Santander-Mediterranean railway and the Burgos-Madrid (direct) railway.

The deposits of San Juan de las Abadesas in the Pyrenean recesses of the province of Gerona are of a certain importance, if only local. There are here and there other smaller districts in Logroño, Cuenca and Navarre.

It is fortunate, for a country in which communications are not easy, that important coal deposits are also available in the south. Three basins meet the growing requirements of Andalusia :

Belmez, a rich district (about 150 million tons are estimated to constitute its central zone alone) and abundant in all kinds of coal;

Puertollano, in the province of Ciudad Real, a rich basin, though less favoured in point of quality, was also developed during the exceptional circumstances of the War, and has held its own in the market owing to its vicinity to Madrid.

Villanueva del Rio, in the province of Seville, a promising district. The coal is good, and what appears to be a considerable extension of its carboniferous zone has been discovered in 1929.

Lignites are found in numerous districts, the most important of which are Utrillas, in the province of Teruel; Mequinenza, on the border between Aragón and Catalonia; Figols, in the province of Barcelona; and others in Santander, Majorca, etc.

The determining factor in the production of coal and lignites is the price of English coal. England being the most important market for Spanish goods in Europe, there is always an ample supply of cheap freight to convey Welsh coal to Spanish harbours. As, moreover, railway transport in the Peninsula is very expensive, owing to the broken condition of the territory, Spanish coal can only compete with

English coal in limited districts and under exceptional or precarious circumstances. The life of a fair number of Spanish coal mines depends, therefore, to a considerable extent, on events which are beyond Spanish control. This fact explains the precarious conditions under which the industry has been developed. Spain's coal industry has grown only when helped by the State to weather dangerous crises. A certain stimulus, however, has also been provided by the industrial growth of the country at large. Spain produced $2\frac{1}{2}$ million tons of coal in 1900, 4 millions in 1910, 4·9 in 1920, 6·2 in 1924. Despite this effort the national production remains behind the national requirements by about a constant sum. Thus in 1910, 2·3 million tons had to be imported; in 1920, 1·9; in 1924, 2·4. The consumption of power has, however, increased more rapidly than the production of coal. The difference is met by the growth in hydro-electric power.

Hydro-Electric Power.—A somewhat theoretical calculation, on the basis of a 10 per cent. exploitation of the annual rainfall, estimates the possibilities of hydro-electric power in Spain at rather more than 5 million h.p. Other calculations, based on the total volume of water flowing in Spanish rivers—estimated at 1,500 cubic metres per second, with an average flow of 600 metres—would put Spanish hydro-electric power at 8 million h.p. Estimates are bound to be vague, owing to the irregular and extreme character of the climate.

The most moderate estimate, however, is optimistic enough, and everything in recent years tends to show that Spain is definitely aware of her possibilities in this field. Curiously enough, though the beginning of electricity in Spain dates as far back as 1888, on the occasion of the Barcelona Exhibition, the first

plant for transmitting electric power at high voltage, a kind of work in which Spain was to become a pioneer in Europe, was installed near Madrid in that historic year—1898. A force of 3,000 h.p. drawn from the Manzanares river was transmitted to Madrid at a voltage of 15,000 volts. It was quickly followed by plants for bigger and bigger distances and voltages: 26,000 volts (*Hidro-eléctrica Ibérica*); 50,000 volts (*Bolarque*); 65,000 and 130,000 volts (*Hidro-eléctrica Española*). The most vigorous effort was made between 1898 and 1910, the period which saw the electrification of practically every watermill in the country and when a kind of electrical *fiat lux* lit up the secular darkness of villages which had known no other light but the tallow candle and the oil lamp. By 1917 there were 881,884 h.p. of hydro-electric power available; by 1922 the figure had risen to 1,202,280 h.p., while the proportion of the power actually utilised to the available power had passed from 42 per cent. in 1917 to 65 per cent. in 1922.

The electrical harnessing of the country's water resources has continued to attract the attention of the public, the authorities and the business community. Schemes of growing importance are in course of execution or in study—notably the systematic exploitation of the Guadalquivir Valley and the long-discussed Duero scheme, protracted owing to the complications involved in its international character (Portugal holding somewhat different views from Spain). The total capital of the firms engaged in the production and distribution of electricity is estimated at £85 million.

The main problem to be faced for further development is, of course, that of regularity and reliability. As firms market a higher proportion of their available

power the necessity of securing a regular supply becomes more and more pressing. Two solutions are in sight: the control of rivers by means of appropriate dams; the use of poor or unfavourably placed fuel in reserve steam stations.

The first of these two solutions offers particular advantages in a country in which there are many demands on water and there is only a fitful and scanty supply thereof. Irrigation, town water supply, sanitation, power, are the four main uses to which rivers are put. They are not irreconcilable, but they may be conflicting if no one takes the trouble to co-ordinate their claims. Present-day Spain has evolved an original and fertile idea towards the solution of this problem, the *Confederaciones Hidrológicas* or chartered associations of all the municipal, provincial and business entities interested in a particular river and its affluents. The idea arose in Saragossa, the main town on the main river of Spain. The *Confederación del Ebro* proved so successful that the Duero, Guadalquivir and other rivers soon followed suit, and in 1926 (March 5th) a royal decree gave an official assent and a charter to these spontaneous creations of the nation. The decree stipulates that such confederations must be set up in the river basins in which the State may think them necessary, or else when 70 per cent. of the agricultural and industrial concerns interested in the river demand it. Once the confederation has been recognised as necessary by the State, affiliation and co-operation become compulsory for all official bodies (such as municipalities and county councils), irrigation associations, water users, private and public enterprises dependent on the river or its affluents. The main tasks of the confederations are to study general schemes for the use of the river and its water, to supervise the financial and technical arrange-

ments for applying such schemes and, in general, to administer and husband the water available in the whole basin. The idea seems to have come up in auspicious times, for it has met with a ready response everywhere. Two facts may be given as fair intimations of the vitality of the hydrological confederations : the Ebro Confederation, which still retains its leadership, has launched into a thoroughgoing study and census of sanitary conditions in the rural areas of the whole basin ; and all the extant confederations met in 1928 with the object of co-ordinating their efforts and profiting by their mutual experience, with the result that the *Union of Hydrological Confederations* has acquired a permanent footing.

The second remedy available in order to meet the irregularity of water power in the Peninsula is the use of fuel for electrical purposes as auxiliary to waterfall production. As it happens, Spain possesses abundant supplies of fuel, either too poor in quality or too inaccessible to be marketable after transport charges have been added to cost of extraction. The ideal solution for all such deposits is transportation in the form of electrical power. Important plants have been set up on this principle.[1] A more general system of electrical supply based on a network of hydro-electrical and steam-generating plants, has been under consideration for some time. A definite plan may be launched before this book is out.

In conclusion, Spain's supply of natural power is abundant, and only requires enterprise and co-ordination to put it to a good use. The last years show considerable development both in the use of

[1] The most notable of which is that of the *Peñarroya Mining Company*, which, during the dry season, supplies the *Mengemor Hidro-Eléctrica* with electricity made out of its poorer coal while the Mengemor Company supplies *Peñarroya* with hydro-electrical power during the winter months.

power and in the ability to develop it in the best possible way.

COMMUNICATIONS.—Nature has treated Spain with niggardliness in what concerns communications. A rugged surface, brittle material and an extreme climate, all the conditions for bad roads and difficult and expensive railways are to be found in the Peninsula. Road-building does not begin till the middle of the eighteenth century, though the work had an illustrious precedent in that mediæval saint, Saint Dominic of the Causeway (Santo Domingo de la Calzada), who, in the eleventh century, improved the pilgrims' road to Compostela and dotted it with hostelries. In this, as in many other aspects of Spanish life, the leading monarch was Charles III, though the plans for his road-building enterprises had been prepared in the reign of his predecessor Ferdinand VI. By 1802 the road system covered 388 leagues. A document dated 1856 calculates that Spain had 4,580 kilometres of roads in 1833. In 1856 the figure was 6,587 kilometres. But, in 1868, when Queen Isabel II left the throne, her reign had raised the figure to 17,409, and it is only fair to record that this reign, in many respects so deplorable, left an honourable trace in road-building. Nor were her successors—with the exception of the revolutionary period—less active, for, by 1900, the road system of Spain had reached a total of 35,800 kilometres.

Here, as in other fields, the first years of the present century proved exceptionally fertile. By 1919 the figure of 1900 had been more than doubled (77,000 kilometres). This figure is far from adequate. Much remains still to be done both in quality and in quantity. But consideration should be given, when comparing figures with those of other countries, to the high cost of construction due to the broken nature of the country and to its sparsely distributed popula-

tion. As it is, road-building and maintenance have made enormous strides in recent years, and both commercial and pleasure traffic are nowadays adequately served. Several "auto-pistas," or special roads for fast motor traffic, are under construction.

For all its steel rails and signals and stations and uniformed officials, a railroad is a road, and Spanish railways had to contend with difficulties similar to those which prevented the swift development of roads, i.e., a broken country and an extreme climate. They had also to contend with difficulties of their own, the first of which was that, while road-making had a tradition and official dignity dating from the Roman Empire, railway business incarnated in adventurers, speculative men claiming full freedom to do what they liked with their money. Spain did not suffer from the more frantic pranks of railway speculation and on the whole the capital to which she owes her railways (French, and to a lesser extent Belgian and British) worked honourably and conscientiously. Yet there was a certain amount of watering, or over-capitalisation, which was to remain one of the difficulties in a situation already burdened by excessive natural costs. Then politics stepped in. Lines were not always built along the economic but along the political route, and subsidies may at times have been proportioned to political services rather than to geographical difficulties or economic handicaps.

On the whole, however, the railway system was built expeditiously and efficiently, though natural difficulties made it somewhat expensive. By 1920 the total State subsidy to construction was estimated at 800 million pesetas (£26,670,000), while the average cost per kilometre was put at 375,000 pesetas (£12,500). The "virtual" length of the

Spanish mile of railway (i.e., the length of straight flat line equivalent to an average Spanish railway mile from the point of view of speed and haulage) is about 2·1. It will be seen therefore that Nature has made transport in Spain more than twice as difficult as in the flat countries of north and central Europe. It is calculated that the transport of coal from the collieries to Madrid more than doubles its price.

Such unfavourable circumstances explain why Spain's railway system is relatively small. In 1896 it measured 12,541 kilometres. But though it had risen only to 14,800 in 1911, this year saw traffic exactly doubled, the number of passengers increasing from 25·7 to 50·3 millions and that of goods from 14·3 to 29 million tons. It will be seen how the end of the century is here again a critical date, marking a clear difference in the rhythm of development. The system is now over 16,000 kilometres long. Progress is envisaged in the following directions:—

(1) The building of new main lines, much needed, particularly in a number of central districts.

(2) The construction of secondary and so-called "strategic" lines (the word "strategic" in Spanish railway jargon means little more than a label to allow higher subsidies in particularly difficult regions).

(3) Electrification, much to be desired for reasons of general national economy, and quickly developed in recent years. Main lines in Asturias, Catalonia and the Basque region are already electrified, and important schemes are afoot for Castile, Valencia and other regions.

(4) The conversion of the whole of the "normal" system of the Peninsula to the European gauge. The Spanish railways were built on a gauge of 1·674 metres, i.e., 239 millimetres wider than European lines. The conversion to the European

width is considered important both economically and politically by the best observers. It has been held up so far owing to the high estimated cost (which varies from 800 to 3,000 million pesetas according to whether experts are favourable or hostile to the idea). A further argument in favour of this scheme is that it would allow Spain better to fulfil her natural rôle as the transit route between Europe and Africa. A Spanish engineer, Colonel Jevenois, has been at work for some time on a scheme for a railway tunnel under the Straits of Gibraltar.

The financial requirements of such transformations far exceed the means at the disposal of the railway companies. Most of these companies hold their lines on 99-year concessions due to end towards the middle of the century. After a series of tentative measures, a railway régime has been set up in 1924, the main features of which are that, while the management of the lines is left to the existing companies, the State will control and finance future development in permanent way, rolling stock and new lines. The State raises the money by means of special railway loans. Rates are fixed by the State. They must cover working expenses, pensions, financial charges (including sinking fund on the capital provided by the State) and an equitable dividend on the company's capital. Considerable improvements in rolling stock and permanent ways have been effected on the basis of this régime since 1924.

Nothing could better illustrate the growing demand for communications than the rapid development of omnibus lines. Though the Spanish road system is hardly more adequate than the railroads in proportion to the area and population of the country, recent statistics show that the total length of regular motor-bus lines is nearly double that of railways, i.e., 30,000 kilometres. Regular air lines exist also between the

main towns (Madrid–Barcelona, Madrid–Seville, Madrid–Lisbon, and Seville–Lisbon), apart, of course, from the regular French line connecting Paris with French Africa via the eastern coast of Spain.

A first glance at the map might lead one to expect that Spain should have developed a flourishing Merchant Marine, for few European nations have a longer coast-line and a greater variety of seas to serve. Yet Spain seldom rises above the eighth rank in Merchant Marine statistics, lagging behind smaller countries, such as Norway and the Netherlands. Several factors account for this, the most important being precisely her geographical position on the main line to South America and the East, which makes it possible for other flags to offer cheap freight rates from Spanish ports. It should be added that the hinterland conditions of Spanish ports are far from favourable, owing to the broken character of the land and to the high cost and low speed which it entails in land transport. Finally, Spanish rivers do not lend themselves easily to navigation, and the best of them flow out of Spain into Portugal.

The crucial date in the development of the Merchant Marine is also 1898. At this date the total merchant tonnage of Spain was 552,000. It was 816,000 in 1903; 877,000 in 1913; 1,106,000 in 1923. In so far as the prosperity of shipping lines is determined by their capital expenditure, the protectionist tendency to have the ships made in the country somewhat cuts across the equally protectionistic tendency to develop the Merchant Marine.

COMMERCE.—There is a special difficulty when discussing foreign commerce. Figures do not work, or rather they work too well in the hands of those who use them. Nations, with an eye on commercial treaty negotiations, and exporters with an eye on foreign

Customs, find it to their interest to overstate their imports and to understate their exports. Import figures tend, therefore, to produce what might be described as *over-statistics*, and export figures *under-statistics*. It happens, of course, that as between two nations A and B, what is an import for A is an export for B, so that by a patient study of foreign statistics one may, perhaps, hope to come as near the truth as this elusive lady will consent. But such a study would lead but to uncertain results, since it would be difficult to strike an accurate middle course between the under-statistics of one side and the over-statistics of the other.

The above remarks apply to Spanish foreign trade as to the trade of other nations. They should provide some comfort for those Spanish patriots who grieve at the alarming size of the unfavourable balance which Spanish trade tends to evince of recent years. The revaluation of goods which took place in 1922 was of so drastic a nature that the total value of imports for 1921 was put at 1,261,000,000 pesetas or at 2,834,000,000 pesetas according to whether the old or the new system were applied; while, for exports, the figures would be 812,000,000 and 1,584,000,000 pesetas. It may be noticed that while new valuations raise import values by 124 per cent., they raise export values by only 95 per cent. Total figures, however, pass from 2,074 to 4,418 million pesetas, i.e., from £69·1 to £137·2 million.

With the reservations which these statistical peculiarities suggest to the wary reader, it may be gathered that the trade of Spain shows a development parallel to all the other signs of economic development which we have observed. Total yearly trade up to 1894 oscillated within 200 million pesetas of the figure of 1,500 million, i.e. within 6·7 million pounds of 50 million. In the period between 1898

and the outbreak of war the total trade oscillated within 10 million sterling of 60 million pounds. Disregarding the official revaluation, the post-war figure tends to settle round about 80 million pounds. If official revaluations be considered—and they cannot be altogether disregarded, since values have altered—the figure would have to be about doubled.

The official figures for the balance of trade for the period 1900–24 would amount to a deficit of rather more than 6,000,000,000 pesetas (£200,000,000). Nearly all of this deficit (5,500,000,000 pesetas) would be due to the years 1921–24, precisely those years during which new values were in operation. There is no doubt that the trend of the foreign trade of Spain seems to be unfavourable to the country. Even after the readjustment of values effected in the reverse direction by the Council of National Economy in 1925, the figures for 1926 and 1927 show deficits as high as 543 and 688 million pesetas respectively. But it is obvious that the deficit of the Spanish balance of trade cannot be very alarming, or its effects would be felt in the economic life of the country and particularly in its exchange. It is true that the peseta, which rose as high as sixteen to the £ during the war, seems now to have settled in the vicinity of 70 per cent. of its pre-war value.[1] But the fact that it has settled at all is incompatible with a huge commercial deficit, particularly if it is borne in mind that though tourism has considerably increased on the invisible export side, remittances from Spanish residents abroad have somewhat fallen and large sums are debited owing to the increasing number of Spaniards touring abroad.

[1] The deplorable financial administration of the Dictatorship and the political instability which it created have brought it down since to about 60% of its par value, but these facts do not affect the argument.

PART THREE

THE ELEMENTS OF THE REIGN OF ALFONSO XIII

CHAPTER XI

THE KING

THE reign of Alfonso XIII may be interpreted as the struggle to drive into the consciousness of the Spanish people the lessons of the intellectual and economic awakening which has been outlined in the preceding chapters. The nineteenth century, full of romantic, unrestrained individualism, rich in inchoate enterprises, resounding with the clash of civil wars, lit up still with far-off visions (the last conflagrations of a dying empire), uplifted by short-lived hopes of constitutional perfection and free development, followed by no less agitating periods of reaction and dictatorship; creative withal, witness how, in the midst of the Peninsular agitation, a few bold, optimistic public men, with the help of foreigners, imported the strong impulses of material civilisation—a century of strife and transition, imagination and emotion, unlimited hopes and unrestrained activity, is over. The Restoration did much to appease its feverish rhythm, yet twenty-five years are not enough to calm down the echoes of such stormy times, and Cánovas and Sagasta felt now and then that not even their opiates could send to sleep this nation, for ever young though heavy with experience. The true

remedy was not to come from the palliatives which they devised—military measures; the suspension of constitutional guarantees. It was slowly evolving under their eyes, thanks to the twenty-five years of relative peace which they gave the country. The national will was taking in the ballast of economic solidarity, the national mind was beginning to feel the brakes of a universal culture. The reign of Alfonso XIII was destined to gather in the benefit of this double progress. The Spanish monarchy had once again a great task before it. A great nation was to come of age. The monarchy had to grow accordingly or to risk its life. Such was the dilemma which Fate had laid on the cradle of the man who was born a king.

With stubborn relentlessness Fate still pursued Spain in her kings. Alfonso XII had died in the prime of youth. And when the times demanded that the crown should be worn by an experienced head, preferably an heir well seasoned by long and patient waiting on the steps of an illustrious and long reign, Spain began her twentieth century under a boy king. Alfonso XIII was sixteen when, in 1902, he took up his heavy responsibilities.

He was then a most attractive prince in whose open and immature features eagerness, goodwill and wonder were revealed with charming spontaneity. A quick intellect, but of the active rather than the speculative kind, impulsiveness, love of action, a certain imperiousness covering, perhaps, the fear of opposite wills, and an earnest desire to perform his royal duties to the best of his ability and to be of service to his country though unmistakably at the head of it, such were the main elements in his personality. But, as time was to show, the main thing was the personality itself. The new king was some-

body. He soon felt the ambition to play his part in the life of the nation, and who would blame him for thinking that it was to be a leading part? Outside circumstances, as well as the inner voice of his ambition, pointed the same way. He was the summit of civil life; he was the heir to a long tradition of absolute monarchs never wholly and sincerely converted to the half-measures of constitutionalism. He was, in practice, through the short-sighted policy of Cánovas, the true source of political power, the pivot of all government, the *de facto* ruler of parliaments and cabinets. Political leaders, neglecting the "sovereign people," came to him for the authority which they would not seek in the public opinion they were supposed to lead. He was the centre of all adulation and intrigue; the pole-star of all political hopes; the sphinx of the political future. And he was sixteen, twenty, twenty-five, thirty. Are we to wonder that he tried to rule?

Rather should we wonder at his restraint during those first years of his reign—when more impetuous youth might have come to grief. But, despite appearances to the contrary, there are in this impulsive man folds and counter-folds of cautiousness, treasures of patience, a marvellous capacity for winding round obstacles and for taking the long way about. And it must be laid down as a tribute to his political sagacity—to that practical intelligence which is, perhaps, his chief characteristic—that he gave himself time to find his bearings and to feel where his true course lay.

There is a criticism easy to formulate from the standpoint of principles. It is true that, strictly speaking, the king had a constitution to go by and that, moreover, he had sworn it on the gospels. But we know by now that the constitution was deliber-

ately used as a tool by Cánovas and Sagasta—and considerably soiled in the process. Moreover, while by ancestry and tradition the king could not be expected to feel much attachment towards a constitution having for its official object the limitation of his powers, by training the king belonged to that school of Spanish thought which accepts neither liberalism nor democracy. The crux of the matter is here. It is in the fact, so unpalatable to Spanish liberals as to be repressed by them into oblivion, that the doctrines of liberal democracy have conquered but a small proportion of the Spanish nation, including perhaps the majority, though by no means the whole, of its intellectuals. It is convenient to attribute such resistance to the " backwardness " of Spain. The explanation satisfies the foreigner and excuses the national from any mental exertion. But the matter is much more complex than that. When the Rousseau-Voltaire-Godwin-Franklin ideas spread over Europe, Spain had behind her a whole era of imperial experience, rich in political thought. She had, moreover, in her own veins a blood of strong originality, an unyielding national spirit, a character which has resisted centuries of foreign intercourse. These universal ideas, so attractive in their abstract perfection, so taking in their robust optimism, cannot convince the Spanish mind nor conquer the Spanish temperament. They are delicate seeds, requiring the soft, moist lands of milder climates. The dry, parched, extreme soil of Spain must yield a sterner philosophy. Its creeds cannot be so easygoing and debonair. The Spaniards still lingering in the traditions of old would be content with the political and religious faiths of the past. The Spaniards whose intellect had succumbed to the new ideas were beginning to despair of ever seeing them take root

in the soil of Spain. But the Spanish political philosophy of the day was not—is not—yet born.

Not that the king was ever likely to feel the gap. His mind, though keen, is not bent on philosophy. But the absence of a clear set of faiths, though it may not be felt by the person, makes itself felt in his acts. The king is a first-rate politician; he is not a statesman. Had he been a statesman, he might have evolved that Spanish political philosophy which we still miss in the renaissance of Spain. Had he found such a philosophy in his environment, he might have risen to statesmanship. The goodwill and even the ability—all but a decided disinclination for the things of the mind—were there. As it happened, neither the man nor the philosophy were what the situation required, and the king had to remain what he was: the acutest politician of his reign.

This reign was to be the most important, the richest in historical meaning since that of Charles III. Under Alfonso XIII, Spain becomes an industrial nation, reaches the highest level of population since her pre-Roman days, returns to full membership of the world of culture which she had all but led in the sixteenth century; is thrown back into full participation in international politics by the Great War and by the reopening of the Moroccan question; reconquers spiritually that America which she had discovered, populated, civilised and lost; and sees grave problems of industrialism and nationalism rise in her home life and stimulate her political thought.

In the midst of this activity, the king grew to maturer years in a school of mere politics. Most of the men who surrounded him took the short view; he did not take a much longer one; most of them saw the historical movements of their great nation

merely as they affected their own political position; he saw them in relation to the crown and to its power. The king's political position being the highest, and his political interest the most permanent, his actions were generally the least divergent from the true national interest. Thus it is that the royal politician strikes the detached observer not merely as the most acute, but often as the most patriotic of the public men with whom he had to co-operate. Nor is this view to be lightly dismissed. In the absence of an objective standard on which to base his actions, the king could not but choose the stability of the throne as the main principle of his policy. And it must be added, in all fairness, that not one of the political leaders who surrounded him—whatever they may have said or written—acted on any other assumption.

If the royal policy is open to criticism it is not so much, therefore, in that it sought the stability of the throne rather than that of constitutional principles and peaceful development of a contented democracy, as in that it failed to perceive the true lines along which such stability was to be sought. It is at this point, perhaps, that we touch on the weakest spot of King Alfonso—a weakness which makes him, it must be owned, a typically Spanish king. It is a kind of tacit pessimism which makes him rely on force. The liberal who seeks stability in the interest of the greater number is an optimist—a modest optimist, perhaps—in that he believes that men will know their interest when they see it, and will act accordingly. But there is a kind of pessimism which does not credit men with enough sense to be enlightened egoists, and believes that they are always ready to do the foolish thing unless there are soldiers and policemen to hold them back. By temperament, King Alfonso belongs to this school; by training, he was

confirmed in it. His education was in the hands of men of austere frame who were no democrats, no optimists. Priests and artillery officers are not an appropriate ground for the development of Rousseau's views. Had King Alfonso been entrusted in his tender years to Don Francisco Giner, Spain would probably have become a peaceful and contented nation with a monarchy well grounded in a prosperous peasantry. As it was, peasant risings were countered by an increase in the numbers and salary of the Civil Guards, and the king, while playing the game of outward politics with liberals and conservatives, came gradually to recognise but two parties in the real politics of the nation: the Church and the Army.

The tale of "political" events is but the canvas on which real events were being woven by Fate. A tedious sequence of cabinets, crises and elections; the gradual disintegration of the old parties, owing partly to the rivalry between the several leaders competing, not for the votes of the electorate, but for the royal signature which would enable the winner to fake them, partly to the king's own use of this tool; and, while the system was rapidly decaying at the top, a new political vitality attacking its very roots, for the electorate was awaking, so that it was becoming more and more difficult for governments to "make" an election and, therefore, to "win" it. Real decisions were made difficult either by royal veto or by Church obstruction or by military bullying; at times also by the selfish opposition of a limited but active section of public opinion. In the rising complication of national life, the king, whose taste for personal power had by now become pronounced, sought help in the army. From his earliest days he had felt attracted by parades and uniforms. Had not

the War tragedy ruined the reputation of William II, King Alfonso was well on the way to emulate many of his more theatrical habits. As it is, the Spanish king took up his personal rôle in the army with a style all his own, a youthful dash combined with a kind of popular zest reminiscent of the plebeian tendencies of Ferdinand VII and Isabel II, yet with a touch of distinction. The fashion of using the second person singular in talking to persons whom he means thereby to honour—a fashion to which his nineteenth-century ancestors were also addicted—shows him again inclined to that mixing of personal and official atmospheres typically Spanish, yet perhaps not without danger for a modern king. His temperament, his tradition, his surroundings, all tended to involve him in the turmoil of events which were to shake the country, then the world, then the country again.

The evolution of his reign can only be understood in the light of the main movements which control it.

CHAPTER XII

THE AGRARIAN QUESTION

The basis of Spain's national life is, we know, her agriculture. It follows that the basis of her social life is her agrarian organisation. A study of the obstacles which a defective agrarian organisation, in inextricable combination with a defective political system, have put across the path of Spain would be one of the most instructive illustrations of the complexity of collective life. There is little in the general situation of the Spanish countryside which was not already known and denounced more than a century ago. "The situation in the north-west of Spain," writes Professor de los Ríos, "is the same as that described in the Report of 1763 on Seignorial Rights fortunately preserved in the national Record Office, while the position in the rest of Spain is still reflected in the Memorials presented to the Economic Society of Madrid and published in 1780." We are touching here one of the key facts in Spanish history. Much has been written, and much may still be waiting to be written, in the inkpots of the world, on Spanish conservatism. But how much of this conservatism is due to the fact that, once an agrarian system goes wrong, it becomes so hopelessly entangled with a wrong political evolution that centuries may elapse before the nation evolves out of the meshes or breaks through them towards a new freedom?

Spain, with her area of 195,010 square miles, has a population of about 22,000,000 people. She is an

exception in Western Europe, where the density of the population is everywhere more than twice, and in some places more than three times, as great. She was, in a remote past, under favourable social and political conditions, a densely populated country. The reason for this heavy decline in population is not merely to be sought in the fact that she has remained faithful to the old European sport of civil war longer than the other nations of Western Europe, with the single exception of her northern cousin, Ireland; but in deeper and more permanent causes, i.e., her agricultural production, nay, the very fertility of her land and her very climate have been allowed to deteriorate through a defective handling of her agrarian problems.

There are parts of Spain, notably in the north-west, the province of Pontevedra for instance, in which population is as dense as in Belgium; others, such as certain regions of the Ebro and Guadalquivir valleys, as well as a few privileged districts on the eastern coast, in which the co-operation of sun and water have created true paradises; but by the side of these developed and wealthy regions, vast deserts of uncultivated lands, true steppes such as can only be found in certain Hungarian or Russian zones, waste on their barren plains the light and heat of a bounteous sun. In four provinces of that Andalusia, whose very name evokes riches and fertility, the area of steppe land is put at no less than 1,650,000 hectares (rather more than 4,100,000 acres). For the whole of Spain the waste of uncultivated land was estimated at 5,478,000 hectares (about 13,500,000 acres) by Señor Flores de Lemus just before the War. The figures are certainly smaller to-day. But on a conservative estimate it is safe to say that "wild and forest land," including the above figure plus the figures for

pastures, meadows and forests, covers an area equivalent to, or slightly bigger than, that of cultivated lands. The latter, moreover, do not yield as much as they might. Here again, certain districts of good climate and abundant water, intensely and intelligently cultivated, present enviable results; but the immense majority of the lands under cultivation show a production below that of other countries. Much is sometimes made of this fact in order to show the inferiority of the Spaniard which one usually brings to the subject in one's brain; and the striking difference between the figures for wheat produced in Spain and in Denmark is occasionally used in such a way as to suggest that, if only the Spaniard abjured Popery, his bushels per acre would rise accordingly in the statistical columns which measure national prestige. Though the religious tenets of the tiller may influence the yield of his soil—who knows how much of the quality and quantity of the faith passes from the heart to the arm and from the arm to the plough and the furrow?—it seems safer to stick to the soil itself and to the climate in which the soil lives. Now, the majority of the cultivated lands of Spain are poor; so poor indeed that nobody but specialists in poor soils would care to waste their time in scratching them for corn or vine; and the climate is so dry that none but a race used to goat-like sobriety would hope to see crops break through its hard crust.

Yet, even here, progress is possible. A distinguished expert, Don José Gascón, asserts that, in the course of an experiment carried out on extremely poor soil in Palencia, he obtained an average crop of 2,695 kilograms per hectare, i.e., as high as any in Europe and more than $2\frac{1}{2}$ times the average yield of Spanish corn lands. Indeed, both Señor Gascón and Señor Carrión, an equally experienced authority,

hold the view that, but for a few south-eastern districts, the whole of dry Spain could, if properly cultivated, yield as high an average crop as the best average obtainable in the rainy area of Europe. This optimistic view is perhaps unduly influenced by the excellent results obtained under exceptionally skilful cultivation. The fact remains that there is room for improvement in the yield of Spanish lands. Agricultural progress in Spain may then take place in two directions : by settlement and development of " wild and forest land," and by improved cultivation of tilled land. Both these lines of evolution would tend to increase the population of the country and to widen the basis of its economic wealth. In both directions, State action has been more or less timidly initiated. Schemes of afforestation appear regularly on the Budget, whence, now and then, one or another succeeds in evading itself towards the particular district awaiting it. A Committee of Internal Colonisation endeavours to settle agriculturists in lands requiring labour. Finally the *granjas agrícolas* act as centres of instruction and stimulation to their respective neighbourhoods. Progress is evident, yet not sufficient to stir an old situation out of its impressive inertia. For, in its essence, the problem is not so much one of cultivation as one of law.

From the point of view of the size of the estates, Spain may be roughly divided into two areas : area of small holdings and long leases, and area of large holdings and short leases. The agrarian problems of these two districts are entirely different.

The line between the two is not unlike that which separates rainy Spain from dry Spain, for undoubtedly a wet climate—all other things being equal —favours intensive cultivation and permanency.

This is confirmed by the fact that the area of small holdings, covering roughly the northern third of the Peninsula, extends southwards along the eastern coast and even westerly along the south coast, following the zone of irrigation. There are, of course, a few exceptions, such as the rich Vega, or plain of Granada, which, though abounding in water, is a land of large holdings.

The first difference between these two areas is that, while the problems in the large holdings zone are fairly uniform, those in the districts of small holdings vary according to the regions considered. On the whole, the eastern part of this area is composed of small holdings sufficiently large and productive to support a family. Often, as in the case of the irrigated districts of Valencia, Murcia and Aragón, their very fertility demands an amount of work and attention which absorbs the activities of the family in a healthy endeavour. Conditions along the northern coast are also well balanced. But in the north-west part of León and Asturias, as well as the whole of Galicia, the situation is far from satisfactory. These districts are afflicted with an antiquated system of *fueros* or seignorial rights which weigh heavily on the produce of a generally overworked farmer. The rights are a part of the estate and in no way depend on the legal relations which may otherwise be arranged between the landlord and his tenants. It follows that the certainty of a comfortable income from his estate enables the landlord to neglect its possibilities altogether, and, in fact, to become an absentee. The *fuero* stands in very much the same relation to the economy of the Gallegan land as the royalty to that of the British mine, save that it weighs on it more heavily.

Both zones present the most objectionable feature

of Spanish agrarian life, i.e., the totally unrestricted right of the landlord to arrange the terms of the lease as he wishes. In the short lease area this liberty of the landlord may be offset, up to a point, by the liberty similarly granted by law to the tenant. The difference in economic conditions is often, of course, sufficient to destroy this legal symmetry, and nowhere more so than in Galicia. For here, not only is the tenant often in debt to his landlord, owing to the operation of the *fuero*, but the high density of the population maintains an endemic land famine which puts the peasant at the mercy of the landlord. Galicia is thus the nursery of Spanish emigrants, and the expatriated *Gallego* is a familiar figure in the rest of the Peninsula, as well as in the whole of South America.

Nor is the picture rosier in the area of large holdings and short leases. This description is hardly accurate, for what really happens in this zone is that a small number of owners possess a disproportionate amount of the land, leaving the remainder to be distributed in very small holdings of very little value. Thus the official data of the province of Avila show that, out of 13,530 land-tax payers, no less than 11,452 have a daily income of less than a peseta (about 8*d.*); 1,758 have an income of less than 5 pesetas a day; and there remain 155 with incomes between 5 and 8 pesetas daily. It may therefore be said that in this fairly representative Spanish province more than 91 per cent. of the landowners earn less than the average urban industrial worker. The figures for that part of the territory which has been reassessed—about one-third of the national area—lead to exactly the same conclusions. Out of 1,026,412 landowners paying tax, 1,007,616 " enjoy " incomes below 8 pesetas a day; and, of these,

847,548 landowners have incomes below 1 peseta. It follows that the landowning system of this part of Spain results in maintaining a class of proletariat landowners who differ in nothing from agricultural workers at the mercy of the wages market.

Two legal features aggravate the situation. The first is that no law limits the liberty of the landlord to cultivate or not his large estates. The small farmer or landowner-worker, bound by dire necessity, lives on the soil and makes it produce; the big landowner in practically every case an absentee, may choose to hand over a few spaces for cultivation and, living on the produce of them, to reserve the rest for hunting, the raising of bulls for bull-fighting, or merely the adornment of his ducal coronet. Furthermore, the big landowner is free to cultivate his land as he wishes and to decide as to the labour he will apply to it. If for economic or other reasons—political for instance—he thinks it better to employ a couple of hundred men, he need but send his steward to the marketplace of the next township and they will sign on without looking closely into the salary; if, perchance, it suits him best to drive the men back to want and the subsequent submission which it breeds, he may do so, even though knowing it means so much per cent. less in his crop yield. Such things are not mere speculation : they actually happen.

The second legal feature which contributes to make the position worse is the above-mentioned liberty of the landlord to arrange the terms of his lease. The liberty is, of course, symmetrical in theory; not so, however, in practice, for the tenant must have his land while the landlord need not lease it. The exploitation of estates by a system of tenant-farming which divides and subdivides them to the benefit

of all but the unfortunate man who does actually scratch the soil, must be considered as a kind of disease of the body politic of the country. The law does nothing to remedy it. Rather the reverse, for it allows the landlord to increase the rent whenever he wishes and to evict the tenant with so much facility that the tenant is never sure of his land and has no guarantee that the money he may spend on it will not go to fatten his landlord's pockets under another tenant, or even be used as an excuse for raising his own rent.

It will be readily understood that, under such conditions, a class of agricultural workers entirely dependent on landlords is a permanent feature of the social situation of the country. This mass of workers lives in an endemic state of unemployment and tends, of course, to gravitate towards districts with large and prosperous estates. Naturally enough, this situation gives rise to uneconomic features. The workers are fully aware of the obvious advantages of ca' canny when the number of men far exceeds the number of jobs; the landlord is led to decrease wages accordingly, and a kind of race away from economic soundness sets in. Andalusia is the typical region in this respect. Though wages are extremely low—ranging from one peseta and meals to five pesetas, with a fairly general average of two and a half to three and a half—there are long periods of unemployment of from ninety days (in up-to-date districts) to a hundred and fifty days in the year. Married workers seek to better their miserable position by renting small plots of land and by using the work of their wives and children. School attendance in these conditions is precarious, and the school authorities cannot enforce the law without doing violence to their better feelings.

The existence of a vast agricultural population which the governing classes have proved unable to save from misery is perhaps the most serious evil in contemporary Spanish life. It is an economic evil, for it is evident that the wealth of the country would benefit by a more adequate relationship between the land and its tillers, and that, through land law reform, Spain would certainly succeed in raising her food supply and a substantial surplus for export at export prices.

It is a social and political evil owing to the many social ferments which develop and which are at work in the mass of agricultural labourers. Ill-fed, ill-clothed, lacking in instruction, with no stake in the land, the best of them combed out by emigration, the agricultural labourers of Andalusia in particular are a ready ground for all the forms of violent propaganda. By temperament and psychology the Andalusian tends to the philosophical anarchy of Kropotkin; environment and experience tempt him to follow the violent path of Bakhunin. Blasco Ibáñez, who studied them at close quarters, has given a vivid description of the sudden illumination wherewith the passage of an inspired apostle of anarchism may light up the wretched and miserable lands of southern Spain. Observers of Spanish political life are well aware of the curious relationship between the active anarchist ferment which is endemic in Barcelona and the passive anarchist attitude which lies in waiting in the Andalusian fields. This attitude is fostered by some unwise landlords and estate managers, too overbearing and too stupid to read the signs of the times; but, worse still, it was often fostered by the Government itself. The Socialist party worked admirably for years to convert these miserable populations to the constitutional and

parliamentary way of salvation. It was a Herculean task with an old, sceptical and individualistic race, kept in subjection for centuries in the name of law and order; but, when the masses at last converted came to vote, all means, fair and foul, and particularly the foul ones, were put in operation to defeat the legitimate use of the vote; candidates imprisoned or forbidden access to parts of their constituency; faked counting of votes; no recourse was too low or too unfair for the so-called Conservative and the so-called Liberal Governments which "made" the election from Madrid. As for wages difficulties, the South has not forgotten how a Conservative home secretary met a strike of wage-earners by raising the wages of the constabulary.

What are the remedies? Two are the problems which require urgent attention: on the one hand, land ownership and land tenure; on the other, credit.

Efforts have been made in both directions. With regard to land ownership the difficulty was two-fold: at one end the *latifundia*, or wide areas under a single ownership; at the other end, the small holdings, too small for economic exploitation. Public opinion was stimulated by a series of enquiries, particularly those undertaken in 1912, on the land situation in the south and south-east, and that of 1919, on the central and eastern provinces. In a bill presented to Parliament in 1921, *latifundia* were compulsorily made available for internal colonisation. Ideas have been bold and numerous, but, even though at times they went as far as Parliament, they seldom reached the realm of actual fact. Still, a Central Committee of Internal Colonisation was set up in 1907 and became, in 1917, the *Instituto de Colonización Interior*, a semi-autonomous body entrusted with the administration of the funds devoted by the State to the acquisition

of land and its distribution among smaller settlers. Similar efforts have been made to limit the excessive parcellation of land, notably suggestions for amending the law of inheritance in this respect. Though not aiming at exactly the same ends, the Homestead Law of 1907 acts in a similar direction in that it limits to the State, municipality, conjoint, and sons, the entities in whose favour the settler's land can be mortgaged, the produce of the land remaining, in any case, free from all charges. This modest beginning has been criticised, and efforts towards completing the measure in a more liberal way have been attempted, notably in 1921. But the general tenor of the work done in connection with land ownership is that, while study and preparation are excellent, execution and legislation are but poor. This is due partly to the political influence of landed proprietors, partly to the instability of Spanish politics.

As for credit, the country had in its *pósitos* an old traditional institution of national rural credit. The *pósito* was originally municipal in character and based, not on money, but on grain. Its existence has to a certain extent rather hindered than helped the development of more modern State methods. Nevertheless, the *pósitos* themselves have been modernised and their credit operations have reached a level of about £800,000 yearly. In more recent years a national organisation of agricultural credit has been set up under the name of *Junta del Crédito Agrícola*, which has been working now for several years with signal success, not only as the provider of credit for the small farmer, but also as the *deus ex machina* which in times of crisis in a particular commodity—be it wine, oil or fruit—steps in and saves the producer from the exhaustive greed of the trade intermediary.

The only agency which can rival the State in its activities in this field is the Church. Early in the century some enlightened members of the clergy realised the social and political possibilities of this field. A campaign of propaganda, fostered by bishops and priests, led to the creation of not a few rural associations termed "syndicates," having for their main object the organisation of rural credit. This was achieved by means of banks based on joint and unlimited liability, a system which, in the small social area of a village, seems to work satisfactorily. The movement met with considerable success, and the sketch of a federation was first attempted in 1912, when the federation of the old Castile and León syndicates came into being. Others followed, until the whole country was covered by the *Confederación Nacional Católico-Agraria.*

This organisation has ambitious aims, and what is more, it attains them. It arranges for the collective purchase of fertilisers and machinery; it organises collective sales of the produce as well as the collective working of not a few industrial-agricultural operations such as wine, flour and oil production, the organisation of slaughter-houses and electric plants, etc. The value of its buildings was estimated in 1926 at about 20,000,000 pesetas, while the deposits and loans of its credit banks were calculated respectively at 250,000,000 and 200,000,000 pesetas. Extensive operations of internal colonisation have been carried out under the auspices of this organism, and valuable work has also been done in irrigation.

It will be noted that the word *Católico* is prominently aired on the very title of the federation. At first sight it may appear strange that such care should be taken to insist on the Catholic character of an institution not expressly religious in its activities

in a country in which—particularly according to the Church—everybody is a Catholic. The institution thus reveals its militant, political tendency. The Church has simply realised the tremendous political importance of the countryside in Spain, and the federation spends freely in propaganda. It owns seventy periodicals and five dailies.

Despite the activities of both State and Church, it does not seem that the agrarian question has yet met with a wholly satisfactory solution in Spain. The breaking up of big estates would not appear to be a sound way out of the difficulty, for, with the new methods which the spirit of the times imposes on all production, it would be more economic to retain wide areas under one single direction, while there is no guarantee that, by renewed use of the mixture of fair and foul methods that prevailed in the past, the small holdings of a number of people may not be sooner or later gathered again into the hands of big proprietors. The best experts incline to think that the solution lies along the lines of an intelligent return to the past tendencies of the Spanish people. Municipal life was vigorous in old Spain, who inherited from the oldest inhabitants of the Peninsula a tendency to communal ownership of the land. Many Spanish municipalities still possess what is known as *bienes de propios*. It may be that, by a return to the common ownership of the land by the municipalities, combined with a modern technical and financial organisation, Spain may still evolve an original, sound and economic way of ensuring a healthy prosperity for her agriculture and yet an independent social and political life for her people.

CHAPTER XIII

LABOUR

For Spain, the keynote of the twentieth century has been a rapid development of her economic life and, in particular, of powerful industrial centres in the Basque, Catalan, Asturian, Valencian and other districts, such as Seville and Saragossa. We also know that, through a defective legal and social organisation, her countryside is populated by a peasantry which, in the greater part of the country, and especially of the south, lives in precarious and often in miserable circumstances. We have here some of the elements for a difficult labour situation. On the one hand, centres of industrial attraction, in which wages have a rising tendency, drawing men from poverty-stricken country districts towards the glittering towns, either under the pressure of economic necessity or by an act of industrial warfare; on the other, a mass of urban workers under a permanent threat of dispossession owing to the unlimited reserves of potential blacklegs swarming unfed in the untilled fields. Add to these objective and economic elements the subjective and psychological features supplied by national character, and many of the somewhat bewildering complications of contemporary labour history in Spain will become clear.

There is, perhaps, no other aspect of national life which better lends itself to a comparative study of the local varieties of character within the Peninsula. The matter is of some importance, particularly in

connection with not a few of the more extreme and less grounded claims of Catalan nationalists. Labour events suggest two definite leading regions—Catalonia and Castile—or perhaps more accurately, two leading cities, Barcelona and Madrid; the fields of influence of which would be: for Barcelona, Andalusia and to a lesser extent Murcia, Valencia and Aragón; for Madrid, the rest of the Peninsula. This geographical distribution is highly significant in that it is wholly spontaneous and natural, not in the least the result of deliberate effort and organisation, or of pre-existing lines of communication or administration, but, on the contrary, a fact of nature which, from the outset, determines events. Furthermore, this dualism is not due to a mere opposition between rival men or institutions, nor can it be explained by State or local intervention; still less by the existence of a Catalan nationalism, for labour questions cut across Catalanism at every turn. Here again, we are in the presence of a spontaneous fact of nature, the springs of which are in character. For the keynote of Barcelona labour movements is individualistic, while that of the movements led by Madrid is institutional, a contrast which ultimately resides in character and on which it is necessary to insist.

Generally speaking, Barcelona is anarchist and Madrid socialist. It is safe to say that, when the European labour movement which inspired the First International split, in 1879, Marx and Bakhunin parting in different directions never to meet again, the temperaments which underlay their respective doctrines corresponded to the temperaments which underlie Madrid and Barcelona. Thus in this unexpected field of labour evolution, we meet also the institutional instinct and the sense of authority which, in the Iberian Peninsula, are uppermost in Castile.

That both sides are aware of what is at stake may be seen in this significant detail: when, in 1870, as a result of the Hague split between Marx and Bakhunin, the Spanish movement divided its forces accordingly (in a congress held at Saragossa), the Marxian party styled themselves *autoritarios*, while the followers of Bakhunin were known as *anti-autoritarios*. This detail shows the difference which separates the Castilian from the Catalan conception.

The ways of the spirit are not altogether inscrutable, but they are often picturesquely devious. Though Castilian socialism prides itself on its freedom from all religious tenets and considers itself as a natural adversary of the Catholic faith, its policy springs from an attitude towards life which is strongly influenced by the profound traditions of Catholic Spain. That sense of authority, that instinct for government from above, firm leadership, the responsibility and power of the man at the helm, the weight and dignity of institutions, all the subconscious tendencies of Castilian socialism—which it has, of course, in common with every other manifestation of Castilian public life—all may be traced to the Catholic sense of man's weakness and tendency to err, to that profound conviction that it is neither prudent for the community, nor charitable to the individual, to let anyone feel the weight of too much liberty. The *autoritarios* of the nineteenth century were but the worthy descendants of the sixteenth-century Spaniards who had conceived and lived the Spanish Empire as a vast institution based on authority and aiming at the good of man. The faith has changed, and the other world has moved from an ever-receding eternity to an ever-receding ideal; but the gravity, the stern political outlook, and the creative institutional sense are the same. The socialist movement of

Madrid is thus the only truly historical entity in Spanish modern politics, i.e., the only feature endowed with an inner life which gives it a permanent, growing and formative value in the life of the country.

In deep contrast with this contemporary version of an old-standing feature of Spanish life, the labour movement of Catalonia appears as a series of fitful agitations, more often than not violent and even terrible, springing from an unrestricted individualism —both theoretical and practical. The socialism of Madrid, though coming from Marx, calls forth the old orthodox pessimism from the depths of the Castilian soul, and becomes thus quickly nationalised. The anarchism of Barcelona, inspired in the teachings of Bakhunin, hails from the incurable optimism of Jean Jacques Rousseau, and stirs all the unlit enthusiasm of the Mediterranean romantic. If men are naturally bad, or, in Sancho's words, " as God made them and sometimes worse," institutions are needed to bind them together in mutual help. But if men are naturally good, the evils of collective life must needs come from institutions and tyrants—so the sooner we get rid of them the better for natural man. This creed was bound to appeal to a people so strongly individualistic as the Catalan; it was bound to be received with enthusiasm by a race of poverty-stricken Andalusians who had never seen the right side of an institution. The evolution of the labour movement in Spain is determined by the interaction of these two poles: Madrid and Barcelona; socialism and anarchism; institutions and agitations; political action and direct action.

The historical roots of the movement are old, and legal authorities can go as far back as Alfonso the Sage, in whose juridical masterpiece, *Las Siete Partidas*, there are provisions which, while directed against

the "*cofradías*" or confraternities of workers prejudicial to the land or to the king's sovereignty, are by no means opposed to association. The distinction becomes clearer in later centuries, and a line is drawn between the *cofradías* proper, aiming at class organisation, and the *gremios*, based on industry and not on class, the first foreign, the second fostered by old Castilian, Catalan and Valencian laws. Yet, towards 1770, the Superior Council of Castile estimated that there were in Spain 25,927 *cofradías* with a yearly expenditure of 11,687,618 reales and ample landed property. The eighteenth century was unfavourable to both *gremios* and *cofradías*, and the political leaders and thinkers of the period, such as Ward, Campomanes and Jovellanos, attacked them in the name of industrial freedom. Charles III and Charles IV legislated against them, and the Cortes of Cadiz, opening wide all doors to liberty, decreed full industrial freedom in 1813. Ferdinand VII, however, was bent on closing all the doors which the Cortes of Cadiz had opened, and he went back even beyond the relatively liberal days of his father and grandfather. His narrow absolutism did not survive him; before his daughter and successor was of age, the Queen Regent granted the decrees of 1834, one on *gremios*, which were only permitted if aiming at industrial progress and not "contrary to the liberty of manufacture, the circulation of goods and produce within the national territory or the unlimited competition of capital and labour"; the other laying down that "all those who exercise mechanical arts and trades directly or through other persons are worthy of honour and esteem, for they serve the State in a useful capacity," and, as logical sequence to this magnanimous principle, the decree recognised that such people engaged in work would have access

to State posts, honours and dignities on a level with idle persons. By such bold steps the Spanish monarchy prepared the resurrection of the liberal principles of Cadiz, which it actually achieved in 1836.

But a labour movement in the modern sense of the word is not merely industrial; it has to breathe the free air of public opinion and, therefore, it must possess political organs and a political life. The Spanish labour movement could not develop until the right of associating and meeting was recognised by the State and no longer considered seditious. The gradual conquest of these rights is closely interwoven with the political vicissitudes of the nineteenth century. As was to be expected, little progress was made under Ferdinand VII, a king for whom thinking was a "*funesta manía.*" Despite a short-lived law of 1822, timidly liberal, official opinion in 1848 still declared illicit all associations "in which newspapers are read and political questions are debated." Not till 1862 do we see a glimpse of what was to come. In that year, 15,000 workers of Barcelona present a petition to the Congress of Deputies, asking for "freedom of association in order to struggle against capital nobly and peacefully." In 1864 pressure of liberal opinion forced Cánovas to take a step forward by a law so conservative in spirit, that public meetings are defined as meetings of more than twenty persons in the domicile of any of them. But the revolution of 1868 precipitated matters, and by a decree of November 28th the right of meeting and association was established with no other restriction than that of being dependent on no foreign country.

The system under which the labour movement developed in recent years dates from 1876. The Constitution of that year was destined to live for the relatively long period of forty-seven years. This

longevity it owes perhaps to a provision which allows it to go to sleep now and then. Article 17 authorises the suspension of constitutional guarantees by means of a law when the security of the State so demands it and "in extraordinary circumstances." If Parliament is not in session the Government may, nevertheless, suspend the guarantees, submitting its decision to the approval of the Cortes as soon as possible. This provision allowed the authors of the Constitution to be pretty free-handed in granting constitutional guarantees, amongst which we find in Article 13 the right to meet peacefully, the right to express one's thought and the right of "association towards the ends of human life." But if the system did help the Constitution to attain the age of forty-seven—honourably long, given the average expectation of life in Spanish constitutions—it drove the labour movement to live on the frontiers of legality, now "guaranteed" by the Constitution, now persecuted when, as was frequently the case, circumstances were found "extraordinary" by the Government, and the guarantees accordingly suspended. This hot-and-cold treatment at the hands of the State was, on the whole, stimulating for the movement, but contributed not a little to encourage the individualistic, anarchist tendencies of Barcelona at the expense of the more statesmanlike and constructive tendency of Madrid.

The first symptoms of a new spirit appear towards 1840. In this year Munts, a Catalan weaver, founds the Association of Handweavers; while in Casabermeja, in the province of Málaga, a peasant rising seized several estates and organised a kind of rebel State which was energetically suppressed by the central authorities. Munts's initiative met with success and, imitated by other trades, it led to a

confederation of labour unions which was created in 1854 under the name of *Unión de Clases*. Both features—the tendency to peaceful association and the tendency to high-handed direct action—appear, therefore, from the outset. The third and most unfortunate tendency which the labour movement brings out, that of the State to meddle unsympathetically and mostly by means of soldiers, was soon to reveal itself. In 1855, the tactless intervention of General Zapatero, Captain-General of Catalonia, calls forth the first general strike which Spain was to know, and in which no less than 40,000 workers were involved. The conflict gave occasion to not a few criminal outbursts, but better counsels prevailed and the strike was terminated by a compromise in which the workers were moderate enough to waive their demand for a ten-hours day, and to accept that a mixed jury should settle their differences. This period was one of labour trouble all over Spain: secret societies; risings in Saragossa and Valencia (1855); incendiarism in Valladolid, Palencia and Zamora (1856); disorders in Olivenza and Badajoz in 1859; a serious rebellion in Loja, in the name of "the rights of man, respect for property, a domestic home and all opinions." This was the period of moderate claims and violent methods.

The ferment operated also in other fields. The same year, 1840, is generally given as the date when the co-operative movement begins with a Co-operative Association of Consumers founded by a hundred families in Barcelona. Co-operative associations of consumers spread relatively quickly on the eastern coast, notably in Catalonia. The first co-operative association of producers appears in Valencia in 1856 with the significant name, *La Proletaria*. It had for its object the manufacture of silk. The movement

spread and even won a certain semi-permanent prosperity. The example of Valencia was followed by Barcelona and Madrid, where, in 1871, a printing co-operative association was formed.

Intellectual socialism began towards the same date with Joaquín Abreu, who introduced Fourier's doctrines into Spain, and later with Fernando Garrido, founder of the first socialistic journal of Spain, *La Atracción* (1845), and inspirer of the first socialist nucleus in Madrid. It is significant that the foundation of the first socialist newspaper of Spain should have taken place in Madrid at about the same time Munts founded the first trade union in Barcelona; thus Barcelona and Madrid took up their positions as the industrial and the intellectual leaders of the movement. The tone in Madrid at the beginning was distinctly moderate, particularly under Garrido's successor, Ordax Avecilla, while in Barcelona Abdón Terradas and Monturiol (in the weekly paper *La Fraternidad*) took a definite communistic and revolutionary line.

The year 1868, in which a liberal revolution drove out Isabel II, brought to Spain the first emissary of the "International" in the person of Farinelli, of the Bakhunin brand, soon followed by Lafargue, Marx's son-in-law. The "International" made quick progress in the generous years when Spain experimented with political liberty (1868-1874). The *Manifesto of the International Workers of the Madrid Section to the Workers of Spain* (December, 1869) went as far as could be desired by the wildest believer in immediate Marxism. Two labour congresses took place in Barcelona, one in 1870, the other in 1872, attended by 150 labour associations. Some conservative-minded people, who did not like the look of the French commune, asked the Government what it

meant to do in the circumstances; the debate (October, 1871) in the Cortes may still be consulted as a repertory of all the ideas which it is possible to connect with the freedom of association—not excluding those of the immanence and the transcendence of God, which were abundantly discussed by Salmerón. In spite of its all-embracing scope, or, perhaps, because of it, the debate resulted in nothing but a free hand granted to the Government to curtail the activities of an association born with so much nonsensical gas in its head. In this brief period the Spanish branch of the International had gathered 25,000 members, 149 local federations, 361 sections, 12 regional unions. It was declared illegal by the provisional Government formed after the *coup d'état* of 1874, which closed the revolutionary period. But this first experiment had been more useful for the labour movement than most of its followers could see at the time, for during those five years the movement had lived down not a little of the folly which it will have to eliminate before it can contribute permanent values to the life of the country.

The era of wisdom was announced by the appearance of the desire to know. After the Restoration of 1875, a few clear heads began to wonder whether the time had not come for finding out the facts about industrial difficulties. The idea was not altogether new. Attempts had been made, in 1855 by Luxan, in 1869 and 1871 by the Cortes. Not till 1883 did the scheme materialise, thanks to Moret, who set up a *Comisión para el estudio de las Cuestiones que interesan a la mejora o bienestar de las Clases Obreras, tanto agrícolas como industriales, y que afectan a las relaciones entre el capital y el trabajo.* Cánovas was appointed chairman. The desire to learn was stimulated by the disorders and crimes produced by

the Black Hand, a secret society comprising 150 federations and 50,000 members, which at the time held the whole of Andalusia in terror.

While the Commission worked and slowly gathered up a monumental amount of material, the publication of which lasted from 1889 till 1894, the movement went ahead in its two branches, the anarchist and the socialist. The anarchists formed the *Federación de Trabajadores de la Región Española*, which met in congress in Barcelona, 1881, Seville, 1882, Valencia, 1883, Madrid, 1887, and Valencia again, 1888, when it was dissolved, though it left behind a considerable number of adepts and active newspapers such as *Tierra y Libertad*, published in Barcelona. Meanwhile the two forces which were to constitute the socialist movement of Spain were bringing forth the political and the industrial organisations which, to this day, have maintained their hold on labour events in Madrid. The first was represented by the small band of *autoritarios* who had sided with Marx when the Saragossa split had occurred. They had founded, in 1879, the *Partido Democrático Socialista Obrero*, which came out into the open in 1884, and, in 1886, founded its daily, *El Socialista*, still the leading socialist paper in the country. In 1888 the first congress of the party took place in Barcelona. Most of its leaders, particularly Pablo Iglesias the apostle and founder of Spanish socialism, were also the driving element in the industrial organisation which proceeded apace, for 1888 saw also the creation of the *Unión General de Trabajadores*, the trade union organisation of Spain.

We know that the minority of King Alfonso was a period of preparation for the industrial development of the twentieth century. In this period both the anarchist and the socialist branch of the labour movement show signs of activity. The Government is at

times enlightened and well disposed, at times in excessive sympathy with a class of employers, wholly unable yet to see the advantages of a constructive trade union movement, and who add fuel to the fires of reaction.

Much of the responsibility for the troubles of this time lies at the door of the anarchists. Bombs, assassinations and other outrages can hardly be considered good weapons for propaganda, and the inexperienced public could not be expected to draw a fine distinction between socialists and anarchists, particularly when there were so many interests against such a distinction being made. Though the Congress of Valencia had dissolved the anarchist federation, a *Commission of Relations and Statistics* which it left behind acted as a clearing-house and leading committee for local branches and endeavoured to attract converts by means of congresses and "federations of resistance to capital." The movement frankly appealed to the passions of the crowd and sought to stimulate risings and direct action. In 1889 a petard exploded in the Royal Palace and an employer was murdered in Barcelona; an epidemic of bombs made numerous victims in Barcelona in 1893 and 1896. Andalusia, always in tune with Barcelona, saw the peasant rebellion of Jerez in 1892, an aftermath of the Black Hand movement, during which many an ugly crime was committed. From 1890 to 1902 there was a series of strikes in practically every part of the country, often accompanied with violent excesses and followed at times by excessive government repression. The origin of these troubles, or at any rate of their disorderly and revolutionary features, was practically always due to anarchist action or inspiration. The socialist party and the General Union of Workers, though active and

sympathetic in every case of industrial hardship, concentrated their effort on the development of their organisation, on peaceful propaganda and on a certain number of political campaigns of a liberal character. Their industrial activities were always inspired by strictly industrial aims and they prudently measured their co-operation whenever anarchist risings were contemplated by the other school. The anarchists, however, succeeded in scaring the nation, and Cánovas, following a Liberal example, passed a law to defend civilised society against the terrorism of those who were in too great a hurry to make it perfect. Cánovas paid with his life. In 1895 he was assassinated by an Italian anarchist.

The period that followed, with the frank development of industrial activity which set in, lent itself particularly well to the advance of the labour movement in all its branches. The socialist party and the General Union of Workers consolidated their hold over the masses in north and central Spain, the General Union passing from 15,000 members in 1899 to 147,000 in 1913, while, what is perhaps more important, the number of its sections grew from 65 to 351. Two important new factors made their appearance. On the one hand, the revolutionary wing of the movement found in the syndicalist ideas brought over from France an adequate compromise between its own anarchist conception and the need of some sort of organisation for a collective effort to express itself at all. The general lines of this new philosophy had been formulated by Georges Sorel in his famous book, *Reflexions sur la Violence*. The world was to be organised for the producers by the producers; the method to be purely industrial, since politics were but economics masquerading as the art of Government; policy was to be identical with war;

the troops were to be the associations of men of the same industry, i.e., the syndicates; the weapons, the class struggle, incidents, strikes, violence. In so far as ideas are dictated by temperament, there was much in this philosophy to appeal to the Barcelona school of labour adepts, and it mattered little that Sorel came forth as a Mohamed whose Allah was Marx and not Bakhunin, for, as the Castilian saying goes, " Let the miracle be done even though the devil do it." The framework, moreover, was at hand, for the idea of uniting the men of one profession was too obvious to be missed in an epoch so rich in labour activity, and there already existed in Madrid, Barcelona and other towns various federations which united the men engaged in the same trade under one central leadership. All that was needed was to instil into them the appropriate *apolitical* views. This was tried, not without success, by centralising leadership and organistation, first in what was known as *La Confederación Nacional del Trabajo*, which, of course, settled in Barcelona, a rival to the politically-minded and socialist General Union of Workers settled in Madrid; and then by the *Sindicato Unico*, which was to become famous in the annals of contemporary Spanish history as one of the chief factors in the tragic years of Barcelona.

Much of what was to come, much indeed of what was happening, could be explained also by the shortcomings of the Spanish employer. Nowhere, as a rule, conspicuous for his moderation or his sense of the spirit of the times, the employer is generally more exacting and less tractable in the Catalan region. There is no better wedge than that of the same wood, and the Catalan employer, usually on a small scale, is more often than not a foreman who has succeeded in crossing the line. Much of the peculiar bitterness

and, at times, violence of Catalan labour conflicts becomes sadly clear when viewed in this light. Spanish employers, scared at the success of the more lively labour organisations, decided to take for once a leaf out of the syndicalist book, and met in a Congress of Employers' Federations in 1914. Till then they had followed an oblique line of attack consisting mostly in organising blackleg syndicates or unions, which, significantly enough, often took the Catholic label. The *Centros Católicos de Obreros* sought to maintain a certain social discipline amongst the working classes. The Jesuit Father Vicent lent the movement his organising ability and linked the *Centros* up with the international Catholic labour movement led by Belgium. The national organisation was centralised in a *Consejo Nacional de las Corporaciones Católicas Obreras*, founded in 1910 under the Archbishop of Toledo as chairman. The movement has gathered considerable momentum, no doubt helped by the fact that it can draw financial help from wider sources than a wages fund. The number of Catholic labour clubs passed from 160 in 1906 to 376 in 1913. The activities of the movement are of a somewhat complex nature, for the clubs seek to provide illness, unemployment, old age and accident benefits. A more strictly industrial type of Catholic association has developed in recent years under the leadership of Dominican specialists, such as Father Gerard and Father Gafo.

When, in the turmoil produced by the War, the several movements which agitated the country—amongst them the labour movement—converged towards the crisis of 1917-1921, the labour organisations of the country were progressing, each along its own line, however divergent. The events of the War period are of so complex a nature that they can

hardly be interpreted under a strictly labour label. All we can do here is to point out that, when King Alfonso took on his heavy responsibilities as the nominally irresponsible king of a nominally constitutional monarchy, Labour was no longer the shadowy spirit of a foreign Utopia hovering over a dispersed and ignorant mass of poverty-stricken workers, but a relatively powerful movement evolving towards a conscious republican state-socialism in Madrid, towards religious social institutions in its Catholic organisations, and towards a deliberately violent subversion of society, as at present understood, in the ever-seething cauldron of Barcelona and the dissatisfied plains of Andalusia.

CHAPTER XIV

THE CHURCH—CLERICALISM

CLERICALISM is an evil unknown in Protestant countries. In Catholic countries it is sometimes mild, as in Belgium, or even in France, where the evil is perhaps rather anti-clericalism. But it would be difficult to find a country in which clericalism is more rigidly inimical to all reasonable compromise with the *zeitgeist* than contemporary Spain. The history of the nineteenth century in Spain would have been much quieter and much richer in results had the evolution of the Spanish people taken place in the absence of clericalism and militarism. As it is, the almost chronic civil war, the outward form of that evolution in the nineteenth century, though beginning as a conflict between absolutism and liberalism, gradually degenerates into the conflict between clericalism and militarism and, what is worse, ends in a tacit but efficient treaty of peace and co-operation between the two, so that the arms of the Restoration might well be described as a sword and a cross (considered as a weapon) surmounted by the royal crown.

That the once glorious and liberal Spanish Church, the Church which, with Vitoria and Suárez, had founded international law and, with Mariana, had defined the democratic prince, should have degenerated to the level of the *curas guerrilleros*, or fighting priests, and the bogus mystics such as Sor Patrocinio, who, by simulating stigmata and heavenly visions, brought about Cabinet crises, may be counted as one

of the trials which Providence as history put in the path of a people given to the sin of pride. Those persons who prefer rationalistic explanations may note that the Spanish Church was great while it lived on the culture of the great universities of the sixteenth century, and that its decadence followed that of the celebrated seats of learning. Ignorant and stubborn monks led the resistance to progressive measures during the nineteenth century. Larra has left us, in *Nadie Pase Sin Hablar Con El Portero*, a vivid picture of the Customs line against books established on the frontier between Liberals and Carlists by monks in the Carlist Army. "Recherches?" asks the monk, scrutinising a French book found in the baggage of one of the unfortunate travellers going south. "I suppose this fellow Recherches must be a heretic. To the fire with it." Larra is, of course, writing fiction, but the elements of his fiction were but too real, and in the very month when the present lines were written, a local priest and a local mayor in a small Spanish town made a bonfire of all the books of Galdós which had been purchased by the municipal librarian.

Such persistence in error must correspond to permanent features in the country as a disease does to health. And, of course, there is no doubt that the Spanish people are profoundly religious. Their inherent religion, moreover, harmonises in many points with the Catholic faith. The synthetic and spontaneous nature of Spanish thought, for instance, is readily attracted by the doctrine of a revealed dogma, and there are obvious lines of sympathy between the transcendental pessimism of the Catholic and the experimental pessimism of the stoic—stoicism being at bottom the natural attitude of the Spanish soul. Such an attitude places the subject

in the mood of a contemplative spectator who sees the world as drama, a point again on which the stoic Spaniard can find himself at home in the Roman faith. Add the Spanish tendency to lay stress on synthetic human standards rather than on ethical values, and we shall see how deeply the Catholic roots have struck ready earth in the Spanish race.

This fact explains the strength of Spanish clericalism. For clericalism, though a disease of Catholic societies, is natural to them, being a diseased growth along the lines of their healthy development; it is, therefore, extremely difficult to attack clerical abuses without seeming to attack Catholic institutions, or even without being naturally drawn actually to attack them. Now a criticism of Catholic institutions, implying as it does criticism of the faith which they incarnate, is always sure to provoke a strong reaction in Spain. There is, after all, no impregnable ground for such an attack. Moreover, the strength of the Spanish clerical is but the weakness of the Spanish anti-clerical, for, in the immense majority of cases, the anti-clerical brings forward no substitute for the religion which he would displace. The Catholic religion has now been for twenty centuries perhaps the central element in Spanish culture and civilisation, and, though fallen on evil ways, mostly under the action of historical causes which have influenced to an equal extent other forms of national life, though fallen even for ever from its predominant position in Spanish life, it still is and must remain for a long time to come one of the chief features of the spirit of Spain. The believer, whether a clerical or only an anti-anti-clerical, stands therefore on stronger historical ground than the newcomer, whose ideas are more often than not a "heady" acquisition without roots even in his own soul.

It is useless to offer the Spaniard that rationalism which, in the form of intelligent doubt, is such a "soft cushion for the well-made head" of the Frenchman. The pendulum of the Spanish soul oscillates between the two extremes, self and the universe. To such a type religion is a necessity even if it be no more than the passive religious attitude of the stoic. It is true that, when he drops out of the Catholic faith, he does not become a Protestant. It is true that the established religion is not, as in England, surrounded by a number of smaller denominations into which the stray people are gathered, forming smaller groups. But the explanation is not, as superficial foreign observers have been led to believe, that all religious preoccupation goes with the dogma which had held it. Far from it. The explanation is to be found in the uncompromising individualism of the Spaniard, who, when ceasing to go to church, makes of his religion a strictly personal affair. We are again in the presence of the now familiar rhythm of the Spanish spirit, oscillating from extreme to extreme without a position of equilibrium in the middle term. Either the religion of authority or that of the solitary individual, the religion of absolute certainty or that of isolated search. All or nothing. It may be worth noticing here that the Catholic religion, by worshipping in Latin and by giving the faithful but a passive rôle in the worship, reduces to the very minimum the gregarious elements of the service, another feature which explains its success in individualistic Spain.

He remains himself but he is held within an institution, and this fact is also important in a country in which institutions are few and weak. A country, moreover, attached to a tradition of simplicity and even austerity which no amount of familiarity with

the civilisation of the North has succeeded in breaking. In no sense Puritan, it is nevertheless sparing in its pleasures and inclined to look askance at the general loosening of the family ties, the lowering of the standards of feminine modesty, the cheapening of the pursuits of life, which a general emancipation from church worship brings in its train. It is very difficult to discriminate between religious and moral issues, and the fact that cabarets and anti-clericalism both come from France, though in essence perhaps irrelevant, influences the situation far more directly than might be imagined.

The story of Eve and the apple—the fruit, be it remembered, of the tree of knowledge—is a marvellous basis for a crusade against education, and in a country in which husbands do not trifle with feminine slips, the Church is bound to find many an ally—avowed and unavowed—in its efforts to keep Eve away from apples and serpents. There is thus a plausible origin to the obscurantist tendency of the Spanish Church. It comes from Spanish pessimism. Let us keep the children out of mischief. The less they know the less they will want to have. The less they will want to have, the less harm they will want to do. As it happens—as it *would* happen—this philosophy runs along the natural line of the Spanish stoic : let the river of life flow past my window. The decadence of the Spanish Church is then a decadence of inertia.

But times of activity were at hand. Partly, at any rate, the passivity of the Church could be explained by the absence of a methodical and persistent opposition endowed with institutions. Though the history of the nineteenth century may be interpreted as the fight between liberalism and clericalism, the *Isabelinos* and *Alfonsinos* who fought on the liberal

side were let down royally by Isabels and Alfonsos as soon as the fights were over, and Alfonsos and Isabels reigned with Carlist principles and tendencies, and, therefore, with the help and sympathy of clerical Spain. Thus, backed by the State and the Crown, the Church let itself live, and, lacking outside stimulus did little or nothing in the spiritual interests of its flock. Ganivet, writing in 1896, humorously suggested that if a few freethinkers and Protestants could be hired to live in Spain, matters might be improved. He was convinced of the inherent Catholicism of the Spanish nation, but he believed that dissidence was indispensable as a stimulant. We know that his humorous suggestion would have failed, for dissidence, without the resistance which institutions can give it, cannot withstand the formidable weight of the Church. However, dissidence embodied in institutions was to come.

The danger approached from the two quarters whence came the renovating influences in contemporary Spain: the increased complexity of material life and the development of Spanish culture. The first led to the Canalejas reforms in the law of associations; the second to the institutions for enlightenment created by the Committee for the Development of Studies. The charter of the Spanish Church is the Concordat of 1851, signed after an interval of fourteen years, during which the Vatican remained aloof in protest against the anti-clerical measures of Mendizábal. This Concordat is, of course, very favourable to Rome, and particularly in the matter of the religious orders to be admitted into the country, it goes as far as can be desired, mostly through vague and even misleading wording. Though dissolved and expelled a few years earlier, orders of all kinds soon invaded the country again, a fact less harmful than is

sometimes imagined; but what was harmful was that these orders, through their inveterate policy of acquiring and accumulating wealth, rapidly succeeded in nullifying themselves as spiritual forces, while interfering with the sound economic and political development of the nation. The right of religious orders to freedom from all Government regulation and inspection, a right which, given the general trend of Spanish legislation, constitutes a privilege, was one of the issues between liberals and clericals. The conflict came to a head owing to the development of workers' unions, which made it necessary for the Government to reconsider the law of associations in force since 1887. Difficulties, in fact, had begun earlier, when, in 1901, the Government decided to apply the law of 1887 to the religious orders, which till then had quietly ignored it in tacit agreement with the bureaucracy. The change meant mere registration with the local authorities for all but the three orders authorised by the Concordat to reside in Spain. All the Government wanted, therefore, was that the considerable number of orders, whose very right to reside in Spain at all was, to put it at its lowest, doubtful, should comply with a law which had been in force for fourteen years. Modest as the claim was, it drew a protest from the Vatican which proved too strong for the Government. The outcome of this struggle is related in a subsequent chapter.

Another point on which battles were fought by the liberals was that of Article 11 of the Constitution. In virtue of this Article the Catholic religion is declared to be the State religion, and no others are recognised, though they are "tolerated." In point of fact, the clericals are perhaps entitled to their view that the situation creates no hardship for any considerable

group of people. It is evident, however, to anyone not blinded by bigotry, that if there were but one Protestant, foreign or national, in the country against whom the Article implied spiritual discomfort, the situation would be indefensible. There are, however, in Spain, though very few, enough non-Catholics to render a narrow interpretation of Article 11 most unjust and even intolerable. Thus, though Protestant churches and chapels have been erected here and there, the law, interpreted as narrowly in their case as it was widely interpreted in that of the congregations, refused them the right to show by any outward signs the use to which they were put. Canalejas made a move towards liberalism in this direction, but such was the uncompromising spirit of the Church that his decree (June, 1910), mild and respectful as it was, provoked another protest from the episcopate. The Prime Minister held his ground, backed by a powerful current of public opinion, and seized the opportunity to reform the law concerning oaths before Parliament and the Courts, so as to enable persons of no definite religious views to promise instead of swear.

Article 11 is also responsible for difficulties in connection with the marriage laws. In theory, Spanish law is based on civil marriage, but it must take place in church, in the presence of an officer representing civil authority except when the conjoints have explicitly declared that they do not belong to the Catholic faith. The intention to block civil marriages in an indirect way is obvious. Many more stratagems are applied to the same end. The clerical ministry, in 1900, issued a decree whereby civil marriages contracted without the parish priest's opinion being heard as to the religious faith of the conjoints, were declared void. Thus not only were the conjoints put

in the position of having to declare that they did not belong to the Catholic fold before they were allowed the benefit of the law in favour of civil marriage, but, according to this decree, their opinion was not to be taken as final, and the parish priest was to be called in to say whether they did or did not belong to his flock. This monstrosity was abrogated by Count Romanones when Minister of Justice and Worship in 1906, but not without a most violent protest on the part of the episcopate.

The efforts of the clerical faction were, however, most pertinacious in the field of education. The policy of the Church rested on two rules: to seek material power by "cultivating" the rich, thereby obtaining legacies for its institutions and, through political and social influences, to block all State developments in education. The result was that, as late as 1923, a leading Spanish expert calculated that fifty per cent. of the juvenile population of Spain was not being educated at all; twenty-five per cent. was educated by the State and twenty-five per cent. by the Church. The State budget for education is still inadequate by at least one hundred per cent. to meet the requirements of the nation, though it has progressed in proportion to the freedom from Church interference which political circumstances have warranted. It is calculated that elementary schools have increased of late at the rate of about one thousand teachers a year. Even so the number of State teachers hardly exceeds that of priests and nuns engaged in education, and the amount of money at the disposal of the Church is about equal to that which is spent by the State. It may be argued that it is no matter who educates so long as there is education. But the question is too serious to be so lightly dismissed. When confronting State with

Church education we are not raising a religious issue but an educational issue. Spanish State education is not lay in the French sense of the word; it is religious, orthodox, Catholic, unless of course the family explicitly wishes it not to be, which is an extremely rare occurrence. The true opposition lies in this, that State education is both tolerant and, in non-dogmatic matters, intellectually neutral, whereas the Church educates with *a tendency*, and gives all its teachings a pronounced bias and an intolerant turn. Hence the persistence of a rift in the nation, a state of mutual intolerance born of the intolerance of the Church, since one cannot be tolerant towards intolerance. It should be added that, technically, the methods of the Catholic schools of all kinds are nearly always inadequate.

The Church, however, was threatened with another rival which embodied no mere anti-clericalism. Of necessity, anti-clericalism, even when generous as that of Canalejas was, is negative and combative. The clericals found their stranglehold over the education of the country threatened by a work of deep and far-reaching significance, for, without in the least attacking the Church, still less religion, this work was constructive, peaceful and liberally open to co-operation with sincere believers. We refer, of course, to the movement which began with Don Francisco Giner and the *Institución* and which finally led to the admirable activities of the Committee for the Development of Studies. The clerical faction tried all kinds of weapons to combat the danger. Its first attempts were directed to accusing the Committee's activities of anti-Catholic sectarianism. This the Committee was able to prove unfounded, for it had always taken great care to count amongst its leaders a good proportion of Catholics and to bestow

particular attention on the religious education given on strictly orthodox lines to those who wished to receive it. The trouble, of course, was precisely here, in the fact that orthodox religious education was not compulsory. For compulsion is the key tendency of Spanish clericalism.

A detailed narrative of the tribulations which the Committee had to undergo—which it is in fact undergoing—at the hands of the clericals would be out of place here. Two points must, however, be emphasised: the first is that the clerical faction has always to seek help by dark intrigues in ministerial corridors and even in royal antechambers; the second, that despite the precarious conditions under which the Committee has to live, with this sword of Damocles hanging over its head, it is still alive and performing its valuable work for the country, owing to the immense prestige and authority which it has gained over high and low alike.

These two significant facts should put us on the way to a right estimate of the power of the Church in Spain. The country is profoundly religious with a religion of its own which for all practical purposes coincides with Catholicism. But the people are profoundly opposed to clericalism. They are not militant anti-clericals, because militant anti-clericalism is a political attitude, and the Spanish people are *apolitical*, but the potential antagonism which underlies their attitude towards clerical matters is definite and precise; it may, in fact, be closely analysed. With their clear intuitive perception of spiritual facts the Spanish people feel respect and deference towards truly spiritual religious orders: men and women who give themselves to charity, or who, in real poverty, devote their lives to contemplation, are safe. But Orders which amass wealth and try to

influence social life by providing clothes, education or other advantages in exchange for religious liberty, do so at their own risk. In 1909 the populace of Barcelona let loose years of accumulated anti-clerical passion. The result was terrible.

Anti-clerical measures have always been popular in Spain, despite what superficial observers say to the contrary. The famous Ubao case, a scandal in which a clerical family was proved to have conspired to lock up a young woman in a convent, under cover of a non-existent religious vocation, in order to secure her money, produced a political agitation not yet forgotten. And when, by a curious coincidence which seems to have been wholly fortuitous, Galdós' play *Electra*, built on exactly the same theme, appeared on the stage at the same moment, its instant success all over the Peninsula and the enthusiastic popularity which it earned for its author plainly showed where the feelings of the Spanish people lay.

There is, no doubt, much strength in the clerical position. It comes from the following quarters :

In the first place the clerical tendency of the Crown, due to the tradition which entrusts the education of the heir to thoroughly tried clerical men, whether lay or in orders. The present king was educated by men whose pedagogic, constitutional and philosophical outlook on life would have struck the great Spanish churchmen of the sixteenth century as unenlightened and mediæval. It is only fair to add that the clericalism of the Crown, rooted in mis-education, is strengthened by political prudence which, even if short-sighted, can hardly be condemned as foolish. This observation implies the existence of other substantial causes of power in the clerical position.

A good proportion of the middle classes are

strongly influenced by clerical views. They do not necessarily coincide with the proportion of the nation which is devoutly religious. To take the women, for instance, the majority of middle-class women are devout Catholics, but the majority of this majority give no thought whatsoever to Church politics and are even fairly passive when, in an anti-clerical crisis, the clergy endeavour to mobilise them against the Government. The reverse may be said to be the rule with men. Only a minority of middle-class men can be said to be devout Catholics. But of this minority the majority are clericals as well, men being more inclined than women to mix their religion with their politics. Many of these "lay jesuits" move actively in Government offices, the universities, the law, provincial and charity administrations. They constitute one of the most secure tentacles of the clerical octopus.

There are regions of Spain in which the people are traditionally clerical, in particular the higher regions of the Spanish Pyrenees from the mountainous districts of Catalonia to the strongholds of Navarre and beyond to the hills and high valleys of the Basque provinces. These are the districts on which Carlism could always count for raising its civil wars against the accursed liberals who fought for Isabel and later for Alfonso XII. The spectre of civil war in the north is always conjured up to do yeoman service in frightening off liberal reforms. It is, to say the least, doubtful whether the exploits of the *curas guerrilleros* of the nineteenth century could be repeated in the twentieth. The northern peasant is nowadays more sophisticated than his grandfather was, and would probably look closely into the agricultural consequences of a war before indulging in it. Moreover, the big towns such as Bilbao, Saragossa and

Barcelona are thoroughly industrialised and the workers care nothing for the Church and still less for Carlism. Nevertheless, the bogey is there, and it has been efficient enough to frighten liberal governments and the Crown with genuine or simulated fears every time bold liberal reforms have been contemplated.

But the most substantial cause of clerical strength in the Church is that it is an institution in the midst of a people whose fanatical love of liberty prevents the development of institutions. Its immemorial roots, its stern discipline, the abundance and, in the lower ranks, the cheapness of its personnel, its intimate, yet autonomous, connection with the State, make of it a vigorous organism within the national organism itself. A typical example of what this situation implies is the power which the Church is able to wield in education. The fact that it has developed its educational system under a régime of freedom (slightly privileged by State subsidies) is in itself a proof of its value as an institution and a condemnation of the sterility of Spanish liberalism. But let us not be too hard on Spanish liberals. They could not rely—as could the clericals—on the splendid foundation of a historical institution like the Church, always sure of State protection. They have, moreover, in spite of many handicaps, produced the best educational establishments in Spain. But when their precious seed grew and new plantations had to be made, the liberal movement had to call at the State gates and seek its financial help in order to build up the Committee for the Development of Studies with all the inestimable institutions which it implies. Why are there no great and powerful institutions of learning with a liberal spirit in the free zone outside the shadow of the State in which the Church has thriven ? Because rich Spaniards

give no money for education. The public-spirited rich man, that type to which England and America owe so much intelligent and efficient social work in all spheres, is rare in Spain.[1] The Church, more familiar with the usual type of Spanish potentate, makes him open his purse by standing at the gates of Paradise and asking for an entrance fee. The rich bigot who keeps Spanish Church schools going is but an egoist who prolongs his selfishness beyond the Bourne. The rich liberal, generally an unbeliever, or, what amounts to the same, a believer in his own individual way, has no such motives for endowing social foundations and his name dies for evermore. It is important that this fact should be realised, for it serves to emphasise the value of the Church as an institution in the midst of an ultra-individualistic people such as that of Spain.

A similar remark applies to other social activities. Nursing, for instance, is in Spain overwhelmingly in the incompetent but devoted hands of nuns, despite the sporadic efforts of liberal medical men, such as Dr. Rubio, to foster schools for lay nurses. The matter of agricultural credit is a typical case in point. The intimate connection between Spanish politics and the miserable state of the peasant in the clutches of local usurers is a familiar subject in political books, articles and speeches. The liberal-minded people of Spain are fully aware of its central position with regard to the political evolution of the country. Yet what has been done on the liberal side? What associations, banks, propaganda, help has been forthcoming? None. Meanwhile we know with what

[1] As these words were written a handsome legacy is announced left by the Count of Cartagena to the various Spanish Academies and to the Prado Gallery. It is significant that this enlightened member of the Spanish aristocracy lived mainly in Lausanne.

intelligent attention the Church has followed up its discovery of the opportunities of agricultural life. A comparison of the educational and the agricultural problem of the country will lead to the same conclusion, i.e., that, while the liberal development of the country, through lack of voluntary work and attention, must rely on State aid, enlightened in its inspiration but slow and fitful in its legislation and inefficient in its working, the Church is able to set to work at once owing to its wealth, to its collective institutional character and also to the influence which it wields in the higher and middle spheres of official Spain.

But then it may again be asked why not let the Church do its work? It is difficult for anyone not familiar with Spanish life to understand why there should still be in Spain any fuss about clericalism. But the facts of the case are clear. Much as one may wish to stand aloof from the somewhat cheap, radical anti-clericalism which afflicts a certain type of Spanish politician, one cannot be indifferent to the dangers of Church power in Spain. It is obvious that clerical education is thoroughly bad by any standard, as shown in the efforts of Church Schools to escape objective examinations, and that, far from checking the tendency to superstition, the Church sedulously encourages it. Worse still, the Catholic Church of Spain is strongly intolerant, and, if it could it would prevent all development of independent thought in the country. The Church has always applauded measures of a coercive character with regard to the free expression of opinion, and, in all its activities there is a tendency to militancy, an aggressive attitude and a self-assertion which are as unchristian as unco-operative. However deserving of praise some of its work in the realm of rural

economy and in certain fields of scholarship may be, its influence on the country is essentially of a retarding and irritating nature. It adds one more problem to those which already burden the conscience and intellect of Spanish leaders. Instead of being, as of old, one of the most powerful instruments of government, it has become an element of strife and division, always ready to abuse its power by oppressing those who do not bow before its narrowly conceived authority. Cases might be told of excellent, useful men broken and lost to the nation by the relentless persecution of hard-headed and hard-hearted bishops with an undue and, generally, an illegal influence on the State. And the pity of it is that, through the unintelligent intolerance of its attitude, the Church is blocking the way towards a real solution of the spiritual life of the country, which cannot be a bigoted Roman Catholicism, but which is certainly not to be found in an equally limited rationalism unsuited to the Spanish genius. The only hope is in a movement within the Church itself which may turn inwards its present over-zealous activities for the education of others. The Spanish Church stands in great and urgent need of self-education.

CHAPTER XV

THE ARMY.—MILITARISM

MILITARISM is hardly a correct word in the case of Spain. It is used here only in order to conform with the now traditional misuse of it. The position in Spain bears no resemblance to that of countries—such as pre-War Prussia—in which a military caste controlled the national policy, particularly in matters of defence and foreign affairs, with a warlike spirit and intention. In Spain there is no such thing, and the evil would be better described as *prætorianism*. For a body of officers, by no means a caste, controls the political life of the nation, giving but little thought to foreign affairs and intent on the preservation of power and on the administration and enjoyment of a disproportionate amount of the Budget.

The evil is relatively new in Spain, yet not without roots both in the old tradition and in the national character. Generals begin to loom large in Spanish history during the Spanish struggle against Napoleon. There is, indeed, food for thought in the fact that prætorianism appears in Spanish politics as Spain begins her free life. Castaños, the conqueror of Bailén, Riego, the first successful conspirator, are the two first names in a list that was to fill up the whole nineteenth century and which has been unexpectedly but dramatically lengthened in the twentieth. Civil war which, with fits of precarious peace, was the chief occupation of Spaniards from 1800 to 1876, and the colonial wars which continued to this date, pro-

vided a plausible pretext for the maintenance of a military establishment enabling many an officer to climb up the military ladder to the highest official posts. Men like Espartero and Serrano, who became regents of the realm by a combination of military dash and courage with cheap field successes, would never have risen beyond obscure positions in any walk of life requiring a moderate amount of brain power. The Army, moreover, by establishing the custom, which it turned into a necessity, of entrusting the governor-generalship of overseas possessions to military men, obtained a number of enviable posts, and, by intervening in politics, often laid hands also on the high offices of State. This fact made of the military profession a kind of lottery which all pushing and ambitious men with no excessive love of books were eager to pursue. It would be erroneous to imagine the Spanish Army as a huge military machine powerfully organised to obtain the highest possible fighting efficiency out of the large portion of the Budget which it consumes. The Army is a bureaucratic machine which spends most of the money paid to it in salaries for generals and officers, a lesser amount in war material, and a still lesser sum in preparing for war. The Army, in fact, is more important as an instrument of home politics than as a weapon of war.

During most of the nineteenth century the Army was, on the whole, a force in favour of liberalism. It has been shrewdly said that the intermittent civil war of the nineteenth century may be interpreted as a struggle for supremacy between the Army and the Church, ending in a compromise. This would explain the Army's change of front, during the Restoration, from its liberalism of old to its present reactionary attitude. But this change has more complex causes

behind it. Cánovas, who saw the evil of prætorianism, struggled to keep generals out of politics, but, lacking in the constructive statesmanship which was necessary to provide the throne with an alternative basis, he left the country in danger of a relapse. Circumstances made it fatal. The Church was no longer a rival to the Army, for the Church in Spain, though a strong prop of the structure, granted the structure, would collapse with it if it went. Danger came from other forces, and in particular from the growth of the spirit of citizenship.

There are at least two reasons for this. The first is that the growth of a spirit of citizenship tended gradually to create a national community standing on its own basis and therefore able to do without the somewhat surgical appliance of the Army (or for that matter of the Church). The Army instinctively realised that the new force, if allowed to grow, would tend to check the political activities of the military institution and therefore to reduce it to the modest proportion required in a nation as secure from foreign attack as Spain. The second is that, while the new spirit of citizenship stimulated healthy forms of political life and even of agitation, it led also to unfortunate outbursts, not perhaps worse or graver than those which have at times afflicted other democracies, but certainly as bad. New social forces are not always tactful nor even sensible, and at times it was difficult to disentangle the actions of those who endeavoured to make a new Spain from the agitation of those who attempted to destroy the old. Armies are seldom credited with much psychological penetration. By a process of natural selection they draw to their ranks a large number of men richer in blood than in judgment. The body of officers, moreover, felt somewhat sensitive after the close of the 1898 War,

when the Army behaved with its usual courage and spirit of sacrifice but when even its hottest advocates dared not stand up for the efficiency of its administration, or for the competence of its leadership. It so happened, moreover, that the spirit of citizenship moved in directions athwart the Army's most cherished tendencies. It is only natural that an army should tend to consider itself as an incarnation of the Fatherland, and thus the Spanish Army felt offended by the nationalist forms which progress took in Catalonia, in which it saw, at times not without cause, a danger to the unity of Spain. Then the political movements of the masses often took a republican-socialist turn, and the Army, deeply monarchical, was disposed to feel directly interested in the matter. All these tendencies and feelings were strongly polarised by a vigorous *esprit de corps*. The Spanish Army comes from all classes. In its social composition it is as open and democratic as the French. There is no reason why a gulf should separate the Army and the people. The Army, at any rate the body of 20,000 officers which lead it, is in direct touch with the middle classes who, along with a sprinkling of aristocrats, fill up its ranks. But there is the *esprit de corps*, the collective form of that strong individualism which is both the gift and the bane of the Spanish nation. Finally the Army wielded force, and force, a temptation for all peoples, is the most irresistible of temptations for the Spaniard.

Trouble began in Catalonia when, in 1905, a somewhat scurrilous caricature in a Catalanist satirical paper roused the wrath of some spirited officers, who invaded the paper's premises and destroyed all they found. No disciplinary measures were taken. Far from it. The military agitation which ensued culminated—after one or two ministerial crises—in the

so-called Law of Jurisdictions, whereby attacks on officers and military institutions are judged before military tribunals. This law is still in force.

The Government and Parliament which voted it under compulsion, or rather for fear of worse evils, were of "liberal" extraction. They voted with their eyes open. They knew that the battle which civil institutions had just lost was but the first in a long campaign, and several of the men then beaten no doubt realised what the end was to be. From that day, the power of the military class in the State—a power which had always been uppermost, in fact unique, in purely military affairs—overstepped the professional limits and began to intervene in civil life. The progress of citizenship was then severely checked. But the danger was to threaten older and higher institutions, and this law, which the Crown had helped the Army to wring from a reluctant Parliament, was to strengthen the Army against the true interests, perhaps the safety, certainly the prestige, of the Crown itself.

Always prominent in Spanish politics since the Restoration, the Army became then predominant. The king chose to rest on it against the onward movement of civil life. Now he claimed the right to communicate directly with commanders over the head of his Cabinet ministers, a thoroughly unconstitutional practice which was weakly tolerated by his political "advisers" in office; now he organised *audiencias militares*, days on which all his visitors were military and naval officers; now he ostentatiously showed his royal favour by visiting barracks, attending banquets, making speeches, with other stage effects. The Army budget became untouchable by civil hands. Money was lavished on military laboratories, schools, health establishments, which

was sadly lacking in their civilian counterparts. The posts of secretary and under-secretary for war became military sinecures, not to be entrusted to any civilian. Control of military expenditure disappeared altogether in actual practice. The Army and its administration became a State within the State.

Two consequences followed. This huge administration, free from all Treasury control, became as cumbrous as inefficient. It developed a disproportionate head, while it starved its body, so that there were, in 1927, 19,906 officers (including 219 generals) for 207,000 troops, while the habit of sending a considerable number of the men back home instead of keeping them in actual service makes this proportion of officers still higher. As it is, and even accepting these figures at their face value, the proportion of officers to soldiers is about one in ten, while in France it was just below one in twenty at the same date (30,622 officers for 606,917 men). This comparison with the most efficiently militarised European nation abundantly shows that the administration of the Spanish Army is overburdened with a military bureaucracy insufficiently occupied in professional activities precisely because the object of its administration, defence, is starved in order to fatten the subject of it.

As a natural outcome of this state of affairs the body of officers—for that is what in reality stirs behind, and usurps the name of, "the Army"—turned their attention to civilian affairs. A potential antagonism was implicit in the very conditions under which political life in Spain had to develop. This antagonism was seen acutely every time civilian opinion crossed one of the military dogmas. Whether it were an attempt at reducing extravagant expenses in personnel, or a concession made to

Catalan home-rulers, or a decision on Moroccan affairs which reduced the possibilities of that costly adventure from the point of view of military officers ready to gamble their life for promotion and prestige, Parliamentary Cabinets and statesmen were sure of having to go through a calvary of the most unruly acts—protests, meetings, "outspoken" speeches by military members of Parliament, or even by the War-Secretary, a general of course, who, if necessary, did not hesitate to declare that he spoke in the name of the Army. The Crown invariably stood behind "its" officers.

Gradually this antagonism between the State and "the Army" brought about an organisation of the army officers, not, be it understood, aiming at the fulfilment of their professional duties nor along lines of hierarchy and discipline, but on openly trade-union lines for the defence of their rights. This episode of Spanish prætorianism is so closely dovetailed with the historical events determined by the War that it had better be left for a later chapter. We would merely point out here that the movement known as the Committees of Defence (*Juntas de Defensa*) is one of the most monstrous aberrations which the history of Spanish institutions can register. The Army officers took a weapon from the arsenal of syndicalist labour and turned against the State the force which the State had entrusted to them. The moral effect of this truly anarchist attack on the very source of authority and of institutions was to be so deep that institutions have been falling ever since and may still continue to fall.

And yet . . . Experience shows that an army is an indispensable element in the *internal* life of Spain. It would indeed be difficult to explain how an utterly useless public body could gain such an ascendancy

over the nation. The Army provides that minimum of outer and mechanical order without which the evolution towards inner and spiritual order, which is the true meaning of progress, cannot take place. The tendency towards disorder springs in the Spanish people from the interplay of certain essential features of its character. Normally passive and quiescent, the Spaniard is given to outbursts of activity and expression when roused by events. Political leaders know this well, for phrases such as "it is necessary to heat up passions" (*hay que calentar las pasiones*), or else "the atmosphere is heated up" (*el ambiente está caldeado*), which in an English political environment would sound incomprehensible, are a matter of course in Spanish life. Then the extreme character of Spanish idealism, that swing between the *nothing* of pessimistic depression and the *all* of optimistic exaltation which typifies it, multiplies in the Spaniard the energies of his energetic moments. Finally, there is in Spain a tendency to split and form separate antagonistic groups always apt to solve their differences in civil strife.

An army in the midst of such a people is an indispensable organ of State. It keeps order and provides a neutral national environment in which all particular tendencies are merged and mixed. Incidentally it performs a certain amount of service as an adult school, giving elementary education to those recruits who come to it in an illiterate condition. This detail suggests a curious parallel between the Army and the Church. Both are useful as institutions in a country in which institutions are scarce and precarious owing to the excessive vigour of individualism; the one is the main agent of spiritual development, the other the main agent of order and stability. Yet, mark the tragic inversion of the normal ways of

life : while the Church, by its bigoted and superstitious outlook, turns its tremendous strength against the spiritual development of the country, the Army by its overbearing and undisciplined attitude towards civil law saps the very roots of order and precipitates the decay of institutions beginning by that of the Army itself.

Thus during the first part of the reign of Alfonso XIII there were already discernible the main lines of the present problem : how to create institutions under the " protection " of the two existing ones, both of which were neglecting, misunderstanding or tragically inverting their own duties and aims.

CHAPTER XVI

THE CATALAN QUESTION

I.—The Psychological Background

The Catalan question, and in a lesser degree the questions raised by the movements of local consciousness in the Basque provinces and in Galicia, are amongst the most difficult yet also the most fertile in Spanish contemporary public life. They have been complicated to an incredible extent by the admixture of half-baked notions from the realms of anthropology, art, literature, history and economics. Thus the question whether Catalonia is, or is not, a separate *nation*, the question whether the Catalans are, or are not, a separate *race*, and other disquisitions equally puerile on both sides have been allowed to befog an issue which circumstances make difficult and character makes thorny, but which, on the whole, is clear.

In the opening chapters we had occasion to see how the Peninsula strongly asserts a fundamental unity comprising considerable variety, and how these two same features observable in nature apply also to man. We found in the Peninsula a common general feature, the keynote of which was a lofty inaccessibility, and along with it a variety of environments separated by such obstacles to communications as to constitute a kind of inner inaccessibility between the parts analogous to the inaccessibility of the whole. Similarly we found that the Spanish character stood

out with a vigorous individualism which puts it in a class by itself in the western world, while within the nation, regional characters stood distinctly separate with a mutual differentiation, a mutual assertion of individualism which drove inwards, into the very soul of the nation, the vigorous individualism wherewith the nation confronted the outward world.

Such is the true origin of the centrifugal movements to be observed in certain parts of Spain. And it is not by mere accident that these movements occur in Catalonia, the Basque Provinces and Galicia, for it is precisely in these regions of Spain that we may observe the clearest indication of a distinctive individualised genius. A language, in so far as it is the creation of a people, is like a signal to show that there is a people there. That Spanish and French are alike does not mean that the Spanish and the French peoples are alike, since the likeness of the two languages is not due to the two peoples, but to the common historical factor of the Roman conquest; that French and Spanish are different does mean that France and Spain are psychologically different, for the differences between the two languages born of the same stock are obviously due to the difference between the genius of the two peoples.

The claim of Catalonia to be considered as something more than a mere region arises, therefore, quite clearly from the fact that she speaks a language of her own. (The attempts of some Castilians to describe Catalan as a dialect of Castilian are too silly to deserve more than contemptuous mention.) Even here, arguments and discussions are seriously wasted on such questions as to whether Catalan comes from Provençal or from somewhere else. Surely the case is clear. Catalan comes from Catalonia.

But what is Catalan and what is Catalonia? For Catalanists of the nationalistic school the answer is clear: Catalonia proper, or the county or earldom, as it is called, plus the kingdom of Valencia and the Balearic Islands. Some, carrying their enthusiastic logic beyond the frontiers, go as far north as the Roussillon, and, if they do not add to the map the town of Alghero, in Sardinia, in which Catalan is still spoken, they do not forget to mention it in their inventory. Such is in actual fact the *philological* Catalonia. Valencia, however, thoroughly dislikes to be considered as anything else than Valencia. Her language differs sufficiently from Catalan to be entitled to a separate grammar and vocabulary, if her literati cared to build them up as the Catalans have done. But, despite their proud assertions to the contrary, it is doubtful whether Valencian would have remained a separate dialect if there had been a few centuries of Catalan culture in Barcelona. It certainly differs less from Catalan than French dialects from Paris French or Yorkshire English from king's English. Yet, in so far as Valencian can be explained historically by the repopulation of the Valencian lands with Catalan settlers after their conquest by Jaime I of Aragón and Catalonia, the existence of such a language in Valencia may not be so strong a justification of the "Catalanity" of the Valencian peoples. The phenomenon here would be at least partly similar to the common latinity of French, Spanish and Italian due to the accident of a common Roman Conquest.

Leaving aside for the present the Basque language, there exist then in the Peninsula three main languages: Castilian in the centre; Portuguese in the south-west (with the Gallegan dialect in the north-west), and Catalan in the north-east (with the

Valencian dialect in the south-east). This fact has been interpreted as follows in another of the author's books :

" Seen in its entirety, above the historical and political contingencies which have obscured its intrinsic unity, the Spanish Peninsula appears as one well-defined spiritual entity. This fact the Portuguese critics are beginning to realise and the Catalan critics to forget. Both movements are historically logical, for, while Portugal has outlived the period of her affirmation as a separate sub-entity within the Spanish wider unity, Catalonia is, on the contrary, but beginning a struggle for asserting her own personality within the Peninsula and putting it beyond reach of attack from political prejudice. Strife pyschology is never the ideal atmosphere for thought, and so it will be found that Catalan critics do not always realise the true strength of the ties which bind them to the Peninsula, nay, of the roots which make them part and essence of the spirit of the Peninsula as the land they inhabit is part of its body. But the spiritual unity of Spain does not depend on the vagaries of critics, being grounded on deeper realities. Yet these vagaries do serve a useful purpose, since they bring into relief a fact no less important than that which they tend to obscure, namely, that Spain is not a simple, but a complex unity, a trinity composed of a Western, a Central, and an Eastern modality, the norms of which respectively are Portugal, Castile, and Catalonia.

" Three languages (or groups of languages) embody these three spiritual modalities of the Spanish race. In the West, the Atlantic modality finds its expression in the Portuguese, of Latin languages the most tender and melodious. In the Centre, the Continental modality inspires that stately Castilian in which strength and grace are as harmoniously combined as

tragedy and comedy in good drama. To the East, the Mediterranean modality shapes Catalan and its dialects, languages as supple and soft as clay, as vivid as painters' palettes, as receptive as the still waters of the clean sea which bathes the shores where they are spoken.

"In literature and the arts the character of each of these three varieties of Spain may be defined by the predominance of one particular æsthetic tendency. This predominant or specific tendency is in the West lyrical, epic-dramatic in the Centre, and plastic in the East. The lyrical attitude is personal and has for its object the artist himself. The artist sees life as a flow and listens to the murmurs which rise as this flow falls on his own soul. The dramatic attitude is passive and has for its object the world of men. The artist conceives life as an endless drama between character and destiny. The plastic tendency is active. The hand stretches towards matter, eager to impress upon it the form obscurely felt in the artist's soul. Matter is therefore the object of the plastic creator, and his way of approach is through the outer crust towards the inner meaning of things. Thus we find in the Eastern modality of the Spanish race the qualities and the defects of the plastic tendency. The Catalan possesses a firm hold on the material aspects of things and a determination to stamp his own personality on the clay of life which can be felt, for instance, in certain cadences of his language. Let the sounds be compared of the words *génie* and *seny*, and the difference will be perceived between a geometric line drawn on a white paper by a mathematician and the heavy impress of a sculptor's thumb on a piece of soft clay. There is always in the Catalan an implicit form which demands as its right some matter in which to become embodied, thus passing from mind into space. Hence a certain

sense of order which has misled some people, amongst them many Catalans, into believing Catalonia to be a kind of French spiritual *enclave* in Spain. But the French sense of order is the outcome of a logical type of mind, while the Catalan sense of order is due to a plastic feeling. The French sense of order can be put on paper, is successive and has but two dimensions, and is felt instantaneously, while the Catalan sense of order is three-dimensional, like the feelings of up and down, back and front, top, middle, and base, symmetry, and, most mysterious of all, the feeling that guides the arrangement of useless objects on a mantelpiece.

"Yet this feeling of order, though plastic and not logical, does give Catalonia the position of a *liaison* country between Europe and the rest of Spain. Europe, that is the West-Central-European nucleus which more consciously and intelligently represents the ideals of the white race, has chosen the Apollinian rather than the Dionysian path for its way up to the Temple of Mysteries, and, though careful not to reject Dionysian testimonies, yet looks on them with Apollinian eyes. Both the Western and Central types of the Spanish genius partake of the Dionysian rather than of the Apollinian nature. Not so Catalonia. If not always in actual life, at least in her ideals, she is Greek; Greek in that "classic" sense which corresponds to a literary rather than to a truly historical view of the Hellenic nature, Greek not as Æschylus, but as Goethe. The most original and vigorous of modern Catalan minds, Eugenio d'Ors, has expressed this ideal in a striking little passage: 'It is impossible to speak about Goethe coolly. We are troubled by something which it is difficult to confess, yet impossible to disown. We are troubled by *envy*.

"'The worst kind of envy, for it does not aim at attributes, but at the substance. Usually we envy great figures some one of their properties or qualities. We should like to possess their eminent gift or their priceless booty, but without ceasing to be ourselves. . . . But our passion towards Goethe is more grave, for it tempts us to the blasphemy of renouncing our own personality.

"'We should like to *speak* like Demosthenes, to *write* like Boccaccio, to *know* as much as Leibniz, to *possess*, like Napoleon, a vast empire, or, like Ruelbeck, a Botanic Garden. . . . We should like to *be* Goethe.

"'All Olympian souls see in this Olympian the image of their own selves elevated to its maximum power, glory and serenity.'

"Here, the Central European ideal of Catalonia is asserted with all the ingenuity and, be it noted, the 'three-dimensional' precision of the Catalan plastic mind. This choice of Goethe as a model is typical, for neither Castile nor Portugal could ever consider Goethe as their ideal. Rather would they turn to Shakespeare, despite his lack of 'Olympian' manners. And the reason is that while Western and Central Spain aim at character, Catalonia aims at culture.

"Catalonia is determined to plod on the road to progress. Leaving the contemplation of Eternity to the Castilian, she is well content with Time, and particularly with the present time as manifest in the sundry objects of everyday life. The Mediterranean Spaniard is no ascetic. He feels the *joie de vivre* and lives. He does not seek the high summits of speculation, and finds enough grounds for intellectual enjoyment in the many sights of the valley below. He approaches these sights precisely as sights, not as

symbols of some higher or deeper significance, but merely as objects the shape and colour of which are in themselves a sufficient attraction. The Catalan is sensuous.

"A Spaniard he still is, in that his nature is synthetic rather than analytic. But he differs from the two other types in that he develops along the line of talent and intellect rather than along that of genius and spirit. Thus Catalonia is—mentally—a land of plains at a good medium level, below which and above which fall and rise the inequalities of Castilian genius. The Catalan talent is hard-working and purposeful. It knows the use of the file and of that literary instrument which Flaubert called *gueuloir*. Spanish still in that it improvises, it is no longer so in that it tries to refine the material thrown up by improvisation—a sculptor endeavouring to chisel Greek statuettes in lava.

"As it moves south, the Catalan genius, without losing its main plastic tendency, changes considerably in every other respect. Valencia is a land of flame and colour, painted in vivid tones—the gold and green of its orange-groves, the ochre of its earth, the pale blue of its skies, the dazzling white of its low houses over which now and then towers an eastern-looking cupola covered with dark-blue glazed tiles. Here beauty is so abundant on the surface of the world that men forget how to seek for it below. Anyone is an artist, anything a work of art. Thus Valencia disperses its genius and gains in surface what it loses in depth. It is a land of painters, with a decorative talent and a fine feeling for the values of light and quality over the surface of things. When power is added, work of great descriptive value may result. Thus, Blasco Ibáñez.

There is to the south of Valencia a land historically

within the kingdom, but spiritually a thing apart. It is the province of Alicante. North of it stretch the colour and flame of Valencia proper; east, the Latin sea; north-west, La Mancha, the very lands in which Don Quixote was born. Just as Galicia is the transition between lyrical Portugal and dramatic Castile, so Alicante is the transition between dramatic Castile and the plastic East. Here, the spirit of the Centre touches the spirit of the East; Castile looks on the Mediterranean. The dramatic feeling of man emerges from its depths of concentration and meets on the surface the plastic sense of things. This delicately poised zone of the Spanish spirit is represented in Spanish letters by two contemporary authors: Azorín and Gabriel Miró."

So much for first facts and their obvious conclusions. The Catalan nationalists have endeavoured to draw from them other inferences of a somewhat bolder kind. At a time when a minority of Catalanists believed that, by pouring abuse and contempt on Castilian history, character, politics and administration, Catalan progressive ways would stand out more clearly before the world, a time which coincided with much European nonsense about races and progress, a famous Dr. Robert, who became mayor of Barcelona, made a stir by declaring that the Catalan skull was bigger than that of the mere Spaniard. There was an uproar in the Castilian Press—in all save a small minority of good-humoured people who realised that this difference in size might be merely momentary. But as a matter of fact the eminent doctor was talking through his skull. If there is one thing which recent anthropological studies have shown beyond dispute it is that there is no difference whatsoever between the Catalan "race" and the remaining "races" of Spain. The reader is referred to our second chapter,

in which the data available on this point have been analysed. He may choose to observe for himself or to register the observations that have been made as to language, sayings, habits and events, and he will certainly come to the same conclusion.

Since language is, after all, the starting point of our opinions, we may as well turn to it for further findings on the matter of character and race in the Peninsula.[1] Now, at first sight, there is no doubt that Catalan does differ profoundly from Castilian and that it suggests a certain outward likeness with French. Gone the poise and balance which Castilian owes to the normal place of the accent on the centre of gravity of its words. Catalan drops those final vowels which give their roundness to Castilian and thus provides a linguistic suggestion of " shortness," a clipped feeling which, as with French, we are at liberty to connect with the closeness in matters of money by common consent attributed to Catalans in the Spanish world. Yet it would be rash to identify such a feature with French thriftiness and moderation. Were we tempted to fall into such an error, other typical features of the Catalan language would suffice to warn us against it. To begin with, while French distributes its accent evenly on every syllable of the word, Catalan participates with all the Spanish languages in the existence of a strong tonic accent. It is a language with a definite beating rhythm in direct contradiction with the subtle and soft rhythm which the French language derives from the evenness of its stresses. Moreover, the Catalan dominant vowel is typically different from the French, and makes of Catalan an unmistakably Spanish language. In French, as we know, the dominant vowel is " e," the moderate and

[1] *Cf.* chapter on languages in *Englishmen, Frenchmen, Spaniards*, Oxford University Press, 1928.

middle vowel *par excellence,* as distinct from the over-subtle and intentional "i" (ee) typical of Italian as from the full and sonorous "a" and "o" typical of Castilian. The characteristic Catalan vowel is an open "ae," not a pure vowel but a sound with a definite movement in it and with that characteristic sense of fling which we know to be one of the most direct manifestations of the Spanish genius. Spontaneous, integral, personal, this Catalan "ae" is like an ever-recurring, nay an almost permanent diphthong. Now a diphthong is the most un-French linguistic feature, the most characteristically Spanish. No one who has heard Catalan spoken, even by the choice minority which endeavours to submit it to a severe discipline, can doubt that Catalan is a Spanish language, direct, spontaneous, vigorous, fully manifested and popular—that it is, in fact, the language of a man of passion.

There is a further confirmation of this conclusion in the fact that Catalan presents that exclusively Spanish feature: the double translation of the word "to be," one meaning "to be in essence," and the other "to be in state." Now this feature corresponds closely to the most profound characteristic of the Spanish nation, namely, the distinction between that which is essential and that which is passing, between being itself, which is permanent, and circumstances, which are merely ephemeral. The existence of this distinction in the Catalan language would suffice to establish it as one of the languages of the Spanish family, as Spanish, indeed, as Castilian, Gallegan or Portuguese. Another feature which confirms this solidarity is the fact that the differences which, taken altogether, constitute the two separate languages, Catalan and Castilian, do not occur abruptly, but by a gradual merging of Castilian into Catalan through

Aragonese which can be studied by the new methods of the philological mapping out of linguistic territories. Indeed, the matter is self-evident, and is only mentioned here in view of the somewhat rash statements that have been made now and then when, for political reasons—and not very wise at that—an excessive distinction is drawn between the Catalan character and nature and the character and nature of the other Spanish peoples.

But what then about that "clipped" feeling? It does constitute the most distinctive feature of the Catalan language. It must be coupled with the open "ae" in order to be appraised in its right value, for while it suggests that sense of thrift and even parsimony which corresponds in French psychology to the French "e," the Catalan "ae" reminds us that there is a certain openness in Catalan psychology, a readiness to live and to enjoy life as it comes without an excessive consideration for the future, without that foresight which is typical of the French nation. It is true that Spain is full of stories in which the Catalan does the wrong thing in matters of money. At first sight they suggest Scotch stories; yet Catalan stories and Scotch stories are, for all their superficial likeness, as far apart as Sabadell and Aberdeen. Scotch stories are tales of niggardliness, or at any rate of nearness. They suggest a people naturally led to think of economies by a miserly nature.[1] Catalonia, though, is plentiful. She has a splendid sun; she has water. She is industrious. Life is easy for the Catalan who cares to work. The stories told against him are not precisely stories of niggardliness, but of self-interest, inclined to be

[1] But by no means a miserly people. The thrift of the Scotch is saving of *things*, it has a social inspiration. It is utilitarianism, not egoism. It can be most generous.

uncompromising and self-assertive. The typical Catalan story is that of the Barcelona shopkeeper who was a communist, for, he said, "With what I shall get on the day all wealth is distributed equally *plus* the house I have in the country, I shall be quite comfortably off.")

(Absurd caricatures, no doubt, but let us not undervalue caricatures. *When the river roars it carries water*, says a Spanish proverb, typical of a country in which rivers are not expected to carry water as a matter of course. When *vox populi* insists on a particular feature of a whole people we may suspect *Vox Dei* speaks in it. These stories, however, do not say that the Catalan is mean, thrifty or miserly. They say two things: that, like all Mediterraneans, he has an eye for material things, for the pleasures of life and for the means whereby they can be enjoyed; and that the Catalan is very much alive to the claims of his own self, that he is an individualist. Now the first of these judgments was to be expected from the Castilian, whose outlook on life is more spartan even in the midst of enchanting Andalusia; but the second is startling. Here is a people of fierce individualists witnessing to the individualism of another people living in their midst. The individualism of the Catalan towers, therefore, even above the individualism of the remaining Spaniards. Our conclusion is that the Catalan is an ultra-individualist.)

Such a conclusion, based on the indirect and spontaneous signs detected in Spanish life, is, of course, implicit in our interpretation of the language. "The language of a man of passion," we said. And, of course, for the fact is evident, a man of passion living by the Mediterranean. In our opinion, then, the key factors of the Catalan question may be drawn from this statement which at the beginning of the chapter

would have been a truism, but which now is—we hope—an ascertained truth : that the Catalan is a Spaniard living on the shores of the Mediterranean. It follows that his substantial features are Spanish while some of his secondary characteristics differ from those of his co-Spaniards, thereby constituting a sub-type within the Spanish family. We shall see that this inherent " Spanish-ness " of the Catalan, far from being a favourable factor, is one of the most serious obstacles towards a solution of Catalanism.

Curiously enough, the Catalan out-Spaniards the Spaniard in many ways, and far from being, as some of the theoreticians of Catalanism fondly imagine, a European exiled in an African Spain, he is an Iberian showing some of the typical Iberian features more markedly than the other Peninsular peoples. Thus, while we know all Spaniards to be essentially men of passion, we also know that in most of the Peninsular types this " pathic " life which flows in them is kept normally in a quiescent state by a kind of stoic reserve and a sense of balance. But in the Mediterranean type the man of passion is more given to letting out, and he easily becomes passionate as well. Reserve is not so typical of the Catalan as of the Iberian in general. In a sense, that criticism of the Catalan which one can feel implicitly in Spanish stories about him means, precisely, that he is lacking in reserve and does not hold life in as well as the other Iberians do.

The Catalan is as prone as the Castilian, if not more so, to mix the whole of his personality with his thought so that his ideas will be synthetic, personal, disconnected in time and space and dictated by his passionate sense of life to an equal, nay, to a greater extent than is the case with the other Spaniards. Of this we shall have abundant proof when studying the

intellectual history of the Catalan movement. But, though essentially a Spaniard, the Catalan is a Mediterranean. He lives plastically, he lives in the realm of movements and forms. And he breathes from his birth the atmosphere of commerce, trade and exchange, which makes of the Latin Sea a kind of market-place surrounded with busy shops on all its shores. The Spaniard who lives in such a market-place must surely differ from him who lives facing the deserts of mid-Castile, or on the shores of the immense Atlantic Ocean. He is more given to rationalising his passions and intuitions, and since he is rich in them, as all true Spaniards are, his intellect has a tougher task to perform and he becomes ingenious. The Catalan is, therefore, more inclined to use his mind than the Castilian; he is a more acute contriver of intellectual systems, a more felicitous artist of words, a better orator. For all his intellectual application, however, the Catalan is no intellectualist in the French sense. He is intuitive, as are all Spaniards, and no more methodical than the rest. The stimulus of the Catalan intellect comes from his desire to rationalise passion and intuition. It often leads him to wild flights of imagination, characteristic of a passionate type and inconceivable in the moderate genuine intellectual. We shall see some effects of his ingenious imagination when dealing with the political aspects of the Catalan movement.

Finally, in the realm of action, we shall find the Catalan a typical Spaniard in his individualism. For instance, a glance at the statistics of limited liability companies founded in Barcelona, Madrid and Bilbao in any one year will prove that in Barcelona the average capital per company is much smaller than in the Castilian or the Basque city, for the Catalan limited liability company generally represents the

efforts of one man or, at best, of a very small number of friends. This remark applies particularly to the average capital per bank, which is distinctly smaller in Catalonia than in the Basque country or in Castile or in other provinces, such as Coruña. A sidelight to very much the same effect comes from the most authoritative of quarters, Señor Cambó, undoubtedly the greatest political talent of Catalonia and perhaps of the whole of Spain. In the course of a masterly study of the Catalan question Señor Cambó says, " When it is a matter of managing a private business it would be difficult to find more gifted men than Catalans. For the management of enterprises in which interests of many persons are concerned the leader will very rarely be found in Catalonia. That is why, amongst us, limited liability companies live so precarious a life." Evidently the Catalan can throw no stones at the other Spaniards on the score of individualism. This is borne out again by the fact that, contrary to what is generally believed, the hold of foreign capital and enterprise on Catalonia is much bigger than on Castile, the Basque country or Andalusia, and, what is more significant still, that there are more Basque and Castilian enterprises in Catalonia than Catalan enterprises in Castile or the Basque country. While on this matter of the comparative progressiveness of the Catalan and the other Spanish types, it may be as well to point out that Catalonia is not at the head of Spain in education. In the list of provinces drawn up according to the number of inhabitants who can read and write, the first is so typically Castilian a country as Santander; the second, a Basque country, Alava; the third, Madrid; the fourth, no less Castilian a province than Palencia (notorious, by the way, as one of the provinces in which political bosses are all-powerful in electioneer-

ing); the fifth, another Castilian province, Burgos; the sixth, Segovia, also typically Castilian; the seventh, a Basque province, Guipúzcoa; the eighth, another Basque province, Vizcaya; and we meet with the first Catalan province, Barcelona, in the ninth place on the list; the other three Catalan provinces are seventeenth (Gerona), twenty-first (Lérida), and twenty-second (Tarragona). It cannot be argued that Catalonia is not free to develop her education as she wishes, because the matter of primary education is entirely regulated by municipal law, and the municipalities in Catalonia are as free as those of the remainder of Spain to develop their educational policy as they wish.

It seems clear, therefore, that no *substantial* difference singles out the variety of Spaniard to be found in the north-east of the Peninsula. We discern, of course, in him the dispersive element which is characteristic of the individualistic type. It is most noticeable in Catalan life as between persons. It constitutes the mainspring of the Catalan movement itself, when, transferred to the group, it gives rise to Catalanism from its regionalistic to its nationalistic forms. Separateness, a strong consciousness of the distinctive and differentiated existence of the self, is the truly Spanish tendency which we find in Catalanism. And thus we are led to the paradoxical yet inescapable conclusion that the purest types of "Spanishhood" to be found in Catalonia are precisely those who, going to the extreme end of the tendency, deny that they are Spaniards at all and dream of Catalonia as a separate independent nation.

We may test some of these conclusions by consulting our Catalan friends themselves. Señor Rovira y Virgili is the undisputed theoretician of Catalan nationalism. It would be difficult to find in the whole

Peninsula a more Spanish type than this man who sincerely believes he is not a Spaniard at all. A Spaniard in his qualities, his almost Puritan disinterestedness in the service of ideas (i.e., his Quixotic love of his Dulcinea), his uncompromising faith, his extreme views, his intellectual honesty; a Spaniard in his defects also, in that way of thinking which alters the shape of facts under the heat of intellectual passion, in the lack of political sense, the inability to see any incoherence in his reasoning, the " eruption " of disconnected ideas as from a volcano. Señor Rovira y Virgili is explaining how the Catalans, under the Crown of Aragón, felt foreign to the Aragonese, in order to draw the conclusion that Catalonia was already a nation with a strong national consciousness. He forgets that exactly the same feeling prevailed between Leonese and Castilians, nay, a keener feeling still, for, after all, Aragón and Catalonia never came to blows, while the rivalry between León and Castile caused much bloodshed. That the Catalans felt the Aragonese to be strangers, that they even felt a national consciousness in that period, proves, therefore, absolutely nothing. What does prove something is the historical detail which Señor Rovira y Virgili enlists in his service: " James I, for example, says in his chronicle that the Castilians *son de molta ufana e erguylloses* (are proud and haughty people)." And in the same work, describing one of the nineteenth-century theoreticians of the movement, our author says: " Almirall was an all-round Catalan, a Catalan on his four sides, a *catalanísimo* spirit. His temperament, his virtues, his very defects are those of our people. He is a magnificent paragon of our race. He was, above all, rich in that sense of dignity, in that haughtiness (*orgullo*), if you prefer, which is the marrow of the Catalan character." We would

point out not only the obvious conclusion from the two texts, i.e., that the feature which Señor Rovira y Virgili considers as characteristic of the Catalans is that which struck King Jaime in the Castilians; but also, what is still more telling, the profoundly Spanish character of the style and of the mental attitude of Señor Rovira y Virgili as revealed in this quotation. That attitude of haughtiness and defiance which swells it—and all the page from which it is taken—is at the core of the problem on both sides, tragically preventing unity of thought precisely because of the underlying unity of temperament. Let us give yet another example, if only because it enriches the discussion of the subject itself. The ambition of the Catalanists is to round off "Greater Catalonia" by including in it Valencia and the Balearic Islands. But so Spanish is the Catalan race that Catalonia, as a centre of unity, meets in Valencia with the same centrifugal force wherewith Castile meets in Catalonia. The Valencians do not want to hear any "Greater Catalonia" nonsense. Just as a few silly Castilians claim that Catalan is but a dialect of Spanish, a few Catalans claim, on better grounds, that Valencian is a dialect of Castilian. This, however, Valencia stoutly denies. The librarian of the University of Valencia said to Mr. J. B. Trend (in Castilian, of course): "It is as grave a heresy to Catalanise Valencian as to Castilianise it." Note the word *heresy*. And a young Valencian writer, Señor Durán, who endeavoured to espouse the Catalanist cause in Valencia had to leave his country and settle in Barcelona "in view of the hostility of his countrymen," says Señor Rovira y Virgili himself, too blind, however, to see the strong Spanish spirit which pervades all these facts.

Naturally enough, similar conditions prevail on the other side, i.e., on the Castilian side. The bulk of the

nation feels the Catalan problem obscurely, but the two old kingdoms of Castile and Aragón feel it definitely. Historical factors will be considered later, but we may anticipate here that Aragón and Castile were the two stages in the process by which Catalonia was absorbed into a higher, i.e., a more universal nationhood. Castile, in particular, has within her a conception of "imperium" not unlike that of old Rome, nearer, perhaps, to the Roman genius in this respect than anything Europe has produced with the single exception of Great Britain. The psychological situation thus developed may be compared to a kind of tug-of-war. Catalonia pulls away from the group; Castile pulls towards the group in order to hold her in. And as there is much temperament on both sides, this pulling goes on accompanied with a good deal of recrimination.

Generally speaking, there is more mind in Catalonia and more will in Castile. The fertile and subtle wits of the Mediterranean break their successive frothy waves against the cliffs of the stubborn Tableland. The somewhat stolid and steady Castilian looks upon the brilliant Easterner with very much the same dogged-puzzled-suspicious determination wherewith the Englishman meets the onslaughts of an over-clever Frenchman. But the Catalan is no more a Frenchman than the Castilian is an Englishman, and temperament makes him now rise into fury, now sink into pessimism, now let himself go to a kind of quiescent and brooding patience. At bottom the difficulty comes, not from lack of common ground—for theoretically it exists—but from lack of mutual confidence; the Catalan mistrusts the Castilian's sense of imperium and is convinced of the Castilian's inability to understand freedom; while the Castilian suspects that the Catalan is essentially unco-operative and

dispersive, and that therefore he will use whatever freedom is granted him to break up that national unity which Castile built up by centuries of hard work, enlightened now and then by fits of statesmanship. Conflicts of confidence can only be cured by time. The objective solution towards which time can work, and probably is working, must be inspired by that formula, somewhat obvious in appearance yet significant if every word in it be granted its full meaning: the Catalan is a Spaniard who lives on the shores of the Mediterranean.

CHAPTER XVII

THE CATALAN QUESTION

II. The Historical Background

History is a common meadow where everyone can make hay, says a Spanish dictum. The history of Catalonia is no exception to the rule. Yet here it must be owned the Catalanist hay is more strongly flavoured than the Castilian, for "Castilian" historians, including the Catalans and even some Portuguese (such as Melo), who wrote histories of Spain, never saw that there was anything to prove or disprove by history, and the achievements of Catalonia were never minimised or passed over by them, for the simple reason that they naturally considered them as their own. Not so with those amongst Catalans who have been led by their apostolate to use history on behalf of the Catalanist cause. No serious progress can be made in the Catalan question without a sound historical approach. We hold that even the sympathetic approach of most Castilian historians is not satisfactory, for Catalanists are entitled to miss in it a sufficient (subconscious) recognition of the distinctive national spirit of the Catalan nation. What is required is an outlook which, while avoiding the quiet subconscious absorption of Catalonia by Castilian history, should also keep its head above the clouds of passion which have obscured the most obvious facts in the eyes of extreme Catalanists.

Catalonia does not seem to emerge clearly from the mass of Spain with any definite outline of her own, either under the Roman Empire or during the Visigothic period. Her destinies differed in nothing from those of wide districts of Spain. Under the Romans she belongs to the Tarraconensis, a province the capital of which was Tarragona, now that of one of the provinces of Catalonia; but this important Roman province included not merely the present Catalonia, but a considerable proportion of non-Catalan Spain, which varied from time to time; while Valencia never belonged to this Roman province, being part of the Carthaginensis. This period has left many traces, not the least of which is the wealth of Roman remains found in Tarragona and far from fully explored yet. Some Catalan authors have endeavoured to take the Roman connection as a basis for special claims to a superior Latinity. Such claims would not appear to amount to much. In the turbulent period of the Visigoths the Catalan region does not differ in any way from the rest of Spain. Catalonia, as a word, begins in the twelfth century. When, towards the end of the eighth century, the Moors invade the Peninsula, Catalonia falls to them. But, as in the case of Asturias and Navarra, she soon became one of the centres of Christian recovery, with this notable difference, that having on her Pyrenees several fairly easy ways of access from France, the Christian recovery in Catalonia begins under French stimulation. After an unsuccessful attempt by Charlemagne in 785, Louis le Débonnaire took Barcelona in 801 and made it the chief town of a Mark which, be it noted, was styled the Spanish Mark without the slightest regard for the feelings of present-day Separatists. In 809 the earl in charge of the Mark, Wilfred, rebelled against the French king

and Catalonia started on her historical career as an independent unit.

She became, that is, one of the small independent units through which the national spirit of Spain was emerging from the Moorish invasion, even as submerged land reappears here and there as seemingly separated islands when the waters begin to recede. There was, properly speaking, no Catalonia then. There was a congeries of counties, i.e., districts under the sway of counts or earls, the most powerful of whom was the Count of Barcelona, for he held a city of ancient foundation (it had been founded by Hamilcar Barca, the Carthaginese general) and rich in the arts of industry and commerce. Gradually the Count of Barcelona absorbed the other countries of the land, mostly by marriage and inheritance. Still he remained Count of Barcelona, even when his sway extended over practically the whole of what is now known as Catalonia and over extensive lands in what is now known as France. With Ramón Berenguer I (1035–1076) the true history of Catalonia may be said to begin. In actual fact Catalonia was not conscious of her name and existence till much later, but the count was a statesmanlike prince and he endeavoured to develop unity through order by bringing the customs of the country into some kind of expressed form. This was the origin of the famous *Usatges*, or usages, a systematic codification of feudal customs. The *Usatges* codified and legislated also on political questions, such as the duties and rights of the Count of Barcelona and the obligation laid on every man of lending military defence in case of danger; on civil matters, such as the protection of strangers; on matters of penal law and of procedure.

This time saw, also, the development of a seafaring

activity which was to make the Catalans familiar figures in the whole of the Mediterranean Sea, eastern as well as western. The successors of Ramón Berenguer I, his twin sons Ramón Berenguer II and Berenguer Ramón II, must be mentioned, if only because they were brought into close relationship with Castile in ways which deserve to be noticed. They inherited the country *pro indiviso*, but soon decided to divide it, a provision by which Ramón Berenguer II, a brave, though kindly and well-disposed person, failed to appease the jealousy and ambition of his brother, so that when he was murdered public opinion had strong suspicions of a fratricide. This did not prevent Berenguer Ramón from remaining the sole possessor of the Crown. His dealings with the Moorish kings who surrounded his estate and held many of the lands of what is now Catalonia, brought him into conflict with *El Cid*, that noble and picturesque hero of the Castilian Middle Ages who enters history through the decorative gates of literary epic. The Cid, exiled by the king of Castile, Alfonso VI (for the habit of exiling good citizens is an early one with Spanish kings), lived the life of a free-lance magnate, conquering Spain from the Moors by means of that curious technique, a combination of raiding, settling, warring and establishing protectorates over weak Moslem princes, which is only now beginning to be fully understood, thanks to the unrivalled scholarship of Señor Menéndez Pidal. In the course of their respective operations, the Cid and Berenguer Ramón came to blows and the Catalan Count had the worst of the fight, being made a prisoner and then left free with that mixture of political shrewdness and personal generosity which the contemporary poet saw, and historians confirm in the Castilian hero. Moreover, the Cid, as the

mediæval poet makes him say in truly magnificent words :

> "Contra la mar salada conpezó de guerrear
> A oriente exe el sol e tornós a esa part."

(Towards the salty sea he began to carry war; in the orient rises the sun and he turned towards that part.) Castile, represented by her free-lance, conquered Valencia from the Moors. The king of Castile, Alfonso VI, had been her *de facto* ruler for years through one of his lieutenants whose name is often met with in the *Poema del Cid*—Alfar Hañez. It will be seen how Castile in her all-embracing policy did not neglect the eastern borders. Alfonso VI was active in all the directions of the compass and his efforts were to be seen also towards Aragón, in his time still under the Moorish occupation. Valencia was held by the Cid, and later by his widow, till 1109, when she fell to the Moors again. It was not till 1156 that the kings of Castile and Aragón, Alfonso VII and Ramón Berenguer IV, agreed that the conquest of Valencia should be left to the Crown of Aragón—an agreement which did not prevent St. Ferdinand (of Castile) from accepting the homage of vassalage from the Moorish king of Valencia in 1225. This contradiction may be merely superficial, for from the times of Ferdinand I (father of Alfonso VI) the king of Castile claimed a kind of sovereignty over all the princes, Christian or Moslem, of the Peninsula, the traditional motive power for which came from the Visigothic Crown through the Crown of León. This interesting point is made abundantly clear in Señor Menéndez Pidal's book on the Cid, for Alfonso VI, the Cid's sovereign, paid particular attention to it, styling himself Emperor, *Constitutus Imperator Super Omnes Hispanie Nationes.* The other Spanish princes acknowledged this claim

and—to come back to our Count of Barcelona—it is significant that, when the followers of his murdered brother challenged Count Berenguer Ramón II to a judicial duel, they did so before the king of Castile, Alfonso VI. For anyone aware of the close relationship which existed then in Spain between duelling and the judicial authority of the king—a kind of "umpire-ship" in an actual duel of words, arguments or arms—this fact could not be more telling, and it explains other events of equal import which occurred later.

With Ramón Berenguer III the Great and Ramón Berenguer IV, Catalonia became an important Mediterranean power, maybe the most important, and spread considerably beyond the Pyrenees. The Count of Barcelona felt that order at sea as well as on land was necessary for the prosperity of his country, and the Mediterranean was then infested with Norman and Saracen pirates. Ramón Berenguer III was active at sea, and tried, though without success, to settle in the Balearic Islands. His successor, Ramón Berenguer IV, followed the same policy.

Meanwhile, by the joint efforts of the kings of Navarre and of Castile, a new centre of Christian expansion had been set up in Aragón. The Crown of Aragón was then on a head unwilling to wear it. Ramiro II had been taken out of the monastery in order to reign. He came, married, had a daughter, married her to Ramón Berenguer IV of Barcelona at the early age of two, and went back to his monastery, leaving the Crown in the hands of his Catalan son-in-law, who took the title of Prince and Dominator of Aragón. But at his death (1162) Ramón V, his son, became king of Aragón under the name of Alfonso II (I of Catalonia). This is the moment when Catalonia becomes Aragón. It is but natural that Catalan

historians should deplore the change in name. "Catalonia and Aragón now united under the government of the same monarchs," says a contemporary Catalan historian, "maintained their complete autonomy. For Aragón the union with Catalonia was advantageous; it meant the advent of her name to cosmopolitan and imperialistic life. On the other hand, for Catalonia the union with Aragón meant a constant fight against the Aragonese tendencies inimical to all Mediterranean expansion, particularistic and inclined to privilege, as well as the possibility of union with Castile. It meant also through a mere superiority in hierarchy [i.e., the superiority of the title of King over the title of Count] the disappearance of the name of Catalonia from international politics under the name of Aragón, i.e., the disappearance of the name of the principality under the name of the Kingdom." But is that all? Was it a mere reason of verbal hierarchy that made the Count of Barcelona become King of Aragón? We believe that this matter should be treated with a keener sense of the value of words at the time when they were used. Some hot-headed Catalanists—not certainly the historian quoted—insist on the fact that Catalonia comes first as being the real driving force in the federation. But the point is that though Catalonia was the driving force in the federation, though till 1410 the Kings of Aragón felt at least as much Catalan as Aragonese and probably more, they were known as Kings of Aragón; their house was no longer the house of Barcelona (they never were the house of Catalonia), and when in later years the Sicilian, Roger de Lauria, declared (in Catalan) that "the fishes [in the Mediterranean] would not dare to appear above water unless they could show on their backs the bars of Aragón," he plainly showed

that, for the Catalans of the time, Catalonia had been absorbed in Aragón, for the bars were the arms of the house of Barcelona.

What had happened? A thing both very simple and very complex. The Count had naturally changed his name on becoming King. Catalonia did not exist as a name. He was Count of Barcelona. As the nation which a count or king ruled was not at the time clearly distinguished from the private estate which he owned, Barcelona became "Aragón" as a matter of course. So far it is quite simple. But there are subtler forces at play. The more we hear of the power, the civilising and organising force, the leadership, the expansion of Barcelona, as compared with the poor Aragonese, who do not come out of Catalanist hands under a very flattering light, the more we must suspect the existence of strangely powerful influences which, robbing Catalonia of all the glory and the fame of the events of which she was the main inspirer, handed them to Aragón. The Count who became King was also a Ramón who became Alfonso, that is to say a prince who dropped a Catalan name in order to adopt an Aragonese name recently borrowed by Aragón from León and Castile. The Catalan dynasty linked itself up with the very centre of the Castilian dynasty in this choice of the typically central patronymic. True, the change and choice were due to Petronila, mother of the child-king, but the queen was far from all-powerful, for under the nominal supervision of the king's tutor, Henry II of England, the real control of affairs was in the hands of typical Catalans, Guillém Ramón de Montcada and Guillém de Torroja, Bishop of Barcelona. How would such men have allowed the change had it not been in the spirit of the times?

We are, in fact, in the presence of the inherent unity

of Spain, drawing all the Spanish nations like a magnet towards the predestined centre—Castile. The phenomena which pass before our eyes are symmetrical in their movement towards the centre: Asturias→León→Castile and Catalonia→Aragón→Castile. Under the turbulence and disorganisation of the Middle Ages, though broken up into a regular jig-saw puzzle of petty princedoms, the old unified Spain of Roman and of late Visigothic times was acting on history with the magnetic fascination of a historical fate. In fact, the history of the late Middle Ages, during which a unified Spain emerges from the oriental jig-saw puzzle of the Moorish invasion, is but a repetition of the history of the late barbarian period during which a unified Visigothic and Christian Spain emerges from the occidental jig-saw puzzle of the Germanic invasion.

The merging of Catalonia into Aragón is thus but another case of a well-known phenomenon of Spanish life. Asturias and Galicia merge separately into León. León, though the true heir of Visigothic unity, after a long epoch of antagonism against Castile merges with the Castilian Crown. But, though this Castilian Crown was only that of the latest newcomer, an upstart, a mere Count who had rebelled against León, just as the Count of Barcelona had rebelled against the king of France, an even more modern Count than that of Barcelona and, moreover, poor, the coloniser of a deserted land, without a sea, without a navy, without foreign prestige, without money, *it was León, the Visigothic, the aristocratic, the rich and refined León that merged into Castile and not Castile into León; just as it was the richer, the international, the maritime, the commercial and civilised Catalonia that merged into Aragón and not Aragón into Catalonia.* For this

Castilian upstart had before him the prospect, soon to be realised, of conquering Toledo, the imperial city, the centre of mediæval civilisation, the depository of Visigothic tradition, the symbol of Spanish continuity and unity. So, just as Galicia and Asturias merged with León and then all of them with Castile, so Catalonia and Valencia merged separately with Aragón, thence with that Greater Castile which was to be Spain.[1]

The problem is, therefore, not one of mere puerile hierarchy as between count and king. The real inner reason of the events which puzzle and sadden some Catalan historians is to be found in the magnetic effect of the centre of the Peninsula, creating a hierarchy far more important than that of count and king, a hierarchy ascending towards the centre and which, in a process of unswerving directness, was to culminate in a centralised empire with a capital in Madrid.

Catalonia then enters a phase of her history, in which she acts as the leading member of a bi-lingual confederation with Aragón. Being on the sea-board, used to foreign enterprises, she was bound to have wider views than the Kingdom proper, recently re-conquered from the Moors and still busy with its internal reconstruction which, as in every other part of Spain or, for that matter, of Europe, took the form of a struggle between the Crown and the more hot-headed and powerful nobles. Yet the situation is apt to be exaggerated as in the passage

[1] I am supported in these views by a penetrating remark of Señor Menéndez Pidal. Just as in France, the North, the country of custom law, gave the language and the centre of unity to the nation, imposing them on the South, the country of written law, so in Spain, Castile, the country of custom law imposed its language and unity to the countries of written law—Catalonia and León (*La España del Cid*).

quoted above. That the Aragonese nobility were a thorn in the flesh of the monarchs and did not always understand what they were after is the truth, but not the whole truth, for incomprehension was not limited to the Aragonese; it was a pure matter of feudal indiscipline, independent of nationality, and the kings of Aragón had at times as much trouble with the Catalans as with the Aragonese. The great James I was much hampered in his enterprises by combinations of Catalan and Aragonese magnates. Here, again, a hasty or a biased interpretation of a general fact has sometimes been used to justify *a posteriori* the features of separateness and progressiveness which some modern Catalans want to emphasise in Catalonia. This period, from the reign of Alfonso II till the death of Martin I in 1410, is that in which the star of Catalonia shines brightest. The Kingdom produces a series of active, efficient, and at times admirable kings. Their policy had been outlined in the main by the Counts of Barcelona and by the kings of Aragón. It had three possibilities: France, and in particular the Catalan-speaking lands thereof; the Peninsula; the sea. Much energy was wasted in France, where Peter I took up the cause of the Albi heretics against the French armies of Simon de Montfort. But the Spanish king lost the battle of Muret and his life, and his successor, James the Conqueror, proved his wisdom by giving up his claims to French territory in exchange for a similar self-denial on the part of the French king over Spanish territory. This act of obvious good sense is deplored by some Catalanist enthusiasts who still cast melancholy eyes on the philological map of Catalonia.

The peninsular policy of the kings of Aragón was unimpeachable. They co-operated bravely and

loyally in freeing Spain from the Moors. Peter I, in alliance with the kings of Castile and Navarre, was present at the battle of Las Navas de Tolosa (1212) with a strong contingent of Catalan and Aragonese knights. James the Conqueror took the Balearic Islands, then conquered Murcia, farther south, but, in fulfilment of the pledges of his House towards Castile, he handed over his Murcian conquests to the Castilian king, Alfonso the Sage, his son-in-law. The great king of Aragón showed thereby that prudence which, in strong men, is the crown of courage. It was a typical virtue with him, as revealed in a curious episode of his career worth recording, for it illustrates the drive inward of the eastern Spanish monarchy. James had seen the king of Navarre, Sancho, in 1231. As a result of this interview, both monarchs had made wills declaring each other heirs to their respective kingdoms, an obvious move towards extending the domains of the Crown of Aragón in a north-westerly direction, for Sancho was well advanced in years. But, at Sancho's death in 1234, the Navarrese refused to accept a "foreign" king and James wisely refrained from pressing his claims. By his expedition to and conquest of the Balearic Islands, James put the sea policy of the Catalan-Aragonese federation on a solid basis. He laid the foundations of further enterprises by marrying his son Peter to the daughter of the king of Sicily. Peter the Great, the maritime king, conquered Corsica, Sardinia, Sicily and the coast of Africa. Under his son, Jaime II, a host of Catalans and Aragonese commanded by Roger de Lauria, who were at a loose end in Sicily, were sent to the rescue of the emperor of Constantinople, and having settled in the Greek Peninsula they founded the Duchy of Athens (1326–88), a curious offshoot of Catalan

civilisation which lasted for a considerable time until it gradually disintegrated through strife and civil war.

Barcelona had by then become a rival to Genoa and Venice in trade and shipping. The Aragonese fleet was a prominent factor in the fight against piracy and in the colonisation and trade of the Mediterranean shores. Led by their juristic sense, of which they had given an early proof in the *Usatges*, the Catalans produced, under Jaime I, the famous *Lleys del Consulat de Mar*, the first code of maritime law attempted by Europe and one which was to regulate sea life for a long time amongst seafaring nations. Cultural life was made illustrious by such lights as Francesc Eximeniç, Arnau de Vilanova and, above all, Ramón Lull (1235–1315), the Majorcan mystic, a link between Eastern and Western civilisations, whose picturesque life, from his birth in Majorca to his martyrdom in Tunis, stoned to death by a fanatical Moslem crowd, is so Mediterranean. To that great period which saw the expansion of Catalonia and Aragón the eyes of contemporary Catalans are turned with love and admiration; and to the date 1410 with a sense of regret deeper even than that which seizes them when recalling how the counts of Barcelona became kings of Aragón.

For in that year Martin I died without succession and the Catalan dynasty of the kings of Aragón became extinct. The three Cortes of the three nations (Aragón, Catalonia, Valencia) sent delegates to Caspe in order to find a way out. The Catalans preferred James of Urgel, a Catalan candidate; the Aragonese preferred Ferdinand of Antequera, the Infant-Regent of Castile. The Valencians were divided. The influence of an eminent representative of Valencia, Father Vincent Ferrer (since canonised by the Church) turned the scales in favour of the

Castilian prince. Catalonia acquiesced, and the revolt of the evicted candidate was easily put down by Ferdinand. He had, however, to learn that Catalonia had by then become a genuinely democratic country. Having refused to pay the tax called *Vectigal* which a Barcelonese custom imposed on king and all, the Barcelona Council sent him a delegate to insist on the city rights. The king, with much mortification of his Castilian pride, surrendered.

The reign of his successor, Alfonso V, was spent almost entirely in Naples, which he had conquered in faithful continuation of the old Catalan policy of expansion in Italy and of rivalry between the Pope and the House of Aragón. In 1447 he further enlarged his Italian territories by his inheritance of the Duchy of Milan. The king of Aragón became thus the most important potentate in Italy. On his death, however, he gave Naples to his natural son Ferdinand, and his Spanish crowns, together with the Italian islands, to his brother John, king of Navarre. A conflict between John of Navarre and his son Don Carlos, prince of Viana, degenerated into a civil war in which Catalonia, Aragón and Navarre took part, and Catalonia in particular as a hot partisan of Don Carlos. An agreement made in Villafranca between the Catalans and the king, stipulated that Don Carlos should be his heir (for the king had disinherited him), and that meanwhile, he would be sole governor of Catalonia, even during his father's lifetime. Soon afterwards Don Carlos died and the *Diputació* of Barcelona entered the path of open rebellion. This story is not found in some of the most extreme Catalanist books, perhaps because the Catalans, when, in the ardour of civil war, they sought whom they should elect as Count of Barcelona, landed on Henry IV of Castile without the slightest regard for the pet theories of

twentieth-century Catalanists. It is true that after their offer to Castile they made other offers further afield in the Peninsula and outside it, but the incident is typical of the fact which underlies all Catalan history, namely that the particularist tendency of Catalonia was not due to a sense of national separate existence, but was merely a Catalan psychological feature which exerted itself somewhat blindly by tearing away from the nearest link, then represented by the king of Aragón and Navarre. The present *a posteriori* explanations of Catalan nationalists, if true, would make the offer of the Crown of Barcelona to the king of Castile unthinkable. After years of wasteful war between the old king and Catalonia a compromise was patched up. The king died in 1479. His son, heir to Navarre, Aragón, Valencia, Catalonia, the Balearic and the Italian Islands, was already king of Castile by his marriage with Isabel. The unity of Spain was at last achieved.

Thus ended the period of Catalan history in which the Catalan-Aragonese confederation is ruled by a dynasty of Castilian kings. Catalonia, if the Catalan nationalistic theory of our present day has any meaning, should then have shown signs of decadence, being governed by kings foreign to her spirit and unable to understand her. And yet this is the period which saw Catalan literature and civilisation at its highest. The University of Lérida dated from the preceding era (1300), but that of Valencia was founded in 1441 and that of Barcelona in 1450. Catalonia, or more exactly Valencia, gave then the greatest poet of the language, Auzias March (1397–1459); her great prose writer, Roiç de Corella (1430–1500); she (or again more exactly Valencia), produced the romance of chivalry, *Tirant lo Blanch*, known because Cervantes praised it; Bernat Metge, the quiet, smiling philosopher of

Lo Sompní ; Dalmau, the great painter. The epoch is unmistakably one of literary and artistic liveliness, if not of actual splendour (to which, in the letters and arts, Catalonia never attained in a degree comparable with Castile and the other leading European nations). Yet the present-day Catalan authors who speak of decadence are not altogether wrong. The Castilian language penetrated then into Catalonia, not through legislation, but by the sheer force of Castilian culture and because the virtues inherent in it were beginning to make themselves felt. Before Boscán, the Catalan poets of the court of Alfonso V in Naples wrote in Castilian. Not very much later, Castilian was to be the language of Luis Vives, the great Valencian philosopher who, with Erasmus and Bude, leads the renaissance of thought in Europe.

With Ferdinand of Aragón, Catalonia enters the wider unity of Spain. There is, of course, " a difference " in this unity. The fact that Castile does not allow Catalonia to trade with the newly-discovered Indies has often been quoted. But it has not always been adequately interpreted. The exclusion was not without plausible causes, such as the fear of increased danger for the Spanish fleets if passing into the Mediterranean, then infested by pirates. The exclusion, moreover, was not a discrimination against Catalonia only. It applied to all the subjects of the Crown of Aragón. It is but a reminder that the same Ferdinand and Isabel who made the union were, of course, monarchs of an un-united Spain. This distinction between the Spaniards who discovered America and those who did not is the last which preserves the old grouping between the lands of the Crown of Aragón on the one hand, and those of Castile on the other. Spain is to remain for centuries a congeries of separate kingdoms, but the kingdoms

of Valencia, Aragón and Catalonia will henceforth be considered as individually attached to the Crown not through the subentity of the Aragonese federation, but direct, without any intermediate link.

What had occurred? Simply that a people with the gift of unity and of "imperium" had absorbed into a higher unity a group of three peoples, Catalonia, Valencia, Aragón, which, despite a long personal union, had failed to amalgamate constitutionally.

There follows a period in which Spain, as a whole, ascends to the summit of world power while the county of Catalonia sees her mediæval prosperity on the wane. The coincidence of these two movements is not merely casual. Certain facts are obvious: the above-mentioned prohibition to trade with the Indies is one. But need this have stopped Catalan prosperity? The Spanish monarchy forbade the Indies no less severely to trade with Flanders and France, yet both these countries minted money through the discovery of America, not merely by illicit means, but by skilfully adapting themselves to the situation. It is, perhaps, more objectively true to say that the discovery of America disorganised the old economy of the Mediterranean on which Catalan life was founded, and that Barcelona suffered thereby along with other Mediterranean ports.

But the main point, though one which is generally overlooked, is that the Catalan nation failed to realise the immense opportunities which lay in a partnership with the greatest empire which history had known. Here was the age of navigation, and the Catalans were great navigators. Here was the age of trade, and they were the best traders of Spain. Here was the great age of world politics, and—where were their statesmen?

For Spain, after all, was not governed by the king,

even under Charles V or Philip II. Spain was governed by men, ecclesiastics and lawyers for the most part, and some soldiers and grandees. Two of the most powerful secretaries of Philip II, Gonzalo Pérez and his son, Antonio Pérez, were Aragonese. If Aragonese could rise to the government of the empire, why not Catalans? If the Catalans were then what some Catalanists claim them to be now, the most forward, enlightened and European part of the Peninsula, why did they not try to "run" the immense empire instead of watching hopelessly the decadence of their old prosperity? The position would then have been similar to that of Scotland: first, an independent nation, at least as independent and historically important as Catalonia, then, after the Union, a most powerful leaven in the British Empire and a mother of omnipresent statesmen and leaders of industry. It is true that Catalonia resisted all attempts of the Crown to interfere with her liberties, be it said with the reservations which we shall have to make presently. Both Philip II and Philip III showed a wise restraint in their attempts at extending Castilian institutions to Catalonia. Philip IV, ill advised by his minister, Olivares, brought about a rebellion during which the typical tendencies of Catalan separatism were observable. This rebellion was caused by general dissatisfaction owing to a number of things: taxes; the presence of non-Catalan troops on their way to foreign campaigns and their misbehaviour while in Catalonia; the appointment of non-Catalans to Catalan posts; French intrigues with an eye on the recovery of Roussillon; the overbearing manner of Olivares, apt to be centralistic and "short" with Catalanist tendencies; last, but not least, the fear of the bigoted Catalan peasants lest so many foreign troops should

corrupt their faith. The rebellion started in 1640 with cries of "*Visca la Iglesia ; Visca'l Rey y muyra lo mal govern.*" The Church and the king were the banners of these "rebellious" Catalans. The king sent a Catalan viceroy, the Duke of Cardona, to undo the evil caused by an inconsiderate Castilian viceroy. But the Barcelona authorities had had dealings with Richelieu, and while Olivares was secretly thinking of abolishing Catalan home rule Barcelona was hankering back to the republican idea, i.e., thinking in terms of Italian mediævalism, while Olivares was thinking in terms of nineteenth-century nationhood. Two historical currents fought in this way and the hard fact which dominates the life of Catalonia, i.e., that she must be Spanish or become French, led the Barcelona authorities to recognise the sovereignty of Louis XIII. The war was long and wasteful. It lasted till 1652, not to count several further years during which troubles remained more or less endemic. Philip IV, however, though victorious, did not abolish the liberties of Catalonia.

The true crisis in the liberty of Catalonia came later. The rebellion under Philip IV was on a par with other movements which occurred in other parts of Spain : Aragón, where a conspiracy attempted to erect a separate kingdom under the Duke of Hijar; Andalusia, in which the Duke of Medina Sidonia tried to carve a kingdom for himself while his ally, the Marqués de Ayamonte, worked for a separate republic; the Basque Country, which rebelled in defence of the *fueros*. The rebellion at the end of the eighteenth century presents more typically Catalan features. Catalonia, or rather Barcelona, intervenes in the War of the Spanish Succession with a policy of her own and widens the sphere of her international efforts, seeking again an independent republican

status. Catalonia had been the staunchest Peninsular supporter of the Archduke against Philip of Anjou, and was gradually, though reluctantly, abandoned by the Archduke after he assumed the Imperial Crown. When the liquidation of the War was being discussed in Utrecht, the Catalans hoped that under the pressure of the Emperor and of England respect for their *fueros* would be stipulated in the treaty. Bolingbroke, however, had definite instructions to the effect that the liberty of Catalonia was of no special interest for England, an obvious fact, for Catalonia is on the east of Spain, tucked away in the northern corner of the Mediterranean, while the liberty of Portugal, as we shall see anon, was a different matter altogether, since Portugal is on the Atlantic Sea. Amnesty was all England asked on behalf of the Catalans, arguing—with the matter-of-fact commonsense she was to apply in later years to her own northern neighbours, the Scots—that the Catalans would benefit more by the union and the consequent participation in the commercial privileges of the other Spaniards in America than by maintaining a separate establishment under Spain. The Emperor then asked that Catalonia should be made an independent republic under the protection of the allies and particularly of England (whose genius for chaperoning maiden nations was already beginning to be recognised the world over), but England modestly declined while gallantly offering a fleet to enable the Empress (who as " Queen " of Spain had remained in Barcelona) to evacuate her temporary kingdom with dignity. The treaty signed in March, 1713, in Utrecht, left the matter of Catalan *fueros* untouched, a flaw which two of the Emperor's delegates overlooked, but not the third, who refused to sign. This stickler for Catalan rights was a Castilian nobleman. The general treaties of Utrecht

did no more for the Catalans. In Article 13, Philip V granted them the same privileges which were enjoyed by . . . the Castilians. Catalonia, meanwhile, was occupied by Imperial troops. Starhemberg, the Emperor's "Viceroy," let her down gently and disappeared from the town with as little noise as possible. The Catalans were left to the tender mercies of a French king, born and bred in an absolutism which Spain had never known. The nobles and the churchmen of Barcelona were for compromise; the people voted for war and the nobles came over to their side. This, however, was Barcelona, for Catalonia as a whole was not responsive. The matter of Catalan liberties was again discussed in Rastatt while the Barcelona armies fought against the royal troops. A debate in the English House of Lords discussed the matter in a sense favourable to the Catalans. Philip V, however, was adamant. Barcelona, besieged, surrendered in September, 1714. In the same month several Catalan institutions were suppressed (the Council of the Hundred, the General Deputation); the use of Catalan in the law courts as well as many other privileges of the Catalans disappeared by the Decreto de Nueva Planta in 1710. The Catalan Cortes had already been merged into the Cortes of the realm. All was not vindictiveness in this policy. Philip V and his French advisers were intent on unification on the French pattern, and the liberty of Aragón, Valencia, Galicia and the Basque Provinces had already gone, in so far as these liberties meant differences from the constitution which governed Castile. Catalonia was only tasting the kind of fate which would have been hers had she succeeded in her separatist tendencies, for such a success could only have meant leaving the Spanish pan to fall into the French fire.

The history of Catalonia does not really begin

again till the nineteenth century. It is the history of her renascence, which had better be considered separately.

What, then, is the conclusion of this survey? The claim that Catalonia has a distinctive type within the Peninsular kingdoms is abundantly proved. This type shows itself in enterprise, war, law, commerce, art and literature. Catalonia is a definite national spirit, a culture, a civilisation with characteristics of her own which one can recognise. The claim, however, that such a culture, such a national spirit, such a nation is a "Latin" nation like France and Italy, inherently independent from Spain, a nation whose development was frustrated by her union with Spain, is not, in our opinion, substantiated by historical facts. Historically, as psychologically, our conclusion is that Catalonia is one of the Spanish nations, profoundly linked up by nature and history (as she is by geography and economics) with the other nations of the Peninsula. We found a mediæval State, a city of Barcelona, active and spirited from about 1000 to 1162; a City State comparable with the more enterprising Italian republics and particularly with seafaring Venice, but evidently without a serious claim to compete in historical importance or in creative spirit with the Venetian Republic. It is even arguable whether Catalonia can compare in historical importance with Scotland, Burgundy, or even Savoy. But, even if it were admitted, as indeed it may be, that Catalonia was at one time a nation with a European importance analogous to that of Scotland, Burgundy, Savoy or Venice, the separatist conclusion drawn by some contemporary Catalan historians from that fact would be rendered absurd in the face of the historical

evolution which has obliterated all these one-time typically independent European nations, or, rather, integrated them into higher units which, while absorbing their history, have developed and increased their significance for the history of mankind. We found this State of Barcelona, or Catalonia, following a similar evolution to that of the others we have mentioned; amalgamating first with the kingdom of Aragón, then with Castile, i.e., seeking with a kind of historical instinct, the fulfilment of her Spanish destinies. In the Catalan-Aragonese federation, precisely when known to all the world as Aragón, Catalonia reaches her maximum splendour, no longer a County of Barcelona, but a clearly Spanish nation inseparable from Aragón. It is then, and particularly when governed not by the Catalan but by the Castilian dynasty, that Catalonia reaches the crest of her culture. But of this culture an English scholar says: "His works [Vives'] however, when not in Latin, were written in Castilian, and the works of Lull, Eximèniç, Roïç de Corella and others owed their wide circulation to the Castilian and sometimes French translations in which they were diffused through Europe. Ancient Catalan literature is strictly mediæval. It never adapted itself to the spirit of the renaissance, and remained bound to the old Provençal forms when the current of general taste was leading in a very different direction. Its death was due more to inanition than to political causes, for though Catalonia suffered a loss of prestige in the union with Castile, it only lost national independence in 1714, after the Wars of the Spanish Succession." For Catalonia was a mediæval creation, and, therefore, as a separate entity she died with the Middle Ages. During the period of the Spanish Empire Catalonia remains absorbed despite

the hardships entailed by the discovery of America. The Catalan language, the only specific feature of the region, dies as a language of culture early in the sixteenth century. Catalonia defends her liberties now and then against the King just as did other parts of Spain, but with the added zest of a national consciousness that remembers its tendency towards a republican status. But her culture is Castilian, so is her language.

We observe, therefore, in the history of Catalonia a national consciousness which manifests itself rather in particularistic and negative, than in co-operative and positive, ways. It is but natural that the strong individualism of the Catalans, stronger, as we know, than that of their co-Spaniards, should have manifested itself in the national sphere by making Catalonia self-centred and so to say centrifugal. Her history shows how devoid of any fundamental principle of foreign policy she found herself as soon as she tried to resist the only natural historical law which governs her life. She now sought help in France, now in the Emperor, now even in England. But it was obvious *a priori*, and it was proved by events, that of all these nations France alone was in a position to help her, but not to her advantage—for the help of France meant either the absorption of the whole of Catalonia, or at least the loss of that part which she claims as hers, and which lies north of the Pyrenees. The phase of negative nationalism in Catalonia must be considered, therefore, as a natural outcome of her psychology. We are about to see that her rebirth in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries had still to live down a long phase of negative nationalism before some of her more distinguished sons evolved a political philosophy truly worthy of a nation with such a glorious past and so splendid a future.

CHAPTER XVIII

THE CATALAN QUESTION

III. The Origins of the Present Position

At the beginning of the nineteenth century Catalonia as a national spirit is as good as dead. The language is spoken by illiterate peasants and a kind of corruption of it by the rabble of the towns. The newspapers, which, under the brief French occupation in 1810, were made to appear in Catalan by the French invaders, went back to Castilian in order to be read at all so soon as the French turned tail. The Spanish Government, now under the liberal but dogmatic and centralistic inspiration of the Cortes de Cadiz, now under the absolutist inspiration of the Crown, completed the work left unachieved by Philip V and deprived Catalonia of her forgotten and unused liberties. The nineteenth century resounds to the hammerings of the Government hammer driving nail after nail into the coffin of Catalonia: her penal law went in 1822; her right to use Catalan in schools in 1825; her commercial law in 1829; her special tribunals in 1834; her coinage in 1837; her regional administration in 1845. Down went the hammer on the coffin. The body was well held under the lid—yes, but the spirit was free. And, at that very moment Catalonia was resuscitating.

Obscure efforts date from the end of the previous century. An association had been created for the purpose of speaking Catalan amongst its members.

Other signs here and there appeared to the wary eye. But the theatrical move occurred when, in 1833, a Catalan bank clerk, Aribau, who lived in Madrid, wishing to celebrate the birthday of his employer, also a Catalan, struck the idea of writing an ode to the fatherland in the Catalan language. The poem was published in a Barcelona paper quaintly called *El Vapor*. This progressive paper, as its name showed, and the review *El Europeo*, both, of course, written in Castilian, were the organs of the Catalan romantics, all of whom dreamed of a *renaixença* of Catalan culture, but none of whom, save a scholar, Rubió y Ors, dared believe in the possibility of raising the Catalan language from the gutter. Rubió y Ors did it, however, single-handed. History works in such strange ways that this man who, by giving Catalan a new distinction out of purely intellectual reasons, did more than anyone to set in motion the political rebirth of Catalan nationalism, never took part in the political movement itself, nor is it certain that he approved it. In 1859 the Municipal Council of Barcelona called back to life the old festivity known as the *jochs florals*, or floral games, a kind of poetic tournament in Catalan. A French saying has it that in France everything ends in song. In Catalonia everything begins in a poem, and experience shows that the custom is not so bad after all. The Catalan Press began its career a few years later represented with appropriate modesty by a newspaper with the name of *Un Troç de Paper* (a bit of paper) followed by a literary review, *Lo Gay Saber*. The first attempt at a Catalan theatre dates from the same epoch, with Federico Soler.

The time was ripe for political nationalism to emerge. The first feeling of some kind of local desire for freedom appears in Pi y Margall's federalism. Pi,

who was one of the four presidents whom the Spanish Republic successively tried in one year, held federal opinions of a somewhat theoretical kind. In his idea the extreme variety of regional life in Spain required some form of devolution, and he, as a Catalan, would have been content with such a formula. He conceived political life as a regular hierarchy of covenants between individuals to form the city, between cities to form the region, between regions to form the nation. He organised the Spanish Republican Federal Party. One of his followers, Almirall, laid the foundations of republican Catalanism in his *Lo Catalanisme* (1886), a doctrine which seceded from Pi y Margall's because, according to Almirall, Pi was too theoretical and understood Catalanism not in itself, but merely as one of the by-products of constitutional thinking about Spain. Almirall is thus the creator of what might be described as Left-Wing Catalanism. The eminent Bishop of Vich, Torras y Bages, with his *Tradició Catalana*, became the authority for Catholic or Right-Wing Catalanism. (This symmetry, Republican Left and Clerical Right, is indispensable in Spain. It is the first of a long list of typically Spanish characteristics of Catalanism.)

It will be noticed that Catalanism, born in poetry, was still in the domain of pure intellectualism with Almirall and Torras y Bages. These two authors each in his way tried to define the personality of Catalonia within the framework of Spain. They differ, of course, in that for the one Catalonia means "Progress," free-thinking and democracy, while, for the other, Catalonia means faith, order, and, above all, tradition. So far, however, neither had clearly seen Catalonia as a nation.

This step was to be taken by the master and leader of Catalan nationalism, Enric Prat de la Riba. For

him Catalonia was a nation and not merely a regional form of Spanish life. Prat de la Riba was a noble thinker, and there was in him more statesmanship than in any other leader of Catalan life, with the single exception of his disciple and political heir, the present leader Cambó. Prat saw that the resurrection of a mediæval Catalonia could not take place as if nothing had occurred since 1492; he realised not only that Spain could not be dismembered in order to please a few philologists, but that Catalonia could not revolutionise her whole life in order to adapt herself to a new political conception, however pleasing to the Catalan historical imagination. Prat saw things on a big scale—both as a Catalan and as a Spaniard. His ideal for Catalonia was a federation of all the Catalan-speaking lands, Valencia, the Balearic Islands and Catalonia proper, nor did he always omit the Catalan territories belonging to the French Republic, for there was in him that dash of romantic imagination which is nearly always to be found even in the most practical and hard-headed of Catalans. For Spain, his ideal was an Iberian Federation including Great Catalonia, Castile and Portugal. Prat was the undisputed intellectual leader of Catalonia until his premature death.

This rapid evolution from apparent extinction to vigorous rebirth took place in the realm of thought. The fact is sometimes used as an argument to minimise the *renaixença* by those for whom thought does not matter at all. Certain peculiar defects of Catalan thought, notably a kind of airy tendency to forget the hard bones of reality, lend authority to this short-sighted and cynical view. In our opinion, thought blossoms out of the blood of men and nations and we cannot behold without respect and admiration this wonderful re-creation of a national spirit

achieved by the faith, the devotion and the ability of a handful of men. Coming after pages—perhaps too many—in which the arguments of Catalan political thinkers on the problem have been strictly scrutinised, these words should be read as a spontaneous homage to the substance of the Catalan claim no matter how flimsy some of the arguments, historical and psychological, used on its behalf may be. *In our opinion Catalonia is a nation, if a Spanish nation.* She has a spirit of her own with every title to the full manifestation of her genius and culture and to the full enjoyment of her own life. That she owes her rebirth to but a few of her sons is only a further proof that the national spirit which they called back to life, though dormant, was ready to hover again over the waters of history. We are going to follow its first, somewhat awkward, steps as it tried to descend from the pure heights of idealism to the dismal and troubled spheres of politics.

But, as we approach practical politics, the beautiful order and symmetry of political principles begins to be blurred. The question whether Catalonia is going to live as a nation or not presented itself in Catalonian life as one only of the several problems at issue. A part of Spain in practice, Catalonia felt her life-blood circulating in a body politic which was Spain's, not merely hers. And Catalan politics are governed by at least three movements of almost equal value: the nationalist movement with its antagonistic reaction—centralism—in Castile and also in Catalonia; the labour movement; and the action of economic interests.

We have already made acquaintance with both the labour and the nationalist movements. The matter of economic interests is very complex indeed. Centralistic writers, whether Catalan or Castilian,

have not failed to lay stress on the economic solidarity which binds Catalonia to the Peninsula. This solidarity is obvious and its consequences all important. Much harm, however, has been done to the cause of good understanding between Madrid and Barcelona by presenting it as if the connection were all to the advantage of Catalonia. It is true that the Catalans were the first, and are the most persistent, advocates of that excessive protectionism which prevents Spain from taking full advantage of her excellent economic opportunities and of her high gold reserves. It is also true that, up to a point, Catalan protectionism is devised in order to enable the industry of Catalonia to produce in the uneconomic conditions dictated by excessive Catalan individualism. The claim of some Castilian writers that Spain as a whole has to pay for Catalan individualism and industrial indiscipline by raising her tariffs against cheap foreign goods is not altogether unfounded. But the Catalans can counter it by pointing out that, if they were allowed to get foreign food by sea instead of having to buy expensive Spanish grain and meat transported through the hilliest country in Europe, they would be able to produce cheaper cloth. To which, of course, the Castilian farmer retorts that he cannot produce cheap grain when he has to pay his cloth to the Catalan and his tools to the Basque at perfectly fantastic prices.

Let us turn a French dictum upside-down and sum up by saying that when everybody is right everybody is wrong. The commonsense view is that Spanish economic life is moving in that vicious circle —or rather vicious spiral—into which protection is apt to launch nations if engaged in without due moderation as to time and as to the industries selected for protection. Who began first, the farmer

or the industrialist? Moreover, the matter is not merely one of tariffs. Obsolete machinery, workers reluctant to sacrifice comfort and leisure to gain, defective agrarian laws, unnecessarily harsh employers, a complex knot of circumstances, some acceptable as "qualities," others classifiable as "defects" by ordinary human standards, handicap Spanish production. Hence protection. Political influences added explain over-protection, and then things become too difficult for anyone to apportion the rights and the wrongs. We shall not follow the Castilian school in laying on the Catalans the responsibility for protection, much as Prat de la Riba himself tempts us to do so when he says in his *Nacionalisme*: "The economic point of view [*criteri*] of the Catalans in tariff matters has prevailed [in Spain] for years." We refuse even to accept the view that Catalonia benefits by the situation any more than the rest of Spain. We limit our position to this moderate but indisputable ground: that the economic argument establishes beyond doubt the closest possible solidarity between Catalonia and the rest of Spain.

As for the political side of economics, we would go a little further. It is obvious to any student of Spanish contemporary history that the Catalan sector of Spanish politics has always been particularly alive to tariff matters and that it has nearly always succeeded in carrying the rest of the nation over to its view. The words just quoted from one of the most eminent leaders of Catalonia would suffice to establish the point. Some observers have even suggested that Catalan nationalism has often been ready to barter political demands in exchange for tariff favours. Politics is a strange art, and it would be difficult for Catalans to deny that such things

have ever occurred at all. Indeed, a tinge of regret at their occurrence does now and then appear in the writings of some of the more disinterested intellectual leaders of Catalanism. It would, however, be a profound mistake to jump to the conclusion that the leaders of the Catalan movement were bluffing the Spanish Government with a nationalistic ghost in order to extract economic advantages from a reluctant nation. No. Catalanism is a deep spiritual faith, sincerely held, powerfully felt. And in so far as it is one of the truly profound emotions in Spanish political life it is, we are convinced, one of the few factors which are contributing to the true political rebirth of the whole Peninsula.

The nationalist emotion is therefore cooled down, controlled and made as practical as possible by the Catalan sense of business. It is also complicated by the dualism which afflicts Catalonia, like the rest of Spain, in matters of religious politics. Clericals and anti-Clericals, Catholics and free-thinkers, men of the Right and men of the Left, pessimists and optimists, reactionaries and liberals, men hankering back to absolutism and men yearning for a republic —such is the line of cleavage which cuts across Catalanism as it does every other form of Spanish political life. We know that in the realm of Catalanist theory these two ways of thinking are represented respectively by Bishop Torras y Bages and by Almirall. The cleavage stands for much that is complicated and even obscure in Catalan politics, for such political enmities, simple enough in ordinary public life, become blurred and confused in the presence of a nationalist "previous question" which, by forcing the political world to a kind of sacred union, drives differences underground and makes them dark and distorted. As if further to

complicate matters, the labour movement professed for long to ignore nationalist questions, being interested only in economic and class struggles, while the whole process of Catalanism was dominated by the ferment of individualism, and by a tendency to uncompromising dispersion due to the psychology of the Catalan.

Strictly speaking, the political movement is an offshoot of federalism. The first period of Catalan nationalism is dominated by the figure of Valentí Almirall, whose first newspaper (1869), written in Castilian, was significantly styled *El Estado Catalán.* Thus the movement from its birth revealed its will to be before the very instrument for its being—the language—was entrusted with the duties of political life. But, in 1879, Almirall founded the *Diari Català* and, in 1882, he created the first strong Catalanist institution, the *Centre Català*, professedly a home of Catalanism independently of the political ideas of its members on other subjects. This first attempt to unite Catalans exclusively on the field of their nationalism failed, and the moderate elements of the association (moderate not precisely in Catalanism but in other matters along the Right-Left line) seceded and founded the *Lliga de Catalunya* (1887), and a newspaper, *La Renaixença.* The *Lliga* ultimately was to become the leading organ of Catalanism. The dramatic touch had not been neglected by these Mediterraneans, some of whom, like Guimerá, one of the founders of the *Lliga,* were excellent dramatists. In 1885 Almirall submitted to the king a *Memoria en Defensa de los Intereses Morales y Materiales de Cataluña,* which, typically enough, was prompted by the negotiations then begun towards commercial treaties with France and England and also by the attempts of the Government to standard-

ise civil law in the Peninsula. In 1888 the *Lliga* addressed a message to the queen regent on her visit to the Barcelona Exhibition, when Menéndez y Pelayo, the great Castilian philologist, extolled the beauty and glory of the Catalan language in a speech pronounced before Her Majesty. The movement gathered strength and led to the Assembly of Manresa (1892), in which a programme of Catalan requirements was drafted which became famous in Spanish politics under the name of *Las Bases de Manresa.*

The task of estimating this document is no easy one. It would be unfair to describe it as a reactionary charter, since it aimed at securing the freedom of a whole people to evolve along its own lines. And yet the philosophy which underlies it is not particularly liberal. It is rather that philosophy of nationalism under which the rights and welfare of individuals are apt to be forgotten, or even deliberately sacrificed, for the sake of the rights of the community. The *Bases de Manresa* seek to reorganise Spain on a federal basis which would secure for Catalonia the control of all matters of internal administration, including coinage and the manner in which she would contribute to national defence, while reserving for the Federal Government matters concerning more than one of the several regions or "States," defence, foreign affairs, inter-State communications and customs. The document reflects that "particularism" which, under Almirall, passed from the realm of subconscious character (where we found it), to that of political theory—to the point of excluding non-Catalans from public offices in Catalonia even when such offices depended on the Federal Government. The Assembly of Manresa was followed by those of Reus (1893), Balaguer (1894), Olot (1895), all of which discussed

schemes of action, or theoretical questions bearing on the programme, not in the least troubled by the fact that the application of them was out of the question in the circumstances. This may seem curious to positive and practical minds. Yet the method was, perhaps, instinctively wise, and its value as a process of direct education cannot be disputed.

Two sets of events came to trouble deeply the evolution of Catalanism. The first was the wave of terrorism which plunged Barcelona in chaos between 1892, date of the attempt on the life of Marshal Martínez Campos, and the disorders of Monjuich in 1896. This period was the first of a series of anarchist outbreaks to which Barcelona had been condemned by the peculiar forces acting at the head of, and more often lurking behind, Catalan labour. Simultaneously, Cuban events were going from bad to worse, and it became apparent that Spain was heading towards a catastrophe there. Catalanist opinion was not sympathetic. "Particularism" played a definite rôle in the situation, though, in the responsibility for Spain's failure in Cuba, Catalonia had at least her fair share with the rest of Spain. When the Treaty of Paris closed this chapter of Spanish history, Catalanism received a powerful accession of strength—a typically particularistic one. Let us quote that noble, if narrow-minded, exponent of the doctrine, Señor Rovira y Virgili: "This general movement of protest led towards decentralising and regionalistic points of view a considerable number of elements, particularly from industry and commerce, which in actual fact lacked all Catalanist spirit. This was the cause of the great strength which Catalanism suddenly acquired during the last years of the nineteenth century, and also the cause of the internal weakness of the movement." This movement, curiously enough, coincided

with the first serious attempt on the part of Madrid to meet Catalan aspirations. It was made by a Cabinet presided over by Silvela, but inspired in these matters by a general who, though returned from the Philippine Islands at the head of a defeated army, tried to play the rôle of saviour of Spain, for which he lacked every quality, including mental ability. Castile had been " saved " so often by incapable generals that she did not mind watching in silence, but Catalonia, with that ever-rising optimism of the Mediterranean sun, gave credit to " the Christian soldier," for such was the quaint name which his clerical admirers gave to General Polavieja. Failure came from both sides. Polavieja's programme met with opposition among certain Madrid die-hards, and the Catalans protested against the wise and statesmanlike measures which the minister of finance, Villaverde, adopted in order to save Spain from a difficult financial post-war situation. This example is typical of contemporary Catalan history. Wrongs always on both sides : narrow-mindedness towards Catalan home rule on the part of Madrid and towards sound financial and economic policy on the part of Catalonia.

New leaders arose almost with the new century and, faithful even in this detail to the law of contemporary Spanish events, Catalonia turned the corner of her history towards 1900. In 1901 the two organisations, *Centre Nacional Catalá* (nationalist), and *Unió Regionalista* combined, won a famous victory at the polls. These were soon afterwards amalgamated under the name of *Lliga Regionalista*. Prat de la Riba was the leader of this powerful organism of Catalan nationalism, and it was then that, by his side, there appeared in Catalan politics a precocious political leader and lawyer, Cambó. But the field was not clear. In Catalonia, particularly in Barcelona, there

was a mass of " Left " opinion, radicals, anti-clericals, republicans, for whom these ideas, independently of all nationalism, were more important than the Catalan question. This mass found a leader in Don Alejandro Lerroux, who led them to a remarkable victory in 1903, when the nationalists were beaten. This result was hailed by centralist monarchists as a victory, though their own candidates were also defeated, for the elected deputies were all republicans. Catalanist politicians have always since then suspected Señor Lerroux of being in actual fact an agent of centralistic politics.

From that moment on until the present day the Catalan movement becomes so intimately connected with the other events of the period that separate treatment is impossible. A discussion of its possibilities, its future evolution and the final solution which all well-meaning Spaniards should strive for must be left for a later occasion. This much may, however, be suggested here : that the nineteenth and twentieth centuries in the history of Catalan nationalism show it to be a Spanish, all too Spanish, phenomenon. Why does it appear just then ? Because it is precisely then that all Spain wakes up towards a new sense of nationhood, and it was, therefore, but natural that Catalonia should wake up as Catalonia. The main obstacles in the way to the solution come precisely from the strong Spanish character of the Catalans. Spaniards settled in the Mediterranean, we have found them to be. In recent years they have evolved an abundant crop of doctrines and schools, centres and leagues which melt and dissociate, group and fall out and re-combine kaleidoscopically, at times exalted to a point of " stridency " (to use a now established term in Spanish Catalan politics), at times ready to hear the alluring voice of this or that

ally, Spanish or foreign; while the main thing, the art of persuading and gaining the confidence of the main partner, is sadly neglected. Why? Because of another Spanish feature, the Catalan individualistic sense of dispersion which we have observed in our historical survey and detected in our psychological analysis. As a matter of course, national consciousness implies a sense of difference, but not necessarily a political or constitutional separation. This last tendency, wherewith the majority of Catalanists disagree nowadays, has been unwisely aired by some Catalanists, coupled with a cordial separation, a kind of cutting of the knot of solidarity. The attempts to shake off all responsibility for Cuban affairs, for instance, were misguided both on the score of fact and on that of feeling. A tendency to wound has been too much in evidence in Catalan nationalism. And—need we say it?—it has been admirably reciprocated in Madrid. Nor is it necessary to waste time in the idle discussion as to who began this tiresome process of mutual irritation.

There are other difficulties. The reader will have noticed the predominant position which Barcelona occupies in the history of Catalonia. This, the chief factor in past history, remains the most important in present politics. Catalanism is, above all, a Barcelona affair. It was created in Barcelona, developed there, talked of there, organised there, and it is there it lives. And yet Barcelona is not and can never be wholly Catalan. Her *hinterland* extends far up into the Peninsula. Even if Greater Catalonia were given her to satisfy her political ambitions, Valencia, with the great town of the same name and the harbour of El Grao, will always be a natural rival of Barcelona, needing a *hinterland* of her own. A Catalan republic is an economic impossi-

bility, even if politically it were feasible. Barcelona, then, the main cause of Catalanism, is at the same time the origin of the main forces working for Spanish union. Moreover, Barcelona contains a huge proportion of non-Catalanist inhabitants (both Catalans and non-Catalans), enough at times to put Catalanists in a minority. Thus, despite the remarkable progress made in recent years by the Catalan Press written in Catalan, the biggest newspapers in Barcelona are still printed in Castilian. Last, but not least, experience has shown that labour matters in Barcelona are of so grave a character that, though often mismanaged by the central government, an exclusively Catalan government would probably be too weak to handle some of their more serious aspects.

All these factors combine to render Catalanism a difficult problem. None perhaps more so than that all-or-nothing attitude of the Spaniard as typical of the Catalan as of the Castilian. An admirable case in point is the career of the most statesmanlike political genius which present-day Catalonia and possibly Spain has produced. The difficulties with which Señor Cambó has had to contend in his own country spring from his spirit of compromise, from his readiness to take what the day can give and wait for more to come from the morrow. Such an evidently wise attitude for a political leader has constantly been misinterpreted both in Catalonia and in Castile as an actual moral weakness. Another form of the same difficulty is the sense of hurry, the lack of political patience which afflicts most Catalanists. Having slept for three centuries in the bosom of Spain, they now wake up and want Spain to let go the work of centuries in one generation. Castile is slow, terribly slow. But she is moving. She is moving in many ways, thanks to the fact amongst others

that Catalonia herself has wakened up. And in this observation we may find hope that the Catalan question may still be solved in mutual happiness.

THE BASQUE QUESTION.—The linguistic element is a guiding light in Catalanism; it is a less trustworthy factor in the Basque question. The Basque language is a mystery which has baffled both history and philology. Some similarity has been found between its pronouns and those of Hebrew; between its marvellously complicated verbs and those of certain American-Indian languages, such as the Dakota and the Aztec; its vocabulary is a thing in itself; its numerical system an eclectic combination of the decimal and the vigesimal. The language is receding in Spain more even than in France to the point that in Spain it is not spoken in any of the big towns in the Basco-Navarrese region, which was once its undisputed domain. Of the four provinces, Alava, Biscay, Guipúzcoa and Navarre, the third only has remained entirely faithful to it—with the exception of San Sebastián. It has lost most of Alava, including the capital, Vitoria; the west of Biscay, including Bilbao; the southern half of Navarre, including Pamplona: in France it is not spoken in Bayonne. There is a school which holds that the Basque was originally spoken by the Iberian pre-Roman population of Spain. The idea, first put forward by Humboldt, has been restored to the scientific dignity which it had lost by the authority of that brilliant expert, Dr. Hugo Schuchardt. It seems a natural conclusion to adopt, for, otherwise, it would be very difficult to explain the subsistence of such a philological curiosity in that corner of Europe.

Needless to say, if the Humboldt-Schuchardt theory held the field finally, the claims of Basque extremists would be deprived of their main basis,

which is linguistic. For, unless the linguistic argument starting from a difference of languages leads to a difference in nationality, it has but little use in home rule matters. Now it is evident that if Basque were the general language of Spain before her romanisation, the remnant of it is but a philological curiosity without much historical significance; it merely shows that the Basque-speaking Spaniards were left, somehow or other, out of the romanising process.[1]

All this does not prevent—rather does it explain and determine—the appearance of a dispersive or centrifugal force in the Basque country. The Basques have always watched over their liberties with uncompromising stubbornness. The particularistic tendency, fostered here by the features of a country so difficult of access, mountainous and all knotted up in circumvolutions of narrow valleys, has been kept alive partly by temperament, partly under the influence of the local Church, not in the least anxious for the spread of the Castilian language which might threaten its strategic position in control of the passes over the lands of culture and thought. The country was well prepared for a nationalistic campaign.

The movement was started by a young enthusiast, Sabino Arana-Goiri, on his return from Barcelona, where he had been studying in the university at a moment when the Catalan movement itself was at its height. On his return home he wrote his *Bizcaya Por Su Independencia*, in Castilian, of course, though fancifully spelling *Vizcaya* in an unusual way which

[1] More recent history provides an argument to the same effect. It is now evident to Spanish mediævalists that Castile was, for a relatively long period during the Arabic occupation, a kind of desert no-man's-land between Christians and Moslems, and that it was repopulated by Navarrese and Basque settlers. Thus the fundamental unity of Castile and the Basque country is historically ascertained.

for some mystical reason is supposed to represent its soul more faithfully. He was not very successful at first. In fact he died young (1903) without having seen many signs of a following. And yet he had struck a chord which was soon to vibrate. Three years after his death the Nationalist Basque Party was founded in Bilbao. It was definitely a party of tradition, loyal to the Church, to the old laws of the country, to the old institutions and to the language and arts of the people.

So far so good. But it happens that there is not one Basque language, there are a number of them, the exact determination of which is one of the problems which baffle experts. According to Prince Bonaparte, there are twenty-five Basque dialects which may be classed into three groups known as A, B, and C.

Such is the precarious basis for the nationalist movement of the Basque lands. The movement commands no authority with the best men of the country. In contemporary Spain there is an exceptional amount of Basque talent. Basque names are abundant in industry, banking, the higher ranks of the technical and liberal professions; in arts and letters they almost predominate. Zuloaga, Unamuno, Baroja, Maeztu are Basques. But these men without exception look upon Basque nationalism as an aberration, and in big business it commands but little attention, though one of its staunchest patrons is a well-known shipping and steel magnate in Bilbao. All are, however, agreed that much is to be gained by granting the Basques a liberal measure of home rule, which they have shown they deserve, having organised the most able and advanced of municipal and provincial administrations.

The Gallegan Question.—There is also a Gallegan question. It is a curious movement, if only

because it shows how different Spanish questions can be from one point to another of the map. One thing is certain : in so far as the Gallegan movement has any political importance at all, it is a reflection of the Catalan movement, which has stimulated all the awakenings of local feeling to be observed in Spain to-day. The language is, here again, the basis for the movement. Gallegan is a language far more akin to Portuguese than to Castilian. It was the language in which the Castilian poets wrote when they felt in a genuine lyrical mood. As late as the fifteenth century there were still lyrical poems written in Gallegan by Castilian poets. Then, as in the case of Catalonia, Gallegan poetry, practically the only literature which Galicia ever had, all but died out. The language fell, as Catalan had fallen, to be the exclusive appanage of the humbler classes. In the nineteenth century the big towns such as Coruña and Vigo spoke Castilian. They are still overwhelmingly Castilian. And yet the best poetry written in Spain in the nineteenth century was—with that of Maragall in Catalan—that of Rosalia Castro, the admirable poetess who, though she wrote also in Castilian, was at her best in her native Gallegan.

Rosalia Castro, Curros Enriquez and other less known poets, were read in Galicia even by those who disdained to speak the language. But under an obscure political inspiration, societies known as *Irmandades da Fala* (language confraternities) appeared towards the beginning of the twentieth century endeavouring to resuscitate Gallegan as a cultivated language and to fight by example against the prejudice which exiled it to the lower strata of society. A *Seminario de Estudios Gallegos* has been created since. Galicia, though densely populated and suffering from want at the lower end of the social

scale, has an upper and middle class in fair prosperity, and the historic university in the old city of Santiago de Compostela is considered by some Gallegan leaders as the future centre for the rebirth of her culture. Galicia has the makings of a rich local spiritual life.

But there is Portugal; and obviously the more Galicia becomes herself the more her inherent likeness to Portugal will become apparent. We see how the future of the Gallegan movement opens out perspectives of what should be fruitful collaboration but might also be—who knows?—misunderstanding and strife.

CHAPTER XIX

PORTUGAL

THE relations between Spain and Portugal are no exception to the rule prevailing amongst the Peninsular peoples. A double wall of pride bristling, on the Portuguese side, with mistrust of Spanish ambitions, prevents a clear understanding of a reality which in its essentials is simple enough. So simple, indeed, as to amount to a repetition of the Catalan reality: the Portuguese is a Spaniard with his back to Castile and his eyes on the Atlantic Sea.

The symmetry of the position has been described in the chapter on Catalonia. Political and literary history confirm at every turn the description there given. If we take it as correct, relying on the following pages for further proofs of the main ideas which it embodies, we shall find in it the root cause of the permanent separation between Spain and Portugal: the identity of temperament between these two varieties of Iberian stock. Here, as in the case of Catalonia, arguments, theories, history, geography, and what not, are to a considerable extent the intellectual puppets of a radical emotion which is no other than the dispersive force of the Iberian race. No doubt geographical factors exert some kind of influence. Just as Catalonia may be explained by her trans-Ebrian position in the margin, so to speak, of the Castilian Tableland, so Portugal finds a geographical basis for her separate existence in the sunken territories of the west, also cut off from the Tableland

by a geological accident. But reasons remain to be found for the difference between the destinies of Catalonia and those of Portugal, for the one remained attached to Castile while the other, but for a brief period of sixty years in the sixteenth century, succeeded in maintaining a separate historical development to this date.

As was to be expected, the reasons are numerous and closely interwoven by history. Let us begin by pointing out that the symmetry between the two cases is not geometrically perfect; in a north-south direction the Peninsula is symmetrical, with Portugal on the left and Catalonia on the right of Castile; but from east to west the symmetry is inverted, or in other words the figure before us is not an M but an N, a remark which applies to both geography and history. As for geography, Catalonia is out of the way behind the high ranges which limit the Tableland towards the north-east, while it is easily accessible by the plains of La Mancha and the southern end of the Valencian kingdom in a line running from south to north along the coast. Moreover, the Catalan-Valencian region has its main nucleus to the north in Barcelona, and a secondary one, not so important, further south in Valencia. Portugal, on the other hand, has her great port to the south in Lisbon and a second port further north in Oporto, therefore in an inverse position from that of the two sea cities of the Catalan-Valencian region. Moreover, though access is fairly easy from Madrid southward towards Lisbon, this line of approach was under Moorish occupation at the period when Spanish nationalities were being formed, while the movement of reconquest naturally took place from the north. We know, moreover, the important rôle played by the Castilian Tableland as a centre of attraction, and how the

Christian effort, born in Galicia and in Asturias, concentrated later in the kingdom of León, to settle finally in Castile. This obviously determines for the Christian reconquest, a line of advance in a diagonal direction from Galicia towards Murcia and Alicante, i.e., a north-west—south-east line, being the middle line of the letter N which schematises these mediæval movements.

These obvious facts determine, also, other no less significant events in early Peninsular history. Catalonia was born in her own capital. She began as Barcelona, and this metropolis remained so predominant in her history that, to the present day, the King of Spain's title to sovereignty over the Catalan region is that of Count of Barcelona. Starting from her base, Catalonia cannot, therefore, spread in the Peninsula without moving away from it, and therefore without moving towards the Castilian magnet, whether through Aragón or through Valencia. The enterprises of the Catalans in France, in Italy, in Africa, were gallant attempts at escaping their fate. But the county of Barcelona was not a sufficient base of operations for wide expansion abroad. The Aragonese Confederation and the conquest of Valencia were inevitable events in the history of Catalonia, and we know that, once federated with Aragón, the political attraction of Castile was to prove too strong for the independence of Catalonia. The very reverse is the case of Portugal. The main base of what was to be Portugal, Lisbon, was in the hands of the Moors. Portugal became a mere feudal affair, a gift of Alfonso VI to one of his sisters, who had married a turbulent Frenchman of the House of Burgundy. This first Count of Portugal worked for his own ends and he contributed in a most spirited manner to the anarchy which followed the death of Alfonso, trying

to round off his Atlantic estate with typically Castilian lands and actually occupying the Galician territories of Orense and Tuy. His son, Alfonso Enriquez, came to trouble with the king of Castile, Alfonso VII, who laid great stress on his imperial title and did not trifle with his rights over the other princes of the Peninsula. That is perhaps why, although he had beaten Alfonso Enriquez, he granted him the title of king under his suzerainty in 1143. It is clear that Portugal was born without a base and Catalonia with, and on, her base. This explains also, why Portugal should have been born with a historical tendency to secede from, while Catalonia was born with a historical tendency to accede to, the Spanish-Castilian unity, particularly if it be noticed that, while the expansion of Castile, as we have pointed out, had to follow the diagonal line north-west→Castile→south-east, the Portuguese line of advance was inevitably drawn dead-south towards Lisbon, thereby creating a natural divergence; while the Catalan line of advance being also dead-south along the coast (to avoid as far as possible the attraction of Castile) was bound to meet Castile all the same where it actually met it, in Murcia—hence the agreement between the king-count of Aragón-Catalonia and the king of Castile as to the conquest of Murcia. Thus the N-shape, which we found convenient to explain the characteristics of the literature and culture of the Peninsula, accounts also for the movements of her early history. While Catalonia, through Aragón, falls into the Castilian basket, Portugal remains hanging outside it.

Efforts were, no doubt, made to bring her in, both from the Portuguese and from the Castilian side. In the thirteenth century John I of Spain, having married the Portuguese Doña Beatriz, came by the

throne of Portugal, which he was, however, unable to conquer owing to a revolt of the Portuguese, led by the Master of the Order of Avis, who became king under the name of John I of Portugal. Ferdinand and Isabel, the two most efficient nation-builders that Spain has known, tried to enmesh Portugal when casting far and wide their matrimonial nets. Nor was Portugal the obstacle in this case. The obstacle was Fate, through her chief steward, Death. Fate seems to have made up her mind that Portugal was to remain a separate unit in the Peninsula. In a sense, the duel between Isabel and her niece, Juana La Beltraneja, for the succession of the Castilian throne, implied a choice between union with Aragón-Catalonia on the one hand and union with Portugal on the other; for Doña Juana, daughter of the Portuguese princess, would have carried the kingdom of Portugal with her had she been successful in securing her father's throne for herself. The choice had already been made by Isabel, for when after her brother, Henry IV, father of Doña Juana, had disinherited his daughter and recognised Isabel as his heir to the throne, he expressed his wish that she should marry the king of Portugal. Isabel, however, preferred Ferdinand, the heir of Aragón. The Portuguese were undoubtedly then under the subtle influence of the Castilian "magnet," for the tendency towards union came at least as strongly from Alfonso V of Portugal as from the Castilian court. Yet Castile could not marry both east and west at a time, and Isabel probably thought that the great Aragonese-Catalan-Valencian federation, so strong on the Mediterranean, was worth having first unless, being a woman after all, she preferred Ferdinand's looks to Alfonso's, for of such things, also, history is made. That she did not

forget Spanish unity she was to prove in later years. In 1479 Ferdinand and Isabel arranged that their heir, Don Juan, should marry Juana La Beltraneja (who as the daughter of a Portuguese princess might bring in Portuguese rights eventually) while their daughter Isabel would marry a Portuguese prince. The first marriage failed because Juana entered a convent, and the second came to nothing because the Portuguese prince died untimely; and this was the first time that Death cut the nets of Ferdinand and Isabel. Nothing daunted, they married young Isabel to the Duke of Beja, heir to the Portuguese throne, and Don Miguel, issue of this match, had the chance of being king of a united Spain by the death of Prince Juan of Castile and Aragón. This chance Don Miguel threw away by dying, and, as if Death meant to dot the i's and cross the t's, she also took Don Miguel's mother, Princess Isabel. The Castilian kings persisted in their policy and married her Portuguese widower to another of their daughters, Mary, whom Death also took away, then with yet another daughter, Doña Leonor.

But Death was not the only factor working for separation. The era of discovery which sealed the fate of Catalonia by binding her to Castile, gave a new impetus to the separate existence of Portugal. Let us remember our definitions. The Catalan is a Spaniard on the shores of the Mediterranean; the Portuguese is a Spaniard on the shores of the Atlantic. A historical wind blowing westward was bound to have dramatically opposite effects on Catalonia and on Portugal. The seafaring activities of the Catalans withered when history's stage shifted from the mere Mediterranean to the vast Atlantic and to the mysterious Pacific. The seafaring activities of the Portuguese gained a great impetus thereby. It

mattered little to them that the queen of Castile forbade their trade with the newly-discovered empires. They sailed forth magnificently; indeed, they went on sailing forth, for, as good Atlantians, they had begun before the Castilians, they, the dauntless forerunners of all sea daring and discovery, and Christopher Columbus gave them but a wider scope to do

> "Mais do que prometia a força humana
> Por mares nunca de antes navegados."

The Portuguese historian, Oliveira Martins, has dramatically described the emotions of the Portuguese discoverers of the eastward way to the Pacific when, to their amazement, they found on these far-off waters the ensign of the Castilian king flown by the boats of Magellan, after the discovery of the Straits; and Magellan himself, writing to a friend in India, expressed the hope that he would meet him some day, when he would come back to Europe either by "the Portuguese way" (i.e., by the eastern way), or by "the Castilian way" (by the Magellan Straits). The world was small in those days for Castile and Portugal. The Pope had to be brought in to carve it between them, giving Portugal all the lands lying east of a line which he defined so vaguely as to enable every kind of conflict to flourish right and left of it. Ferdinand did not hesitate to organise armed resistance against the Portuguese on his newly-acquired domains, and this rivalry and colonising activity did, of course, much to strengthen the historical vigour of Portugal.

Both Charles V and Philip II married Portuguese princesses, and married their sisters with Portuguese princes. Charles V's marriage was the cause of the union with Portugal which lasted from 1580 till 1668, for the throne of Portugal fell vacant and Philip II

was the candidate with the best legal title and also with the strongest army at his disposal, a combination generally irresistible. The period during which Portugal was ruled by Spanish kings is by no means a period of Spanish rule. In fact, a detached study of these sixty years of Portuguese history goes a long way to upset a number of prejudices and yet to confirm the essential features of the Hispano-Portuguese psychology. Philip II's reputation has been made on his Netherlands record, but since his record there was due to the stern faith which he held, it is to be expected that his dealings with a nation so devoutly orthodox as Portugal then was would differ considerably. In fact, though the Dutch, hopelessly heretical as they appeared to him, were bound to force the king to actions which show him under an intolerant light, Philip was no maniac of intolerance. As monarchs went in that period he was, on the whole, a moderate ruler, even in religious things, as shown by his efforts to damp the Inquisitional zeal of Mary Tudor. The Spanish period of Portugal is a case in point. It was, on the whole, brief, and the reader, knowing all about Alba and Egmont says: "No wonder." But what did actually happen during those sixty years? Philip appointed not a single Spaniard to a Portuguese post; laid hands on not one single Portuguese institution; respected every Portuguese liberty. His only difficulty from the very beginning was in the lower clergy, many of whose members he had to punish for their violent attacks against him. The old Court remained untouched and the Portuguese branch of the Braganza remained unmolested in the full possession of its dignities and privileges, a leniency which was to be ill repaid in later days; the political and commercial organisation of the colonies was respected, and Lisbon lost neither materially nor

morally by the personal union; no military, naval or financial help was exacted for the king's Spanish activities abroad; customs barriers between Spain and Portugal were abolished; public works were prepared in order to increase the navigation value of the Tagus, which flows past Toledo and Lisbon without really linking the old imperial capital of Spain and the wonderful sea capital of Portugal; legislation and administration were improved; the aristocracy, the commercial and liberal professions were contented and felt self-governed—but there was the lower clergy and there were the Jesuits, who thoroughly disliked Philip II, a feeling which the king heartily reciprocated. And the Jesuits, the lower clergy and the ambitions of a Spanish woman broke the union as soon as an unwise Spanish minister of State gave them an opportunity therefor.

The trouble came because the king of Spain wanted fair play for the Jews. Spanish history is full of unexpectedness. Philip III first, then Philip IV, tried to soften the condition of the Portuguese Jews, oh! ever so little, for they were too pious themselves to go too far in this dangerous direction. They merely suggested that, when the Jew made up his mind to emigrate towards freer lands, he might be allowed to sell his property. The lower clergy of Portugal, and the masses whom they led, were shocked at these winds of heresy coming from Spain, and the mood of Portugal was ready for secession. Then Olivares, Philip IV's minister, thought fit to advise his sovereign to go now and then to Portugal, to appoint some Portuguese nobility as ambassadors, viceroys, and high dignitaries of his household and service, and to send Spaniards to Portugal also in order to promote an interchange of the higher staff of the monarchy. And this again raised a wind of fury in the separatist

Iberian. Finally, the worst of mistakes came from Madrid, for, breaking away from the wise policy of Philip II, taxes were laid on the Portuguese people to meet Spanish enterprises in Europe. Olivares first tried to get rid of the Duke of Braganza, who as a scion of the royal house might dangerously personify the separatist tendency, by making him Viceroy of Naples, an honour which the Portuguese prince declined; then, taking the bull by the horns, the Spanish minister entrusted the Duke with the command of the military forces of the Portuguese realm. The Duke, a man of honour, was thus placed in a position of trust from which he would not spontaneously have felt inclined to strike a disloyal blow. But Olivares forgot the Duchess. She was a Spanish woman, a sister of that Duke of Medina Sidonia who was to make his name famous by organising a separatist move in Andalusia, and, unable to resist the sight of a queenly crown so close to her, she drove the Duke to rebellion and had him proclaimed king in 1641.

He had but to look round the map of Europe to see prospective friends. French, Dutch and English help was forthcoming. The Spanish armies were fortunate at first, but after a protracted war which Philip IV fought but half-heartedly, having too many conflicts on his hands already, the secession of Portugal was consolidated in the Battle of Villaviciosa, in 1665, with no other loss to Portugal than that of some colonies which one of her allies, the Dutch, had taken from her during the crisis.

There was, however, a further and more lasting and important loss. Portugal lost her independence. English help was given her only under conditions which bound her destinies to those of the rising star of the north. Not by her two treaties (1654 with Cromwell, 1661 with Charles II), but by the new

system of forces which her secession created was her dependence on England sealed for centuries. Portugal became the fulcrum of England's lever against the might of Spain. By then, of course, Spain was no longer Philip II's, but that ghostly Empire which a half-witted king ruled with a hesitating hand; half a century later, during the War of Succession, England was to conquer her second fulcrum on Spanish territory—the invaluable Rock. But the secession of Portugal was the most important of downward events in Spanish history and, in a truer sense than the superficial one usually applied to it, of Portuguese history also. English political domination over Portugal is the last and perhaps the most important factor acting for the separation between Spain and Portugal. The political reasons which explain this fact are so obvious that they need no elaboration. With a weakening Spain and a rising England strong at sea and conscious of the value of the division between Spain and Portugal for her policy, Spanish efforts towards re-union by means of dynastic family arrangements had no longer any sense.[1] But the existence of this strong English interest in Portugal acted against the union in at least two other ways, more far-reaching than mere politics.

Politics, after all, is but the moving surface of the waters, and we cannot claim more than superficial knowledge when we stop at political events. In the case of Spain and Portugal a survey of the relations between them in literary history is indispensable. One

[1] War attempts, of course, still less so, but then it is a curious fact of Spanish history that though there were numerous civil wars between Christians, the aggrandisement of Christian States by war against other Christian States was never attempted; wars between Christian States did take place in order to avoid separation, but never in order to bring about union.

of the most important documents in the history of Spanish letters is the epistle which the Marqués de Santillana sent to Don Pedro, the Constable of Portugal, with a gift of his works, in 1449. Don Pedro, a prince of the royal house, following the traditions of his family, was a poet, and the first Portuguese who wrote Castilian prose and verse. The Marqués having referred in his letter to the ancients, then the French, the Italians, the Catalans, the Valencians, "and even a few of the kingdom of Aragón," reminds his Portuguese friend that the *Arte mayor* was discovered "in the kingdoms of Galicia and Portugal in which there is no doubt that the exercise of these sciences [*of poetry*] is more customary than in any other region or province of Spain, to such an extent that not long ago all reciters and trouvères of these parts, whether Castilians, Andalusians or of Estremadura, composed their works in the Gallegan or Portuguese language." Poetry in Spain was born in Gallegan-Portuguese. It remained Gallegan-Portuguese (to the point that the king of Castile himself, Alfonso X, wrote his poems in that language), as long as it remained lyrical. Then the mood of the Peninsula changed and from lyrical it became epic. The tide had turned. The people were no longer a race of Christians expelled from their country by the Moors; they were a race which had reconquered the land and was full of the marvellous vigour that, not very much later, was to expand European civilisation beyond the dreams of the boldest mediæval imagination. Spain (including Portugal), became epic and dramatic. She had to express herself in Castilian. It was not—we saw it with Catalan—it was not the political connection which preceded the linguistic conquest; it was the language which unified Spanish culture before any conception of political unity had appeared. Portugal did not be-

come politically united under Philip II until 1580. Don Pedro began to write Castilian poems and prose in 1449. Castilian became a normal means of expression for the Portuguese as Portuguese had been earlier for the Castilians. The *Catálogo Razonado*, issued in 1890 by Domingo García in Madrid, contains upwards of six hundred names of Portuguese authors who wrote in Castilian. The most efficient instrument of Castilian penetration was the *Romance*, that swift-moving poem of eight syllables in assonance which is so admirably adapted to the popular genius of Spain that, to this day, the Spanish Jews expelled from Spain in the fifteenth century still know *romances* by heart and sing them from Asia Minor to Columbia and from Tangiers to Amsterdam. The Castilian *romance* caught in Portugal as much as the lyrical *cántigas* of Portugal had caught in Castile. Indeed, more deeply, for the Portuguese lyrical poetry was adopted, as Santillana says, by *decidores y trovadores*, while the Castilian *romances* were adopted by the Portuguese people as well. Their popularity in Portugal is attested by the number of *romanceros* or collections of them which appeared in Lisbon. Moreover, long before any *romance* had been published in Portugal, Spanish *romances* in Castilian appeared on the Portuguese stage on the lips of popular characters. A typical case in point is that of Gil Vicente, that truly magnificent poet, one of the most gifted of Europe, the creator of the Portuguese theatre, whose work is, in form as in substance, a link between the two nations, a garland of poetical flowers uniting in spirit Spain and Portugal.

On June 6th, 1502—Portugal had been an independent nation for four centuries and Philip II was not to be her king till seventy-eight years later—a prince was born in the Portuguese Court, he who was to be

John III. The next day, Gil Vicente, the Portuguese poet, put his muse at the service of his patriotic heart and, disguised as a shepherd, celebrated the birth of the Infante in a kind of pastoral monologue, a dramatic sketch *written in Castilian.* Twelve years earlier, in a tournament celebrated in Evora on the occasion of a royal marriage, all but one of the mottoes of the knights participating in the festivity were written in Castilian. Castilian became so deeply ingrained a language in the Portuguese Court that the word king, *Rei*, to the present day cannot take in correct Portuguese the Portuguese article, but must be used with the Castilian article: *El-Rei.* Gil Vicente, in many ways a poet of the Court, used the two languages indiscriminately, writing plays now entirely in Castilian (with stage directions in Portuguese), now entirely in Portuguese, now using both languages in the same play, as when he makes a nurse in a play written in Portuguese sing a *romance* in Castilian. Nor was he a peninsular author in language only, for the very spirit of his work, ranging from his sacred *autos* to his merry and satirical *comedias* and *farsas*, brings to mind the typical features of the Castilian theatre. He stands in the line of great peninsular dramatists, a successor and pupil of the Spanish Encina (far surpassing his master), and the predecessor of Lope and Calderón. Yet with this difference, that he possessed that marvellous gift for lyrical poetry which, in the Peninsula, we know to be the privilege of the Gallegan-Portuguese West.

The vicissitudes of Castilian influence over Portuguese literature do not concern us here. All we need remark is that the greatest Portuguese poets used both languages of their own free will out of the sheer wealth of impressions and inspirations which they wished to manifest. While men of mere talent, how-

ever refined, more imitative and cultivated than creative and spontaneous, men such as Sá de Miranda or Antonio Ferreira, severely denied themselves the use of Castilian, Gil Vicente used it freely, and Camões, the Portuguese poet *par excellence*, wrote in Castilian with such splendour that he deserves to count as one of the best poets of the Castilian language. An edition of Camões' songs and *canções* passes without warning from Portuguese to Castilian, from Castilian to Portuguese. And this simple fact is eloquent. For both Gil Vicente and Camões were ardent patriots, and no one can claim that the practice which these two poets followed could be prejudicial to either the development of Portuguese genius and culture or to the respect which Portuguese sovereignty and independence deserve. The two great poets felt that the spirit which moved peninsular inspiration could equally well emerge in either of the two languages (as it can in the east in either Catalan or Castilian), for it all depends on the mood of the poem itself. They had two means of expression at their disposal, just as the painter has oil and water colours, and, being rich in things to say, they quietly assumed the right to use whichever means was more adequate to the aim in view.

For, in fact, Castilian and Portuguese literature cannot be studied separately—any more than Castilian and Catalan. When the compiler of *romances* prints an anthology he does not know how many of his flowers were grown on Portuguese soil. The Oxford Book of Portuguese Verse contains a fair number of Spaniards belonging to all periods from the very earliest down to the nineteenth century. The Oxford Book of Spanish Verse, though by an inexplicable oversight forgetting the name and poems of Camões, also contains a good number of Portuguese

poets. The fact is that there is an inherent unity underlying all Iberian differences which makes these two cultures in these two nations two aspects of one and the same spirit.

The political union under Philip II was not particularly favourable to the manifestation of this inherent harmony. The golden age of Spanish-Portuguese collaboration in the realms of the spirit is precisely that in which the two nations, though united in culture, are politically apart. In the sixteenth century Spain and Portugal were two separate kingdoms thinking more or less vaguely of union, their kings even scheming for it, and, at the same time, curiously linked up by a subconscious feeling of common "Spanish-ness" which somehow or other underlies all peninsular life at that time. The direct political connection under Philip II did much to weaken that feeling. Camões died in the year when Philip II became king of Portugal. The period which then began was closed in the following century with the War of Secession and Portugal's treaties with England.

These treaties and what they implied account for the phase of mutual neglect and isolation which then sets in. The magnet is no longer Castile, but England. In Portugal this change brought about deep spiritual effects. Philip II's rule was not the best historically to be wished for Portugal, though, of course, no other was available at the time in the divine imagination. This fact, combined with the dispersive tendency which the Portuguese share with the remaining Iberians, was bound to lead to secession. But there is little doubt that ultimately the interests of Portugal would have been better served had she remained a Spanish kingdom, even at the risk of falling under the Bourbon absolutism of Philip V. The mistake which

Catalonia tried to commit several times in her history Portugal committed in 1662. Psychology, geography and history pointed to an Iberian evolution for Portugal. She chose a precarious life in the English alliance, forgetting that there is no alliance between the very weak and the very strong. And though England has been a good friend and even a generous one, and though Portugal, unlike Spain, has not lost her colonies, she has been melancholy ever since. For Portugal, three centuries of civil wars with the Castilians would have been more invigorating than peace and a nominal independence underpinned from abroad.

From the point of view of Spain the new historical phase determined a kind of inhibition from Portuguese affairs. The almost total indifference towards Portugal, the ignorance of Portuguese life, the almost complete annihilation of Portugal in the Spanish mind has often been observed. Not so often the fact that it dates precisely from the period when England takes charge. It is an example of a feature of Spanish psychology which may be observed in many other cases—the tendency to give up all interest and to withdraw within the tent of silence and passivity when actions and words are useless. Let us recall the dignified withdrawal of Katharine of Aragón from the tribunal of the two papal legates who were to examine the legitimacy of her marriage with King Henry VIII, or, again, the wholesale inhibition of the Spanish political *intelligentsia* under the present Dictatorship. The case of Portugal is of the same kind. England is there. Very well. Let England do it. And Spain turned away from Portugal.

The tradition of the unity of old remained perhaps fairly alive amongst scholars. No one could look

back on the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries without finding there such eloquent testimonies of it as the close co-operation between the scholars of Coimbra and Salamanca Universities in the early sixteenth century, the period before political union, a time when Portuguese names abound in every walk of Spanish scholarship. Moreover, the matter of a political union or federation was never quite dormant, least of all in the nineteenth century when political thought became more general. Curiously enough, Portugal was the keener of the two, for the change it would imply looms larger in her future than in that of Spain. Some enlightened Portuguese realised that Portugal must be either an autonomous limb of the Iberian body or a disguised and hardly more autonomous limb of the British Empire. One of the most eloquent voices to call Spain back to life, that Spain which includes Catalonia as it includes Portugal, was a Portuguese historian, Oliveira Martins. In his History of Iberian Civilisation, dedicated to the Spanish novelist and critic, Juan Valera, Oliveira Martins endeavours to delve under historical details in order to draw out the essential unity of the Iberian civilisation. He had the courage to write such things as " those differences are but aspects separating our nations without destroying the unity of thought, of character and of action which make Spain one though her modern history has constituted her under a régime of political dualism." He asserted his faith in " a future Spain more noble and illustrious even than that of the sixteenth century," but he wisely pointed out : " in many ways our present-day history repeats the past; and if we meditate on it thoroughly, we, the men of the Peninsula, may still discover an inner and permanent force which, by liberating us from the imitation of foreign forms, may

give the work of organic reconstitution of society a distinctive turn, more lasting as resting on the nature of our race, more efficient as better answering the requirements of the work itself." One of Portugal's greatest scholars, Teófilo Braga, in his *As Modernas Ideias da Litteratura Portugueza*, enumerates the efforts made by the Portuguese through all their history to bring about a dynastic union; from those of John IV at the death of Charles II to the several attempts during the nineteenth century, including the endeavours of Luis I to obtain from Napoleon III the crown of Spain which Prim ultimately offered to Amadeo of Savoy after the Revolution of 1868.

On the Spanish side there were no dynastic attempts in modern times, but the matter seems to have come up now and then, from the time when Campuzano, the Spanish Ambassador in London, discussed it with Canning till 1844, when Queen Isabel and her younger sister were considered as possible brides for the Portuguese heir and his brother. Ideas more in keeping with modern times begin to appear towards the middle of the century. Union recedes on the horizon and a kind of federation emerges in the mind of Peninsular enthusiasts. Works such as the *Estudos Sobre A Reforma Em Portugal* (1851) by the Portuguese, Henriques Nogueira, advocate this solution as corresponding to the inherent unity of the two peoples, and a pamphlet entitled *A Iberia. Memoria em que se provam as vantagems politicas, económicas e sociaes da união das duas monarchías peninsulares em uma so nação*, though still hankering after a dynastic union, rather fostered the ideas of federation. As in most Spanish questions, however, a split occurred between the Right and the Left, the clerical Right in both countries being for union and the republican or anti-

clerical Left being for federation. Discussion became so heated that, in 1853, the Spanish Government forbade all reference to it in the papers. In 1854 no less a person than the future leader of Spanish politics, Cánovas, proposed a dynastic union in a pamphlet called *El Recuerdo*.

The Revolution of 1868 did not help matters because the revolutionary government needed all the help it could get from foreign countries and it was thought prudent not to offend British susceptibilities. A certain amount of anti-federation work was done at this time, notably by Teixeira de Vasconcelhos, who went so far as to assert in a Portuguese paper that Spain was preparing the conquest of Portugal; but federal hopes were not forgotten by Ruiz Zorrilla, the Spanish republican leader, when in exile after the Restoration, he issued his Brussels manifesto, and there was a sensational republican campaign in Spain, led by both Spaniards and Portuguese, which culminated in an Iberian-Republican Congress held in Badajoz in 1889.

Towards the same period ideas similar to those which guided the Portuguese federationists of the Oliveira Martins school began to germinate in Catalonia. The West and the East were feeling their way towards the new ideal of Peninsular reconstruction. As was to be expected, the idea progressed at a quicker pace in the East than in the West. Oliveira Martins had but little following. His Iberian views, in fact, had injured his popularity with his countrymen. The fear of a rigid political interpretation of the union is, in many a Portuguese soul combined with the more concrete fear of actual Spanish conquest and occupation. The unintelligent attitude of some Castilian politicians and newspapers towards Catalonia does little to remove this feeling

in Portugal. In Castile, however, no man in his senses would hesitate for a second to declare that whatever happens must be the result of the free and inner convictions of all concerned. The work of cultural and material approximation has still a long way to go. And if Portugal were never to wish for a more intimate association with the rest of the Peninsula, why should Spain? Ganivet, on the eve of King Alfonso XIII's accession, summed up the matter with his admirable commonsense: "The problem of Iberian unity is not European but Spanish: as the very words show, it is peninsular or Iberian. Though some European nations may be interested in maintaining the Peninsula divided, it does not follow that the question is European: if all nations tolerated that we should constitute such a happy unity that would not justify us in committing an aggression thereto; there would be no one in Spain, whatever may be thought on the matter, capable of such a thing. On the other hand, if Spain and Portugal of their own free will were to agree to bring about such a union no one in Europe would oppose an objection to an agreement which would not affect the continental political balance. The union must be the exclusive work of those who are to be united; it is an internal affair about which it is dangerous to seek outside help.

"Similarly I have never understood the Iberian union as a purely Spanish question. [. . . .] For a long time I was saddened by the sight of two different colours on the map of the Peninsula. But I have seen so many artificial unions that my opinions have changed: if we were to be united like England and Ireland, or Sweden and Norway, or Austria and Hungary, we might just as well remain separate and let that separation serve at any rate to foster feelings

of confraternity incompatible with a system of violent union. The union of several nationalities in one single nation can only have as a useful and human aim the bringing together of different civilisations in order that a spiritual stimulation may come from their mutual influence; and this aim may possibly be brought about without any material political domination."

CHAPTER XX

MOROCCO

THERE is an episode within an episode in Don Quixote which throws more light on the historical roots of Spanish Moroccan policy than all the expert literature written since. The " captive " is telling his new friends, in the hospitable inn where so many things happen, how he escaped from captivity in Algiers with the beautiful Moorish girl who had fallen in love with him. After a series of dramatic episodes, the party land at last on the deserted shore on the southern coast of Spain, and walk on in search of human beings. Suddenly they are much elated to see a young shepherd and his flock. But the shepherd, seeing first the Moorish girl and the renegade guide, also in Moorish attire, runs away shouting : " Moors. Moors in the land. To arms, to arms." And presently the little band sees a troop of about fifty knights coming towards them armed to defend their country against the invader. This was supposed to happen more than a hundred years after the last Moorish king had wept on the hill which was to block Granada for ever from his eyes.

For eight centuries Spain had been the battleground of two races, one of which, the southern, had Northern Africa as its base. Whenever things went wrong in the Peninsula, the Spanish Moors called for help from their Moroccan friends. The idea of retaliating, of carrying the war from Spain into Morocco was but the natural reaction to expect once

the Moor had been expelled from the Peninsula. It occurs early in Christian Spain as soon as a man strong enough to incarnate it appears in the Christian host. Such a man was El Cid. His Homer, the unknown author of the Poema del Cid, wrote (*circa* 1140) after one of El Cid's victories over the King of Morocco before Valencia, that the Moors in Morocco, "where the mosques are," feared that the Spanish champion might fall upon them one night. El Cid was a cautious soldier and a shrewd politician. His faithful interpreter makes him say: "This they may fear but I think it not. I shall not go to fetch them. I shall stay in Valencia. They will pay me tribute with the help of the Creator." For the idea of crossing over to Morocco when more than half the Peninsula was still occupied by the Moors was premature by about three centuries. But the fact that we find it attributed to El Cid by his earliest interpreter shows that the idea was not merely political but national as well; it was not merely a knightly thought but a popular instinct.

As soon as the Spaniards obtained command of the Spanish coast on the Straits free expeditions began. The late fifteenth century, an epoch in which Spanish energy, repressed at home by the stern energy of Ferdinand and Isabel, overflowed in the four directions of the compass, witnessed numerous adventures of a private character for settling on the southern side of the Straits. The most important of them was that led by Don Pedro Estopiñán, who, with the private fleet of the Duke of Medina Sidonia, a magnate holding feudal rights over the African coast granted him by the Castilian king John II in 1449, took Melilla and held it for the King and Duke.

Ferdinand and Isabel let their subjects go towards Africa, the great importance of which they fully

realised. For Isabel, the centre of interest was in Morocco, for many of the Moslems who had been bound to leave Spain in 1492 lived there and might reasonably be expected to work towards a new invasion of the Spanish coast. For Ferdinand, Tunis was important, since he was also king of Naples and of Sicily, and, in fact, the whole coast between Tangier and Tripoli, if only because piracy was a pest which afflicted particularly his Catalan subjects. Nothing, not even that discovery of America which was so violently to deflect Spanish history, could make Castile forget altogether—though it did make her at times neglect—the importance of Moroccan policy. When, after the death of the Queen and the brief regency of Philip the Handsome, King Ferdinand took over the Castilian regency, Cardinal Cisneros, who had been Isabel's confessor, did not hesitate to carry on the Queen's African policy at his own personal expense while King Ferdinand was busy over his European affairs. The spirited churchman conquered Peñón de la Gomera, Oran, Bougie and Tripoli and made the Moorish kings of Tunis, Algiers and Tlemsen vassals of Ferdinand. The connection between Spain and the African coast became thus one of the permanent factors in the network of activities which harassed the head and heart of Spanish monarchs. With the appearance of Barbarossa the Corsair, backed by the Sultan from Constantinople and by the King of Algiers, the situation of Catalan and Valencian merchants and the safety of the Balearic Islands and of the sea-communications between the Spanish and the Italian dominions of the Crown became precarious—so precarious that, as late as 1575, Spain was in danger of losing the most precious of her sons before he had given his best to the world when Cervantes was

caught and made a slave by Algerian pirates while sailing home from Italy, a wounded, ambitious young soldier. Charles V tried to put an end to this state of affairs by attacking the Corsair in Tunis (1535), an expedition which gave the Emperor considerable prestige as the champion of Christendom. Yet the fight against the Moor was an ever-recurring one. After Philip II, in the person of his half-brother Don Juan of Austria, had won the famous battle of Lepanto (1571), in which Cervantes was wounded and lost the use of his left hand, Don Juan had to take Tunis again and leave in it a Spanish garrison. Signs of activity appear again under Philip III; some of them, such as the Duke of Osuna's expeditions to Morocco, where he took Larache from the pirates, were offshoots of private initiative. African piracy seems to have stimulated international co-operation, for, in 1619, France, England and Spain negotiated an agreement for common action in this field. This co-operation in the face of the common enemy did not last long. Louis XIV in his period of anti-Spanish policy attacked the Spanish-African posts. The Africans needed no such stimulus. In 1666, Larache was nearly lost to a pirate; in 1667 and 1672, Oran was in danger of falling to the Turkish Viceroy of Algiers. The French Ambassador wrote that many people in Spain feared a return of the Moorish Invasion if Oran were lost. This clearly shows the persistence of the traditional "frontier" feeling prevailing in Andalusia, where, even to this day, Jerez (where sherry comes from) is officially known as *Jerez de la Frontera*. Larache was lost in 1684 and Ceuta just saved in 1694. It was evident that Spain had not followed up the line of obvious expansion which she would have adopted had America remained undiscovered and had Charles V

been less solicitous for the salvation of the Dutch. But Madrid thought of nothing but the gold of America and the soul of the Netherlands, and Africa remained a raw problem for later centuries.

When Spain stirred again in these quarters the most important change in the Straits had occurred; Admiral Rooke, on behalf of the Archduke Charles, who considered himself King of Spain, had taken Gibraltar (1704), and English diplomacy had kept it for England in Utrecht (1713). Nevertheless, a minimum of activity in Morocco, a kind of defensive-offensive was maintained as a matter of course by all successive governments. That this policy was indispensable is shown by the fact that Moroccan activity was the only foreign action which that most enlightened of Spanish monarchs, Ferdinand VI, undertook during his reign. By then, it had been discovered that a million *pesos* spent in naval armaments against the corsairs paid better than a similar sum doled out in ransom to redeem slaves, a method which resulted in whetting the corsair's appetite for more slave raiding. In 1767, the Emperor of Morocco signed a treaty with Charles III of Spain on the basis of no corsairs and free commerce. This did not prevent his Shereefian Majesty from declaring war on Spain in 1774, and besieging Melilla for a few months. Spain retaliated by an attack on Algiers which, though begun with vigour and power, ended in disaster through incompetence. A new expedition was organised in 1783-84. Algiers thought better of it, and, having been bombarded twice, signed an agreement in 1786 whereby Spanish consuls were admitted, trade allowed, corsairs forbidden, and the Spanish granted the free exercise of their religion. Tunis followed the good example of Algiers. The next fit of Moroccan activity took place in the following century when, under the O'Donnell

Ministry, Spain declared war on Morocco in order to obtain some respite from incessant attacks on her settlements there. O'Donnell himself took charge of the operations and, after a campaign more spectacular than technically brilliant, took Tetuan. An indemnity, a moderate enlargement of her zone of influence round Ceuta, and the consolidation of an old claim on Santa Cruz de la Mar Pequeña was all Spain obtained from this affair, which was extremely popular at the time and in which particular distinction was won by a body of Catalan volunteers commanded by General Prim. That this expedition led to no permanent results was evident already at the time. But possibly for the first time the fault was not all on the side of Spain. Further trouble arose in 1893 when, in the vicinity of Melilla, General Margallo perished in an attempt to subject the unruly tribes to some kind of peaceful neighbourly behaviour. The incident was settled without further bloodshed, thanks to the firm but able negotiations led by General Martínez Campos.

It will be seen, then, that Spain never actually forgot Africa, yet never actually took up there the position which history, geography and inherent destiny seemed obviously to suggest. Other tasks called her to far-off parts of the world while the main task at her gates remained unfulfilled. Yet, in a quiet non-political way, her people had penetrated far into the life of Northern Africa. She was settled for a long time in Oran; she had frequent intercourse with the most unfriendly centres of Tunis and Algiers through the regular flow of captives who came in by the door of piracy and left duly shorn by the door of charity—a circulation which, in its lucrative effects and in its permanency, would suggest piracy as an occupation somewhat akin to banking. She had, moreover, by

expelling her Jews across the Straits, spread a leaven of hispanification all over Morocco so that, till a quite recent date, the language of business and the coinage were Spanish in the Shereefían Empire. Moreover, by a kind of historical tradition which the victory of Charles V had endowed with a certain brilliance and majesty, the Spanish nation maintained a specially privileged position in Morocco till the nineteenth century.

Yet, passing from imponderabilia to hard facts, the main forces which determined the Moroccan position in the nineteenth century were: first of all, Spain's own political weakness, implying as it did a certain fitfulness, a lack of continuity in her policy as well as the lack of sufficient power to carry it out in the face of other rivals; then, the fact that she had no intention of actually settling in Northern Africa, for all her activity there seems to have limited itself to establishing a sufficient number of coastal settlements as a guarantee against possible trouble from the south; further, the fact that, having lost Gibraltar to England, the question of Straits strategy could not arise. Some French authors have accused her of having neglected the wonderful possibilities of Ceuta as a stronghold on the Straits opposite Gibraltar. But, surely, given the respective naval and economic forces of Spain and England, the transformation of Ceuta into another Gibraltar could only have been made either against England or as second fiddle to her: the first would have been mad, and the second foolish. As a matter of fact, the loss of Gibraltar must have produced deep changes in the subconscious attitude of Spain towards Africa. Before England settled in the Straits there was no "foreign body" blocking Spanish imagination on its way southward. The Spanish people, in periods of peaceful overflow of their energies, might

have penetrated gradually into Morocco, forcing the State finally to intervene and give an official status to the popular colonisation of the country. Let us remember that, as a coloniser, Spain always came after the Spaniards (another feature which brings back to the mind that haunting yet deceptive subject of Spain's likeness to England). Given the inherent similarity of racial basis, Morocco might thus have become a mere prolongation of Spain, a Spain beyond the Straits. But Gibraltar stood in the way, a wedge of foreign spirit drawn in between two peoples who, for eight centuries, had mingled together in peace and war; and those subtle spiritual currents which fecundate the meadows of history found themselves powerfully deflected in this case so that Spain lost the zest of old and turned herself inward.

Meanwhile France had attained a phase when colonial expansion was to become a necessity to her. A "solar" country, deeply possessed of the value of Paris as a centre, and therefore of the need of an adequate circumference for such a centre fully to irradiate, Paris found herself blocked by the growth of a knot of dour resistance in that Germanic mass till then so plastic under her sway. It is generally recognised that when, in 1830, the French sent a strong expedition to punish the Dey of Algiers for his time-honoured predatory habits, they did not mean to stay thirty years and to transform Algiers into three French Departments. But the fact is significant that the French did turn their minds towards Africa *then*, whether to punish or to stay, and also that their minds once turned there stayed there. Bismarck, who knew how history is made out of the stuff of life, encouraged France to settle in Tunis, for the French had by now discovered that what was wrong with them was colonial ambition, and they pursued their

aims with that intelligent determination which makes of their foreign policy an art as scientific and as aggressive as the art of war. Both France and England prevented O'Donnell from gathering territorial fruits from his exploits of 1859, the first time perhaps the three nations met—if only to differ—on the question of Moroccan destinies. From that day on Spain could do little more than defend the *status quo*, i.e., range herself on the side of England, also favourable to leaving that knotty problem in abeyance.

And yet it was indirectly through English action that the *status quo* became so precarious as to lose every right to the name. For, in 1856, the British Government obtained the right of protection for all persons who placed themselves under her flag in Morocco, a fact which led, of course, to equal concessions to every other nation. Consular agents were thus enabled to put Moroccan subjects or foreigners under their nation's protection. The difficulties produced by this practice and the malpractices into which it degenerated led, however, to an important step. An international conference met in Madrid in 1880, attended by representatives of Austria-Hungary, Belgium, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Morocco, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United States of America. If it did not do much to cure the evils of "protection" it inaugurated an era perhaps too hastily closed—that during which Moroccan questions were a matter of international concern.

When King Alfonso attained his majority the Moroccan question was ripe for European ambitions. France was led by a stubborn Foreign Secretary anxious to carve for himself a reputation worthy of a successor of Richelieu. She found Morocco an

appetising prey after the excellent meal she had made of Algiers and Tunis. She was rich, she was powerful. True, she had fears on the east, but that was the more reason for widening the basis of her wealth and—who knows?—of her man-power. Spain, on the other hand, had just returned from Cuba and the Philippines, beaten by the United States. The last remnants of her Empire had gone. Her ports had seen the soldiers back from the fight, emaciated by fevers and privations. Spain was in no mood for further adventures. She dreamed of a few years without telegrams about dead and wounded and "glorious victories" in her newspapers. She wanted to rest from emotional life, to work and put her house in order. Above all, she felt that every man is well where he is and should not be bothered with foreign rule, the white man's burden, the standards of civilisation and the light of Christianity. Spain was in the mood of Don Quixote after the last battle, or perhaps better still in that of Sancho retiring disillusioned and alone from his experiment as a Governor: "Naked I was born, naked I am. I have not lost, I have not won."

But Morocco was there to the south; France there to the north; and England in Gibraltar still a mystery.

CHAPTER XXI

SPANISH-AMERICANISM

The relations between Spain and the Spanish-American nations evolved considerably during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. At the beginning of this period the Spanish-American nations still belonged to the Spanish Crown. The Cortes de Cadiz which studied and voted the Constitution of 1812 were under the spell of the *Americanos*, i.e., the representatives of the Spanish-American constituencies. Most of them, enlightened readers of political thought, had followed the history of the rising United States with keen enthusiasm and generous idealism and tried, not without success, to instil some of the political principles of the young republic into the Spanish Constitution. Their position, however, could not be more illogical. The peoples at home took a more consistent attitude. The Spanish dependencies had been conquered by the Spaniards for the King. In law as well as in that inner law which is the core of all Spanish political philosophy and instinct, the colonies were not Spanish dominions ; they were, just as Spain was, dominions of the King of Spain in so far as the King of Spain incarnated the commonwealth, i.e., each and every one of the separate commonwealths. The union was, therefore, merely a personal union between all the crowns of the King. And when Ferdinand VII abandoned the throne the only link which kept together his European and his American dominions was destroyed.

The revolts in America began in the name of the King. Sooner or later it was realised by the *Americanos*, who significantly called themselves *patriotas*, that the King was no longer necessary as a symbol of a commonwealth which, by assuming its own defence, had assumed its own separate existence. Essentially, therefore, the Wars of Emancipation were not wars of the Spanish-Americans against Spain, but wars between the Spanish-American people and the Spanish State, identical with the wars between the Spanish people and the Spanish State when such a State ruled by a foreign king was disowned by the Spaniards. It is true, that when Ferdinand VII returned he attempted to repress the revolt in America by force of arms, but here again the Spanish State was behaving in its American dominions exactly as it behaved in its European territory, with this difference, that in the first case it failed, mostly owing to distance, while in the second case the war lasted right through the nineteenth century and is not yet perhaps altogether over.

The Wars of Emancipation did much to embitter feelings between Spaniards and *Americanos*. The War was carried on in some cases with grim determination. The Spanish State was very slow to bow before the inevitable, and it was not till 1836 that the law authorising the Government to recognise the independent sovereignty of the American nations was passed. There followed a period in which relations between Spain and her former colonies evolve awkwardly and, perhaps unconsciously, towards a final adjustment. Spain still intervened in America, not always wisely. In 1862 she participated in a Mexican expedition organised in agreement with France and England, ostensibly to secure fair treatment for their respective nationals in Mexico. The Spanish com-

mander, Prim, was not long, however, in realising that both England and Spain were in Mexico as the mere pawns of Napoleon III, and backed out as soon as possible, partly owing to this discovery, partly to his wish to keep a closer eye on political events in Madrid, for, like most Spanish generals, he was more interested in politics than in war. Towards the same period, Santo Domingo having decided of her own accord to put herself under Spanish sovereignty in 1861 and then to sever the connection again in 1863, O'Donnell was unwise enough to attempt a military repression which the nation was too busy at home to maintain with sufficient vigour. Finally, the same bellicose general managed to entangle Spain in a war with Peru, Chile, Bolivia and Ecuador, when Méndez Núñez with a Spanish fleet bombarded the port of Callao (May 2nd, 1866) and passed down to history as the Admiral who coined the saying: "Better honour without ships than ships without honour." He managed, however, to keep both, though he did not end the war, which, as a purely platonic manifestation, lasted on paper till 1871, when an armistice was signed, treaties being slowly evolved in successive years.

Spain had only Cuba and Puerto Rico left under her sovereignty. Both revolted in 1868 at the moment when the mother country was busy with her own revolution. The events of Puerto Rico were not of so grave a character as those of Cuba, where the rebellion was serious and protracted, owing to the help the Cuban insurgents were able to draw from the United States. Puerto Rico benefited by peace, for a government of advanced views abolished slavery in the Island (1873). The war in Cuba lasted through the period of revolutionary troubles in Spain. The man who was to bring it to an end was

that general, Martínez Campos, who had taken upon himself to proclaim Alfonso XII King of Spain and thus close the revolutionary period in the mother country. He was sent to Cuba as soon as he could be spared from Spain, and he ended the war with the Agreement of Zanjón (1878). In the following year slavery was abolished in the Island.

All these activities of Spain in the American continent contributed to maintain the anti-Spanish tradition which the Wars of Emancipation had established. To this period belong the two masterpieces of Argentine literature, *Martín Fierro*, by Hernández, and *Facundo*, by Sarmiento, this last with a definitely anti-Spanish bias. Yet the natural attraction resulting from a community of origin and civilisation was gradually working its way into the spirit of the Spanish-American nations and the enormous growth of the United States was also acting in the same direction. The Monroe Doctrine, hailed at first by the nations of Spanish-America as a guarantee of their independence, was slowly evolving away from them. Several attempts which they made to transform it into a multilateral declaration had conspicuously failed. Not a few of their suggestions for its application, such as the two cases in which the Argentine Republic claimed help under the Doctrine when England occupied the Falkland Islands, had disappointed public opinion in the whole continent as to its actual value for the Spanish-American world. Successive declarations by American presidents made it clear that the United States meant to keep complete control over the definition, interpretation and application of the Doctrine. In 1889 the first Pan-American Conference took place and the foundations of the Pan-American Union were laid. There is no question that this new factor has been highly

beneficial in bringing about a closer union between the Spanish-American nations, for it acted as a kind of outside pressure counteracting the dispersive tendency which the Spanish-Americans had inherited from the Spanish-Europeans. It is significant that the first date in the history of Spanish-Americanism occurs three years after the first Pan-American Conference (1889). The date, of course, could not be more suggestive: 1892, the fourth centenary of the discovery of America. The Spanish Government, then already fairly stabilised, organised a number of events all planned on a Spanish-American basis, invitations for official representation having been sent to all the Spanish-American nations and accepted by them. Spanish-American congresses were held on a number of subjects and the 12th of October was declared a national festivity in Spain. No definite tendencies could as yet be discerned in this movement. It was a mere affective drawing together without any political aim, the almost physical reaction manifesting the obvious fact that the Spanish-American nations were sisters *in* Spain (as mystics are brothers in God). That and no more.

Yet two factors stood in the way. The first was the, as yet, insufficient prestige of Spanish culture in South America. The Spanish-American peoples were born to freedom in an atmosphere of keen intellectual activity. Most of the leaders of the Wars of Emancipation were eager readers of European books. The influence of eighteenth-century French encyclopædic thought has no doubt been much exaggerated, and the more deeply the great America figures of the time are studied the more striking is the unmistakably Spanish originality of their thought. Bolivar is the most brilliant case in point—Bolivar who fought Spain with a magnificent Spanish temperament. All

these men, however, lived in an age when psychology did not delve so deep. Not till the twentieth century was a distinguished Venezuelan historian, Señor Parra Pérez, to remark that free Spanish-America has never produced a generation so brilliant as that which liberated her, which was raised under colonial rule. The times were inclined to simple generalisations, and it was decided that Spain was the backward country and that light and thought came from Paris. Paris spoke in French, and French is an easy language for Spaniards and Spanish-Americans to read, at any rate. The nineteenth century was, therefore, in Spanish-America the French century *par excellence*. Both as a reaction against Spanish domination and as a revelation to minds till then shut off from foreign books, French culture impressed Spanish-Americans deeply. True, the shrewder minds amongst them realised that ultimately culture is but the flower of blood, and that Spanish-America could not go on, in the somewhat naïve words of a Spanish-American delegate in Europe to a French journalist, "Feeling and speaking in Spanish and thinking in French." (There was but a moderate amount of thought in that statement.) But before the Spanish-American nations could again feel drawn towards Spanish culture, this culture had to evolve out of the phase of foreign subservience which it was itself undergoing in the Peninsula.

The second obstacle to the growth of genuine feelings of mutual affection and confidence between Spain and her former colonies was the position in Cuba and Puerto Rico. The movement in favour of Cuban independence had never entirely abated. During Alfonso XII's reign and during the regency of his widow, Queen Maria Cristina, the Cuban patriots were active over the whole Continent enlisting help in the United States and sympathy in the nations

of the Spanish-speaking world. Cuban propaganda was bound to produce a deeply anti-Spanish effect on Spanish-American countries, first by recalling the past and stirring in every Spanish-American nation emotions similar to those of her own emancipation days, and then by presenting Spain for propaganda purposes under an unfavourable light.

This obstacle to Spanish-American understanding with Spain disappeared with the loss of Cuba and Puerto Rico in 1898. At the same time the United States of America, who had gained sympathy in Spanish-American opinion owing to her advocacy of the Cuban cause, rapidly lost her ground on her decision to retain Puerto Rico and to impose on the promised independence of Cuba the serious limitations implied in the Platt Amendment. In 1900 the frigate *Presidente Sarmiento*, of the Argentine Navy, paid a visit to Barcelona. The Argentine naval officers were warmly received in Spain and the Argentine decided to omit from her national anthem two stanzas reminiscent of the War of Emancipation. When the king came of age in 1902, the way was clear for a truly cordial gathering of the Spanish-American nations around their old spiritual home. The progress of Spanish-Americanism was made easier by that of Spanish culture which set in then. Thus everything contributed to making the last years of the century a turning-point in this aspect of Spanish life.

CHAPTER XXII

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

A GLANCE at a map suffices to show that Spain's natural strategic advantages are such that, if strong, she must play a first-rank rôle in the world, and, if weak, she must be the constant object of close attention on the part of the strong. The main natural advantage of the Peninsula lies in the control of the Straits of Gibraltar. This situation makes her the *prima facie* adversary of whichever nation controls the seas and, therefore, it determines her relations with England; it makes her also an indispensable element in the peace and safety of France, since at any moment Spain can block the sea communications between the French Mediterranean and Atlantic coasts. As, moreover, Spain shares with France the longest frontier of this nation, placed at the rear of any European trouble which France may develop, it follows that Spain is a nation which France cannot afford to see strong. This brief and elementary survey leads to the obvious conclusion that Spain has two natural adversaries in the world: France and England.

History confirms what observation detects. England and France have been the traditional adversaries of Spain ever since the three nations attained their maturity, which they did at approximately the same time. The relations between Henry VIII, Charles V and Francis I symbolise the curious situation created by the fact that France and

England, though both adversaries of Spain, are not necessarily allied. The brief spell of Anglo-Spanish alliance brought about by the marriage of Philip II with Mary Tudor, was but a makeshift whereby Philip II tried to secure his sea communications with Flanders. But Flanders, though for centuries the well into which Castilian energies were sunk, had nothing to do with Spain's true interests. With the advent of Elizabeth the instinctive rivalry between Spain and England set in, not to flag again until England had deprived Spain of her rank as a Great Power, first at the Peace of Utrecht, then at the Congress of Vienna.

It is doubtful whether a true Spanish policy, i.e., the inherent policy arising out of her geographical situation and of the creative possibilities and consequent requirements of her soul and people, has ever existed. It came as near existence as it ever did in the statesmanlike imagination of Ferdinand and Isabel, probably more in that of the masculine and stouthearted queen than in that of the feminine and astute king. Two master-strokes of destiny deflected Spain from her true course: one was the discovery of America; the other the election of King Charles I to the imperial throne, a stroke for which, by a curious irony of history, Spain helped to pay by enabling Charles to bribe his electors with Spanish gold.

America, in Spanish history, was a white elephant. To be sure, Spain decorated it wonderfully and reaped a considerable amount of prestige from the possession of so immense and picturesque an animal. No doubt, moreover, the discovery made Spain a universal nation before any other European Power, and to a degree unequalled even by present-day Great Britain. But the greatness of Spain, in so far as it came from

the discovery and colonisation of America, had something abnormal and almost monstrous about it. It was more in the nature of a diseased growth than in that of organic development and it contributed greatly to prevent the normal evolution of a foreign policy adequately adapted to the requirements of the nation.

The Imperial connection was no better calculated to lead to such a policy. Under Charles V Spain was the base of operations for European schemes in which the great emperor sought to create the wonderful unity of Christendom conceived in his mind, and of which Spain was but a part. Charles, who was his own foreign secretary, never saw Spanish foreign policy as such; he saw Christendom, of which he was the political chief, and, if he was gradually won over from his father's to his mother's country to the point of dying in a Spanish monastery, he never was able to see Spain and her future as his wonderful grandmother, Queen Isabel, had seen them. When he died his hopes of preserving a European union had been shattered by the Lutheran Reformation, and Philip II was left with the comparatively simple task of saving Spain from heresy. But even here Spain was to be sacrificed to the dynastic loyalty of the monarchs of the House of Austria towards the spiritual welfare of their northern subjects as they understood it. The Low Countries, which should have gone to Ferdinand, went to Philip, and the energies of Spain had to concentrate on the hopeless and entirely disinterested, if odious, task of keeping the Dutch within the fold. This, of course, had no connection whatsoever with true Spanish policy.

It is difficult to estimate to what an extent these two mighty events, the discovery of America and the Imperial connection with its sequel of religious wars,

by working themselves deeply into the Spanish soul, have prevented it from acquiring a conscious or subconscious sense of foreign policy such as England and France evolved from a relatively early date. Every opinion is possible: from that which sees Spain as the tragic victim of two mighty and somewhat quixotic enterprises, to that which considers her as naturally disinclined to conceive and apply a systematic conception of her own history. Truth lies, probably, in a combination of all the intermediate views, the recipe of which must remain a divine secret particularly inaccessible to historians. The results, however, are only too clear. Under the lesser Austrias the policy of Spain was an imitation of that of Charles and Philip, combined with a new difficulty which arose out of the necessity of keeping together the two branches of the House of Austria against the French. Under the Bourbons the policy was what the king wanted it to be, which, more often than not, meant what the queen wished. The only king of that period who seems to have had a truly autonomous sense of an inherent Spanish policy was Ferdinand VI. He stuck to peace and reconstruction with that quiet determination which is the mark of true enlightened and meditated opinion, and even his one exception to the rule of peace, his Moroccan activity, is but a brilliant confirmation of the intelligent attention which underlay his policy. But both his predecessors and successors in his dynasty squandered away Spanish energies in futile and misguided attempts to meddle with events in which Spanish vital interests were unaffected, inspired nearly always by a patrimonial and personal conception of thrones and territories which they considered as family estates.

The lack of a central line of foreign policy was, in a sense, but the natural result of the sudden accession

of power which befell Spain immediately after she attained full nationhood. A full-grown nation in 1492, she is a full-grown empire in 1519, predominant in Europe, ruling over America and the Pacific Sea. The natural attitude in such a case was defensive. There was no need of a line of expansion. This passivity and this absence of a definite principle of action in foreign affairs were to turn to the advantage of Spain's adversaries. England had for centuries, as the main principle of her foreign policy, the gradual weakening of the Spanish Empire and its ultimate destruction, with the seizure of every point of vantage which fell to her in the process. France found Spain most inconvenient on the flank of her traditional duel with the House of Austria, even after she had recovered from the Spanish Crown the considerable territories, potentially French, which had been handed down to Spain from the House of Burgundy. And during the eighteenth century France made Spain an ally in her own exclusive interests, through the *Pacte de Famille*, the very name of which reveals the purely personal outlook of the diplomacy which inspired it.

When the Spanish people emerged out of the monarchical shell to take a direct responsibility in their destinies after the War of Independence (*anglice* Peninsular War), the situation was far from rosy. England had succeeded in maiming Spain in her three most vulnerable places: her American Empire was gone; her reunion with Portugal was made impossible; her control over the Straits was lost; and, what was worse, England had set foot on her soil in Gibraltar, the very name of which rings with an echo of the Moorish Conquest. France had ruined the Spanish Navy by forcing an incapable monarch to put it at the disposal of an incapable French admiral, who

led it to defeat in Trafalgar. She had tried to erect Spain into a French kingdom; she had led Spain to a disastrous civil war, the more disastrous as it contributed to lend the noble and convincing colours of patriotism to the most reactionary and isolationist passions in the Spanish people. In foreign, as in home affairs, Spain had to start the nineteenth century from the bare ground. There was nothing.

The century began with both France and England on Spanish soil. The two adversaries were not necessarily allies. Spain, too weak to play an independent rôle, as she had done under Charles and Philip, was nevertheless mixed up in their quarrels, so that, while she fought with France against England in Trafalgar, she fought her War of Independence with England against France. Nor was this change merely capricious. The Spain that fought in Trafalgar was the State; the Spain that fought in Bailén was the people. England went over to fight on the side of the Spanish people while she was still technically at war with the Spanish State. Wellington, of course, was not so much fighting *for* Spanish independence as *against* Napoleon, and, so far as England was concerned, the Spanish War of Independence was merely the Peninsular War. This contrast, which moved the generous mind of Wordsworth to write his spirited pamphlet on the Convention of Cintra and inspired him with many a fine sonnet in praise of the people of Spain, was, however, inevitable in the circumstances and at the time. The main lesson that emerges from that war, when England contributed powerfully to the independence of Spain while fighting her own duel with France, is that neither England nor France can go to extremes in their policy with Spain without coming into conflict with one another.

The basic rule of the nineteenth-century foreign

policy of Spain was thus evolved from experience. When England and France agree, seek agreement with both; when they disagree, abstain, following Sancho's wise dictum: do not put your thumbs between the two mill-stones. So far as Spain was concerned that was the only rule of the game. The stakes were mostly of a conservative character. Often they could not go beyond ensuring foreign respect, or even mere recognition, of this or that precarious form of government, for the nineteenth century was spent in constitutional strife. Rare was the government which did not have to solicit favours from London, and more frequently from Paris, with regard to the close watch which it had to keep on its political exiles and would-be conspirators. This source of internal weakness made itself felt also in the colonial field, for Spain had often to conciliate foreign interests while dealing with the colonial troubles in what remained of the overseas Empires. African preoccupations were, of course, a matter of frequent discussion. Spain protested rather platonically when France occupied Algiers; she had to bow before the joint opposition of France and England to her reaping any territorial advantages from General O'Donnell's victory in Morocco in 1860. Her throne was twice at least an apple of discord in European politics, first when Palmerston and Louis Philippe played rather sharp chess with the marriage of Isabel II; then when Prim made the round of Europe in search of a king after Isabel II's expulsion, and Prussia tried to secure the throne for a Hohenzollern.

Towards the middle of the century, in spite of the terrible waste of an almost chronic civil war, Spain had attained sufficient economic development to sharpen the political competition of her two intimate and faithful adversaries with a material edge. A land

of great mineral wealth, hedged round with fertile fruit orchards, it attracted the industrial and commercial attention of Englishmen and Frenchmen alike. Capital began to flow in. Through competition these two adversaries of Spain became the most efficient artisans of her economic development. Railways were built in the north and east mostly by French, in the south and west mostly by English, enterprise. Mines were likewise developed, with roughly the same geographical distribution as to the nationality of the capital and expert management. Simultaneously, both France and England reached the summit of their world power, and thus became the most important customers of Spain. The picture was now complete. Spain became closely linked up by ties of interest with the two nations with which she had constantly had to contend on the fields of history.

When Alfonso XII felt himself safely in harness he began his foreign policy from the beginning. He tried to secure for Spain the predominant position in Morocco which was traditionally thought necessary. The Conference of Madrid (1880) showed the Spanish Government that Morocco was one of those rare, yet essential, points of Spanish policy which had the virtue of bringing France and England together in a united front against her. Cánovas, who was a historian and a politician, bowed before the laws of power. But the young king was not of so philosophical a disposition, and he then began to widen the diplomatic area in which Spain had so far moved. Anxious to provide the throne with good dynastic props in foreign countries, Cánovas (after a shortlived love match into which the king had entered against his advice) had succeeded in marrying the king with María Cristina of Hapsburg, a princess of the strongest Roman Catholic court available in Europe at the

time. Alfonso followed up this hint possibly beyond what Cánovas would have wished and moved towards Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy with a view to securing, either from them or from the balance between them and the Western Powers, better treatment in Morocco and the restoration of Spain's position in Europe as a Great Power. In 1883, Alfonso accepted the Kaiser's invitation to visit him in Berlin and was made a colonel of Uhlans. The king of Spain held to his previous public decision to return to Spain via Paris. He faced an imposing demonstration of popular disfavour in the French capital, which he met with dignified calm, received with cold demeanour the apologies of the French President at the Spanish Embassy, and returned to Spain more than ever convinced of the wisdom of his policy. Two years later he was rudely shaken out of his assurance by the Caroline Islands incident provoked by Germany, who with characteristic directness sent a German squadron to occupy a port in the Archipelago without the slightest consideration for the undisputed Spanish sovereignty there. The populace in Madrid got out of hand and burnt the scutcheon of the German Embassy in the Puerta del Sol. Alfonso and his Cabinet succeeded in solving this grave incident satisfactorily by suggesting that it should be entrusted to the arbitration of the Pope, who gave an award in favour of Spain. The king died less than a year later, and Spain had again to seek the goodwill of all foreign powers on behalf of a young widowed queen and a child who was born a king. Foreign nations responded with every kind of helpful and sympathetic assurance, but Spain was reduced thereby to a policy of strict passivity for so long as the king was a minor and fears remained as to the stability of his throne.

This prudence did not save Spain from trouble. So long as Cuba remained under the Spanish flag, there was an inherent source of conflict with the United States of America. The old puritan and peace-loving Republic of Washington and Jefferson had gradually developed appetite as it developed strength. Most of its acquisitions, the very territories on which it expanded westwards, had taken place at the expense of Spain. As late as 1800 Spain possessed a much larger proportion of what is now the United States than did the United States herself. Louisiana, illegally ceded by Napoleon, was Spanish when the United States received it from the French Emperor who did not possess it, and Spain's protests were of no avail. Florida had to go, under threats of force which Spain was not then in a condition to face. Several times during the nineteenth century Spain observed the tendency to help or even stimulate Cuban rebellion on the part of the United States of America, and at least once she made representations to that effect in Paris and London. The rebellion in 1883 was followed with keen interest in the United States. Closer attention still was bestowed on that of 1895. The events of this rebellion and the war with America which ensued have been dealt with in a previous chapter. Here we are concerned only with the international aspects of it. Writing to his friend, F. C. Moore, on February 9th, 1898, Theodore Roosevelt said: "I should myself like to shape our foreign policy with a purpose ultimately of driving off this continent every European power. I would begin with Spain, and in the end would take all other European nations, including England. It is even more important to prevent any new nation from getting a foothold. Germany as a republic would very possibly be a friendly nation, but under the present despotism she is much more bitterly

and outspokenly hostile to us than is England." Yet it was but natural that England should take the side she took in the juncture. When, through the Pope and the Austrian Court, Spain sought the mediation of the European powers, England's attitude chilled an impulse which, to be candid, had not shown signs of much warmth. And when the German squadron present in Manila evinced a tendency to intervene against the American fleet (possibly with an eye on valuable territorial spoils), Admiral Chichester made it clear that England was resolved to prevent all interference between the United States and Spain. Her action was the natural sequel to both her traditional policy of destruction of the Spanish Empire and the ties of racial kinship with the United States. The events of 1898, therefore, did much to revive in Spain the old historical consciousness of antagonism with England which the War of Independence had helped to abate. France was sympathetic. While England took over American diplomatic interests in Spain, France took over Spanish interests in America. Negotiations for peace were started by her ambassadors and a treaty was signed in Paris.

With her evacuation of the seas and continents which had seen her rise and fall, Spain turned her eyes again to the natural line of her foreign policy : the Straits and Africa beyond. On June 29th, 1900, Don Fernando León y Castillo, the Spanish Ambassador in Paris, signed an agreement with the French Government whereby Spain acquired important territories in El Muni. The South became at last the point on which Spanish attention was to concentrate for the years to come. The coming reign was to tackle these problems partly because no other enterprises remained to distract the country from her true course partly because, as Fate would have it,

the Moroccan Question was then ripe for international action, whether Spain was ready for it or not. What was the mood in which Spain approached the problem? First, with a deep consciousness of the fact that the two nations which, together, controlled, and, separately, paralysed, all Spanish action were, at the same time, her natural adversaries and her best customers as well as the two peoples most stimulating to her life and culture; then, with that kind of philosophical acceptance of inevitable facts which the full knowledge of a situation brings about in men and, particularly, in Spaniards. It is part of their stoic dignity that they do not abuse or criticise or even refuse recognition and praise to those who have wronged them. This sober view of the position which Spain occupies in international life was admirably expressed by Ganivet, writing, precisely, at the close of the nineteenth century: "There is no humiliation nor dishonour in the recognition of the adversary's superiority: it is more than obvious that England exerts supremacy over the seas of the world; few nations have been free from her abuse of power favoured by disunion in the Continent. And against such abuse the wisest policy is to make oneself strong and to inspire respect. Facts of force, such as the occupation of Gibraltar, are not without practical utility, for they act as regulators of national energies and prevent over-confident people from shouting too loudly. Gibraltar is a force for England so long as Spain is weak; but if Spain were strong it would become a vulnerable point and would lose its *raison d'être*.

"Amongst all the nations of Europe Spain is, after Italy, the nation most interested in the preservation of the naval supremacy of Great Britain for a long time to come. We are in this case very much as that

ruined gentleman who on no account would part with an old steward of his, not particularly honest. 'Not for any love that I may feel for you,' said the poor man, 'but because I fear that your successor will leave me a beggar.' And if some of those who feel irritated at the affront of Gibraltar do not find this idea elevated enough, let them bear in mind that it has been suggested to me by the wise Sancho Panza, who was as Spanish and as Manchegan as Don Quixote.

"England has two advantages on her side: the first, that she has no immediate connection with the Continent and still less with the Mediterranean shores; the second, that she has attained the fullness of her development and feels already bound to take shelter under a defensive policy. Her power, therefore, would be useful for Europe if, shorn of her aggressive possibilities, she succeeded in maintaining herself as the agent of international public order.[1]

"Gibraltar is a permanent offence which we in part deserve for our lack of good government; but it does not hinder the normal development of our nation and is not a sufficient cause for us to sacrifice other more valuable interests in order to anticipate (on the most advantageous hypothesis) a fact which must come about as the restoration of our nationality evolves towards its logical conclusion. It seems absurd at first sight that our interests should be linked up with those of the only nation towards whom we have motives of real resentment, but in recognising and accepting such absurdities lies at times the deepest wisdom."

[1] This was written in 1896, twenty-eight years before the Geneva Protocol was discussed.

PART FOUR

THE REIGN OF ALFONSO XIII

CHAPTER XXIII

PRE-WAR

On May 17th, 1902, a youth who had that day attained his sixteenth year made ready to take over his royal duties from the devoted and cautious hands of his mother. Count Romanones, then a minister in the Sagasta Cabinet, has just given us a striking picture of that historic day. A luminous morning such as Madrid can enjoy in the Castilian spring which, for vigour and warmth, deserves the name of summer. The Cabinet were waiting on the stone steps of the Congress of Deputies, a group of black and gold uniforms the diplomatic monotony of which was broken by the naval uniform of the minister of marine, the Duke of Veragua, who, though a civilian, was admiral of the fleet by birthright as the lineal descendant of Christopher Columbus, and by the military uniform of General Weyler, a small, determined and taciturn figure famous for his " resolute " ways in Cuba, then minister of war. Sagasta, who feared for the future the dangers he had experienced in the past as a parliamentary politician, had amended Moret's draft of the king's message to his people, inserting in it the following significant passage: " The education which I have received makes me see that from this first moment duties

weigh on me which I accept without hesitation as without hesitation I have sworn the Constitution and the laws, conscious of all that is implied in the solemn engagement contracted thereby before God and before the nation." He had, moreover, resolved that the ceremony of the king's oath before the Cortes should be as solemn as possible, "in order," says Count Romanones, "that the monarch and the people should fully realise all its transcendental importance." The people was represented by an innumerable crowd covering with its waves the Carrera de San Jerónimo and the Plaza de la Cibeles, all agog with excitement and sunshine. The procession of stately carriages of the picturesque Spanish Court, drawn by magnificent horses in gorgeous harness, aroused powerful waves of enthusiasm. The senators and deputies in the House were no less enthusiastic when the boy king, followed by the queen regent, entered the Hall of Assembly. The president of the Cortes, the old Marqués de la Vega de Armijo, who had been a Cabinet minister under Isabel II, the king's grandmother whose pranks with the Constitution had cost her the Crown, was to administer the oath, or rather, as Count Romanones puts it, was to pronounce the formal words for the purpose, for the king takes the oath spontaneously and is not asked to swear by anyone. So the stately Marqués bent deferentially towards the royal youth and, in a voice which trembled a little, said: "Sir, the Cortes convened by your august Mother have met to receive from Your Majesty the oath which, in accordance with Article 45 of the Constitution of the State, Your Majesty comes to pronounce, to the effect that Your Majesty will observe the Constitution and the laws."

Amidst tense silence, the king, laying his right

hand on the Gospels open on the table, with clear, ringing voice said: "I swear by the Lord on the holy Gospels that I will observe the Constitution and the laws. If I do so, let God reward me, and if not, let Him call me to account."

These words were received with a loud ovation by senators and deputies; the moving ceremony was over and the official world headed by the new effective chief of the State went to the old church of St. Francis for a Thanksgiving Service. When the king and his ministers at last reached the royal palace the Cabinet were exhausted with heat, excitement and responsibility, encased in their uncomfortable uniforms. They formally resigned. The king formally reinstalled them, and the ministers felt then free to go and change and have a rest, most of all Sagasta, who was old and asthmatic and, in fact, within a year of his death. But the king was neither old nor asthmatic nor near his death and he loved uniforms and the political game, so he suddenly sprang upon his ministers the proposal that there should be a Cabinet meeting at once. In Spain the king presides over Cabinet meetings. The queen regent had made the king attend the meetings in the period preceding his actual accession. There was nothing for the Cabinet to do but to acquiesce.

That historic meeting, the first Cabinet Council held by Alfonso XIII, has been described by Count Romanones with enough detail to make us wish for more. The king took the chair at the head of the long walnut table and, after a few words of salutation spoken by Sagasta with tired gesture and voice, "the king, as if he had never done anything but preside over ministers all his life and with great coolness, addressing the war secretary in an imperious voice, submitted him to a close examination with regard to

the causes of the recent decree shutting down the military colleges. [The army was then hopelessly over-staffed as the result of the Cuban and Spanish-American Wars.] Ample explanations, ample for his wonted laconicism, were given by General Weyler—Don Alfonso was not satisfied and held that the colleges should be reopened. General Weyler replied with respectful firmness and, when the argument was taking a dangerous turn, Sagasta cut in, making the king's view his own and thereby defeating his war minister. After a brief pause, the king with the text of the Constitution in his hand read Case 8 of Article 55. [The king makes all appointments to civil posts and grants honours and distinctions of all kinds] and, by way of comment, said: 'As you have just heard, the Constitution confers upon me the granting of honours titles and grandeeships; that is why I warn you that I reserve for myself entirely the exercise of this right.' We heard these words with great surprise. The Duke of Veragua, a scion of one of the most illustrious lines of Spanish nobility, and a man of proven Liberal spirit, met the king's words with a simple reply: having asked his leave, he read paragraph 2 of Article 49, which says: 'No order of the King can be put into operation unless it be countersigned by a minister.'" Sagasta, who attached no importance to honours and decorations, did not trouble to intervene. The lesson of constitutional law was lost, and Count Romanones winds up his narrative in typical fashion: "Ah! if the day had not been so hot perhaps the fate of the Constitution would have been different from what it is. Solomon in his Book of Proverbs already said: *Train up a child in the way he should go and when he is old he will not depart from it.*"

Such was the tone in which the reign began. This

scene already reveals the main features of Spanish politics in later years : personal power, based on the army and on the husbanding of royal favour, on the part of the monarch ; weakness and vacillation in the royal palace, on the part of the political personnel. There were in this situation some of the elements which might have made a truly great reign : a masterful personality on the throne, served by intelligent, though pliable instruments of his will, might have been able to build up a peaceful and vigorous nation even in the face of the grave problems outlined in the preceding pages. Unfortunately, the master's will was not led by a mind trained for its tremendous responsibilities ; quick this mind certainly was, but it had no vision beyond a sincere and ardent patriotism ; and, in the place of general principles and of a mental-moral culture, the youthful king could bring to the government of the State only a knot of narrow prejudices of a frankly anti-democratic and anti-parliamentary tradition. " It was a pity," writes Count Romanones, " that the opportunity afforded by the last months of the Regency should not have been seized to send the monarch to travel abroad and make him familiar particularly with those nations which have mastered the practice of the parliamentary system. Motherly affection won, and the queen had not the courage to part with her son." The count may be right, yet the trouble was older. In 1900, Canalejas made a sensational anti-clerical speech on the occasion of the marriage of the king's elder sister (then heir to the throne) with the Count of Caserta, of obviously Carlist and clerical leanings. He was violently attacked in the leading clerical newspaper by a priest, Father Montaña, who boldly signed his article though he was the confessor and tutor of the king. The queen dismissed him

instantly, but the king thus shriven and tutored began to reign within two years.

The fact is that while the two parties which, with varying fortunes but equally sincere efforts, were endeavouring to guide Spain towards a peaceful parliamentary régime fought each other, ousted each other from power and solved or left unsolved more or less doctrinairian questions, the three factors which were to shape the destinies of Spain in the early twentieth century were left to themselves and no one troubled as to how they were being educated. The Army, the Church and the King, all three admirable in many ways and particularly as raw material, have not been adequately educated for the fulfilment of their responsible functions. The Army, the Church and the King have killed the parliamentary system.

Troubles poured in from every quarter at a time in the general effervescence caused by the liquidation of the war. The movement of the Unión Nacional, led by Joaquín Costa, with the enterprising Aragonese business man, Basilio Paraïso, and a young Castilian barrister, Santiago Alba, was a forerunner of later events which were to shake the confidence wherewith the two old parties held the wheels of the State machine. The parties themselves were gradually disintegrating now that the two great chiefs had gone. Sagasta died in 1903, leaving a party unable to agree on a leader. The Conservatives took office in December, 1902, and fell in July, 1905. In this brief period they went through five prime ministers (Silvela, Villaverde, Maura, Azcárraga, Villaverde again), and sixty-six new ministers. Count Romanones' comment on this fact deserves quotation. It took place, he says, " as a logical consequence of the weakening of the parties and owing to the initiative

of the king, who, no doubt anxious to find out the aptest, did not cease changing, rather did he seem to enjoy frequent changing of the persons in whom he deposited, more or less completely, his confidence."

And yet all the questions of Spanish political life were waiting for the attention and considerate thought which only a stable Government could devote to them. Catalanism was entering a perilous phase during which all the nationalistic forces united against the radical centralists led by Señor Lerroux, and a tension of fierce political hatred was thus artificially created. Clericalism, which had forced the Sagasta Government to abandon its efforts to limit the number of religious houses, had forced Maura to appoint an unpopular monk, Father Nozaleda, as archbishop of Valencia and to propose to a nation, which had just met a crushing war-debt and submitted to Villaverde's severe financial measures, that a loan should be raised to compensate religious orders for the damages done them during the Revolution of 1868. The anti-dynastic ferment seething in the towns was provoking serious riots in Salamanca, Madrid and Barcelona, and, in the General Election of April, 1903, in which Maura tried to reform the evil ways of past home-secretaries, the big towns, Madrid in particular, had elected Republican deputies. In December, 1904, a serious situation developed in Andalusia, where the farm labourers suffered from unemployment and famine. This period, however, was fertile in constructive ideas, mostly under Maura's administration. The prime minister tried to deal at the same time with the Catalan situation and with electoral corruption by a Local Government Bill reforming the administration of the country and granting a certain amount of devolution. In this period also the *Instituto de Reformas Sociales* was created, a statesmanlike experiment

which was to prove fully successful in the study of industrial questions and their peaceful solution. The Moroccan question had sprung forward in 1900, when León y Castillo, from the Spanish Embassy in Paris, had called the attention of the Government to the instability of the status quo, and in 1901, when Silvela had anonymously published in *La Lectura* a sensational article urging negotiations with France to meet possible developments there. This was precisely what the Duke of Almodóvar del Rio, Sagasta's foreign secretary, was doing at the time with Monsieur Delcassé. But when Silvela took office in 1902 he refused to sanction the favourable treaty which had been negotiated because, in his opinion, nothing should be done in Morocco without consulting England—perhaps also because he thought the treaty laid too heavy obligations on Spain. In the circumstances it is to be regretted that England should have agreed to negotiate with France in 1904 in the absence of Spain. England's refusal to negotiate separately behind the back of the nation most directly interested in Morocco would have been but the just recognition of the correct attitude of Spain in the matter, and would have saved France the loss of sympathy and confidence she underwent when, in later years, she again applied the 1904 method by treating alone with Germany and turning to Spain with a *fait accompli*. The agreement of April 8th, 1904, between France and England paved the way for the Franco-Spanish Treaty of November, 1904. This treaty, in the good old way, declared publicly that France and Spain agreed as to the terms of the Anglo-French Treaty concerning Morocco, i.e., the integrity of the Shereefian Empire, its independence and its sovereignty, matters in which France and Spain were recognised to have a special interest. This done, the treaty went

on behind the veil to the effect that, things remaining as they were, Spain and France might, nevertheless, exercise certain specified actions under certain specified conditions, each in a certain specified zone; and that should the sultan's sovereignty vanish, France and Spain would enter into practically full possession of such respective zones. The treaty defined the zones, granting Spain a considerably larger part than that now left to her.

The Government which had borne the responsibility of these important negotiations and which should have been left in peace to ripen the consequences thereof, a Government led by one of the two statesmen whom Spain had then to spare, the same Maura who, a year earlier, while accompanying the king to Barcelona, had been wounded by a fanatical enemy of the régime, had to leave office in circumstances which throw much light on the true origins of the decay of institutions in present-day Spain. The Cabinet decided to appoint a certain general as chief of staff. The king had other views. The Cabinet could and should have insisted on its right to govern under the Constitution. The king held his ground and Maura resigned. The clearest symptom of the new and grave disease which was to sap the system, and maybe the very régime, was that a Cabinet was formed under General Azcárraga merely in order to endorse the king's signature for his candidate's appointment. This Cabinet was so unstable that it fell within a few weeks.

The close co-operation of internal party bickerings and royal policy on the one hand, and the pressure of public problems on the other had worn out the Conservative Party before the Liberals had had time to recover from the death of their last leader—a recovery which could not be achieved until another man of

sufficient standing was ripe for leadership. The party possessed such a man in Canalejas, but between him and power there were three obstacles : two men with better party claims, i.e., Montero Ríos and Moret, and his own radical opinions on the clerical problem. Montero Ríos took office and the general election gave him a comfortable majority. A Liberal phase lasted from the summer of 1905 till January, 1907. This short period saw seven Cabinets with four prime ministers (Montero Ríos (1), Montero Ríos(2), Moret (1), Moret (2), López Domínguez, Moret (3), Vega de Armijo). The country meanwhile was seething with political and social troubles. Catalonia led the van. The pendulum between Catalanists and Radical Centralists which, in a country such as England, would have led to political stability by stately swinging, began to rock wildly, threatening to break the machinery altogether with its inordinate movements. The 1905 election was a triumph for the nationalist *Lliga*. A caricature offensive to the Spanish Army, published on this occasion by a satirical paper (an incident described in a previous chapter), led to the Law of Jurisdictions, which has done more towards providing the heat necessary for the hothouse cultivation of Catalanism than all the hot air of Catalan orators. The two problems, Catalanism and Militarism, became thus hopelessly entangled. All the Spanish garrisons, particularly those of Madrid and Seville, backed the garrison in Barcelona. The Cabinet decided to deprive the three captains-general (Madrid, Barcelona and Seville) of their commands, but the war secretary, General Weyler, demurred, knowing the strength of the forces against the step, amongst which he probably counted the king's opposition. The Cortes were roused against the military by the Republican minority; those

members who had not forgotten 1873, when General Pavía had dispersed the Cortes with his soldiers, came to the sittings armed with revolvers; and Canalejas, with the true statesman's eye on realities, had a quiet talk with the officer commanding the Civil Guards in charge of the protection of Parliament House, who loyally answered his enquiries by announcing that the Guard would do nothing to prevent an attack from the Madrid garrison. The attack did not take place, because the king negotiated with the "Army" on the basis of the Law of Jurisdictions. Montero Ríos refused to put his signature to the treaty and made way for the more pliable Moret.

To this extent had the new Government capitulated before taking office that the new war minister was General Luque, the same who, as captain-general of Seville, had incurred the wrath of the previous Government by sending an enthusiastic telegram to the captain-general of Barcelona. Luque from the first, and, given the circumstances, not unnaturally, considered himself as the representative of the Army in the Cabinet. The Army had its law and became a State within the State, but it had "tasted blood," and neither the Cortes nor the king were ever to recover from this disastrous surrender before what was, at worst, a serious crisis and, more likely, a mere bogy which would have collapsed at the first sign of real energy on the part of the King, the Cabinet or Parliament.

The first result of the Law was the conclusion of the Solidaridad Catalana proclaimed in the Gerona Meeting (1906) by delegates of the Regionalist, Republican, Federal, Integrist, Left, Nationalist and Catalan Union (for such was the number of Catalan parties) on the basis of Catalanist interests. On May 20th the Solidarity celebrated a feast in Barce-

lona in honour of the parliamentarians who had fought against the Law of Jurisdictions. In October another imposing meeting of protest took place. The most dramatic event of the new movement was the conversion of the ex-President of the Spanish Republic, Salmerón, till then a convinced Centralist. The arm had been forged which would thereafter lead Catalonia to the polls.

While such grave events were occurring in home politics the Government had to lend close attention to foreign affairs. In May, 1905, under the Villaverde (Conservative) Cabinet, the king had paid an official visit to the President of the French Republic, M. Loubet, during which he had undergone his first ordeal at the hands of anarchists, who threw a bomb at his carriage as he came out of the theatre in the Rue de Rohan. The king gained much popularity by the cool courage which he showed in danger. As soon as Montero Ríos took office, he endeavoured to draw the political conclusions which this journey seemed to imply in anticipation of the impending visit of M. Loubet to Spain. He went to San Sebastian to negotiate with M. Cambon on Tangier, where Spain desired an exceptional position in recognition of her exceptional historical and geographical claims. Nothing came of this effort, which perhaps accounted for the somewhat cold reception which M. Loubet met in Spain. Leading statesmen in Spain were beginning to experience the peculiar indifference to Spanish interests which France evinces whenever she feels on good terms with England. In November, 1906, scarcely one month after M. Loubet's visit, the king went on an official visit to the courts of Austria-Hungary and Germany. This visit does not seem to have had any political effects, though it cannot have failed to encourage the

young king to persevere in his policy as head of the Army, after having seen the chief artist in that kind of tragi-comedy in Berlin. Good observers, however, did not believe that the Kaiser impressed the Spanish king as a very attractive person—two actor-managers are hardly comfortable on the same stage together.[1]

William II was then at the top of his form. Earlier in the year he had made his dramatic visit to Tangier which led to the Conference of Algeciras (April, 1906). In this Conference the effects of the Franco-British Agreement of 1904 were obvious, and Great Britain stood loyally by France. The meeting led to a somewhat obscure situation in which the integrity of Morocco was once again proclaimed and encroached upon, and France and Spain were granted special privileges such as the police of the ports and specified shares in the organisation of the Moroccan State Bank. The Prime Minister (Moret) was then in the throes of the militaristic difficulty and, at the same time, within a few weeks of settling that English royal marriage which had been his constant endeavour for some time. Moret's liberalism was strongly coloured with English ideas, for he was in the line of those Spanish statesmen who had been won over by the wisdom of English institutions, the most typical of whom had been Olózaga. Nature was good

[1] Count Romanones records a scene which says much for the wit and presence of mind of King Alfonso. The speeches for the State Banquet at the Royal Palace in Berlin had been agreed upon and written beforehand in polished and meaningless French. The Kaiser rose, however, and without a glance at his paper waxed eloquent in free and untutored German. King Alfonso quickly perceived the possibilities for misunderstanding which the situation afforded and immediately devised a happy escape therefrom: he waxed eloquent in a Spanish at once so swift and obscure that honour and policy were both comfortably safe.

enough to help him, and for some time before the news was official the king rejoiced in a swift sailing-boat which he had named "Queen * * *," the three stars representing Ena, the name under which the future queen of Spain was known until her marriage. Things were not, however, as easy as they might seem, and the cloud of "blacks" which swarmed in the royal palace was humming with dissatisfaction. The Pope was helpful and gave the newly-christened queen the Golden Rose, but the clericals were not appeased, particularly when they read the comments of the Liberal Wing of the Press in which hopes were expressed of an enlightened education for the coming royal generation. The wedding took place on May 31st, the young queen conquering her new country at once by the simple yet rare method of looking every inch a queen. The day was marred by an attempt on the royal couple from which they escaped unhurt, but which cost the life of about a dozen soldiers and civilians. The bomb had been thrown by an anarchist of good family, who had absorbed his misguided doctrines in the *Escuela Moderna*, held in Barcelona by a narrow-minded reformer, known as Ferrer, who was to become famous three years later.

Soon after the wedding Moret had to resign on the King's refusal to dissolve the Cortes, for it was the royal policy not to grant this privilege twice in succession to the same party, and in this case he was backed by a strong letter which he had received from Maura. General López Domínguez took office with a strong anti-clerical programme—"strong," of course, for Spain. Violent protests were raised by the episcopate, but the Cabinet was short-lived, for Moret, apparently shaken in his anti-clerical convictions by a conversation with M. Clemenceau in

Paris, opposed the anti-clerical policy of his successor and of his own party, and wrote to the king to that effect. He had to take office again in the teeth of his own party's opposition, fell and was succeeded by the veteran Marqués de la Vega de Armijo, who revived the anti-clerical programme of López Domínguez. A typical situation, combining in a nutshell all the faults of that disappointing period: Canalejas, firm both in vetoing Moret's candidates for the Cabinet and in demanding that the Law of Associations, which was the backbone of the anti-clerical programme, should be passed; the clergy, insolently rebellious to such a point that the Cardinal Archbishop of Toledo, in an official telegram addressed to the Government, accused it of cowardice and hypocrisy, with complete immunity; the King, congratulating the prime minister on his anti-clerical policy in an affectionate private letter: "for that is the right way, yours ever, Alfonso"; Count Romanones working against the Bill while shouting anti-clericalism outside; and one evening, in the palace, the King provoking the crisis by informing his prime minister that Canalejas no longer supported the Cabinet owing to its vacillating policy in anti-clerical matters. Thus King Alfonso saved at once the Church and his Liberal reputation by playing on the ready keyboard of his political personnel.

It was now time to call in the Conservatives again. This time, however, the Party had a man at its head. Don Antonio Maura had the necessary qualifications of mind and will to be a strong and respected leader, and though he made mistakes, some of them serious, he was not easily manœuvred. His first mistake was the choice of Señor La Cierva as Home Secretary. A fanatic of force and, though a successful barrister, a man with an inelastic and incurious mind, Señor

La Cierva organised a general election which was to undo in advance by example all the good which Maura's plans were meant to do in reconstruction and organisation. All his resolute methods did not prevent the triumph of a strong anti-dynastic minority and the sweeping victory of the Catalan Solidarity in Catalonia, forty-one seats out of the forty-four assigned to the region having fallen to its candidates. This success was partly due to the emotion produced by a criminal attempt on the life of Señor Cambó a few days before the election. In striking contrast with his home secretary's methods, Maura introduced his Local Government Bill, the most efficient attempt yet made to cope with the power of *caciques* and to purify the roots of political life. The Bill met with strong opposition from the Liberal Centralists owing to its regionalistic tendencies, and did not reach the Statute Book.

Maura's Government was particularly active in foreign affairs. It negotiated the Cartagena Agreements on the occasion of King Edward's visit to Cartagena, whereby Spain, France and England acknowledged a common interest in the *status quo* in the Mediterranean and agreed to consult each other whenever circumstances should arise which might alter such a *status quo*. In order to provide the country with the necessary means to carry out his bolder foreign policy, Señor Maura reorganised the navy and initiated the policy of reconstruction of the Spanish naval strength, much depleted since the War, by a certain number of contracts with English firms which laid the foundations not only of the Spanish strength on the water, but of the renewal of the Spanish naval building industry in the Peninsula itself. These efforts did not particularly help the popularity of the Government, for it was suspected of

capitalistic leanings, and public opinion was inclined to criticise its naval policy on the strength of the generous terms which it granted to capital and to certain heavy industries. The Government, moreover, was soon brought back from external to home events by a campaign of anarchist outrages which broke out in Barcelona. These anarchist outbursts in Barcelona have always had somewhat mysterious features. The claim made by the Catalanists that, as they occur always when Catalan nationalism gives signs of special vitality and as they always lead to repressive measures which react against Catalan nationalist interests, the question *cui prodest?* suggests uncomfortable answers, has never been adequately met. Nor is the absolute quiescence of Barcelona anarchism under the present Dictatorship a phenomenon likely to allay Catalanist suspicions. At the time, at any rate, Maura was led by the series of outrages in Barcelona to introduce a Bill for the repression of terrorism which roused storms of protest in the Liberal sectors of Spanish public opinion all over the Peninsula. The hard and tactless mind of his home secretary had been obviously at work in this Bill, and the campaign then started was to prepare the atmosphere of public excitement which ultimately brought about the downfall of the Government as a sensational world event. The Bill had to be dropped, but the home secretary was enabled to leave at least one good trace of his passage in office, i.e., a sound reorganisation of the police.

Despite so many obstacles, Maura's qualities would have enabled him to remain in office for a long term and to mature a number of reforms which he had at heart, but for Moroccan events, which drew out his peculiar weakness, an unyielding sense of Government authority, even when in the wrong. An attack

by Riff tribesmen on the railway line linking up Melilla with Spanish iron mines up-country, made the sending of reinforcements imperative. The war secretary, General Linares, struck on the worst possible idea : calling up the Catalan Reserves. A general strike followed (July 26th, 1909), quickly transformed by the revolutionary ferment ever present in Barcelona into a violent riot against convents and monasteries. Three days of street fighting ensued and a period of stern military rule all over Spain. A theoretician of anarchism and anti-clericalism, Francisco Ferrer, a narrow-minded intellect but an honest person, was caught, amongst other revolutionary leaders, and sentenced to death by a military tribunal, in spite of a brilliant and convincing defence by his legal counsel, a captain of the Royal Engineers. There is little doubt that he was technically, and probably also morally, innocent. Even if legally guilty his death would have been a political blunder. He was shot. The emotion in Spain and abroad was profound and the Cabinet fell, having against it not merely the dynastic opposition but also the Liberal Party, whose leader, Moret, headed the popular demonstration against the Government in Madrid.

Moret became prime minister on October 22nd, 1909, but had to resign on February 9th, 1910, for the king, who had not forgiven him his pro-Ferrer activities, refused to grant him the dissolution decree, on the ground that he had mismanaged his party affairs. (A revolt had been organised against him by Count Romanones.) Canalejas took office. He was the only Liberal statesman capable of holding his party together by sheer superiority. His rule lasted till he was murdered on November 12th, 1912. He came to power determined to tackle the preliminary

problem without the solution of which Spain's free development cannot take place, i.e., the emancipation of the State from the control of the Church. Count Romanones records the effect of his appointment in the royal palace. The veil of his story is not so thick as to prevent us from guessing that it was the queen mother herself who said to the count, in anguished tones : " For heaven's sake, Romanones, we rely on you." But Canalejas was no fire-eating Radical, as his term of office was to show. He was, in fact, a sincere and devout Catholic, but, like the Catholics of sixteenth-century Spain, he declined to admit that loyalty to his faith, and even to his Church, implied submission to the Vatican and a free licence for religious orders to remain above the law. Moreover, his integrity, his firm moderation and his intellectual distinction, had succeeded where most of his predecessors had failed : in obtaining real ascendance over the king.

He tackled the work at once with an order for the coercion of all religious houses which had disregarded previous laws and decrees with regard to registration and payment of taxes when engaging in industrial and commercial enterprises. Furthermore, he made the king declare, in the royal speech at the opening of the Cortes (June 16th, 1910), that there would be a check on the growth of religious orders and that Article 11 of the Constitution would henceforth be interpreted in accordance with the spirit of liberty of conscience prevailing everywhere. Simultaneously he announced compulsory service and the abolition of the municipal food tax (*consumos*). These measures were intended to propitiate the Republican Wing of public opinion, which looked askance at his Cabinet, believing it to have been born in a dark palatine intrigue to get rid of Moret as a

punishment against Moret's opposition to the execution of Ferrer. This episode is also typical of the complexity of Spanish political problems. When the progressive parties had at last found a man capable of carrying out a constructive programme of liberalism whose sincerity and ability were beyond doubt, they launched a discussion on the somewhat obscure and even shady origins of his political power, thereby playing into the hands of the Crown, which, with consummate ability, divided the enemies of clericalism at the very moment when they seemed to have attained power.

While he had to defend himself against his own kith and kin, Canalejas was withstanding the onslaught of an infuriated Vatican, which was enlisting against him practically all the bishops of Spain. The prime minister countered with his famous Padlock Bill, which closed the frontier to further religious congregations until negotiations with the Vatican should finally establish a new régime. The Vatican objected and asked for the withdrawal of this and other precautionary measures before opening negotiations at all. Canalejas resolved to withdraw his ambassador in Rome. The Vatican, with its usual methods of *realpolitik*, second in nothing but sincerity to those of the hardest period of Bismarck, tried the effect of the Carlist ghost on the royal palace. Meanwhile, the storm raised in Spain had impressed on the prime minister himself the necessity of conciliation, and a formula, which revealed the Jesuitical upbringing of its ingenious contriver, was found by the Marqués de Comillas: the law was passed for two years unless, in the interval, a new law of association should be voted. The Marqués de Comillas knew his Spain. The king stood by his prime minister while contributing powerfully to

water down his anti-clerical wine. But he seized the first opportunity available to put himself right with the Pope. Just when Canalejas introduced his bill for regulating the right of association a eucharistic congress was taking place in Madrid. The prime minister succeeded, not without difficulty, in dissuading the king from taking the chair at the opening meeting, but the king arranged that the closing ceremony should be an imposing religious procession which, after circulating in the main streets of the capital, ascended the grand stairs of the royal palace and ended in depositing the Sacrament in the throne room, while the cardinal archbishop of Toledo blessed the royal family with the utmost solemnity.

The Spanish prime minister's attention had then to turn to foreign affairs. He was beginning to realise that, unless Spain took prompt action, all was over with the Spanish position in Morocco, not through any danger from the infidel, but owing to the irrepressible civilising zeal of the French Republic. The "colonial" party in Paris was growing impatient and, as usual in such cases, obliging disorders occurred in the region of Fez. The prime minister, who had observed signs of French vitality in those quarters, warned the French Government that, should French troops occupy Fez or Tazza, Spanish troops would follow their example in a few picked spots of the zone reserved to Spain. A French column under Major Brémond entered Fez and, on June 3rd, 1911, despite an unfavourable public opinion at home, Spanish troops landed in Larache and took Alcázar and Arcila. Canalejas was safe in defying public opinion, for he knew that his step in Morocco would unchain a French storm which would justify him at once in Spain. At this juncture the German Government chose to send a cruiser, *The*

Panther, to Agadir (July 1st), and much capital was made in the French Press of the coincidence between the Spanish and the German actions. Nevertheless, the key to the decision of the Spanish Government was to be revealed in later years to Count Romanones by "a person to whom the utmost authority is granted on Moroccan affairs" in France. This mysterious person declared to the Count that, had Canalejas's orders been delayed by a few hours, the Spanish troops which landed in Larache would have found that the French had preceded them there. Such is the generous eagerness wherewith Christian nations vie with one another in their anxiety to spread civilisation amongst the unruly and un-co-operative tribes of the Black Continent.

These events required a readjustment of the Moroccan position. What had happened? France had alienated the confidence of Spain to such an extent that the Spanish army sent to Larache was convinced that the Moors whom they met on the River Kert were provided with French arms and ammunition. This state of mind, whether justified or not, is explicable in the light of the following words of M. Tardieu :—

"Often for lack of a synthetic policy both Governments adjusted their actions to that of their local agents whose patriotic zeal underestimated the strength of common interests and of mutual obligations. If we were to survey the grievances on either side we would conclude, no doubt, that in this excess of zeal the Spanish agents went farther than ours. [M. Tardieu may be right. On the other hand, as he is a Frenchman himself, this opinion may be a pure effect of perspective.] But how could we deny, on the other hand, that the French Government of 1909, by keeping Spain out of its negotiation with Ger-

many, and, later, by allowing the Franco-Spanish negotiations on Morocco, whether financial or of another kind, to drag on either intentionally or by negligence, had not remained sufficiently within the spirit of the initial agreements and had diminished the credit which it was necessary to maintain in Madrid in order to obtain from the Spanish Government a treatment of good neighbourhood?"[1] This is an admirable summary of the psychological situation. In her dealings on Moroccan affairs with England, as well as with Germany, France always treated Spain with scant courtesy. In her direct dealings with Spain she resorted to a policy of obvious procrastination and illwill, the shortsightedness of which events were soon to demonstrate. France bought Germany off in her 1911 negotiations, then once more went alone to Fez and signed the Franco-Moroccan Treaty of March, 1912, establishing what amounted to a French protectorate; having thus secured a predominant and isolated position in Morocco, while Spain remained out in the cold, she turned to Spain and claimed from her a share of her zone as part price of what she had had to pay in Berlin for freedom of action in this sphere. Spain stuck to the treaty of 1904, but, by force of circum-

[1] Souvent, faute de vues d'ensemble, les deux gouvernements ont emboîté le pas à des agents locaux, dont le zèle patriotique appréciait trop peu la communauté des intérêts généraux et de l'obligation des transactions. S'il fallait reviser les griefs, on trouverait sans doute que, dans ces excès de zèle, les agents espagnols ont été plus loin que les nôtres. Mais comment nier, d'autre part, que le gouvernement français de 1909, en excluant l'Espagne de la négociation avec l'Allemagne, en laissant ensuite par système ou par négligence traîner toutes les négociations franco-espagnoles, financières ou autres, relatives au Maroc, s'était mal inspiré des accords initiaux et avait diminué le crédit qui lui était nécessaire à Madrid pour obtenir du gouvernement espagnol des procédés de bon voisinage ?

stances, negotiations had to be reopened and, after laborious discussions embittered by a press campaign of unusual violence on both sides of the Pyrenees, the treaty of November 27th, 1912, was concluded, mostly at the expense of Spain, whose zone was further reduced for the third time in twelve years. The Spanish zone was at last limited to an area of 18,300 square miles, while France secured 460,000. Tangier remained a thorny problem to be solved later. Much responsibility for these events was attributed in Spain to the policy of the English Government.

Home affairs revealed in Canalejas an equal grasp of realities combined with genuine idealism. His stand against the power of Rome has been described. Militarism did not make him retreat. When Congress debated the Ferrer Case retrospectively, it was obvious that the prime minister was not endeavouring to go beyond a perfunctory defence of the military tribunal concerned. His war secretary felt offended at this attitude and resigned, but Canalejas let him go with equanimity. In this enlightened man Catalonia soon perceived a mind capable of understanding her grievances. Being led then by a statesman of equal breadth of view, Prat de la Riba, the Catalanists tried to come to terms. The prime minister received them cordially and met them by introducing a bill, *De Mancomunidades y Delegaciones*, which enabled the four Catalan provincial councils (*diputaciones*) to combine in one *mancomunidad*, to which the State granted a fair measure of devolution. The bill was, of course, freely attacked by many Liberals and Conservatives, yet provided the basis for a decree granted in later years by Count Romanones, which enabled Catalonia to make a first and promising home rule experiment till 1923.

Such sympathy and understanding did not come from any weakness in the prime minister's character. When in September, 1912, a general railway strike threatened to plunge the country into anarchy, Canalejas decided to call up the railwaymen of military age and made them serve as soldiers in their railway posts, a measure which, though fiercely attacked by the parties of the Left, was undoubtedly at the time an indispensable act of State defence. But, though firm, he was not harsh. Far from it. No Spanish prime minister ever took more to heart the responsibilities of life and death which power implies. His advice was always for leniency. In one particular case, when after terrible scenes of disorder in Valencia a few men were sentenced to death, he advised the king to reprieve all but one of them. The king reprieved them all without exception, and Canalejas, anxious that the king should reap the full benefit of this generosity, formally resigned. This dramatic gesture greatly enhanced the popularity of the monarch. Never, neither before nor after this period, was King Alfonso's popularity more general and genuine than when Canalejas was able to tender his generous and liberal advice on public affairs. The democratic current, which had set in as the reaction from the execution of Ferrer, had impressed on many dynastic Liberals the necessity of absorbing the Republican Left by enlarging the monarchical programme in that direction. Moret had tried, somewhat prematurely, to attract to the Government men such as Azcárate and Don Melquíades Alvarez, leaders of moderate Republicanism. The revolution in Portugal which resulted in the expulsion of the Braganza dynasty and the setting up of a republic, helped this evolution of the monarchists. Canalejas's policy had the same aim, even though he tried to secure it by

more direct methods, and the king seemed to be wholeheartedly convinced by his prime minister. In 1912, Don Melquíades Alvarez, whose gifts of eloquence made him a powerful leader with the urban republican masses, corresponded to these efforts from the monarchical field by initiating an evolution towards monarchism which the enlightened policy of the prime minister enabled him to pursue. The moment seemed propitious for a gradual change of heart. There was, however, no lack of symptoms that the usual shady political intrigue was beginning to be woven round the great prime minister. Count Romanones, who more than once, moved by personal ambition, had taken steps which it was difficult not to connect with palatine tendencies, was beginning to show signs of premature appetite for power. Maura had a somewhat sensational meeting with Moret. This time, however, the dismal crisis which seemed to be in preparation in the backyard of the palace was spared to the nation and the prime minister. Canalejas fell. He fell dead, shot through the head by an anarchist while he was looking at the books in a bookshop window in the Puerta del Sol.

The only ruler which Spain had evolved during the reign of Alfonso XIII had been destroyed by Fate. Had Canalejas lived, it is almost certain that the forces which were disrupting the system which had been slowly evolving from the Restoration would have been controlled by his masterly hand and keen intellect. The petty party intrigues, above which he had not always been able to remain, would have been met by frank exposure and attack, and the help which they were apt to meet with in the royal palace energetically checked; the progressive forces of the nation would have been absorbed into active partnership; the Army and the Church reduced to obedience

by a moderate, yet firm, handling of their preposterous claims; and foreign affairs conducted with tactful vigour. But Canalejas was killed by an irresponsible fanatic and the Liberal Party found itself without a head. Señor García Prieto is no more than a well-meaning gentleman, and Count Romanones is the prototype of the Spanish politician and nothing more. Count Romanones became prime minister and began by endeavouring to consolidate the absorption of the Moderate Wing of the Republican Party by having Azcárate and some of his friends called to the royal palace to advise the king on the crisis. The king heard, then, some of the best men of Spain; they spoke to him with loyal sincerity; some of them, it is said on excellent authority, moved him to deep emotion. But, while he looked towards the Left, Maura from the Right thundered "implacable hostility" to the parties which had precipitated his fall on the occasion of the Ferrer trial. Romanones, who was trying to conciliate these parties over to monarchical ground, felt thus excommunicated by the man who normally was to be his collaborator in carrying on the king's Government, and finally resigned (October 25th), immediately after the visit which the French President, M. Poincaré, paid to Madrid as a return for the visit which King Alfonso had paid to Paris to celebrate the Franco-Spanish Treaty on Morocco. The obvious choice was Maura. But at his name there was a regular revolt in the Republican and Socialist ranks. *Maura no*, was the motto. This campaign of ostracism was so intense that the king bowed before it and called in the next Conservative leader available. Dato, who took office with a Cabinet of Conservatives, thought it well to revive the old name of the party: Liberal-Conservative. The political parties were thereby thoroughly disorganised

both on the Right and on the Left. While the Liberals had lost their leader by assassination, the Conservatives had lost theirs by ostracism and by that kind of political *harakiri* which Maura was now and then led to commit, under the influence of his intractable pride. The system inaugurated by Cánovas and Sagasta in the pact of El Pardo was thus coming to an end.

One afternoon in the month of March, 1914, a youthful man with a heavy forehead, expressive eyes and an attractive, if self-conscious, smile, came forward on the stage of the theatre of La Comedia in Madrid and began to speak with quiet assurance, elegant gesture and a finely modulated voice to a crowded house which listened eagerly, and now and then interrupted with vigorous ovations. He was the already famous professor of metaphysics of the University of Madrid, José Ortega y Gasset. But what he was explaining to this packed theatre was no metaphysical question; it was the grief of his generation at the sight of what their elders had done with Spain. "Our generation," he said, "has never negotiated with the topics of patriotism, and when it hears the word Spain it does not think of Calderón and Lepanto, it does not remember the victories of The Cross, it does not call forth the vision of a blue sky, and under it a splendour—it merely feels, and that which it feels is grief." He poured scorn on what he called "Official Spain." "Official Spain consists, as it were, in ghostly parties upholding ghosts of ideas which, backed by the shadows of newspapers, keep going Cabinets of hallucination." Yet he was careful not to let the blame fall on the political world alone. "I hold a point of view which is harder as a judgment on the past, but more optimistic as to the future. The old Spain—with its governing and its governed

classes, with its abuses and its usages, is now dying." The Restoration, he held, was the period when all Spain was subordinated to peace, and peace to the monarchy. The Republicans were no better, for, in their turn, by putting the Republican ideal above peace they also forgot Spain. For him it was necessary to kill the Restoration, since, he added, "the dead must be thoroughly killed." And he concluded that it was high time that everything in Spain was nationalised and liberalised: the Army, the Crown, the Clergy, the worker, and even, he pleasantly added, the ladies who now and then sign petitions without realising their essentially anti-national import—a dart, this, at the clerical ladies of the aristocracy who, without realising the gravity of their step, were always found on the side of the Vatican against the true interests of the nation.

This memorable day was the beginning of a movement of real leadership in Spanish politics. The spring tapped by Don Francisco Giner and fed by the devoted efforts of the *Junta*, or Committee for the Development of Studies, had by now become a strong and clear river of intelligent opinion flowing into the troubled and muddy waters of Spanish politics. Great hopes were raised when this body of new men, uncontaminated by the responsibilities of the past and the intrigues of the present, declared their intention to take part in public life and to raise the tone and the substance of Spanish politics. But four months after this day an Austrian prince was killed in Serajevo, and Europe went mad.

CHAPTER XXIV

THE WAR

The Cartagena Agreements signed in 1907 and the conversations held in 1913 between M. Poincaré and Count Romanones stipulated that, " should new circumstances arise tending to alter the territorial *status quo* " in the Mediterranean or on the African and European coasts of the Atlantic, the Governments of England, France and Spain would " enter into communication " with a view to adopting the measures required by the new situation. The declaration of war could no doubt be fairly interpreted as falling within the purview of these provisions, and it is almost certain that the Spanish Government expected some sort of " communication " to be made to it. Nothing, however, was forthcoming, and Dato lost no time in declaring Spain a neutral. A neutral. As Europe recovers her sanity the word becomes respectable again. There was a time when it was under a cloud. But a reasonable discussion of Spanish neutrality is nowadays possible, at any rate in the English language. On the face of it Spain might—almost should—have been drawn into the vortex. Situated on two of the three main seas on which the conflict was raging; touching war on her three frontiers—France, Portugal and Gibraltar; intimately connected by her foreign policy with the two leaders of the allied group, France and England, how could she remain a neutral? It is now possible to see the reasons why this happened. They are to

be found in both home and foreign conditions. At home the nation split in two. Roughly the liberal, anti-clerical, progressive Left was pro-Ally; the reactionary, clerical Right pro-German. But a more attentive study of the situation revealed its complex features, one of which was that, strictly speaking, there were in Spain neither pro-Germans nor pro-Allies, but only mental and emotional attitudes towards national, historical and philosophical problems which might be more or less adequately represented by these two convenient and popular labels.

The so-called pro-Ally side was led by the liberal and progressive intellectuals. It would be difficult to find a case in which the intellectual leaders of a country gave a better proof of their capacity for rising above shortsighted national views and feelings than that which the Spanish élite gave in 1914 when they sided with France and England. The men who took up the cudgels for the Allies knew the historical rôle which these two nations had played in the downfall of the Austrian Dynasty and in the destruction of the power of Spain which Ferdinand VI and Charles III had built up again after the War of Succession. They were aware of England's share in the disruption of the Spanish Empire from Canning to Salisbury; of France's ways in Morocco. Yet they did not hesitate. For them France and England were fighting their own battles, but incidentally they were fighting for liberalism, i.e., for the political school of thought which sees in the individual the true aim of the State and not a mere tool in the State's hands. They were not so much pro-Ally as anti-Prussian, and in this term they did not in the least condemn the Prussian people, but the political system which, for good or ill, was identified with Prussia at the time, just as it might now, under

perhaps a slightly different form, be identified with Italy. Unlike the generation of the middle of the nineteenth century, most of them owed more perhaps to Germany than to France, and felt far more in sympathy with German than with French culture, philosophy and letters. Several of them had to master their feelings, which would have led them naturally to espouse the cause of Germany, because their mind pointed clearly the other way even from the point of view of the best interests of Germany. And for many the open advocacy of the Western cause implied a painful sacrifice of friendships and memories dear to them from their student days beyond the Rhine.

The line of cleavage which the best minds of the nation had discerned from the beginning cut across public opinion and proved to be the real frontier, irrespective of political party lines or other considerations. At bottom the issue was one between the liberal and the imperative temperaments. Behind the intellectual leaders and the liberal temperaments in the political world (which were not all of them necessarily in the Liberal Party) there were a fair proportion, perhaps the majority, of the professions, and practically the whole of the organised working classes, a substantial minority of the Army and a handful of enlightened clergy. The peasantry was for the most part indifferent. The upper middle classes, the clerical world, the majority of the Army and the reactionary politicians were pro-German. Business was, on the whole, pro-Ally, even though heart and temperament inclined it to Prussianism, as is often the case in the best-regulated industries; but then the winds of prosperity blew unmistakably from the West. The Court was divided. The king, with his unrivalled skill and exceptional

opportunities, managed to conceal his true sentiments right through the war, and he would be a bold man who would even now venture to express a definite opinion as to the side to which he was more attached; the queen is English; the queen-mother was Austrian. The Court had always been a quiet but ardent battleground between the clerical and the reactionary elements entrenched on the queen-mother's wing of the palace and the liberals (of course with moderation) who clustered round the young queen. The former were probably stronger and certainly more vocal. Shortly after the death in action of Prince Maurice of Battenberg, brother of the Queen of Spain, Señor Vazquez de Mella, the Carlist leader, addressed a pro-German meeting crowded with wealthy aristocrats. In a high-falutin' style, which went by the name of eloquence among his enthusiastic supporters, he sang his admiration for mighty Germany, cried his pity for "poor France," and shouted his historical hatred of perfidious Albion. A bright array of Court ladies attended the meeting and ostentatiously applauded the speaker, whose feet they covered with flowers while he declaimed a passionate *finale*.

It is obvious that a nation so deeply cleft in twain by the war issue could not be an active belligerent on either side. Moreover, both sections of public opinion were agreed that the war was not Spain's business, and this for at least two reasons: the first, a kind of underlying scepticism born of a long historical experience which the Treaty of Versailles was later to justify; the second, an intimate conviction that no vital Spanish interest was at stake or could be benefited by Spain joining in the fray.

This second reason, at any rate, was no doubt reciprocated by France and England, who do not

appear to have shown any eagerness to recruit Spain's belligerent help. Both France and England well knew that Spain could not enlist without putting Gibraltar and Morocco on the tray of the war stakes. On the other hand, Spain was an admirable war factory, for the Peninsula produces practically every mineral, animal and vegetable raw material, except rubber and mineral oil, and she could also provide abundant labour and a fair amount of technical skill and even of capital. The choice for the Allies was, therefore, not doubtful. And as the obvious interests of all concerned could be served best by neutrality, Spain remained a neutral.

The war, nevertheless, produced deep effects on Spain. They may be summed up in one sentence: the war drove a powerful current of foreign vitality right into the inmost recesses of the nation. The current was as muddy and impure as it was impetuous. It carried much gold and much poison along with the vivifying ferments of a new life. And it came further to complete and render acute practically every one of the problems which beset Spanish Governments. In the intenser atmosphere of the war and through the din of the constant debate between pro-Ally and pro-German advocates, the now familiar processes of Spanish politics evolved apace with grave international difficulties arising out of the German submarine campaign.

The period will show:—

The gradual disintegration of the two political parties, in part through their own internal weakness, in part through the peculiar policy of the king.

The definite alignment of the king in favour of coalition ministries, which was bound to accelerate the downfall of the party system.

The gradual emancipation of the electorate, which, in the end, made it impossible for the government that "made" the general election to be sure of a majority.

The revolt of the army, i.e., of the officers' soviet, and its usurpation of the powers of both king and parliament.

The swift development of syndicalist, communist and anarchist movements, partly under the financial stimulus of German agents, and, later, under the political stimulus of the Russian Revolution.

The endeavours of certain Catalanists to obtain the help now of Germany, now of France, for setting up a separate nationhood.

The picture was black enough. But it began rosy. Orders from the Allies were plentiful and money flowed into the nation, which enabled the Government to lay the foundations for the repatriation of the foreign debt. The peseta rose in a gratifying manner and the nation seemed to be settling down to its work as an allied war factory, when a debate on military reforms forced Dato to resign (December, 1915). Count Romanones took office in rather difficult circumstances. Military operations were being carried out in Morocco, where public opinion suspected him of being financially interested in the mines which it was the predominant intention of the operations to safeguard from Moorish attack, and German submarines were carrying on a brisk campaign against Spanish ships, while the prime minister was also suspected of wanting Spain to join the Allied battalion. He took his responsibilities bravely in the teeth of a campaign against him in the pro-German press, as ruthless as the submarine campaign of Germany against the Spanish ships, and while

news of heavy fighting arrived from Ceuta he was making strong representations in Berlin. At the same time he had to face a general railway strike in the summer of 1916 and, in September, a violent campaign against his finance minister, Don Santiago Alba, for the heinous crime of introducing a bill to make the Treasury participate in the handsome war profits which business men were reaping at the time. Spain had by then lost close upon 40,000 tons of shipping, and, when Germany sent in her note of absolute blockade of the allied coasts, Count Romanones decided to test public opinion by answering it in stiff and spirited terms (February 6th, 1917). Public opinion was by then not only divided on this important issue of foreign policy, but profoundly disturbed by no less than three movements of a revolutionary character, hereafter described, and Count Romanones decided to leave power on April 19th.

There was more than met the eye in this resignation. In point of fact, Count Romanones knew that a serious military revolt was brewing and he preferred to be out of reach when it broke out. This revolt was a curious after-effect of syndicalism acting on the permanent state of semi-rebellion of the Spanish officers. The syndicalist idea, preached in Barcelona by a few disciples of Sorel, had fallen on particularly favourable soil in Spain. The tenets of particularist association, abstention from politics and direct action, spoke but too eloquently to the individualistic Spanish soul; they were revolutionising the labour movement by erecting a syndicalist *Confederación General del Trabajo* in Barcelona against the socialist *Unión General de Trabajadores* in Madrid. They were at the same time in a curious indirect way influencing the medium in which such

influence was least to be expected. The committees of defence, organised by the army officers with a conscientiousness, a discipline and a foresight which might have produced far-reaching effects if applied to the army's proper purposes, arose partly as a kind of irritated reaction against the more objectionable forms of " anti-patriotic " Catalanism, partly as an instrument of internal solidarity and with a view to removing the evil effects of favouritism in the ranks of officers, but mostly in order to break down the power of the *Casa Militar* or military house of the king, a kind of palatine war office which administered the king's pleasure in military matters. Their official aims were " moderation in rewards, justice in promotions, respect for seniority, reorganisation of the medical corps and the commissariat, improvement of staff and material conditions and exclusion of military forces from civilian conflicts in order to avoid dangerous strife between the people and the army." The ostensible aims were perfect. The methods were, of course, inadmissible. All confabulation of officers was illegal, but, moreover, the committees, though theoretically a secret organisation, soon started to threaten and bully cabinets and even the Crown.

And yet the Crown continued its policy of whittling down and destroying its political parties. Señor García Prieto, always a willing tool in the king's hands, had organised a cabinet of liberals into which, at the king's request, he had admitted the conservative Admiral Miranda as minister of marine. But soon after he had taken office, and while social troubles were threatening on the horizon, the committees of defence initiated their attack on the institutions. General Aguilera, the war secretary, ordered the arrest of the leaders. The committee

sent an ultimatum to the Government. Pressure, it is believed, from the Crown did the rest. The Cabinet resigned and the committees won.

Curiously enough, the nation was with the officers, a fact which admits of two explanations, both true. There is no doubt that a man or body of men who succeed in carrying their point through sheer will-power manfully facing all obstacles, is sure to appeal to the Spanish people, whose dramatic sense is the most keen of their political reactions. The committees of defence were popular because they beat the king; not on account of any enmity against the king as a person, or as an institution, but merely because a king takes some beating. Then it was felt that the committees were bringing a renovating element to Spanish political life. The old " ghostly " system was going; realities were coming in. " Renovation " was in the air. " Renovation " became the watchword of a new hope. It became the motto of the new daily, *El Sol*, a clean, intelligent, wide and generous organ of opinion, free from bonds or prejudices, just created under the same inspiration by an enterprising business man and intellectual, Don Nicolás María Urgoiti. With uncompromising independence of the past, *El Sol* led public opinion, over which it had quickly acquired considerable command, to the view that, through the somewhat revolutionary action of the committees of defence, the old system would be forced to acquire a new spirit and organise the life of Spain on a new basis. The crisis was hailed, not as what it was—the triumph of a rebellious body of army officers over Crown, Cabinet and Parliament—but as the turning-point in the history of the Restoration; the moment when new men and new ideas would have to be called to the government of Spain. The king gave office to Dato and to the most orthodox of Conservative Cabinets.

The disappointment was keen. Catalonia in particular, where the nationalist ferment, then stirring in all Europe, from Ireland to Macedonia, had stimulated the old cause, felt defrauded of the high expectations which the "Renovation" movement had made her conceive. A meeting of Catalan members of Parliament took place in Barcelona, and decided to ask the Government to call a session of Cortes, failing which the Catalan members would call all Spanish parliamentarians willing to meet them to hold an assembly. The Government was not in the least anxious to add to its difficulties by a series of stormy sittings in which the king's and its own surrender before the military would have to be discussed. It declared that the assembly would be considered as "factious" and took the somewhat unwise step of discrediting the movement in Castile by tainting it with Catalanist colours. The Assembly met on July 19th, attended by seventy-one members of both Houses (out of 760). It decided to consider itself as permanently constituted and set up three commissions: one on constitution, one on army and justice, and one on national economy. These commissions were to prepare reports to be submitted to a later meeting in another town. The Assembly was thoroughly popular in the whole country; the municipalities of Barcelona, Málaga, Oviedo, Salamanca, Saragossa and the Basque Provinces expressed their approval of the movement, and the support which it received from the other provinces, where the political machinery held official bodies in silence or in opposition to it, was nevertheless considerable. The movement aimed at a non-party Ministry and a general election under guarantees of respect for the popular vote with a view to a constituent assembly.

This movement might have been the true salvation

of Spain and, in particular, of the monarchical system, had the Crown been more convinced of the advantages of a parliamentary form of government and had the hotheads of the labour movement been less convinced of the advantages of revolution. As it happened, the moderate but bold and statesmanlike action of the Parliamentary Assembly fell flat under a combined attack coming from the extremists of the Right and of the Left. A movement towards direct action and violence had begun a few years earlier in Barcelona. The roots of it were to be found in that proclivity to anarchist outrages which is a permanent disease in the Catalan capital. Later, towards 1910, the more enterprising followers of Señor Lerroux could with difficulty be discriminated from political guerrillas. The royalist bands known in Paris as *Camelots du Roy* were imitated in Barcelona by the Carlist party, which organised so-called *Requetés*, or bands of young men ready to fight at any moment for their cause. The radicals of Señor Lerroux countered with similar bands, significantly styled *Jóvenes Bárbaros*. All this ferment of violence and agitation helped, in an indirect way, the cause of syndicalism, which aimed at influencing events by organised force and in contempt of political institutions. Add to the picture the deplorable example of anarchy given by the Army itself, and over it all the exhilarating reports, just then arriving, of the brand-new Russian Revolution. On August 10th, 1917, six days before the day chosen for the second meeting of the Assembly, a revolutionary general strike was declared. The moderate *Unión* of Madrid, in order not to be outdone by the hotheaded *Confederación* of Barcelona, had taken the lead. The aim was political as well as social: a socialist democratic republic. The strike spread over the whole country: Madrid, Barcelona,

Bilbao, Oviedo. The industrial districts of Valencia, Catalonia, Aragón and Andalusía were paralysed. Trains, tramways, bakeries, the building trades, came to a standstill. But the Army was intact. A state of war was declared. Machine-guns and artillery swept the barricaded streets of Madrid and Barcelona. Three days sufficed to put down disorder. The revolution left behind two thousand prisoners, several hundred victims, dead and wounded, and the Constitution dead. The labour hotheads had delivered the nation and its hopeful Assembly into the hands of the only force that remained : the Army.

On August 10th, the Cabinet had passed a credit for military expenses. But on August 19th, the Army had "saved the nation," and mere credits would not satisfy them. The representatives of the committees of defence had been in Madrid, seen the king as well as several important personages, and found in Señor La Cierva, the resolute man who had insisted that Ferrer should be shot, a man to their liking. A message, which was an ultimatum, had been sent to the Palace, as a consequence of which the king suggested to Dato that he might, perhaps, resign. A new Cabinet had to be built round the war secretary whom the committees imposed : Señor La Cierva. The only man ready to accept such a condition was Señor García Prieto. He became prime minister. The crisis took place while the Assembly was holding a session in Madrid. By a movement not yet fully explained the constitution of the new Cabinet deprived the Assembly of its main strength by securing the co-operation of Señor Cambó, who allowed two of his collaborators to enter the Ministry. Thus, by a mixture of stupidity in Labour, astuteness in the older institutions, firmness in the Dato Government,

and vacillation and disunion in the Assembly, the grave but hopeful crisis of 1917 went by without leaving behind beneficial results of any importance.

The inroads on the political system of what was now the past had been so deep that no one was surprised to see in office a Cabinet composed of Maurists, Catalanists and Liberals. The true dictator of the Ministry was Señor La Cierva. The first difficulty he had to weather was a movement amongst the non-commissioned officers, who, not without logic, had formed committees of defence and tried to imitate the methods of their superior officers. They were ruthlessly reduced to discipline by the war secretary, who had been put in office by indiscipline. This happened at the beginning of 1918. But a kind of fever of syndicalism had by then seized all the corporations of the realm, from the postal workers to the members of the nobility, who organised themselves and issued a manifesto. The movement came to a head when, the telegraph officers having declared a strike, Señor La Cierva tried to apply his resolute ways to the conflict and plunged the country into chaos. This event, coming on top of a general election, as a result of which the four leaders of the 1917 revolution (sentenced to death and reprieved with life sentences) were elected members of Parliament by Madrid, Barcelona and Valencia, brought about the downfall of the Government. After days of painful negotiations the king called a meeting of ex-prime-ministers at the Palace at midnight on March 21st. It is generally believed that he threatened abdication if his suggestion were not accepted. It was. Maura became prime minister of a Cabinet in which all the ex-prime-ministers were included, along with a few outstanding political leaders, notably Señor Cambó, who became minister of

finances, and Señor Alba, who became minister of education. The constitution of this Cabinet was extremely popular, for it was a dramatic stroke and it ostracised Señor La Cierva. It took, moreover, a bold and wise, though strictly, perhaps, an illegal, measure : it validated the election of the four socialist members of Parliament, who passed from gaol to Parliament. The Cabinet, nevertheless, was of short duration. Internal dissensions, probably due to political antagonism between Señor Alba (a Castilian Centralist) and Señor Cambó, led to its disintegration. It fell on November 6th. A new crisis was negotiated under the shadow cast by foreign events. The Kaiser fled, and every day brought news of a fresh abdication. The falling of thrones is contagious, and the fear of contagion is a source of caution in the boldest hearts. A Liberal Government was the order of the day. The first attempt, under Señor García Prieto, was not successful. Count Romanones took office on December 3rd, 1918, and immediately left for Paris to interview President Wilson.

Caught in the throes of such grave internal events, Spanish Governments had been hard put to it to maintain Spain's neutrality free from the dangers which beset it. The German Government, in its plight, had concentrated its efforts on war requirements without regard for other considerations. Its secret and propaganda services in Spain had unlimited means at their disposal and a remarkable freedom from prejudice as to the ways of using them. Anarchists and Left-Wing syndicalists were enabled to organise themselves and strikes were always sure of support. Strange Teutonic types were active, at times on the labour, at times on the employer, side, and always in a manner which fostered dissatisfaction, unrest, strife and even bloodshed. Barcelona knew no peace.

Troubles spread also to other industrial centres. Submarines frequented the Spanish coasts, not always in vain. The pro-German Press, with a deplorable lack of national spirit, took the side of Germany to the bitter end. The Government had to steer clear of action which might be misrepresented by the pro-German papers as a disguised attempt to launch Spain into the war. In 1917 a submarine entered Cadiz and was interned on parole, yet broke its word and fled. Trade became practically the monopoly of the Allies, and Spain, in protecting her trade, had of necessity to protect allied trade. Towards the end of 1917 an agreement was negotiated to that effect with the British Government. But Spanish shipping losses became heavier and heavier, and the Government had just obtained from Germany the recognition of the principle of ton for ton indemnity when the war came to an end. Spain had lost 65 ships and 140,000 tons.

What had she won? First, a considerable amount of capital. Her trade balance had, of course, changed its sign during the war, so that between 1915 and 1919, both inclusive, official figures show a balance in her favour of 768,000,000 pesetas. But the influx of capital was much bigger, and, as a result of it, Spain was able to acquire a considerable proportion of her foreign industrial debt and practically all her national debt. Her railways, in particular, are now practically her own. The clearest indication of this change in her economic condition may be seen in the affairs of the Bank of Spain and particularly in its gold reserves. The gold held by the Bank of Spain amounted to 567,000,000 pesetas (22·68 million pounds) in 1914. In 1918 it had risen to 2,223,000,000 pesetas (88·92 million pounds). At the same time the basis of trade expanded, as the following table will show.

	1914.				1920.			
	Imports.	Per cent. of Total.	Exports.	Per cent. of Total.	Imports.	Per cent. of Total.	Exports.	Per cent. of Total.
With Europe	708,786,634	65·19	697,251,646	75·94	730,880,894	49·79	700,449,370	66·64
With Asia ..	78,601,471	7·20	7,764,949	0·84	91,576,896	6·24	3,560,510	0·33
With Africa ..	19,824,235	1·83	19,349,856	2·10	26,784,757	1·83	30,134,127	2·85
With South America	97,920,988	9·01	126,884,661	13·82	264,176,256	17·99	238,675,120	22·73
With North America	154,813,522	14·26	65,664,740	7·15	345,840,071	23·55	78,782,456	7·44
With Oceania	27,228,598	2·51	1,420,668	0·15	8,742,050	0·60	69,352	0·01
Total	1,087,175,448	100·00	918,336,520	100·00	1,468,000,924	100·00	1,051,670,935	100·00

The most typical feature of this change is a considerable increase in the trade with America, both North and South, and particularly of both imports and exports with Spanish-America and of imports from the United States.

Much of this rise in the commercial activity of Spain was due to the industrial and commercial stimulus arising out of the necessity to work under exacting conditions of time and quality during the war. Many industries which were founded during the war disappeared with the abnormal conditions which had given them birth, but a number remained and much permanent improvement of old plant and conditions was effected, notably in the iron and steel plants of the Basque country and in the new establishments of the same trade on the eastern coast.

The working classes went through a period of high salaries which did much to ripen their views and to make them at the same time more exacting in their aims and more moderate and constructive in their methods. Though much trouble was still to come from the unruly elements which disturb the evolution of labour in Spain—both on the labour and on the employer side—the gain was permanent and was to show its effects in due time. The importance of big-scale efforts in industry and, generally, in public life was driven home to the imagination of the country and, along with it, the fundamental rôle of machinery. This period saw the beginning of the influence of American life in Spain. Spain was then invaded by all kinds of refugees from Europe, not a few of those stray human beings living their own isolated life with no concern for the events of history; but also many undesirable types, floating between spying and drug addiction, white slave traffic and gambling, fraudulent finance and shoplifting. Madrid and Barcelona

were constellated with cabarets and the jewellers, perfumery shops and travelling agencies minted money. Along with this internationalism of a lower kind Spain had then to intervene in foreign affairs both at home and abroad. Madrid was the most important European neutral city, and many matters of finance and general policy found there a convenient soil and atmosphere. The king had organised a most efficient system of information and help whereby the cases of missing soldiers of both camps were investigated and many of them alleviated with the utmost care and devotion. The official diplomatic service of the country had to take over a growing number of embassies and legations as the area of belligerency enlarged, and there came a time when the Spanish Ambassador in Berlin represented nearly every nation there. Spanish doctors had to travel in Allied hospital ships to guarantee their *bona fide* character to the irate commanders of German submarines; Spanish military officers had to inspect prisoners' camps to ensure the welfare of the prisoners. All these duties of world collaboration acted as powerful stimuli in the Spanish mind, and, in the aggregate, it may be said that Spain lived then an international life such as she had not known since the days when in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries her statesmen, generals, churchmen and ambassadors were paramount in the affairs of Europe.

CHAPTER XXV

FROM THE END OF THE WAR TO THE END OF THE CONSTITUTION

When peace broke out a wind of liberalism blew over the country. The Government was, of course, in liberal hands—at least, in the safely liberal hands of Count Romanones. He had a clean record in international matters. He had always been as favourable to the Allies as was possible in Spain. He went to Paris, saw Wilson, and returned with a seat for Spain on the Council of the League of Nations. Grave events awaited him at home. The Catalans, stimulated by the nationalist movements of Europe, called on him and asked for a further measure of home rule. In the debates in Congress Señor Cambó, their leader, boldly asserted Catalonia's claim to nationhood. The Count had, moreover, been able to find in Paris traces of Catalan efforts to bring the case of Catalonia before the Peace Conference. Meanwhile, Barcelona was brewing another of her anarchist-militaristic crises. The permanent state of industrial war there was being handled with lenient tact by a progressive civil governor, Señor Montañés, with the co-operation of a brilliant lawyer, Señor Doval, who had courageously taken over the arduous duties of Chief of the Barcelona Police. A dualism had begun to manifest itself amongst the authorities of Barcelona: the civil governor was inclined to arbitration and conciliation and usually found ready help in the more moderate leaders of

labour as well as in a small, but not very influential, group of intelligent employers; the bulk of the employers, however, were of a more resolute and reactionary temperament and gravitated towards the offices of the Captain-General, in the military atmosphere of which they found ready sympathy for their breezy methods. The complexity of the situation may be gathered from the fact that, while the industrial labour leaders in co-operation with the liberal civil governors were indifferent, or lukewarm, to the regionalistic issue, to which the civil politicians were on the whole sympathetic, the reactionary employers, so friendly with the military authorities, were adepts of Catalanism, a doctrine heretical and infamous to army men. With such hopelessly entangled relationships were Catalan politics then being woven. Señor Doval found his work handicapped by the more than shady activities of one Bravo Portillo, an ex-Chief of Police, who had been expelled by the civilian authorities on being found guilty of espionage on behalf of Germany and who was, nevertheless, in the employ of the Captain-General's office. Matters between the civil and the military authorities went from bad to worse, and one evening both the Governor and the Chief of Police were faced with an ultimatum to leave the town at once, which they did to avoid worse evils. The Cabinet, unable to vindicate civil authority, resigned.

By then the whole Peninsula was being rapidly overrun with Bolshevik measles. The infection began, of course, in Barcelona, where the *Confederación Nacional del Trabajo* was actively organising a campaign for the *Sindicato Único*, or One Big Union. This campaign bore fruit in Andalusia, where the *Federación Nacional de Agricultores*, founded by the Congress of Córdoba in 1913, lent a ready ear to the new

ideas on revolutionary tactics which their Catalan comrades advocated. A congress of the regionalist (Andalusian) syndicalist federations had taken place in 1918, and since then a wave of disorders, strikes and even crimes had swept over the small townships and fields of Andalusia—the tragic expiation of a past full of shortsighted mistakes and even of cynical brutality on the part of many a callous landlord. The situation was equally bad in Barcelona. The employers had taken a leaf from the labour book and sought strength in association. In 1914, the first Congress of Employers' Federations had taken place in Madrid. A second congress met in Barcelona in 1919. Between the dates of these two congresses the Employers' League had set up a general secretariat in Madrid, and had launched a policy of uncompromising opposition to labour claims and to Government concessions to labour, which was to lead to disastrous results.

Such were the circumstances in which, on Count Romanones' resignation, Maura was called to power by the king. It should be noticed that Maura was not then the chief of the Conservative party. The party had moved away from him owing precisely to a disagreement on the resolute methods of Señor La Cierva which Maura had adopted. Dato, the new Conservative chief, prided himself on being the pioneer of government reform on social and industrial questions in a sense sympathetic to labour's moderate claims. The king's choice in the circumstances was interpreted as a definite preference for the strong way, coupled with indifference to the claims of his main dynastic party. But disapproval of his step rose to a pitch of indignation when the king granted Maura the coveted dissolution decree, although it is believed by well-informed Conservative leaders that His

Majesty first convinced Dato of the advisability, or, at any rate, the inevitability, of this decision. Maura, in that general election which he controlled, destroyed all the reputation which he had acquired as a sincere respecter of the suffrage in years past. His methods brought back the style of party electioneering to the worst period of the Regency. And yet—a most important point for understanding the evolution of Spanish politics at this time—in spite of his ruthless and unscrupulous methods, he failed to bring more than a handful of Government candidates to the House. *The suffrage was beginning to work in Spain.* This failure in the field of politics was paralleled in the field of social unrest. Confronted with a serious situation in the south and in Catalonia, he met it with force and nothing but force. He suspended the guarantees of the Constitution, he imprisoned and expelled labour leaders, closed labour associations and clubs, applied a strict censorship, used, in fact, all the paraphernalia of lazy and violent governments. A general was sent to Andalusia to deal with the revolted agrarian workers as if they were an army of enemy invaders, when all might have been pacified with a State guarantee of steady work through the year. This deplorable Government fell on July 20th.

Every effort was made, however, to persevere in the resolute policy which had brought it to its end, and, consequently, to obstruct the obvious and constitutional solution, a Conservative Government, because the men who then led the party were committed to a conciliatory policy with labour and such a policy was opposed by the military authorities in Barcelona and by the Crown. No doubt, dissatisfied with the king's attitude and in indifferent health at the time, Dato had advised the king to form a Government of Conservatives under Señor Sánchez Toca, and the king

had agreed, a fact which Dato had announced to his party. To their surprise, however, the summons was sent not to Señor Sánchez Toca, but to Maura, and serious and strenuous efforts were made to induce the conservative leaders to accept this preposterous solution. These efforts included a visit of Marshal Primo de Rivera (uncle of the present Dictator), who threatened the conservatives with an extreme Left ministry under the ex-republican leader, Don Melquíades Alvarez if they did not accept the king's solution, and, later, a visit of Señor La Cierva himself, who failed to carry conviction. Even at this late hour the king persisted, and the task of forming a Cabinet was entrusted to Admiral Miranda. At long last the enlightened wing of the Conservative party had its way and Señor Sánchez Toca was asked to form a ministry—a mandate which he accepted only after persistent efforts made by his chief, Dato, for by this time Señor Sánchez Toca was indignant at the king's obduracy and cavalier treatment of his old advisers.

The history of this crisis is all-important because the Sánchez Toca Ministry went far to prove that most of the criticisms levelled against Spanish democracy by those who never made a sincere effort to trust it, in combination with those who made persistent efforts, the last of them successful, to betray it, are baseless. The Sánchez Toca Ministry was a Government of Conservatives, in fact some of its members would be considered as die-hard reactionaries in France or England. Its home secretary, Señor Burgos y Mazo, is a devout Catholic, and as distant from Socialism as Mr. Stanley Baldwin or President Coolidge. But this Ministry came to office determined to do its best to solve industrial problems with common sense, tact, firmness and prudence, and above all with a high sense of impartiality and justice.

No one who reads the remarkable book written by Señor Burgos y Mazo under the significant title of "The summer of 1919 at the Home Office" can fail to be impressed by its transparent honesty and convinced by the abundant documents which it contains, ranging from diagrams of the German secret service system in Spain to confidential police notes and stenograms of telephone conversations. The general conclusions to be drawn from this study are an indispensable basis for judging subsequent events.

Firstly, the Government vindicated its enlightened policy in every way by repeated successes every time it was allowed the unhampered use of its methods; thus it weathered grave strikes and revolts in Valencia and in Málaga without bloodshed in the teeth of most stubborn and unenlightened behaviour on the part of the Málaga employers; and it dismissed the civil governor of Saragossa for having expelled some labour leaders without reason, thereby provoking a general strike.

Secondly, even in Barcelona, where its policy was to be held in check by the dark forces at work there, the Government succeeded in eliminating the worst cancer from which the town suffered, assassination. This is a point that must be emphasised. *Political and industrial murders were at their lowest in Barcelona while the Sánchez Toca authorities were in charge of affairs,* and it is therefore not true to say that exceptional measures, other than the ordinary application of intelligence and justice were indispensable to bring peace to this tried capital.

Thirdly, the main obstacle to the statesmanlike policy of the Government came from precisely those who claimed to represent law and order, and, in particular, from a more or less avowed combination of the political and press interests connected with

Señor La Cierva, the employers' federation and the military authorities. The story, and, what is more to the point, the documents, printed by Señor Burgos y Mazo go far to show the singular methods of this reactionary combination. The head of the Barcelona employers' federation is clearly shown working for a breach and a lock-out even after committing himself to a solution on the basis of arbitration which he himself had put forward. A curious correspondence shows how General Milans del Bosch took it as a matter of course that, while the civil governor would deal with the labour representatives, he, the captain-general, would negotiate with the employers: a suggestion, or rather an assumption, which the home secretary rightly corrected at once. The negotiations may be followed step by step in the complete and impartial record of the home secretary. They show treasures of patience on the part of the Government and of the moderate leaders of labour, then clearly in control of their rank and file, but they also show a determination on the part of the employers' federation to fight at all costs or, to put it in their favourite words, " to give the battle " (*dar la batalla*). The matter came to a deadlock when the military, in complete agreement with the employers' federation, threatened to repeat their exploit under the Romanones Government and expel the civil governor.

But the crisis which caused the fall of the Government did not come from militarism meddling with social questions. It came from militarism pure and simple. A number of captains studying in the *Escuela Superior de Guerra* (Staff College) had refused to submit to the illegal and vexatious conditions which the committees of defence required from all officers. They were accordingly asked to resign. They refused. They were brought before a court of

honour and sentenced to resign from the school. This incident created a profound impression, and public opinion was shocked at the monstrous injustice done to these men whose very stand implied high qualities of character. The Cabinet resolved that a new court should hear the case and that no solution should be made final without first referring to the Supreme Council of War (a military court of justice). Contrary to his explicit undertaking to that effect General Tovar, the war secretary, approved the decision of the second court, unfavourable to the captains, without referring the matter to the Supreme Council. He had been the object of strong military pressure. The Government resigned. A pliable man was sought to take charge, and an inconspicuous conservative, Allende Salazar, answered the purpose. The lock-out, so much desired by the employers, was launched in Barcelona. It quickly degenerated into a campaign of sporadic murder which cost victims on both sides and which, therefore, may not unfairly be traced to both sides. By a kind of contagion a military rebellion occurred in the lower ranks in a Saragossa barracks, ruthlessly repressed, of course. This unfortunate Government had to take political responsibility for an unpleasant incident which occurred in Barcelona on the occasion of Marshal Joffre's visit. After the French victory the more enthusiastic Catalanists had suddenly realised that Marshal Joffre was a French Catalan, and the visit was made the occasion for exhibiting rather violent Catalanist passions with so little tact that the visitor had to leave before his appointed time. The country could not live through such difficult days under so grey a Government. Dato took office in May, and soon after his accession Count Salvatierra, the "strong" governor of Barcelona, appointed by the

previous Cabinet to please the employers, fell a victim of that ruthless social strife which he had unwittingly perhaps helped to promote. Dato appointed as civil governor a division-general with a reputation for energy, General Martínez Anido. From that moment, the attention of the Government became concentrated on two problems : the general election and the social strife in Barcelona. The first was a complete fiasco for the Government (177 members out of 405), but a brilliant vindication of the view that, despite the imperfections of the electoral law deliberately maintained in order the better to juggle with the votes, the suffrage was rapidly becoming effective. As for the events in Barcelona, General Martínez Anido obtained some kind of peace, but by methods which it would be difficult to describe. He himself declared in conversation with an interviewer that " he was but a surgeon, and a doctor would have to take charge at a later stage." The upshot of it all was that Dato was assassinated on March 8th, 1921.

The king tried to bring back Maura, but Maura had by now become a convinced advocate of coalition Governments and found no support for his ideas in either Liberals or Conservatives. The king called on Allende Salazar again. A deplorable choice, if only because His Majesty had by then come to a stage when, more than ever, he needed strong and independent advice. The scene of grave events shifted from Barcelona, where one general was sowing seeds of future storms, to Morocco, where another general was ready for his harvest of disasters. The high commissioner, General Berenguer, was an able and distinguished officer, a man of cool judgment, forbearance, knowledge of Morocco and of his people, technical skill and general ability, yet sinning, as who

did not in those days, in excessive weakness towards the constant encroachments of the Crown in the management of affairs. Two years earlier, under the Sánchez Toca Ministry, General Berenguer had won great success by taking over the tribes the important vantage point of El Fondak. Since then his ability and quiet methods had enabled the Spanish cause to progress morally and territorially more effectively than it had under any of his predecessors and at a much smaller cost in blood and treasure. But there was one of his subordinate officers, General Silvestre, in charge of the Melilla division, whose cavalry soul felt afflicted at so much civilian skill and at so little military dash and he decided to strike a blow. His plan was evidently approved by the king, who sent him warm telegraphic encouragement couched in friendly and familiar language. It is not clear to what extent it was approved, or even actually known in all its importance, by General Berenguer, his military chief. General Silvestre went gaily on, placed himself in an absurdly dangerous position overlooking the strong armament of the enemy and suffered a most severe defeat (July 21). In a few hours the Spanish troops lost all the eastern zone which had been taken gradually from the enemy since 1909, thousands of dead, wounded and prisoners, and a considerable amount of war material. Moreover, this defeat created a deep impression in Morocco, and greatly enhanced the prestige of Abd El Krim, the leader of the rebellion. General Silvestre committed suicide.

The effect in Spain was, of course, profound. It brought down the Government, and Maura was called to meet the emergency with exceptional measures. The nation was generous in men and money, and an army of 140,000 was put at the disposal of the

high commissioner. But the nation was also wrathful and wanted guarantees that the responsibility for what had happened should be investigated and exacted. The situation immediately took an unpleasant turn owing to the interference of the committees of defence. Maura had asked Señor La Cierva to take over the war office on a strong hint from somewhere, and, though he personally was averse to the military committees, his war secretary liked to consider himself as their man. Maura, who realised that the situation was fraught with danger, tried to get time on his side, but public excitement, far from abating, was constantly rising, partly under the effect of further revelations made by special press envoys, partly under such provocations as a bill submitted to Parliament by Señor La Cierva, granting rewards to generals and officers on account of the very events pending investigation, or the somewhat ostentatious welcome wherewith the king received General Berenguer in Madrid. Public opinion became so insistent that Maura gave way and appointed General Picasso as a special investigator. The General presented a courageous and outspoken report. The military committees were incensed. Maura tried to put down their insolent protests and, exhausted by the effort, resigned his mandate to the king. "Let those who prevent government govern," he exclaimed. The time had not come yet.

The king had by now unwillingly to accept the collaboration of the Liberal-Conservative party, the new chief of which, Señor Sánchez Guerra, took office in March, 1922. Señor Sánchez Guerra had distinguished himself as the home secretary who, in 1917, had put down the revolutionary general strike. He was known for his somewhat old-fashioned

methods in electioneering, but events were to show that he had learnt from experience and had adopted the more enlightened views on social questions which had been applied by the Sánchez Toca Ministry in 1919. He was also known to be a firm upholder of civil authority against the committees of defence. The committees were by then holding an Assembly which had been authorised under the previous Ministry, and they had voted a strict syndicalist discipline for their members. The movement became so threatening that the king referred to it in a sensational speech which he delivered in Barcelona (June, 1922) and which called forth much criticism, for, though the advice was good, the manner and circumstances were unconstitutional. Meanwhile, the campaign for "responsibilities" proceeded, under the stimulus of further revelations of Moroccan irregularities. The counter-attack of the military committees had widened the campaign to include civil, i.e., political, responsibility as well. Señor Sánchez Guerra had by then gained some authority over public opinion by curtly dismissing General Martínez Anido from his Barcelona governorship and by issuing a decree prohibiting military officers from joining associations connected with their service. With these moral assets he faced a heated debate on responsibilities in Congress. The parliamentary committee appointed to study the Picasso report and hear witnesses has led to three different reports: the Conservative members concluded that the disaster had been due to causes beyond human control; the Liberal members, that the Government in office at the time deserved a vote of censure; the Labour members that definite responsibilities attached to definite named persons. The debate in the House proved beyond doubt that the matter was too explosive for

so slender an institution to handle. The Government resigned.

A coalition composed of all the branches of the Liberal party and of the reformists took office with signal courage (December, 1922). Not content with the knot of thorny problems which it inherited, it announced that it would amend Article 11 of the Constitution (on tolerance of other than Catholic worships) in a liberal sense. The bishops shouted anathema : the prime minister, Señor García Prieto, immediately beat a retreat, and thereupon the reformist minister of finance, Señor Pedregal, withdrew on grounds of principle. This shelved the religious question for the time being, but there remained enough problems to destroy many a Government. The general election produced remarkable results : a majority for the Government and a cluster of five socialists (out of seven seats) as members for Madrid. This event confirmed the prevailing impression that the parliamentary system was rapidly ceasing to be a puppet show, and brought home to the wire-pullers the imminent danger of unemployment which threatened them.

Unfortunately, as the parliamentary system began to be a reality, it began also to commit real blunders. The worst blunder in politics is to forget the actual forces in presence, for politics might be defined as the mechanics of moral forces. This the handful of well-meaning Liberals who were then at the nominal head of the nation overlooked to their undoing. Signs of coming trouble had not been lacking. Social unrest in Barcelona had abated since strong methods had been abandoned by more enlightened Cabinets, but Moroccan affairs were still in a grave state and hopelessly intertwined with the quarrel between the military and the civil power. The Government was

strongly imbued with the necessity of asserting civil authority. The Moroccan enterprise was becoming more and more expensive. Thus the average yearly expenditure, which had been 75 million pesetas in 1909–13, had risen to 146 yearly in 1913–19, and to 358 yearly in 1919–23. The Government had broken with the tradition which entrusted the leading posts overseas to military men and sent, as high commissioner, a Conservative ex-minister, Don Luis Silvela. The foreign secretary responsible for Moroccan affairs in the Cabinet was Don Santiago Alba, well-known for his policy of friendly negotiation with the Riffis. This attitude of the Government was keenly resented by the military. The Government should have taken heed, for disquieting signs of a dangerous convergence of anti-parliamentary forces were becoming more frequent and ominous. General Martínez Anido, who, since his dismissal, had remained in obscurity, was suddenly brought back and forced on the Government as the head of the Melilla command, from which post he endeavoured in every way to cross the policy of the foreign secretary. Soon after this appointment an important Moorish business man, Dris Ben Said, who had been the chief link between Señor Alba and the Riffis with a view to peaceful action and the liberation of prisoners, was killed in somewhat mysterious circumstances. Meanwhile, the Supreme Court of Military Justice had taken a strong line in the matter of responsibilities, and in the Army the word " dictator " had begun to be discussed.

Why a dictator? The question would be difficult to answer in a simple way. No less than four historical currents converged towards a dictatorship. The Army officers were carried towards it by the inner logic of their own professional temperament. Once in the political business—and they had been in the

thick of it since 1917—it was but natural that they should apply the technique of the barracks to politics. There was a substratum of dictatorial opinion lying dormant in the national temperament and very much awake in the parties and papers of the extreme Right, whose "big man" and champion was Señor La Cierva; there was the inexperience of the Liberal opinion of the country, which, with characteristic courage but also with characteristic lack of political sense, was then carrying to the bitter end the enquiry over responsibilities, undeterred by the fact that such action led inevitably to a kind of sacred union between all the threatened parties and, notably, between the Army and the Crown; and, last but not least, there was the natural inclination of the Crown itself.

The idea of a military Government was old and tenacious in King Alfonso's mind. Canalejas had already referred to this fact in a famous speech. Count Romanones had heard a suggestion about a Government of colonels headed by a General. In more recent years the idea had become an obsession and it had begun to figure prominently in the royal conversation, and even in those public speeches wherewith the king was loosening the screws and bolts of the constitutional machinery before breaking it altogether. In his speech delivered in Córdoba, on May 23rd, 1921, the king had gone as far as he possibly could in his denunciation of Parliament: "At this moment my Government have submitted to Parliament a most important bill on the question of communications. Now, the king is no absolute monarch and therefore does no more than authorise with his signature the bills that his Governments wish to submit to Parliament. He can do nothing to secure that these bills come out of Parliament duly

approved [. . . .], yet it is hard that things which we are all interested in furthering should not prosper owing to the smaller side of politics. One of my Governments will submit a bill. The bill will be fought against and the Government will fall. The ministers who succeed the fallen ones cannot do better for the bill since the former ones have become the opposition and avenge themselves. How could they help those who are responsible for their political death? There may be some who think that, in speaking as I am speaking, I overstep my constitutional duties; but my answer is that, having reigned for 19 years, during which I have risked my life more than once, I am not likely to be caught in a constitutional mistake. I believe that the provinces should initiate a movement in support of their king and of the bills which are beneficial to them, and then Parliament will remember that they are the mere mandatories of the people, for that is the meaning of the vote you give them at the polls." Good observers were already beginning to realise that the king's hankering was hardening into a policy. The king had gone so far as to express the desirability of a military Government to Señor Salvatella, the minister of education in the Cabinet, in the course of a conversation during a railway journey. His movements, and those of his friends, suggested the action which was being contemplated. When, in the early months of 1923, the Government came to difficulties with General Primo de Rivera, then captain-general of Catalonia, and decided to recall him, the king refused his signature and the Government remained silent for reasons as yet unexplained. A definite move was difficult so long as the War Office was in the hands of a civilian, for the Liberals, breaking with tradition here also, had appointed a lawyer, Señor Alcalá Zamora as

war secretary. Though a civilian, he had been brought over by his military advisers to a view on Moroccan affairs more consonant with military opinion than with the views of his colleague, the foreign secretary, and when the two ministers joined issue the king sided with the foreign secretary, Señor Alba. Señor Alcalá Zamora thereupon resigned and the Liberal Government, forgetting its principles or else yielding to royal pressure, appointed a military war secretary, General Aizpuru, who, as his future behaviour was to show, was to be no obstacle to any plans against the Constitution.

From that moment all efforts were concentrated on the foreign secretary, the strongest personality in the Ministry and in the party. According to custom, Señor Alba was the Government representative in the summer residence of the king, San Sebastian. The Government, however, remained in Madrid. It is asserted by some students of this period that the prime minister, Señor García Prieto, had clear indications as to what was being prepared in a few important garrisons, and that he kept all such information from his colleagues for reasons as yet obscure. Señor Alba, however, knew that General Primo de Rivera harboured strong feelings against him, and that there was much criticism of his attitude in the Army. He did not know that the *coup d'état* was ready for September 14, but did know that General Martínez Anido, one of its chief organisers, was in San Sebastian, keeping him under close observation. The foreign secretary had, moreover, received confidential information that a manifesto had been printed in Saragossa by the conspirators in which he, Señor Alba, was pointed out to the Spanish people as a "depraved and cynical minister" who would be prosecuted by the new Government. On September

12th he tendered his resignation to the prime minister and to the king in order, he said, to permit of a legal solution of the difficulty. He spoke, moreover, to the king, who assured him of his royal protection. But Señor Alba, who had tapped the wires, preferred the protection of the frontier. At 3 o'clock in the afternoon of the 13th he left his office in his private car, ostensibly for a ride in the country. He has not yet returned to Spain.

On that day General Primo de Rivera decided to strike his blow, 24 hours before the appointed time. The Cabinet behaved with the utmost lack of vigour. Instead of taking appropriate measures, which, in the divided and hesitating state of the Army, would probably have been successful, they decided to await the arrival of the king, whom they summoned to Madrid. The king demurred. It is believed by some students of those curious days that he spent the time motoring between San Sebastian, Burgos and Saragossa, to keep in touch with his garrisons while allowing things to ripen. He arrived in Madrid on the morning of the 14th. Till then, though the garrisons of Barcelona and Saragossa were in rebellion, the garrison of Valencia had expressed its loyalty to the Government, most of the others were passive, and that of Madrid was deliberately awaiting the king's orders. The final word which swept away the régime came from the king's own lips, and the definite move came from his own will. The prime minister asked leave to recall the captains-general of Barcelona and Saragossa and to open the Cortes on the following Tuesday. The king answered that such measures needed time for reflection. The prime minister resigned and the king accepted his resignation.

Thus ended the Constitution which had been framed for his father by Cánovas and Sagasta, and

under which his mother had saved his crown during the longest regency which Spain had known. With undaunted courage the king removed the very foundations of the Restoration. A devout Catholic, he made the sacrifice of his oath on the Gospels; a king, he broke his royal word. For such valuable hostages given to fortune, what were his expectations? "Since I was born a king let me govern," he had said. The king wanted to govern.

CHAPTER XXVI

THE DICTATORSHIP

GOVERNING is no easy art for a king. Alfonso XIII would have preferred to remain in control of the new situation. He was going to try government by the Army, and the Army's chief is the king. Things, however, proved less smooth than he had expected. The generals who had directed the movement in Madrid were all known for their palatine leanings, yet, when the king, half an hour after he had dismissed the last civil government of his reign, signified to the Captain-General of Madrid that he approved Primo de Rivera's step and would hear his views, but that he would have to think over the crisis and its solution, the rebellious generals of Madrid objected so hotly that they had to be received in a body that very morning at the Palace and, after a protracted scene, they emerged with the right to announce to the Press that General Primo de Rivera would be asked to form a government. Who was Primo de Rivera?

The fact that he calls himself a dictator has led to not a little confusion, due to the tendency to associate his régime with Fascismo. Unfriendly wits, Spanish perhaps more than Italian, coined a quip to celebrate the General's visit to Rome: "Primo de Rivera ma secondo di Mussolini." A mere quip. Though Fascismo did stimulate him to "cut through the middle street," as the Spanish saying goes, General Primo de Rivera is second to no one—to no foreign dictator at any rate. He is in the true Spanish

tradition. The ambition of every Spanish general is to save his country by becoming her ruler.

This ambition is not limited to such Spaniards as happen to be generals It is, on the contrary, passionately felt by every Spaniard, military or civilian, high or low. Your Englishman, German, Frenchman, when he thinks of public affairs, is quite content with joining the party organisation, hospital fund committee, county council administration, League of Nations Union branch, or other such collective institution, private or public, which he may find handy. His patriotism is modest and humdrum. The Spaniard sees the country and sees it whole. He wants to pluck out all the ills of the country at once by pulling out the root which feeds them all. He is always ready to explain what he would do if he was in office to any person who cares to listen to his views in club, café, railway carriage, or Government office. If he is a general, he is tempted to use his soldiers in order to make a short cut between Government and himself. Fundamentally, if General Primo de Rivera differs from the *politico de café* it is not in nature but in quality. He is a genius of the species, but the species is genuinely national. This is the true cause of his popularity with a considerable proportion of the urban population of the country.

He is a truly representative man, resembling the mass enough for the people to recognise themselves in him, but rising above them sufficiently to carry the burden of representation. He is spontaneous, intuitional, uninformed, impatient of all delay, imaginative, intensely patriotic, apt to take simple views of things, to cut Gordian knots, to solve intricate problems with Arcadian simplicity, to judge in equity and to think in common sense, to act, think, and feel only from his own point of view.

Above these features, which stamp him one of the many, there are qualities which make him one above the mass. First, his courage, both physical and moral, a courage at times bordering on audacity, as in his excursions on the field of intellect, at times rising to high statesmanship, as in his Moroccan successes, political and military. Then, his generosity, for this dictator is a truly generous man and bears no grudge either against those that wrong him or against those he has wronged—the last, a difficult kind of generosity, which irony without humour seems unable to understand. His heart is not only in the right place, but it beats in harmony with his sense. An Andalusian, he is shrewd and, as the saying goes, *fino*. Some of his master strokes have elicited the unwilling admiration of many an "old gang" artist driven by him to unemployment. Thus when, as a punishment for his alleged connivance in a plot to upset the Government, he fined Count Romanones five hundred thousand pesetas, he knew he would have with him all the Spaniards who can see a capital joke, and there are enough of them to make a man popular.

His generosity is the positive agent in the disarming sincerity with which he can alter his views. His appearance on the political stage as the knight who was to rescue the Dulcinea of politics from the old régime Malandrines is in itself a startling change, for no more typical representative of the old system could perhaps have been found in the field of Spanish politics than General Primo de Rivera. The Spanish people do not feel that incurable horror of sin in others which afflicts some races, so the General's enemies have wasted their time in recalling, through the chinks of the censorship, that this contemner of nepotism owes his exceptionally rapid military career

not to military talents—which he undoubtedly has —but to the fact that he happened to be the nephew of Marshal Primo de Rivera, one of the political generals of the Restoration. That weakness in his history makes him more human, more representative, and even more convincing in his appeal for a change of heart. His was the first heart to change.

General Primo de Rivera works by instinct and inspiration. His system is: Wish the best, work for the best, hope for the best. His motto is "Country, Religion, Monarchy." He is very particular as to the order in which the three deities are to be worshipped. His political ideas burst up through a mind unfettered by any philosophy or political theory. The Spanish cadet, when he was one, could win his officer star with but little mental exertion. His intuition and his experience can work such miracles that there does not seem to be any reason why he should plod and look up precedents. This explains the true originality of some of his views, as well as the arbitrary manner in which he is apt to solve the difficulties on his path. Note again the difference with the Italian dictator. Though the Spanish dictator has no grim chapter in his history, he is more arbitrary than the Italian because less systematic and less objective. In fact, Signor Mussolini is a statesman and General Primo de Rivera is a man. Even though his conscious ideal be Signor Mussolini (which is by no means certain) his subconscious model would rather be Haroun al Raschid—after all, a not unnatural model for an Andalusian. He is the good sultan from whose hands falls the honey of good government of high and low, particularly the low; he sits under the porch of his palace and administers justice to all according to their deserts, and turns from a decree granting millions of pounds for a new

naval programme to a letter thanking and rewarding two fishermen for having fished a rare specimen of a turtle and rescued it for the Zoological Museum; a ruler who, having closed the nation's accounts on an excess of income over expenses, decides to devote part of it to rescuing out of pawn garments pledged by poor families in need.

He believes himself to be the leader of a new Spanish order, but he is representative not of the "old régime," i.e., of the Restoration, but of the "very old régime," i.e., the era of pronunciamientos, which covers practically the middle third of the nineteenth century. He belongs to the dynasty which gave Spain Riego, Espartero, O'Donnell, Narvaez, Prim, Pavia, Martinez Campos. No doubt he is a man of his century in many ways, but he descends from that line, just as King Alfonso, also a man of his century, descends from the line which gave Spain Ferdinand VII and Isabel II. With his usual insight and courage he has absorbed twentieth-century elements from the atmosphere of his day. But if the foliage is in our age, the roots are in that middle nineteenth century. His originality lies in that he cannot be easily classed either as a Liberal or as a reactionary leader. The century is rather eclectic in politics, and General Primo de Rivera is of his century. Thus we shall see him a Liberal in municipal affairs, a Socialist of sorts in labour matters, a Conservative in constitutional ideas, a reactionary in education, an opportunist (with but scanty opportunities) in military administration, a truly spirited leader in Moroccan affairs, and an indifferent amateur in foreign policy.

One thing was certain. The new ruler meant to rule. On arriving in Madrid he reconstituted the directorate, dismissed all the men who had prepared

the ground for him (though seeing to it that they received adequate compensation), and organised a directorate composed of a brigadier-general for every military region and of a rear-admiral to associate the Navy with the enterprise. The admiral, the Marqués de Magaz, had seniority over all generals except Primo de Rivera, and thus the dictator made sure that no question of seniority should threaten his control of affairs. He also arranged that, while the directorate, as a collegiate body, would have powers similar to those of the Council of Ministers, he would be the sole minister, the other directors being not in charge of ministerial departments, but entrusted with such questions as might from time to time be handed over to them by the directorate as a whole. The departments were left in charge of under-secretary-generals, practically all permanent officials. As a significant exception to this rule, the under-secretary for the Home Office was General Martínez Anido. After two years of this organisation the dictator altered the form of his Government, raised most of his under-secretaries to the status of ministers, dismissed his military colleagues and made General Martínez Anido vice-president of the Council and home secretary.

So much for organisation. As for policy, General Primo de Rivera's beginnings were frankly bad. He dismissed Don Luis Silvela, the civilian high commissioner in Morocco, and appointed in his stead General Aizpuru, the war secretary of the Cabinet which he had displaced—an appointment which was a singularly candid comment on the General's loyalty to his former colleagues. He dismissed the Cortes and secured the files of the Commission on Responsibilities. This is the moment to observe the date of the *coup d'état*, September 13th. On September 15th

the Supreme Council of Military Justice was to reopen, after the summer recess, and hear the case against the military chiefs responsible for Moroccan affairs; on September 20th the Commission on Responsibilities was to meet again. On October 1st the Cortes were to discuss its report. It was evident that the *coup d'état* had for its main object the silencing of the Commission and of Parliament on a question which, above all others, threatened to expose the incompetence of many generals and officers and the unconstitutional action of the Crown. This vice of origin was to be the main cause of the failure of the dictatorship to achieve any essential change in Spanish political life. It bound the king and the dictator to a policy of censorship, which was to prevent the rise of a new public opinion and of new political institutions to replace those which had been destroyed.

In its main lines the dictatorship is a régime founded on force rather than on authority, with a strong centralistic tendency, relying on the Army, favourable to the Clerical Party and the Church, aristocratic and friendly to big landowners and sympathetic to Socialism as opposed to Syndicalism.

I believe it was Cavour who once said, "Any fool can govern with a Press censorship." The dictator is no fool, but the proof thereof must not be sought in his treatment of the Press. Nothing is printed that does not suit the Government. In suppressing free discussion the dictator was but carrying to its logical conclusion the action he had taken with regard to Parliament. In point of fact, the Press had become a kind of third House of Parliament, rather more powerful than the other two as an organ of publicity and criticism. General Primo de Rivera has periodically sought to justify his policy in this connection by

accusing the Spanish Press of all kinds of misdeeds, but the Press has been able to answer all accusations by the simplest yet most effective of methods : under a dictatorship disposing of all the springs of power and patronage, ninety per cent. of the Press of the country, according to the dictator's own statement, have persisted in a dignified and independent opposition. No more eloquent proof of disinterestedness and loyalty to ideals could be given. The fact is that the censorship is not due to any defects of the Spanish Press, but to the inherent necessities of the dictatorship. Dictators rely on physical force and are, therefore, afraid of the moral forces that would be unchained by free criticism, and this dictator, moreover, has reason to fear free investigation into the origins and causes of the system which he has installed.

Next to the censorship, the dictator relies on the support of the Army, the Church and business; the Socialists are neutral. Finally, the Crown has been the object of every possible outward deference, but it has been allowed little or no influence on events. The king was soon able to realise the consequences of his action. His mistakes in the past fell on his ministers; the mistakes of his chosen dictator fell now on the king. On November 13th, the president of the Senate, Count Romanones, and the president of the Congress of Deputies, Don Melquíades Alvarez, formally called on the king. They came to remind him that Article 32 of the Constitution lays on the king in person the obligation to convene the Cortes of the Realm within three months of their dissolution and that this Article had always been scrupulously respected since 1876. The king received them standing and dismissed them within five minutes. When walking down the grand staircase of the Palace, Count Romanones may well have remembered the day when,

arriving for the first time as president of the Lower House, to submit to the king the laws passed by the Legislature, he had, in the ardour of his newly-acquired parliamentary majesty, suggested to the president of the Senate, who accompanied him, that the custom of receiving the two presidents with the March of Infantes (a kind of second-class national anthem), was not a sufficient recognition of the sovereignty of the Cortes, and that the *Marcha Real* should be played; to which the old president, Montero Ríos, had gruffly answered: "Leave music alone and be thankful for what you get, or a time may come when you will get none." The dictator, at any rate, promptly deprived Count Romanones and Don Melquíades Alvarez of their dignities and functions and announced that he would devote the two parliamentary buildings to some useful purpose in the future. The dictator won, but the king lost.

But, of course, the dictatorship did not limit itself to negative measures against the past. On the contrary, it relied for its political health on its vigour and activity. It would be idle to look to the Spanish dictatorship for a consistent and coherent policy based on a definite philosophy such as is to be found in *fascismo*. Though unmistakably a chief, General Primo de Rivera is not a *Duce*. The activities of the Government are good or bad according to whether the minister in charge is capable or incapable. In general, the record of the dictatorship is good in material reforms and bad in all that concerns the intellectual and spiritual life of the nation. That ubiquitous Englishman who is an enthusiastic *fascist* because Signor Mussolini makes trains arrive in time, will find much to praise in "dictated-to" Spain. The roads are magnificent. They have been described as the best in Europe by an English tourist writing to *The*

Times. Railways have progressed in length, quality and equipment, thanks to an arrangement whereby the Government advances capital in exchange for a considerable measure of control. After Moroccan affairs had taken a favourable turn and relieved the Budget, the Government launched an internal loan of 3,538,947,550 pesetas, a considerable proportion of which is being devoted to public works in handsome yearly instalments. Under this financial stimulation, helped by the period of peace which the Government is enforcing on the nation, Spain is settling down to a life of economic activity. The taste for large-scale enterprises has developed. A contract granted by the Government to the National Telephone Company of Spain, a branch of the International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation of New York, has greatly improved the service in the country and bids fair to make Madrid the centre of telephone and cable communications between Europe and South America. The dictatorship turned its attention to the petrol question and resolved to control supplies by means of a State petrol monopoly which, though much criticised at home and abroad, is now in full swing. Strong encouragement has been given to national and international aviation. In the beginning of 1926 sensational flights to Buenos Aires and to Manila were made by Spanish aviators.

A vigorous economic nationalism inspires the régime. Every effort is being made to foster home production and to limit unnecessary purchases abroad —an effort which, though at times misguided and at times resented by keen free-trading nations, is but natural in a country with a heavy adverse balance of trade. By a decree of 1927, coal consumers were required to use at least forty per cent. of Spanish coal. In 1925 it was enacted that foreign insurance com-

panies were to deposit their statutory reserves in Spain and in specified Spanish securities. Aircraft manufacturing firms and air lines were made to become Spanish in capital, administration and equipment. All these efforts are marred by a return to the " paternal " policy handed down as a mediæval tradition to the kings of old Spain, from which the nineteenth century had succeeded in liberating the country. A Commission for the Regulation of Industrial Production has been empowered with authority to allow or refuse the settlement of new industries and even the enlargement and renovation of existing plant. Nevertheless, and despite this and other lines of criticism, the material or economic policy of the directorate has been its strong point, and by attracting to it the sympathies of the business community has been the cause of much of its stability.

As if, diverted from politics, the energies of the nation had sought an outlet in business, the commercial, industrial and agricultural life of the country seems to move at a brisker pace. Money is plentiful and the Government have set up a special banking institution, the *Banco del Comercio Exterior*, in order to canalise investments abroad. As is the case every time the country enjoys a few years of uninterrupted peace, its prosperity rises rapidly and its vitality makes itself immediately felt.

The dictatorship has endeavoured to apply statesmanlike principles to the social question. Its success has been unequal in this field. In agricultural matters it has fostered agricultural credit by means of a *Banco de Crédito Agrario* which, though in its early stages, is a promising institution and may still prove to be one of the most far-reaching reforms of the present régime. The Government's policy in the matter of land ownership, though well meaning, has not been so

successful, partly because the aim in view, individual small ownership by the peasant, is not the best that can be devised for Spain, partly because the means, the breaking up of big estates, would imply a heavy sacrifice on the part of landowners friendly to the Government. But in the field of labour problems the dictatorship has made a considerable advance. It took a regrettable step in abolishing the autonomy enjoyed by the *Instituto de Reformas Sociales* which has become a much simplified department of the Ministry of Labour, but it has set up a comprehensive system of *Corporations* which, though suggested by an Italian experiment, has not a few original features, mostly an advance on the Italian system.[1] This

[1] The Spanish organisation may be described as follows: the trades and professions of the country are classified into 27 groups or *Corporaciones*. In each of them the organisation comprises: locally a *comité paritario* composed of five employers and five men elected by their respective unions and a chairman appointed by the Government. These committees have power to regulate conditions of work, such as hours, rest, individual or collective labour contracts, to deal with conflicts, to organise labour exchanges and a trade census. Mixed commissions are also created locally in order to co-ordinate the work of the committees of connected trades. The competence of these commissions covers mostly matters of technical education, advice, study and reform. The mixed commissions, however, do not participate in the more general organisation of the Corporative system of the State. The Corporation is defined as the sum total of all the *comités paritarios* of the same trade in the nation. They are governed by a Corporation Council composed of eight employers and eight men elected by the committees. The Councils watch over national conditions in the industry covering the same ground locally entrusted to the committees. It is expected that they will also act as authoritative advisers to the Government on matters concerning their industry and that they will engage in codifying the laws, by-laws, regulations and customs of their trade. At the apex of the organisation the *Comisión Delegada de Consejos*, presided over by the Director-General of Labour, brings together delegates (one employer and one man) from all the Corporation Councils of the nation.

bold system of industrial organisation is too young to be judged, but it has so far met with the cordial approval of many of the leaders of the Socialist party without incurring the active disapproval of the employer class. It will, of course, become what life will make of it, but the Labour minister of the dictatorship, Señor Aunós, has applied to it the best possible spirit and much technical skill.

The most brilliant success of the dictatorship, however, is due to no second-rank figure, but to the dictator himself and in no less difficult a field than Morocco. General Primo de Rivera has always been a lukewarm supporter of the Moroccan adventure. In his early days as a young general he had even advocated the exchange of Ceuta for Gibraltar. When, after more than half a year of office, he realised the extent to which Moroccan expenses handicapped Spanish life, he resolved on a policy of retrenchment and withdrawal. Such a resolution spoke highly in his favour, for it meant adopting the very policy which Señor Alba had advocated and was, of course, in direct opposition to the wishes of the army in Africa. He was made aware of this second difficulty by the cold reception dispensed to him when he visited the army in Morocco—it is even said that his life was then in danger at the hands of a hot-headed captain unable to bear the thought that the Spanish army should give up avenging the affront of 1921. Nevertheless, he courageously decided to apply his policy in person, and appointed himself high commissioner in Morocco. In this capacity he conducted a skilful retreat from Xauen to Tetuan. These operations enabled the dictatorship to relieve the Spanish budget of some considerable expenditure. But they were destined to have more far-reaching effects. In the summer of 1925, Abd El Krim, somewhat encour-

aged by the retreat of the Spanish army, attacked the French zone with so much vigour that Paris was alarmed. This success of the Riffi immediately altered the tone and direction of French Moroccan policy towards Spain. For years Spanish diplomacy had tried to bring about a co-operation between the two occupying nations, for, without it, neither could be sure of success in the work of establishing peace in Morocco. But the Quai d'Orsay demurred and played for time with a calm under which some Spaniards were led to suspect a certain amount of satisfaction. Meanwhile the Moors were always well armed, a fact which unfairly, but not unnaturally, Spaniards on the spot attributed to French help. As soon as Abd El Krim entered the French zone, the Quai d'Orsay became afire with the idea of co-operation between the two old "Latin sisters", and M. Malvy, followed by Marshal Pétain in person, was sent to Madrid to negotiate an agreement. The dictator, despite the fact that French requirements meant a complete reversal of his own policy, agreed to a combined effort —a decision as wise as that which he had taken in the reverse direction one year earlier. As a result of this collaboration, in the course of which General Primo de Rivera scored a brilliant success by landing in Alhucemas, Abd El Krim was beaten and surrendered. Primo de Rivera, however, was able to consolidate the advantages gained by an energetic policy of occupation and disarmament, and the Spanish zone has been quiet ever since.

The dictator has not been equally successful in his foreign policy. The first sign of activity was a visit to Rome. Both king and dictator, then in the honeymoon of dictatorship, had an opportunity to express their enthusiasm for *fascismo* and used it to the full. In the Vatican the king delivered a speech which

Charles V and even Philip II would have thought too filial to the Pope and which called forth unfavourable comment in Spain, not only for its excessive religious zeal, but for its indiscreet meddling with Spanish-American Church affairs; for the king went out of his way to ask that more cardinals' hats should be placed on Spanish-American heads. The outcome of the visit to the Quirinal was an Italo-Spanish treaty of arbitration, conciliation and peace. Though it was used at the time by the French Press to whip up public opinion in favour of a French naval bill, this treaty has little theoretical, and less practical importance, for no Spanish Government will ever lead the Spanish people to a war between France and Italy, on whichever side of the contest it may try to involve them.

The next foreign adventure of the dictator was the Tangier Convention. Left over from the Moroccan treaties, Tangier had been the object of negotiations in 1914. They were resumed in 1923 and led to a solution which Spain accepted reluctantly (February, 1924), since Great Britain had surrendered to the French claims for first place in the international administration of the town. Franco-Spanish rivalry was by no means appeased. A glance at the map shows that Tangier is the natural centre and capital of the Spanish zone, as both Spain and Tangier found by experience; for, while Spain could not prevent the spying and smuggling of the Riffis in the town, the town suffered much hardship owing to war events in the Spanish zone. Nearly half of the population of Tangier, moreover, is Spanish, and for all practical purposes Tangier is a Spanish town, historically, geographically and racially. The matter was revived by General Primo de Rivera and his foreign secretary, Señor Yanguas, in 1927, simultaneously, if not in

actual conjunction, with Spain's claim to a permanent seat in the Council of the League of Nations. Spain had belonged to the Council since its inception, being the only neutral nation mentioned in the text of the Covenant as one of the initial members of the Council. She had performed excellent services in it and her representative, Señor Quiñones de León, had succeeded in obtaining the confidence of the British, as well as the French, Governments, and had been the Council rapporteur in practically every grave conflict (Upper Silesia, Corfu, etc.) Señor Quiñones de León had received repeated assurances from all the Governments represented on the Council that, so soon as an opportunity arose, Spain would be given a permanent seat. The entrance of Germany (with a permanent seat) afforded this opportunity. But Germany objected to any other claim but hers being considered at the time, and Brazil, then a member of the Council and a candidate for a permanent seat, blocked Germany's entrance. This led to the deadlock of March, 1926. Spain had announced her intention to vote for Germany, though she certainly would have left the Council immediately afterwards. A Council Reform Commission appointed to overhaul the position and report to the next session of the Assembly recommended that the number of Council members should be increased from ten to fourteen, that non-permanent members should sit for three years and not be re-eligible, and that a small number of re-eligible seats should be created for nations which the Assembly, by a special vote, should wish to retain on the Council. A motion of the Commission, cordially endorsed by the Council of the Assembly, made it clear that this last measure aimed at ensuring the services of Spain. The Spanish Government nevertheless gave notice of withdrawal. Full discussion of

the Spanish claim must be left for a later chapter. Here we are dealing with the dictator's foreign policy. He should have accepted the Council's offer there and then. He decided to leave only to return within two years on the same conditions. The rumour that he had been assured by Italy that she would follow Spain in her seceding move might make the action of the Spanish Government less inexplicable, if no wiser—but so far there is no evidence to substantiate this rumour.

To make matters worse, General Primo de Rivera chose to connect the conflict over the League of Nations with a claim to complete control over Tangier. This question had to be discussed all over again. It led to but trifling changes, such as the replacing of the Belgian chief of police by a Spaniard and the admission of Italy to an equal share with England in the administration of the town. The solution adopted satisfied neither the requirements of Tangier, nor those of Spain. France has ever since then shown signs of aiming at an increase, rather than a decrease, of her influence there, and it may, therefore, safely be said that Tangier remains a point where conflicts may still be expected in the future.

Portuguese affairs were handled with more success. The setting up of a military dictatorship in Portugal was a favourable circumstance. On August 11th, 1927, negotiations carried on in Lisbon with regard to the Douro water power reached a satisfactory conclusion. Spain retained the frontier waters below the Tormes and Portugal the frontier waters above it, giving respectively 339,000 h.p.s. to Spain and 285,000 to Portugal. In April, 1928, a Hispano-Portuguese Commission on Economic Questions met in Lisbon and established a programme of economic co-operation covering railways, roads, wire and wire-

less communications, passports, most favoured nation clause, co-operation in the cork industry, etc. Some questions were left outstanding, amongst them those of air navigation and fisheries. In October, 1929, the president of the Portuguese Republic visited Madrid to celebrate this new era of Iberian co-operation.

On the whole, therefore, the general policy of the dictatorship in material home affairs and in foreign relations compares not unfavourably with that of the constitutional period. Its adversaries are entitled to argue that the dictator benefits from stability and from the lack of military and clerical obstacles. But the fact remains that the dictatorship has made a good use of these advantages. How is it, then, that public opinion remains hostile to such an extent that censorship is indispensable to the régime and that a constant watch has to be kept against revolutionary attempts? The answer to this question is relatively simple. The dictatorship has made the nation pay too dearly for its material progress and in a coin which is more precious to her than wealth—liberty, justice and self-respect.

It is significant that the worst ministers of the dictatorship should be the home secretary, the minister of education and the minister of justice. The home secretary's record in Barcelona and Melilla would suffice to account for the nation's dissatisfaction had he neglected to give fresh cause for it in his new post. Every measure of the bygone—and ever-recurring—days of tyranny has been revived in the service of the dictatorship. The censorship has already been mentioned. News carefully filtered and views strictly limited to favourable comments mean more than half the battle won. The opening of letters, imprisonment without limit, cause, explanation or guarantees; petty and vexatious inter-

ference with the most innocent activities such as after-dinner speeches; spying over telephonic and even oral conversations; removal and coercion of civil servants; the dictatorship has gone through the whole gamut in the hopeless task of repressing the irrepressible. Liberal opinion did not surrender easily, indeed has not surrendered at all. Clubs and associations, lecture-halls, every possible means of communication and discussion of events has been tied up to the Government or destroyed. For the first time in a long and illustrious life the Ateneo de Madrid, a literary, scientific and artistic club, to which all Spaniards with any claim to intellectual distinction make it a point to belong, was closed. Driven underground, opposition became revolutionary. The Government, on its side, acted with the most deplorable disregard for justice. By a kind of inverted selection the judges and magistrates who took a strict view of their duties were removed. This was the case, for instance, with the highest dignitary of the Spanish judiciary, Don Buenaventura Muñoz, President of the Supreme Court of Justice. Not content with this grave interference with the judiciary, the Government placed itself above the laws and applied penalties of its own invention, such as heavy fines, to citizens that displeased it. Plots succeeded plots and the best minds of the country were driven to an uncompromising opposition. Some of them had to suffer for it. Don Miguel de Unamuno had written a private letter, couched in violent terms, to a Spanish friend in Buenos Aires; the letter was published by an Argentine paper without consulting its author. For this fact Don Miguel de Unamuno was deprived of his Chair of Greek in Salamanca and confined in a small island of the Canary Archipelago. The Vera incident made a

still more painful impression on the country. Early on November 7th, 1924, on the French frontier near Vera, there was a shooting affray between a few unknown men and the civil guards. One of the men and two guards were killed. A handful of the unknown persons were apprehended and brought before a military court which gave a verdict of *Not Guilty*. The military officers who had acted as judges were imprisoned by order of the Government and the Public Prosecutor (of a military legal corps) was deprived of his post for having refused to ask the court to punish the accused with the death penalty. A new court was set up. It has been stated in print by the adversaries of the Government that this court was induced to sentence the accused to death in order to placate the feelings of the Civil Guard Corps and on the understanding that they would be reprieved. The court gave a verdict of *Guilty* and the men were executed—all but one, who refused to suffer the ignominy and committed suicide in most dramatic circumstances. Don Miguel de Unamuno and Don Eduardo Ortega y Gasset, who lead the opposition to the dictatorship on French territory, have made themselves responsible for the statement that the whole affair had been arranged by the police under the home secretary. They provide details such as the number of the police car in which the police inspector, whose name is also given, arrived in Hendaye, the French side of the frontier, and bought a box of automatic pistols; and they printed in their paper a statement, which appeared also in the French Press, in which Captain Cueto of the Anti-contraband Guards (Carabineros) confirms their version with a considerable amount of detail. Captain Cueto has also written letters to the same effect in a well-known Havana newspaper, *El*

Diario de la Marina. He explains that he reported the whole matter to his chiefs, was imprisoned and told to recant, refused, and was set at liberty again. The censorship has prevented the Spanish public from knowing this version of the affair, except in so far as the paper edited in France by Don Eduardo Ortega circulates in Spain in a clandestine manner. It is to be regretted that the Government has not seen fit to answer the very precise accusations levelled against it by its adversaries abroad.

It is only fair to the dictator to put on record that this would be the worst instance of the use of force which could be brought against his régime, were we to accept as proved the case made by his adversaries. At the time Hendaye was the centre of the opposition, a fact which would add plausibility to the incident as an attempt to justify a request to the French Government for the expulsion of Don Miguel de Unamuno and his friends.

Next to the methods of the Home Office those of the Ministry of Education must be considered as one of the weakest spots in the dictatorship. The rule here is wholesale surrender to clerical claims. Under the pretext—not altogether ungrounded in fact—that a number of secondary teachers and university professors wrote textbooks to make money out of them, the Government satisfied the dearest wish of the clerical reactionaries, i.e., the enforcing of a uniform textbook for the nation. The true aim of this measure is to secure a safe clerical point of view in controversial teachings such as history and philosophy. A frontal attack on the Committee for the Development of Studies failed, owing to the prestige of this institution, which has endeared itself to a vast number of middle-class families for its excellent educational centres; a more hypocritical

move, however, succeeded in depriving it of its autonomous powers for selecting its governing body and forced it to accept government nominees who were at once chosen amongst uncompromising clericals. The teaching profession is put under the strictest pressure to bow before the Church, to go to mass, whether they believe or not, and in every way to submit to clerical demands. The Chief Inspector of Schools in Granada was deprived of his post for not being present at the official entrance of the Cardinal Archbishop into his diocese. The folly of such measures may be gauged by the opposition which they call forth in a nation jealous of its right to worship (or not) as it thinks fit. After a campaign of vexatious measures against university professors, which brought many of them to prison and others to resign their profession altogether, the trial of strength occurred in 1928–29, when, under pressure from the Jesuits, the minister prepared a decree whereby the two clerical colleges of Deusto (Jesuit) and El Escorial (Augustinian) were given the right to have their students examined by a jury composed of two tutors of their respective colleges and one professor of the university which was to grant the degree. The Advisory Assembly, though composed entirely of Government nominees, rejected the proposal; the governing bodies of all the universities of the kingdom volunteered a strong expression of dissent. The National Student Federation was equally emphatic against this singular scheme by which the university seal was affixed to an education known to be inadequate. The Escorial College, by far the better of the two, waived the right proffered by the decree. The Jesuit College held to it in stubborn silence. The minister published the Decree. There was a revolt in practically every university of

the kingdom, led by that of Madrid, where some of the students shed their blood for the cause in street struggles with the police. The women students were prominent in the revolt. The dictator closed university after university. Four distinguished professors resigned their Chairs. The dictator announced that he would allow the women students to pass their examinations, but they refused until the men students had been put on the same footing. The Government at last gave way, the Decree was withdrawn and the universities reopened.

This incident is significant, particularly when put alongside of the conflict between the Government and the artillery officers. General Primo de Rivera wanted to reorganise the Army in every way, but the Army is full of officers and officers must live. He began by placing as many as he could in civilian jobs left vacant by the withdrawal of the political personnel of the old régime, and even by creating a considerable number of new posts of an entirely civilian nature in order to place more of his military friends. Try as he would he was unable to do much by way of retrenchment, partly through lack of a consistent policy of military reconstruction, but mostly owing to the fact that, after all, the Army was the only force on which he could rely and it was unwise to interfere with it. In spite of these reasons it is perhaps in the Army that the dictatorship has effected its most far-reaching changes, though unfortunately more destructive than constructive. The dictator, who is an infantryman, tried to abolish the old tradition of the Artillery Corps whereby its members are pledged to refuse all promotion except on grounds of seniority (a tradition upheld as a defence against nepotism), and which General Primo de Rivera, who is the most famous nephew in the

Spanish Army, should have abstained from attacking. The artillery officers rebelled. There were several serious incidents, one of which caused the death of a young officer in Pamplona. But, owing, it is believed, to the personal intervention of the king, the officers gave up their rebellious attitude only to find that the Government carried its measure over their heads and punished the leaders of the movement. Dissatisfaction simmered in the ranks of the Artillery Corps until in January, 1929, it found a leader in Señor Sánchez Guerra. But the rebellion led by the ex-prime minister was not the first in the field. In 1925 a plot was discovered in which several professors were implicated along with two well-known army leaders, General Aguilera and Field-Marshal Weyler, whom it is wonderful to find leading a conspiracy at the ripe age of eighty-six, as he was then. Meanwhile, Primo de Rivera had been trying for some time to evolve a way out of the situation which he had created. As a transitional measure he had devised to summon a National Advisory Assembly composed almost entirely of Government nominees with a handful of representatives from a certain number of institutions. Señor Sánchez Guerra, leader of the Conservative party, had signified to the king that, disapproving as he did of all that had occurred since 1923, the royal assent to the calling of a National Assembly would mean for him that the king was determined to reign as an absolute monarch and that, therefore, the allegiance of the Conservative party, based as it was on the constitutional principle, could no longer be due to him. The king hesitated for a long time before accepting his dictator's proposal, but in the end bowed before the inevitable, and Señor Sánchez Guerra went into voluntary exile and broke away from the king. He is a man of

action and he decided to carry his convictions into practice at once. In January, 1929, he landed in Valencia to put himself at the head of eighteen artillery garrisons ready to follow his lead. The plot failed owing to the hesitation of the Captain-General of Valencia, who had promised his support and changed his mind at the last moment, a move which won him favour with neither Government nor conspirators. The tendency to get rid of the dictatorship is permanent and manifests itself in every possible form. For instance, though Señor Sánchez Guerra made it quite clear that his purpose in coming to Spain was seditious and whenever questioned by the authorities made a point of describing his activities in the very words of the Spanish code which define the crime of sedition and punish it with the death penalty, the Government, after keeping him imprisoned in a warship[1] until October, 1929, had to allow the law to take its course and bring him before a tribunal. A military court was chosen, and it is to be assumed that the Government chose it carefully. It was composed of brigadier-generals. The court found Señor Sánchez Guerra *Not Guilty*, a decision which can only be interpreted as meaning that the dictatorship has lost the sympathies of the army.

[1] A significant precaution. No garrison was trusted to keep the dangerous prisoner.

CHAPTER XXVII

THE DEADLOCK

LET us now attempt an estimate of what the dictatorship represents in the history of contemporary Spain. To begin with, the dictatorship did not come to relieve Spain of a régime which was ruining or dishonouring her. Such views on the old system are melodramatic and false. That the system was incompetent and corrupt there is no question. But in what way, to what an extent, owing to what causes and with what compensating advantages? Finally, how much constructive work did it manage to perform in spite of its defects and what was the political progress of the nation under it?

The incompetence and the corruption of the old system did not extend to its political personnel save in a small proportion as to incompetence and political corruption, and in an almost negligible proportion as to moral corruption. This point must be made clear. The incompetence of the old system was due to the defective general and technical education of the Civil Service and, during the Restoration, to the instability of tenure prevailing in the Civil Service as it prevails even nowadays in many States of the United States of America. The political staff met it in the only possible way by education and by organising the Civil Services on a stable basis, and they were singularly successful in both these tasks. Progress could be seen everywhere in this respect before the dictatorship and is greatly helping it

in its task. There are two exceptions to this progress in administrative education: the Army and the Church, each governed by men of their own choice and enjoying a measure of excessive home rule which they have been unable to put to a good use.

The old régime was politically corrupt, i.e., State power was used by parties for political party aims. But this defect which it inherited from its founders, Cánovas and Sagasta, and which to a greater or lesser extent exists everywhere, was an indispensable substitute for the real parliamentary democracy which the Restoration professed to be, so long as this parliamentary democracy did not materialise. Three were the ways towards this goal: agrarian reform, which the owning classes (backed by the Army and the Church) opposed; education, which, as we know, the régime fostered with as much money as the Army estimates and the Church allowed; and a natural process of evolution and education by experience, which actually brought about so much progress that the Army and the king, frightened at the power of Parliament, destroyed it. It was, therefore, not as corrupt, but in so far as it was ceasing to be corrupt, that the régime perished.[1] Finally, when the old system is described as morally corrupt (the dictatorship is officially committed to that view) it must be made quite clear that, while on the outskirts of it there were, no doubt, men of dubious character, the higher political personnel was remarkably disinterested and honest. There are many ways of confirming this statement. Some of the men in

[1] It is a curious reflection on the dictator's strictures against the Constitutional régime and on his claims to represent a purer form of government, that one of his Cabinet Ministers was twice refused his seat in the Congress of Deputies by the Supreme Court owing to illegal practices in his election. As it happens, he is one of the best Cabinet Ministers of the dictatorship.

politics were rich, heirs to large fortunes, such as Count Romanones, or self-made men, mostly through success in the Law, such as Don Santiago Alba, or through sheer financial genius, such as Señor Cambó. But the average Spanish politician was a modest man living in a middle-class moderate way, and dying in poverty. The most brilliant demonstration of the honourability of the old system was to be made by the dictatorship itself. General Primo de Rivera, in his first manifesto, described Señor Alba, the last foreign secretary of the régime, as "a depraved and cynical minister who would meet with condign punishment at the Law Courts." His house was searched for proofs of his depravity, a specially selected judge worked for long at his case, but all in vain; his honourability had to be declared by a magistrate trusted by a Government which was strongly biased against him, and without his having taken any action whatsoever in the matter.

The main fault of the old system, that which caused its incompetence and most of its corruption, was its instability. The kaleidoscopic succession of prime ministers and Cabinets did not permit any political programme to mature, any Cabinet minister to acquire command over the affairs of his department, any complicated and delicate reform to take root and benefit by experience. But what was the cause of such instability? Certainly, for a good part the petty jealousies and ambitions of the public men. But these defects would have been less prominent if they had been used by the monarch, not as the raw material for his policy of personal power, but as the elements whereby to construct a higher system of government. Let anyone who doubts compare the policy of King Alfonso with that of the Queen Regent, his mother. From November, 1885, till May, 1902,

i.e., in sixteen years and five months, the queen had eleven Ministries; between May, 1902, and September 1923, i.e., in twenty-one years and three months, the king had thirty-three Ministries. The queen's Cabinets lasted, on an average, one year and seven months; the king's average was just seven months and a half. Government is impossible in such circumstances.

When all is said against the political personnel of the fallen régime, there still remains that, taken in the aggregate, these men, who held ministerial posts under the Restoration, were amongst the best-meaning, the least selfish, the most enlightened and the most conscientious Spaniards of the epoch. They were weak towards the graft and jobbery of the lesser beasts of prey which prowl round the outskirts of the political city; weaker still towards the temptations which glittered for them in the royal palace. But they tried to govern to the best of their ability and some of them were very able indeed. They saw the importance of most of the fundamental problems Spain had to solve in the twentieth century; they rebuilt the economic life of the country within twenty years from the date of the American defeat; they recast the system of education; they reconstructed the Navy; they developed railways and ports; they evolved a sound, reasonable method of attacking industrial problems. They could have done more if they had been better men. But they would have done much more, such as they were, had the Army and the Church allowed them and had the Crown sought to unite them by higher politics instead of dividing them by mingling in their intrigues and playing party politics with their petty quarrels. These men and the king were, after all, with a handful of intellectuals, the only Spaniards who saw Spain as an historical problem and devoted their lives to it.

The old régime, moreover, had one saving quality in which it rises far above the dictatorship. *It knew it was bad.* It was self-critical and humble. And this precious moral quality proved highly creative in it. Spain owes to it some of her best institutions. The régime knew it was fettered by political ties and subject to the inconstancy of king and party politics and it evolved a fertile method for evading these defects. It entrusted important social and State functions to institutions of an autonomous character, financed by the State, but depending for their right working on the moral authority of their responsible leaders and ultimately on public opinion. This original and far-reaching method of government and administration has not received as much attention as it deserves from students of politics. It was justified by its signal success. The typical example of it is the Committee for the Development of Studies to which reference has repeatedly been made in this work. But other no less remarkable institutions of this kind were also founded by the Constitutional system, such as the *Junta para Ingenieros y Obreros*, a replica of the Committee for the Development of Studies in the field of technical education; the *Instituto Nacional de Previsión*, an organisation entrusted with the study and administration of matters connected with social insurance; the *Junta de Colonización Interior*, in charge of agrarian problems, and, above all, the *Instituto de Reformas Sociales*, founded by a royal decree of 1903, which, though signed by Silvela, was based on a plan made by Canalejas.[1]

[1] The guiding principle of these institutions, i.e., that the men chosen to control them should be selected on grounds of competence and not of political allegiance, was brilliantly vindicated in this case. A Conservative Government chose, as chairman of the Institute, Don Gumersindo de Azcárate, one of the

Some attention has had to be given to this curious side of the Constitutional régime because it is highly significant. Most of the excellent institutions which it created had to come to life, in spite of Parliament, by the somewhat irregular procedure of royal decree legislation. The *Instituto de Reformas Sociales*, blocked in the Senate, was set up by royal decree. This, however, is not a condemnation of the parliamentary system, but rather of the undue weight which the unenlightened elements in the possessing classes were granted under the Constitution. We know that the parliamentary system, as understood by Cánovas and Sagasta, was a comedy; but we know that this comedy was fast becoming a reality in recent years.

Republican leaders, a man universally respected in Spain for his integrity and for the simplicity of his life, and trusted by all for his moderate views. As members of the organising committee two specialists from the University of Oviedo, Professors Buylla and Posada, were selected, despite their radical views, in collaboration with a retired military man, General Marvá, who had made a reputation for himself on industrial affairs. The Institute consisted of a collegiate body and a technical secretariat. The collegiate body was composed of eighteen Government nominees and six employer and six labour representatives, chosen in each case by big industry, small industry, and agriculture, in equal parts, so that each category would be represented by two employers and two men. The Government appointed its eighteen nominees with a statesmanlike regard for all shades of opinion. The very fact that the industrial members were to be elected acted as a powerful stimulus to association both on the employers' and on the men's side. The mandate of the Institute comprised the study of social and industrial conditions (what is known in America as a fact-finding agency), the study and preparation of legislation and the inspection of industrial life. In all these fields the Institute was eminently successful and, until its character and independence were destroyed by the dictatorship, it acted as a powerful element of industrial peace even when thwarted in its intelligent endeavours by the Army, the reactionary employers and the anarchist and syndicalist hotheads of labour.

Strictures against the Constitution miss the main point, i.e., that the political education of the Spanish people was being slowly matured by their having to live their Constitution, and that, though in all likelihood that Constitution would not have been workable in the end, some sort of a parliamentary system in harmony with Spanish character would have been evolved by the natural process of amendment, had the Constitution been respected and loyally applied by those who had sworn to do so and had it not been torn to pieces by the sword paid to defend it.

It is evident, therefore, that, far from being a new factor in the life of Spain, the dictatorship represents the enthronement of the very forces which prevented a better progress under the régime which it came to displace. Though inefficient, corrupt, slow and weak, the old political system was the only constructive, statesmanlike, liberal and objective factor in the country struggling against the two forces—militarism and clericalism—which are now in complete possession of the field. Roads and railways are very fine things, but they should not let us forget the quality of the men and the women who are to use them. The besetting sin of the dictatorship is that it fails to see in its method the glorification of all that stands in the way of a better civilisation for Spain. What is the essence of the Spanish trouble? It is the fanatical love of the Spaniard for personal liberty. But what is the method which the dictatorship brings to bear on this evil of the body politic? Dictatorship, i.e., the unrestricted use of liberty on the part of the Government. Let us point out the profound difference which distinguishes General Primo de Rivera from Signor Mussolini. The *Duce*, a true statesman, i.e., a will led by a mind, sees the importance of the law. He has altered the body of the law to suit his

conception of the State, but he applies the law. The Spanish dictator, a glorified corporal, shouts orders right and left without the slightest regard for the law. In his simple mind, the dictator is the man who orders other people about and the law is a troublesome book good for lawyers and other gossip-mongers to study after he has spoken. There is a story that one day, at the Cabinet Council, the youthful finance minister, Señor Calvo Sotelo, drew the dictator's attention to the fact that a certain appointment which he wanted to make was contrary to the provincial and municipal statute which he, the finance minister had drawn up a few months earlier and published in two imposing volumes. The prime minister turned to him and said: "Now, young man, do you think that I have tossed the Constitution in the air in order to bother about your two nice little pamphlets?" It may be fact or it may be fancy, but this story is true to life. The dictator governs the country with the best of good will, but with a complete lack of any check on his impulses, good or bad, and without the slightest suspicion of the spiritual harm which this disregard for law is producing in a nation of out-and-out individualists. Every day the twenty-two million Spaniards, every one of whom is a potential dictator, and within the sphere of his private and civil life an actual dictator so far as he is able, receive a splendid lesson of indiscipline and unrestrained liberty, in fact, of anarchy, from this super-anarchist at the head of power. This is the greatest harm which the dictator is inflicting on the nation, and it may take years of liberal order to cure it.

This situation, though, up to a point, working for his popularity, is nevertheless weakening and undermining it as well. The dictator was popular when he succeeded in closing up a dismal chapter of Moroccan

history; but he has squandered his popularity in many ways, and particularly by disposing too freely of people's liberties, comforts and even prejudices without seeking the help which a statesman always finds in the dignity of the established law. The Spanish people are, moreover, prevented from admiring the dictator in that dramatic way so typical of them, because they feel that the strict censorship which the Government applies is due to fear. The Government is afraid of public opinion, and the people, whose sense of power is keen, guess it. The censorship is weakening the Government in other ways as well. Adversaries of the dictator and his colleagues are constantly publishing accusations of a serious character against its actions and omissions. These accusations are widely circulated abroad and also in Spain despite the efforts of the police. They are never discussed in the Press. The Government is, as a rule, silent over them. This is derogatory to the moral authority of the Government, particularly as some of the men who are carrying on this relentless campaign enjoy a considerable prestige as austere and fearless Spaniards—for instance, Unamuno.

The dictatorship lasts owing mainly to two sets of reasons. The first is that the Press is gagged, which prevents the grouping of men under the same opinion or tendency. The masses, moreover, without whom it is difficult to organise a revolution, are socialistic, and the Socialist party, for tactical reasons, lies low and prefers to use this respite in order to strengthen its organisation and to consolidate the corporative system. The liberal professions are, in the majority, against the Government but are not numerous enough nor compact enough to fight. The Army is the darkest factor. It is not pleased. It has been deeply disorganised by the measures of the dictatorship and

dislikes the rôle it is made to play. The two or three revolutionary attempts of the period have been made with the co-operation of considerable numbers of officers, and the committees of defence have turned Republican, if one is to believe a clandestine manifesto published in their name in 1929.

The dictatorship has shown evident signs of lassitude of late, and its desire to evolve towards a "normal" situation is obvious. But how is it to be done? Normal conditions mean publicity and justice for the wrongs committed, but there is a crowd of political figures determined to exact responsibilities for all that they and the nation have undergone. In the eyes of this opposition the dictatorship is but a system whereby the king and the prime minister endeavour to evade the reckoning. Three methods have been tried—but all have failed—to bring about a change without publicity or discussion of the past. The first was to attract the politicians back to the Crown. All but a very few, however, have maintained a dignified aloofness. Then the dictator endeavoured to get rid of Press and Parliament by legislation of a constitutional character, whereby Parliament would be transformed into a kind of advisory council and the Press put under severe supervision. By way of accustoming the nation to his ideas, the prime minister set up the National Advisory Assembly described above. But even this mild body seemed at times too wild for him. He entrusted it with the drafting of a Constitution which he would then have adopted by plebiscite. The draft is ready, but, though it puts back the clock by several centuries, the president is so much afraid of it that he keeps adjourning the time when it is to be actually discussed by the Plenary Assembly, and particularly by the Press.

The king, meanwhile, is a prisoner. The experience is a bitter one for a spirited ruler whose ambition, in getting rid of Parliament, had been to rule. Efforts to supplant the dictator failed. The most notable of them was led by General Cavalcanti, who was then the head of the king's military household. This general had profited by General Primo de Rivera's absence in Morocco to weave a political combination in which he tried, without success, to include some of the most respected and popular men of the progressive parties. The dictator heard of it, and with his usual promptness he appeared in Madrid, saw the king, and obtained from him a decree sending General Cavalcanti to study the organisation of the armies of the Balkans. The position of the king has entirely changed. Under the old system he had a piano on which he could play any tune he pleased; now he has nothing but a clarion which, when played on, blares a note of its own. The king has no choice but to remain bound to the dictator whom he chose for himself. The old Spanish song applies with grim humour to his situation :

> Esta si que es calle calle
> Calle de valor y miedo.
> Quiero entrar y no me dejan ;
> Quiero salir y no puedo.[1]

The deadlock is complete and the way it may come to be solved is the secret of time.

Since these chapters were written, General Primo de Rivera has been dismissed by the king. This event only shows that General Primo de Rivera was not a dictator at all, but the mere figure-head

[1] Oh ! what a street, what a street—a street of valour and fear. I want to get in and am not allowed. I want to get out and I can't.

of the system of forces which we have tried to describe. He fell because these forces abandoned him; in fact, because they began to feel uneasy as to the wisdom of prolonging the dictatorship.

The determining factor was the passive resistance of the nation which in the end impressed the forces in question with fear. The Church was afraid lest on the day of reckoning the angry crowds would make straight for convents and monasteries, as precedents led it to anticipate. The "Army," i.e. the officers, deeply dissatisfied and no longer able to bear the odium of a sterile dictatorship, made it obvious to all concerned that in its opinion the time for a change had arrived. Business at last awoke to the gravity of the financial situation, when seeing the peseta quoted at a price it had never touched since the blackest days of the Spanish American War; the king, alarmed at the growth of republican feeling even in quarters till then traditionally safe, began to watch for an opportunity.

The opportunity was afforded him by the very exhaustion of the dictator. A revolt was brewing in a southern garrison. That this revolt was not altogether spontaneous is suspected by some on the ground that the general who was leading it in a republican direction became Under-Secretary of State for War in the Royal Government formed to supersede the dictator. The dictator, irritated at all these ever-recurring movements in the ranks of officers, decided to consult the Army through the regional commanders in a kind of military plebiscite. The king objected and asked him to resign.

On the day the dictator fell there were demonstrations in the main towns. The demonstrators, however, did not mention General Primo de Rivera at all. They shouted: "Down with the king." They knew

perfectly well who was the main power behind the dictator. The new Cabinet was organised in the private house of Don Leopoldo Matos, a Conservative ex-minister and the legal Counsel of the Royal Household. The Prime Minister is General Berenguer, the head of the Military Household; every other figure in it is a well-tried palatine friend.

Their task is extremely hard. It consists in dissociating the king from the dictatorship, i.e. in solving what we have described as the "deadlock." But is this deadlock soluble? The new administration makes the deadlock but clearer. The irrelevancies of the old dictatorship—the figure of the General with his peculiar, picturesque ways of interpreting what government is, and the vexatious or ill-considered measures which weakened his rule—have been eliminated; but the new Government, composed on the whole of well-meaning and capable men, brings out the real issue into sharper relief. Opponents of General Primo de Rivera might object to his bad government but not to the dictatorship as such; opponents of General Berenguer can only object to the fact that, whether he wants it or not, he is a dictator, or, better, he is the new instrument of the king's dictatorship.

General Berenguer has immediately set his government towards the recovery of constitutional rights and practices, and in so far as the preliminary measures thereto did not imply danger, he has even acted to that effect. Thus municipal and provincial councils have been reorganised on a fair basis, and much hardship, both personal and political, caused by the deposed dictator has been removed. But the key position is liberty of political discussion in the press and in public meetings. Here, the new régime has had to walk cautiously. Every concession, how-

ever timid, has shown the country ringing with republican feeling. The reception granted in Salamanca to Don Miguel de Unamuno revealed the extent of the nation's enthusiasm for the Opposition. Sbert, the student exiled by General Primo de Rivera for his leadership of the anti-jesuitic campaign of 1928–29, was acclaimed by thousands on his return to Madrid. All this feeling points to the Royal Palace. Señor Sanchez Guerra, the king's Conservative Prime Minister of old, at last authorised to speak in Madrid, concentrated his attacks on the king and declared that he would never co-operate with him.

In vain does the Government endeavour to screen the king. His Majesty it was that broke through that paper screen when the two heads of the two Houses of Parliament, come to remind the Crown that the calling together of Cortes three months after a dissolution was a duty which the Constitution laid on the king in person were dismissed within five minutes from the Royal presence. The events of the last six years, and even those which preceded them, await a political trial. The Government is in a deadlock. If it advances along the road to liberty, it frees the feeling which demands that trial; if it resists, it falls back on the dictatorship. The deadlock continues.

CHAPTER XXVIII

ON THE EDGE OF THE FUTURE

In its essentials the dictatorship will leave the Spanish situation no better than it found it. The most delicate of all questions, Catalanism, will have been seriously complicated by the shortsighted policy of the prime minister. He deliberately sought the help of Catalanism to rise to power and not a few of the leading spirits of Catalanism committed the moral and political mistake of giving him the help he sought. They forgot that it was not right to enslave Spain, even in order to get their liberty, and that, in any case, liberty cannot come through dictatorship. This they were soon to experience, for no sooner had the dictator settled in Madrid than the militaristic atmosphere which, of course, surrounded him, made him recant his pro-Catalan views. Catalanism was persecuted as anti-patriotic, and the flourishing *Mancomunidad*, which had achieved a good measure of work for Catalan culture and institutions under the old régime, was wound up and dispersed. The evil caused by the dictatorship in Catalonia goes deeper than mere politics. By its petty persecution of innocent manifestations of local life such as language, folklore, dances and even costumes, it has contributed to develop local Catalan consciousness—this, of course, is not likely to frighten a truly enlightened Spaniard—but it has brought home to the countryside the feeling of oppression by the authorities of

Madrid which was always experienced, though not always reasonably, by the political leaders in Barcelona. Fortunately, signs of a welcome evolution are not lacking in these leaders. Catalanism is nowadays conceived by most of them as the right of Catalonia to her own national culture and to such political institutions as are necessary for its development. Most intelligent Castilians would be ready to meet them on this ground so soon as intelligence can have a say in Spanish public life. Matters may be complicated by the existence of other regions with their own claims, but the probable line of evolution will lie in regionalism for Galicia, Vasconia and other regions, and in a kind of ampler home rule for Catalonia. The position of Valencia and the Balearic Islands is a difficulty in so far as these kingdoms do not feel a Catalan patriotism. It seems that, theoretically at any rate, they should be federated within Spain through Catalonia. But then theory has but little weight in politics. A more serious obstacle is the strong centralistic tendency of the king and the Army.

As for world politics, Spain is coming into her own as a nation with universal interests. Of her past activities in Christianising the world Spain has still left a great number of missions abroad. There are active Spanish missions in China (Ngnanwey, Fukien North and Fukien South, North Hunan, North Shensi); in Japan (Formosa and Shikorzu); Indo-China (three extensive districts); India (Bombay, Cuttak and Veratty); the Holy Land, Bolivia, Nicaragua, Colombia, Peru, Honduras, Trinidad, the Caroline Islands, Australia (two missions), the Mariana Islands and the Philippine Islands, as well as the missions in Spanish-African territories. The Spanish Church contributed in the past to the universality of Spain in another somewhat unexpected

way by expelling the Jews. Although the decree of expulsion dates from 1492, the Spanish Jews have remained faithful to their language wherever they have settled. There are Spanish Jewish communities practically everywhere in the world—in all the big capitals of Europe, in Salonika, Constantinople, Roumania, Bulgaria, Asia Minor, Morocco, the United States and Spanish America. Everywhere they constitute centres of Judæo-Spanish life, and in recent years they have been the object of attentive study on the part of Spanish scholars attracted by the philological and historical possibilities of these centres of Spanish tradition. A rich harvest of old Spanish ballads has been garnered in Jewish colonies abroad. A well-known Spanish senator, one of their race, Dr. Pulido, has made himself the advocate of a policy of repatriation of the Jews, and, as the anti-semitic prejudice is nearly non-existent in contemporary Spain, many have returned.

But, of course, the most solid basis of the universality of Spain is to be found in the persistence and power of her language and civilisation in the lands which were once hers. The feeling of co-operation and cordiality with the Spanish-American nations has made immense progress in recent years. All the nations of Spanish-America have come round to communion with the old Spain whence they sprang. A number of associations have been created on this basis: *Unión Ibero-Americana* (Madrid), *Casa de América* (Barcelona), *Museo Comercial e Industrial Hispano-Americano* and *Centro de Unión Ibero-Americana* (Bilbao), *Centro de Cultura Hispano-Americano* (Madrid). Emigration to Spanish-America increased after the Cuban War. Capital also emigrated there in growing quantities (it was estimated at 100,000,000 pesetas annually before the

war and the figure is certainly higher nowadays). A Spanish-American Postal Congress, held in Madrid in 1920, established the principle that the whole Spanish-American world is one postal territory. The Infanta Isabel paid an official visit to the Argentine in 1910 and the Infante Don Fernando visited Chile and Peru at the head of a Spanish mission in 1920. On the initiative of the Spanish colonies in Buenos Aires, Mexico, Havana, Santo Domingo, and other places, yearly visits by Spanish men of letters and sciences take place, and Spanish professors are invited for long periods to overseas universities. Spanish culture is also represented in the American continent by a continuous collaboration of men of letters in the Spanish-American Press and by the tours which Spanish theatrical companies organise in America. Spanish books have, of course, a wide sale in the Spanish-American world, and there is a large number of Spanish-American books published in Spain. Business is not forgotten, as shown by the two congresses of Spanish-American trade which took place in 1923 and 1929.

This network of relations is being woven entirely free from political entanglements, from power-seeking, oppression, or aggressive aims of any kind, either individual or collective. Spain as an empire-builder has retired from business. She has attained the ripe age when the peaceful relations of commerce (both material and spiritual) wholly satisfy her ambitions. In this attitude she finds herself in complete agreement with all the Spanish nations beyond the seas. If proof be needed of this essentially peaceful tendency of Spanish-Americanism it will be found in the fact that, while a certain definite tendency to elbow out Spain may be felt in the Pan-American movement led by Washington, Spain never

fails to invite the United States of America to all Spanish-American gatherings, even when there is no real ground for such an invitation, as, for instance, when the meeting takes place on a strict basis of race and language. The United States of America were invited to the Spanish Postal Congress as well as to the Spanish-American Exhibition of Seville (1929), in which they were the only nation outside the Ibero-American family. The explanation for this is quite simple. Spain does not seek any political advantage in drawing Spanish-American nations closer to her. She merely wants to preserve the essentials of her civilisation and language in the soil in which she planted them. While by no stretch of imagination can this attitude be represented as aggressive, it does lay on Spain an international responsibility of a world character. But it is evident that Spain can only fulfil the duties arising out of this responsibility in an atmosphere of world peace and order.

A similar conclusion may be drawn from an examination of the other important element in her foreign policy. Spain as a universally minded nation, having passed her stage of world ambition, found in the League of Nations a true medium for her activities. From the first the League Council, Assembly and Secretariat were able to appreciate the combination of world experience and political detachment which Spaniards brought to the problems discussed in Geneva. The Spanish Government was perhaps unwise in its endeavours to obtain a permanent seat in the Council against the opposition of the majority of the Assembly, but it does not follow that this majority was right. There are two points which have been obscured in the cloud of arguments and passions which raged then in the

public opinion of the world.[1] The first is that Spain was quite content with the old system of yearly elections. She was invariably elected every year. True, this re-election proved irritating to many, but it was after all the numerical manifestation of her universality. If Great Britain can always count on the six votes of her Dominions, why should not Spain be allowed to count on the twelve votes of her free sisters beyond the sea? The trouble did not come from Spain at all, but from Belgium, who did not want to cease to belong to the Council by an explicit vote and preferred to leave automatically under a new rule prohibiting re-election.[2] Spain then was justified in complaining that the conditions under which she had joined the League were fundamentally changed and to request that, in exchange for her safe re-election every year, she should receive a permanent seat in the Council. The second point, which is generally overlooked, is that the nations which opposed her re-election on the ground that permanent seats should be reserved for the Great Powers took a materialistic (and in fact a militaristic)

[1] It is an interesting observation to make that, in the split which occurred then, all the Protestant nations were united against Spain. I do not believe that this was due to any conscious alliance on a religious basis. The more reasonable explanation is that this grouping of Protestant forces was but a late offshoot of a mental attitude which has been driven into the European subconsciousness, but in which there still live the feelings engendered by the religious wars of the sixteenth century.

[2] As it happened, Belgium had her way in obtaining a rule prohibiting re-election, but did not escape her fate. Having asked, under another rule adopted at the same time, to be granted re-eligibility by a special vote of the Assembly, the Assembly refused, and Belgium had to leave the Council on an explicit vote to avoid which she had insisted on a reform which had endangered the very existence of the League of Nations. It should be added that Belgium took her defeat nobly and, thereby, turned it into a moral victory.

view of what a Great Power is. Morally and spiritually speaking, Spain *is* a Great Power, i.e., a Power with universal interests—or are petrol and coal to count more than language and civilisation? To give but one example: the United States of America are interested in Nicaragua because it is a good place for a canal; Spain because Nicaragua is the fatherland of Rubén Darío, one of the greatest poets in the Spanish language. Lord Cecil—Lord Cecil of all people—argued in the Council Reform Commission that permanent seats should be reserved for Powers whose armaments were sufficient to uphold the Covenant in case of crisis. The small leading nations, Holland and Sweden in particular, strenuously opposed the claims of Spain, though equally strenuously they backed the claims of Germany. These two facts show that the world's idea of a Great Power is purely materialistic—economic and military. But Spain is a universal nation for all that, and as such entitled to a permanent seat as long as permanent seats exist at all in the Council. So much for the point of view of Spain herself. But, from the point of view of the Council and of the League, it was important to secure for the Council—on a footing of independence and equality with the powerful—the collaboration of a nation which, though by tradition and history aware of imperial problems, is now completely converted to peace, order and disarmament—the nation, therefore, best qualified to act as the honest broker between the big and the small.

The only other international question of importance is, of course, the matter of the Straits. The question of a friendly rearrangement which would remove the sore spot of Gibraltar from Anglo-Spanish

relations has often been discussed in England.[1] This question was not, perhaps, fully ripe for consideration before the war. It is maturing. Two sets of events may simplify it in the near future: the first is the construction of a tunnel between the Spanish and the African coasts, preliminary work for which has already begun. This tunnel, if successful, will revolutionise the economic and strategic value of the Straits. The Spanish Government have put the matter in efficient and active hands. If, and when built, the tunnel would be a considerable Spanish

[1] Mr. Frederic Harrison devoted a long letter to it in the *Manchester Guardian* (August 27th, 1917). He pointed out that, "For the two hundred years that we have held the town we have made it a resort of smugglers, gipsies, vagabonds, African rogues, Spanish rebels—a *sentina gentium*. As a systematic emporium of the smuggling of Spanish products into Britain, of British goods into Spain, for generations Gibraltar was notorious. This is now less general, but some forty years ago my own brother was captured by a sort of piratical smuggling craft, and was an unwilling witness of a vast system of organised thievery." Mr. Frederic Harrison added that from the military point of view Gibraltar had lost much of its importance since the invention of the long-range gun, and that, "For sixty years now an organised group of British publicists have urged, and they still do urge, their countrymen to see that our retention of a Spanish city and fortress is an indelible blot on the honesty of our boasted "respect for nationalities," our horror of "Imperialist domination." Sir Harry Johnstone argued very much to the same effect in the *Daily Chronicle* in the month of May of the same year. John Bright had already said in a speech in Birmingham: "England took possession of the Rock when she was not expressly at war with Spain, and she retains it against all moral codes." Captain F. P. Warren, R.N., published in 1802 a pamphlet under the title *Is Gibraltar worth keeping?*—a question which he answered thus: "If a really secure and equally well-placed harbour for our purposes can be obtained, then let us give up Gibraltar, if not because our finer feelings prompt us to do it, at least, because we can better ourselves, and with this view consider Ceuta."

asset for negotiations with Paris and London on the question of the Straits and Morocco. Colonel Jenevois, the promoter of the scheme, suggests that England might find it to her advantage to negotiate the exchange of Gibraltar for a better base, possibly Alboran Island and the Chafarinas. But the question of the Straits may also become easier as the policy of international co-operation in naval disarmament evolves towards its natural solution, i.e., the complete neutralisation of the seas and the disarmament of all narrow passages without exception.

It will be seen, therefore, that in whichever direction of the compass Spanish interests in foreign affairs are considered, they will be found to agree with the best interests of the world, and that, therefore, the development of the League of Nations should be a fundamental principle in Spanish foreign policy. This conclusion is in agreement with the natural inclination of the country, as was shown even in the period of highest imperial activity, when Spanish jurists evolved the first clear school of internationally-minded lawyers in the modern world.

Home affairs are, unfortunately, much more complicated and, possibly, much less peaceful. Reduced to its essentials, we have already defined the problem of Spanish politics as that of adapting the national psychology to the conditions prevailing in the modern world. This task can only be performed in peace and continuity; but it also demands liberty. Now the trouble comes from the fact that the institutions in charge of peace do not seem able to respect liberty. There is then a kind of preliminary problem to be solved : how to secure the liberty of the country from the attacks of the Army and the Church.

No dogmatic answer to that question can be given.

All we can do is to outline a certain number of features of present-day Spain which may help us to guess the probable trend of events. The Spanish people is gradually being caught by the turmoil of activity which agitates the world outside, and business seems at last to be influencing its character. How deeply? No one can say. But this over-subjective race is being gradually enmeshed by the network of actions and relations which objective life weaves round individuals, and an evolution of this kind may have far-reaching political effects. Furthermore, a certain number of inventions are transforming the spiritual outlook of the nation in a degree which it is difficult to estimate. The spartan, simple Castilian peasant is receiving the direct impact of Western and even Middle-Western civilisation through the films, and who can say how deeply and in what direction the sight of glittering luxury in fast-living mortals is going to work on his character? Films, radios and cars are more powerful ferments than books and newspapers for a race which lives life at first hand and not in the canned form in which it comes to us in books. The Spanish people is a keen consumer of films, radio sets and motor-cars. It is too soon to form an opinion as to the spiritual results of such an influence.

An important change is also taking place as regards women. Spain is supposed to be a country in which women are unimportant and down-trodden human beings. This is, of course, an opinion only to be found in men without first-hand experience on the matter. Marriage with Spanish women has made many a conversion. History goes far to show that Spanish women are unusually energetic beings. The pages of political history are full of Spanish queens and princesses, and it is a significant fact that Spanish

kings never hesitated to entrust women with political duties. Queen Isabel gave Katharine of Aragon ambassadorial powers; Blanche of Castile was a great ruler as well as the mother of a king who rose to be a saint; the ballads have immortalised Doña Urraca, the daughter of Ferdinand I, as a dangerous princess to have for an enemy; Queen Joan was mad, but no ordinary person when lucid; Princess Joan, Philip II's sister, and mother of the king Don Sebastian of Portugal, was an able regent while her brother lived out of Spain, so eager for power that she sought to cumulate the regency of Portugal under the minority of her son, and only gave up her ambition on the insistence of Charles V that the regency should be assumed by his (the emperor's) sister Katharine; in modern times Spain was governed by women for more than forty per cent. of the nineteenth century, and though for at least one-half of this time their rule was deplorable, it was the women who ruled. Nor is the matter merely one of queens and princesses. In the lesser ranks of history women were just as conspicuous for their energy and activity. The wife of El Cid, holding Valencia against the Moors after his death; the mother of the Marqués de Santillana, fighting single-handed for her son's estates with sagacious tenacity; the widow of Padilla, holding Toledo against the troops of the emperor after her husband had died on the scaffold; Santa Teresa, reforming the Church in open war against pope's envoys and ecclesiastical red tape; Agustina de Aragón, defending Saragossa against the French in order to avenge her dead lover, are but a handful of examples taken from a long and constant tradition of feminine energy. Literature and learning witness to the same vitality in feminine Spain as Santa Teresa herself shows. Beatriz Galindo (la Latina), the Latin tutor of Queen

Isabel, was not an exception, but one in a crowd of learned women of the end of the fifteenth and the beginning of the sixteenth centuries. Later, learned women abound in Spain, and books written by them are numerous and received with the assent and satisfaction of the age. Philip II's court was enlightened by the literary academies held by his two daughters, Katharine and Isabel Clara. In more recent years the history of Spanish letters is full of feminine names, chief amongst them Doña Emilia Pardo Bazán, the novelist, who holds, perhaps, the distinction of being the first woman to occupy a chair in a university, for she was professor of comparative literature in Madrid till her death in 1921, and Rosalía Castro, one of the greatest poets of Spain. The power of Spanish women is reflected in the literature of the country. From the dawn of letters till the present day the favourite type of Spanish novelists and dramatists is that of the dominant woman, full of vigour and enterprise, who knows what she wants and gets it. The type is no literary fiction. It is true to life.

The mass of Spanish women choose to stay at home and either accumulate their energies or spend them in the rearing of families of anything from five to fourteen children. This leads shallow observers to the opinion that there is nothing in them, forgetting that the water of a well shines less than that of a pool, but is, perhaps, better for drinking. For good or ill, however, the immense reservoir of Spanish feminine energy is now beginning to flow out of this apparent immobility. Secondary and university education are spreading, mostly under the pressure of economic conditions. Thirty years ago the number of women in Spanish universities could be counted in tens. The figure is now estimated to be about four thousand. Here again we can but pause and wonder. Where is

the change taking Spain? We cannot say. But the change is, no doubt, destined to be profound.

Finally, Spain is now in a period of high intellectual productivity. Her literature is richer than it has been since the Golden Century. Poems, novels, essays, the theatre are flourishing, and at the same time a strong movement is turning the attention of the nation back to the classics of the sixteenth century without in any way impairing the originality of the new men. Valera is no longer the only Spaniard read abroad. Though the great genius of Galdós is not yet recognised, Blasco Ibáñez has put the name of Spain before the multitude, and Unamuno has conquered the more thoughtful, Valle-Inclán and Azorín the more sensitive to poetry and artistry in words, Ortega y Gasset the philosophic mind of Germany, Benavente and the brothers Quintero the theatre-goers. Music is also better cultivated than ever since the days of the great Spanish masters of old, and Albéniz, Granados, Falla are familiar names, while Spanish music is influencing more and more that of foreign composers. In the plastic arts Spain maintains her pre-eminence. She has given in Zuloaga and Picasso two of the greatest names of contemporary painting. Sculpture is equally strong. A similar vigour is to be observed in the philosophical, mathematical, physical and biological sciences and in engineering. Popular arts of all kinds—always a strong point in Spain—still witness to the wonderful creative genius of the race.

The future depends on vitality and on the capacity to canalise it—which, in its turn, of course, is a part of vitality and depends on it. There is no question that the vitality of the Spanish people is now rising. Precisely because her gifts are not of the kind which make for collective and political success in an age

like ours, the fact may be obscured that Spain is far stronger and more creative in her life than in her politics and that she counts, and always will count, far more as a people than as a nation and as a nation than as a State.

On the eve of profound political transformations the Spanish people find themselves still with the constitutional problem unsolved. This problem—the building up of a State in harmony with the national character—is one with which many a nation is struggling to-day. The Spanish difficulty, handed down from the nineteenth century, meets, in the twentieth, a general difficulty born of the scepticism against which democratic ideas are contending to-day. Spain was once a disciplined and united nation because she lived in an age of which she was the prototype—the age of the State-Church. She is now undisciplined and disorganised because the notion of the State—business-firm does not suffice to inspire her sons to give up their cherished liberty. In a sense, therefore, the future of Spain depends also on the future of world ideas. Are we to remain in the present economic stage? Are we to transcend it and rise to higher forms of life? Spain will be an entirely different country according to the answer which time reserves to this question. " It is quite certain," says Count Keyserling, " that the essential substance of Spain can embody itself in the form of modern conditions. It will do this beyond a doubt. But this process, if it runs its course undisturbed, will take place as a differentiation and a shaping of what is eternally the same, and *not* as a changing of form. It has always been the same Spaniard : the Spaniard who, in primeval times, created the glorious rock monuments; who, as Roman emperor, more than once ruled the world; who conquered the New World;

who painted the great portraits; who fought for the faith; and who once more to-day, through the lips of Miguel de Unamuno, proclaims with magnificent bias the gospel of tragedy and of agony. And when we bear in mind that very few peoples have passed through so many racial changes as that of the Iberian peninsula, we are compelled to ask ourselves: Is not change everywhere, in the last analysis, something external? Is not all substance, in the last analysis, eternally the same? It is, above all, as a model of essential substance that Spain means something to a Europe which takes such delight in change. In any case it is only as substance become reality that Spain has a European future of a new kind. Not for nothing did the new rise of Spain—for she is incontrovertibly on the rise again—begin with the close of the age of progress. Thus may she, as essence, for ever remain what she has always been."

NOTES ON SOURCES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

Chapter I

I have drawn chiefly from the excellent work of J. Dantín Cereceda: *Ensayo acerca de las Regiones Naturales de España*, Tomo I, Madrid, 1922, the cover of which carries the proudly Spanish sentence, "NO SE VENDE."

Other works on this subject which may be consulted are:—

Lucas Mallada: *Explicación del Mapa Geológico de España*, 7 vols., 1895–1911.

E. H. del Villar: *Archivo Geográfico de la Península Ibérica*, Barcelona, 1916.

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In English, the best study available is that in the article "Spain," of the *Encyclopædia Britannica*. On the landscape, no reader knowing Spanish should miss the admirable description of Castile given by Unamuno in *En Torno al Casticismo*, of which a French translation appeared in 1922, under the title *l'Essence de l'Espagne* (Plon, Paris).

Chapter II

As for the origins of the Spanish people, the choice is wider than the knowledge which it brings. The more modern works are:—

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T. D. Aranzadi: *Antropología de España*, Barcelona, 1915.

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Altamira : *Psicología del Pueblo Español*, Barcelona, 1917.
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The views expressed in this chapter are, of course, identical with those of my other works, *The Genius of Spain*, Oxford, 1923, and *Englishmen—Frenchmen—Spaniards*, Oxford, 1928.

Mr. J. B. Trend's book, *A Picture of Modern Spain*, London, 1921, is excellent from the point of view of land, people and events. *See also* :—

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Chapters III–V

On the Spanish Empire the facts are well known. All that is wanted is perspective and interpretation. I have expressed my own views, much strengthened and confirmed by the two works of Professor Fernando de los Ríos mentioned in the preface. On Vitoria and his doctrines, *see* Vitoria : *De Indis et de Ivre Belli Relectiones*, published by the Carnegie Institution of Washington, 1917. There is also a useful treatise on Vitoria published in French by Professor Barcia Trelles, being a course of lectures at the Hague Institute of International Law.

On Spanish colonisation :—

From the well-meaning but passionate Las Casas, and by the well-known process of copying and enlarging errors to which we owe so much history, the legend of Spanish colonisation as a short-lived and dismal failure has thriven. It flourishes even in works as modern as Cunningham's *An Essay on Western Civilisation in its Economic Aspects, Mediæval and Modern Times*, Cambridge, 1910, and Lord Bryce's *South America*, 1912. In his *Outline of History*, Mr. Wells deals with the whole history of the Spanish Empire, discovery, exploration and colonisation, in a few paragraphs in which there is less room for facts than for errors. Leaving aside works by older Spanish writers which, though fairly reliable, are still too much influenced by the polemical atmosphere of Las Casas, the first scientific and dispassionate outlook is to be found in Alexander von Humboldt : *Voyage aux Régions Equinoxiales du Nouveau Continent*, published

in 1809 as the result of first-hand observation, much wanted in the matter. There is an English edition, published in 1811. *See also* by the same author, *Essai Politique sur le Royaume de la Nouvelle Espagne*, Paris, 1827. In English there is a curious book, *Notes on Mexico made in the Autumn of 1822*, by an American citizen, J. R. Poinsett, member of Congress. He follows Humboldt, but adds his own shrewd observations. In more modern times L. S. Fisher: *Vice-regal Administration in the Spanish-American Colonies*, 1926; Bourne: *Spain in America*, New York, 1904.

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Chapter VI

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De la Revolución a la Restauración, by the Marqués de Lema, Madrid.

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PART II

Chapter VII

On Don Francisco Giner, *see* an article in *The Genius of Spain*, Oxford, 1923, and a monograph, *Mi Don Francisco Giner*, by J. Pijoan, San José de Costa Rica, 1927.

On education in Spain, *see* two articles in the Spanish Supplement of *The Times*, August 10th, 1926, also L. Luzuriaga, *Documentos para la Historia Escolar de España*, Madrid, 1916.

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Manuel B. Cossío: *L'Enseignement en Espagne*, Madrid, 1908.

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Chapter VIII

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Angel Ganivet: *Idearium Español*, 1896.

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Chapter IX

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Chapter X

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Luis Olariaga: *El problema ferroviario en España*.
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PART III.

Chapter XI

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Soldevilla : *El Año Político*, Madrid yearly.
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Chapter XII

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Chapter XIV

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J. Girón y Arcas : *La situación jurídica de la Iglesia Católica*, 1905.

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Chapter XV

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Chapters XVI, XVII, XVIII

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Quotations from Señor Rovira y Virgili are from his book, *El Nacionalismo Catalan,* Barcelona.

Other good documents are :—

E. Prat de la Riba : *Nacionalisme,* Barcelona, 1918.

L. Nicolau d'Olwer : *Resum de Literatura Catalana,* Barcelona, 1927.

Francisco Curet : *El arte dramático en el resurgir de Cataluña,* Barcelona ; *La Mancomunidad de Cataluña,* Barcelona, 1922.

A. Royo Villanova : *El Problema Catalan,* 1908.

F. Cambó : *Actuació Regionalista,* Barcelona, 1915.

Georges Dwelshauvers : *La Catalogue et le Probleme Catalan,* Paris, 1926, unfortunately written, though by a Frenchman, from the point of view of the rash Catalan nationalist.

The best, most concise and complete treatment of the subject is to be found in a book as yet unpublished, written by an eminent leader of the Catalan Movement, Don Francisco Cambó. The paragraph quoted on page 261 belongs to this book.

There are valuable opinions of contemporary Catalan writers in the following books :—

J. Pijoan : *Mi Don Francisco Giner,* San José de Costa Rica, 1927.

J. Estelrich : *La Qüestió de les Minories Nacionals,* Barcelona, 1929.

On Galicia :—

V. García Martí : *Una Punta de Europa,* Madrid, no date (published 1928).

Chapter XIX

The bibliography for this chapter will be found in the chapter itself, where a number of books bearing on the matter are quoted.

The concluding paragraphs are quoted from *Idearium Español* by Ganivet.

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J. A. de Sangróniz : *Marruecos*, Madrid, 1921.
Conde de la Mortera : *La cuestion de Marruecos*, Madrid, 1905.
Angel Marvaud : *L'Espagne au XX^ième Siècle*, Paris, 1915.
André Tardieu : *La Conférence d'Algeciras*, Paris, 1907.
Gonzalo de Reparaz : *Política Española en Africa*, Barcelona, 1907.
Mariano Gómez González : *La penetración en Marruecos*, 1909.

Chapter XXI

R. M. de Labra : *La orientación internacional de España*, Madrid, 1910.
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R. Cuneo-Vidal : *España. Impresiones de un Sudamericano.*
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An admirable statement of Spanish enlightened opinion on Spanish Americanism will be found in :—

José Pla : *La Misión internacional de la raza Hispánica*, Madrid, 1929.

Chapter XXII

R. M. de Labra : *La orientación internacional de España*, Madrid, 1910.
Marqués de Villaurrutia : *Relaciones entre España e Inglaterra durante la Guerra de la Independencia.*
A. Mousset : *La política exterior de España*, 1873–1918, Madrid, 1918.
F. de Leon y Castillo : *Mis Tiempos*, 1921.
R. Pinon : *L'Empire de la Méditerranée*, Paris, 1912.
J. Navarrete : *Las Llaves del Estrecho*, Madrid, 1881.
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Article in *The Times*, Friday, October 25th, 1929. The closing paragraphs are quoted from *Idearium Español* by Ganivet.

PART IV

THE general books quoted at the head of the notes for Part III are indispensable here also.

CHAPTER XXIII

Salvador Canals : *Los sucesos de España de 1909*, Madrid, 1910.

J. Francos Rodríguez : *La vida de Canalejas*, Madrid, 1918.

CHAPTER XXIV

J. B. Trend : *A Picture of Modern Spain.*

A. Alcalá Galiano : *España ante el conflicto europeo*, Madrid, 1916.

A curious discussion on the political tendencies of the 1917 crisis, with some documents bearing on the period, will be found in *España en pie, por Un Diputado a Cortes*, published without date in Barcelona, Antonio López, Librero.

CHAPTER XXV

THE following work is a first-rate document for the study of this period :—

Manuel de Burgos y Mazo : *El verano de 1919 en Gobernación*, Cuenca, 1921.

The following books bear on the set-back of 1921 in Morocco :—

A. Vivero : *El Derrumbamiento*, Madrid, 1922.

Dámaso Berenguer : *Campañas en el Rif*, 1923. (The High Commissioner and Commander-in-Chief's own story.)

V. Ruiz Albéniz : *Las Responsabilidades del Desastre*, 1922.

CHAPTER XXVI

The book *España Encadenada*, Paris, 1925, by Eduardo Ortega y Gasset, is strongly partisan, by an exile. The collection *Hojas Libres*, published by Señor Ortega y Gasset on French territory is also full of information. It must be handled with caution owing to the same partisan character which animates it. *Conde de La Mortera. Bosquejo Historico de la Dictadura, Madrid*, 1930, is written with severity from a conservative point of view.

On the work of the Ministry of Labour :—

D. Victor González de Echávarri y Castañeda : *El Régimen Paritario*, Barcelona, 1927.

Eduardo Aunós Pérez : *La Organización Corporativa del Trabajo*, Barcelona (without date).

Chapter XXVII

The general bibliography of Parts III and IV.

Chapter XXVIII

For each of the subjects discussed in this chapter, *see* bibliography under the corresponding chapters of Part III. The closing paragraphs will be found in Count Keyserling's essay on Spain in his *Europe*.

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